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Abstract 
The Commonwealth government’s domination of federal structures, systems and processes 
raises questions about the federal system’s capacity to respond to Australia’s immediate and 
long-term policy issues.  This research is predicated on the proposition that the effectiveness 
of federal structures and processes depends on the capacity of officials to find ways around 
political constraints and deliver outcomes despite the constraints imposed by political, 
jurisdictional and organisational interests.   
However, we know little about how the bureaucracy manages the balance between the 
continuity necessary for systemic stability while building a capacity for change.  Accordingly, 
this research addresses the question of how the practice of intergovernmental management by 
Commonwealth and state government officials affects continuity and change in the Australian 
federal system.   
The conceptual framework for the research is provided by federal dynamics theory, which 
contributes a new perspective to the study of intergovernmental management by focusing on 
the way federal structures and ideas combine and interact to inform the strategies adopted by 
intergovernmental managers.   
The empirical data is derived from a series of elite interviews across Commonwealth and state 
central and line departments and agencies. The interview data reveals how intergovernmental 
management is practised in the federation’s formal and informal settings and processes.   
The data shows that, in their pursuit of systemic change and resilience, officials consciously 
balance their ministers’ and jurisdictions’ specific positions and interests with a depoliticised 
commitment to making the system work despite the politics.  The data shows how these 
separate perspectives jointly inform their work in committees, working groups and networks.  
For example, officials responded to the abolition of a number of ministerial councils in 2013 
by developing informal networks that contributed to systemic change and resilience in the 
relevant policy areas.   
The thesis argues that the strategies and motivation that go into such network building, and the 
other tasks of intergovernmental management detailed in the findings, suggest a new set of 
ideational factors is needed to understand the bureaucracy’s role.  Accordingly, the research 
contributes the concept of ‘practice modes’ to the study of federal dynamics, to explain the link 
 vi 
between federalism’s institutional and ideational layers.  These are characteristic and 
contextually set ways in which officials work with colleagues in their own and other 
jurisdictions, drawing on formal and informal structures and processes to produce ideas and 
values that legitimate and frame their approach.  Officials apply these values and ideas to 
particular policy issues, using and sometimes pushing back against the political and structural 
constraints they face.  In doing so, intergovernmental managers make an important contribution 
to the stability and resilience of Australia’s federal system, and its capacity for innovation and 
change.   
These findings challenge conventional thinking about intergovernmental management on a 
number of fronts.  First, instead of the tendency to infer the bureaucracy’s interests and motives 
from the constitutional, legal and political structures and processes that constrain them, the 
research demonstrates that officials play an active role as rule makers, breakers, shapers and 
keepers.  Second, this research challenges the assumption that executive federalism and vertical 
fiscal imbalance close down the options and opportunities for change available to federal 
reformers.  Finally, the research shows that the demands of complex policy challenges, and the 
need to apply technical expertise to processes of national harmonisation and coordination, have 
generated a diversity of views, interests and strategies that caution against simplistic ‘central 
versus line department,’ or ‘states versus Commonwealth’ bifurcations. 
Federal dynamics theory generally looks to constitutional frameworks to balance continuity 
and change.  However, this research also shows that a focus on the interaction between actors, 
institutions and ideas has great relevance for intergovernmental management and its policy 
functions.  The research demonstrates that the role played by the bureaucracy contributes to 
the federal system’s resilience and capacity, through the exercise of personal agency in support 
of ministerial and jurisdictional policies and interests, on the one hand, and stewardship over 
the federal system on the other.  In this view, the federal bureaucracy is not just a utility for the 
implementation of decisions but part of the animating spirit of the federation itself. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The rights of self-government of the States have been fondly supposed to be safeguarded by the 
Constitution.  It left them legally free, but financially bound to the chariot wheels of the Central 
Government. 
(Alfred Deakin, letter of 1 April 1902) 
It is human beings clothed with office who are the real determiners of what the relations 
between units of governments will be. Consequently the concept of intergovernmental relations 
necessarily has to be formulated largely in terms of human relations and human behaviors. 
(Anderson, W (1960), Intergovernmental Relations in Review, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, p 4) 
Writing as the anonymous London correspondent for the Morning Post, barely a year after 
federation, Deakin predicted that the state governments would be unable to agree on matters of 
policy, nor would they overcome their dependence for revenue on the very customs powers 
they had ceded to the Commonwealth.  As a result, he concluded, ‘Power has departed from 
them, and they are just discovering the fact…the independence of our States is doomed’ (La 
Nauze 1952, p. 242).  
In view of the Murray-Darling river system’s salience as a policy issue today, it is ironic that 
one of the areas on which the states could not agree was over the management of water 
resources.  Such contention prompted Deakin’s famous prediction about the ascendancy of the 
national Commonwealth government which provides the epigraph and title for this dissertation.    
Although the Commonwealth’s assumption of control over taxation and a range of state 
government revenues was yet to come, the degree to which such centralisation has evolved 
continues to prompt questions and concerns today.  ‘The current balance within the 
Federation—with the Commonwealth involved in seemingly every policy area—is out of 
kilter’ warned the Federation Green Paper (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
2015, p. 3).  The Productivity Commission similarly concluded shortly thereafter that ‘the high 
level of States’ financial reliance on the Commonwealth has long raised concerns about 
autonomy and accountability for decisions’ (Productivity Commission 2017, p.2).  The ‘steady 
shift of roles and responsibilities from the states to the Commonwealth…has led to confusion 
about who is responsible for what, as well as duplication of effort, and substantial increases in 
the size of the federal bureaucracy’ wrote one ex-state premier (Brumby and Galligan 2015, p. 
Introduction  
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84); ‘the Federation as it now exists is dysfunctional’ wrote another, describing ‘a one-way 
slide towards dysfunctionality for the last 75 years’ (Greiner et al. 2014, p. 5). 
The Reform of the Federation review, announced by the Abbott Government in 2014, aimed 
to ‘relaunch the [Australian] federation’ by delivering ‘a more rational system of government’ 
(Abbott 2014).  The review ostensibly responded to a mood for change among the Australian 
public. The Australian Constitutional Values Survey 2014 reported on the public’s attitudes 
toward the federal system, with over one third of respondents (36 per cent) feeling that ‘the 
current system of government, with three main levels, does not work well’, while another 36 
per cent felt that the current system, with three main levels, works well but does not deliver 
legislative diversity, innovation, or collaboration well (Brown 2014, p.5). 
By 2016, however, the White Paper review process was abandoned, and the prospects for 
systemic, significant reform of the Australian federal system now appear remote.   
Absent such reform, the Commonwealth’s purported domination of federal structures, systems 
and processes raises questions about the federal system’s capacity to respond to Australia’s 
immediate and long-term challenges and to deliver tangible outcomes such as those enumerated 
in Twomey and Withers’ paper for the Council for the Australian Federation (2007). To the 
extent such centralisation ‘threatens to hollow out the very substance of federalism’ (Braun 
2011, p. 36), such questions must also include the impact centralisation has on the quality of 
Australia’s democracy itself (Hollander & Patapan 2018; Galligan 1995).   
At the same time, Galligan noted that the processes for reforming Australian federalism ‘are 
more varied and complex than is often assumed in essentialist notions of reform discourse that 
tend to view federalism as a static institutional or conceptual construct’ (2008, p. 619).   
Accordingly, my research objective is to understand the nature and sources of change in 
Australian federalism, and whether change — however incremental — can occur despite 
systemic centralisation or even because of it. 
1.1 Research scope: continuity and change in Australian 
intergovernmental management 
Intergovernmental cooperation, or the lack of it, forms part of the spectacle and theatre of the 
political dimension of Australian federalism.  However, there is also a substantively separate, 
if interlinked, system in which officials work on the design and implementation of policies and 
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directions set in the political domain.  I will argue that this bureaucratic domain, which I refer 
to as ‘intergovernmental management’ as distinct from ‘intergovernmental relations’ (I discuss 
these concepts in more detail in Chapter 2.1.1) warrants study in its own right, as it interacts 
with and supports or hinders the achievement of objectives and expectations held by politicians 
and the community.   
I have harnessed Deakin’s metaphorical chariot to think about whether, despite our federation’s 
fiscal rigidities and the slowness of major change, there may be at least some capacity for 
achieving better outcomes from the practice of intergovernmental management by the officials 
who work with one another across the jurisdictional divide.  While the federation’s ‘chariot’ 
rolls on with only the occasional deviation on the road to Commonwealth dominance, this 
dissertation investigates whether there may be more to the system than meets the eye, at least 
in its potential capabilities. 
A focus on the public administration of the federation enables us to look behind the politics of 
the Australian federation, such as perennial arguments over fiscal federalism and funding 
inadequacies or the regular spectacle of Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meetings. 
The administrative structures, processes and cultures of the bureaucracy are separate from the 
adversarial dynamics in the political domain, and consequently bring a different set of 
dynamics forward for consideration: practices of cooperation and trust, or their absence; the 
conduct of difficult and complex negotiations over divergent policies and interests; networks 
for data gathering and policy analysis and transfer; communities of practice in regulation and 
harmonisation; and, as a result of the foregoing, long periods in which the hum of work from 
intergovernmental councils, committees and meetings is only occasionally drowned out by the 
discordant clatter of spats between federal and state politicians.  Understanding this 
administrative domain is ‘like lifting a veil over the formal constitutional framework and the 
official narrative of a federation…(to) reveal surprising and under-reported scenarios’ (Poirier 
& Saunders 2015, p. 495).  
Accordingly, my primary research question is: 
How does the practice of intergovernmental management affect continuity and change in the 
Australian federal system?  
More generally, to explore this central question, I ask: What do officials do as 
intergovernmental managers?  Why and how do they do it?  Under what conditions?  With 
Introduction  
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what results?  How does the practice of intergovernmental management respond to and reflect 
longer term cycles of stability and change in the federal system? 
This separation of the bureaucratic from the political dimensions of Australian federalism 
inevitably raises questions about the relationship between the two, particularly in what ways, 
and to what extent, the latter constrains the former.  Accordingly, my research questions include 
how the structures, processes and cultures of the federal system both enable and constrain the 
practice of intergovernmental management; to what extent they do so, and with what effect; 
and how officials manage and leverage the balance between the continuity necessary for 
systemic stability and the capacity for change in a federal system.   
Such questions involve a focus on how the formal and informal structures and institutions of 
the federal system affect the ways officials work with one another and such agency as they 
exercise in doing so, and ultimately how these issues play out in long term trajectories of 
continuity and change.1   
For all their importance, such questions about the bureaucracy of the Australian federal system 
are under-researched: the practice of intergovernmental management is poorly understood, and 
its capacities poorly assessed, including such capacity as bureaucrats themselves perceive and 
exert to act in and on the system.  As a result, the contribution that improving such capacities 
might make to the operations of the federal system overall are rarely considered.  That is the 
gap to which this thesis intends to make a contribution.   
The sporadic nature of previous research also informs the empirical direction taken by this 
dissertation.  The research does not focus on a specific area of policy or a specific component 
of the policy-making process.  Rather, it encompasses a wide range of data from the formal 
structures underpinning COAG, the processes they embody, and the central, policy and front-
line departments and agencies involved in intergovernmental management across a selection 
of larger and smaller jurisdictions.  On the basis of that broader perspective, some general 
propositions about the research question have been formulated, as a contribution to the 
development of theory in federal dynamics and public administration and as a framework for 
more specific, focused research in future. 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this research, ‘agency’ refers to the personal capacity and volition of officials.  The term 
‘organisation’ is used as a generic term for public sector departments and agencies, except where the distinction 
between them is material. 
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In terms of the data generated and analysed, the dissertation adopts Lynn’s tripartite and very 
useful concept of public management as comprising three dimensions.  The first dimension 
comprises what Lynn calls ‘structures’, ‘the organization and programmatic and regulatory 
responsibilities of departments or ministries [and] the requirements of an administrative 
procedure act or of civil service regulations’ (2006, p. 25).  This corresponds to the concept of 
‘rules-in-form’ adopted by institutionalism, and the institutional layer of federal dynamics 
covering the formal structures and processes of the federal system within which 
intergovernmental management takes place.   
Accordingly, the findings in Chapter 4 focus on the intergovernmental forums and the 
processes that support them, including COAG itself, its ministerial councils and meetings, and 
the associated processes of deliberation, negotiation and preparation; inter-government 
agreements; and the departments and agencies in which officials work. 
Lynn’s second dimension is ‘craft’, ‘the operational and pragmatic concerns of public officials 
who have managerial responsibilities and are motivated to apply proven, actionable ideas to 
the problems they face or, alternatively, to fashion solutions appropriate to their specific 
circumstances’ (2006, p. 28).  Chapter 5 provides data on what officials understand to be the 
craft of intergovernmental management, the routines and relationships that take place in and 
around the system’s formal structures. 
Lynn’s third dimension is the ‘institutionalised values’ that imbue structures and craft, 
corresponding closely to the ideational layer in federal dynamics.  The sources of these values, 
corresponding closely with a discursive institutionalist framework, ‘include beliefs within the 
wider society, professional standards, informal norms of practice, ethical precepts, institutional 
memory, and shared experience’ (2006, p. 29).  These are explored further in Chapter 6. 
In effect, Lynn’s three dimensions provide a good account of an ‘institution,’ in terms of the 
the new institutionalism definition of institutions as ‘enduring collections of rules and 
organized practices’ (March & Olsen 2009a, p.3) embedded in structures of processes, 
resources and meanings. 
The limitations of this approach and the possibilities for further comparative case studies within 
this general framework are discussed in the final chapter. 
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1.2 Justification for the research 
1.2.1 Why study Australia’s federal system? 
The context for my research is set by two important, inter-related narratives that emerged in 
the lead up to Australia’s federation and continue to characterise the federal culture today.   
Starting with the settlement that federation effected between free traders and protectionists, the 
first narrative highlights the importance of compromise and negotiated pathways for achieving 
national outcomes.  The strategies and rules by which officials from different levels and 
jurisdictions in the federation engage with one another are shaped by the fact that there is no 
significant policy area in the national or sub-national polity that does not require the 
involvement of both the Commonwealth and state governments.  As Sharman wrote some 
twenty-five years ago, there is  
... such a degree of interpenetration that it is hard to find either an area of Commonwealth activity 
that does not impinge on State policies, or State administration that does not entail some 
Commonwealth involvement (Sharman 1991, p.23) 
As an illustration of this concurrency, the top five areas of state government expenditure, 
accounting for 66 percent of their total spend, are also the subject of national policies and 
agreements: schools (20 per cent of total state government expenditure 2017-18); hospitals (18 
per cent); police and justice (11 per cent); road and rail transport (10 per cent) and family and 
child welfare services (9 per cent) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2018).  Even defence 
policies have an impact on state and, for that matter, local governments, as seen in recent moves 
to remediate contaminated Department of Defence sites.2   
Australians have consistently and clearly expressed an expectation that federal and state 
governments will work together on key issues and policies.  Federalism offers both a way to 
achieve national objectives and the opportunity for democratic participation at the state level, 
and ‘the average Australian treasures both’, Galligan wrote in 1989 (p. 62).  This still appears 
                                                 
2 A comparative analysis of the use of intergovernmental agreements across six western, developed federations 
from 1945 to 2008 concluded that Australia had the second highest percentage of overlapping jurisdictions, with 
both governments operating in 70 percent of enumerated areas; only Germany’s 75 percent overlap was higher 
(Parker 2015, p. 49). Indeed, Galligan (1995) criticises what he calls the ‘misconceived’ coordinate model of 
Australian federalism compared with the basic principle of ‘concurrency’ that, he argues, better reflects its 
constitutional design.  On the normative front, Elazar argues it is precisely these overlapping institutions and 
functions ‘that gives federal systems strength and stability above and beyond many others’ (1987, pp. 30), while 
Gerken enumerates a number of constitutional scholars who have ‘convincingly established the policymaking 
benefits associated with redundancy, administrative overlap, joint regulation, and mutual dependence’ (2014, p. 
1902). 
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to be the case thirty years later.  Despite the states’ important but residual powers and relevant 
expertise, 80 percent of respondents to the Constitutional Values Survey wanted the federal 
government involved in the provision of health care, 59 percent wanted the federal government 
involved in schools, and 56 percent still wanted at least some federal government involvement 
in the provision of roads and highways.  Conversely, in the area of environmental protection, 
where the Commonwealth’s powers vis-à-vis the states have most clearly expanded and been 
reinforced judicially, a sizeable proportion (46 percent) still want state governments to maintain 
their involvement (Brown 2014, p. 12).3  
The second narrative that supports this concurrency is the utilitarian, pragmatic set of outcomes 
that were expected from federation at that time and continue to form Australians’ expectations 
of the system today.  A key characteristic of Australia’s ‘pragmatic federalism’ is that ‘political 
debates seem largely unaware or unwilling to engage with, or shape federalism in terms that 
comprehend, on any level, … more abstract principles’ (Hollander & Patapan 2007, p. 282).4  
Consequently, the principles and practices of the federal system tend to come to the fore only 
at times of stress and strain; and, as a result, such discussions are shaped by the terms of the 
issues generating those pressures, as exemplified by a focus on the distribution of GST revenue 
current at the time of writing. 
These narratives jointly inform the practicalities of federal administration.  National reforms 
and responses to domestic and international challenges require pragmatic and flexible 
cooperation between all governments. As Galligan pointed out, this necessitates 
an adequate system of intergovernmental arrangements and procedures for coordinating policy 
action when that is required for achieving agreement on national standards (Galligan 1995, 
p. 201).  
Whether such outcomes are achieved, and the balance between positive and negative effects 
and outcomes in any policy endeavour, depends to a significant extent on the federal system’s 
structures, operations, systems and culture.  In essence, these involve two conflicting sets of 
institutional forces and rationales.  The first set, embedded in the formal structures and 
                                                 
3In Canada’s case, Simeon argues similarly that, despite the rejection of the Meech Lake and Charlottetown 
referenda which might have generated public demand for big changes in intergovernmental relations, ‘surveys 
suggest citizens want governments to cooperate and get along with each other’(2006, p. 321). 
4 This notion of ‘pragmatic federalism’ reflects Parker’s contention almost 60 years earlier that the Australian 
approach to federalism has little to do with any ‘preoccupation with or conviction about the constitutional and 
political principles of federal government’ (cited in Cole 2014, p. 30).  Collins similarly noted that Australian 
federalism ‘is a product of convenience rather than conviction’ with appeals to states’ rights typically understood 
as ‘claims to particular shares of the federal pie rather than as articulations of normative principle’ (1985, p. 153). 
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processes of the federation, its councils and in the agreements and policy processes they 
manage, is dominated by the political interests of governments.  The second is located in cross-
jurisdictional intergovernmental networks and arenas of policy development and negotiation 
(Painter 2001, p. 139-140). 
As Painter argued, however, these two sub-systems have implications for how those engaged 
in intergovernmental management work within them.  The former involves strongly 
hierarchical relationships, while the non-hierarchical networks beneath them are characterised 
by ‘power sharing and interdependence, where cooperation rather than command is the 
underlying organising logic of effective policy making’.  These are precisely the dynamics I 
want to explore further here, including understanding why, how and when the same actors work 
from one or the other set of styles or strategies.   
Thus, for example, Galligan et al. suggested, but did not explore, “a three-dimensional 
framework that included a second separate tier of administrative management that did not 
correspond exactly with… Commonwealth-state politicisation” (Galligan et al. 1991, p. 16).   
My research follows that up by considering, from the viewpoint of its practitioners, what 
successful intergovernmental management consists of, as a process for recognising, 
accommodating and reconciling differences in policy priorities and directions, and hence 
making a distinct contribution to the quality of policy design and implementation overall 
(Galligan et al. 1991, p. 17).5   
The proposition that improved processes may be part of the answer to the question of whether 
the federal system is ‘fit for purpose’ brings me to the next part of my justification for this 
research, which looks at the role of the bureaucracy in a federal system. 
1.2.2 Why study the role of the bureaucracy in intergovernmental relations? 
This dissertation builds on Galligan’s research that contends that the ‘arena of 
intergovernmental relations and management is the most promising one for contemporary 
reforms’ (2008, p. 68).6  Yet we have accomplished little in such reforms since that was written, 
                                                 
5 My emphasis on the policy outputs of the federal system should not obscure the implications of federalism for 
democratic participation, a matter taken up by Galligan (1995) and, more recently, by Hollander and Patapan 
(2018) who focus on federalism’s potential capacity to enhance human rights. 
6 This conceptual territory is also traversed by Painter (1998a); Productivity Commission (2006); Botterill (2007); 
Menzies (2013).  Arklay et al. (2017) report on some interesting work on practitioners’ views on how to improve 
collaboration between governments. 
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and arguably, with the abolition of the COAG Reform Council, we have even gone backwards.7   
Moreover, as I show in more detail in Chapter 2, there is only limited research relating to 
intergovernmental management in Australia; with only 12 studies in four decades, 
intergovernmental management has not been studied systematically, in terms of an 
epistemologically distinct, coherent, reflexive and additive body of research attracting 
sustained attention over time.  Indeed, this lack of attention to the structures, processes and 
cultures of intergovernmental management contributes to the miasma of ‘ignorance and 
defeatism’ that forced a leading constitutional lawyer to cancel plans for ‘a public forum to 
examine ongoing questions about the performance of the federation, and areas for reform’ 
noting that ‘this is the first time I have encountered this problem’ (Williams 2013, p. 3).  
As described in detail in section 2.2.2, only a handful of studies of Australian federalism over 
the past four decades has focused on intergovernmental management.  Such a gap does not, in 
itself, constitute a justification for further study.  Such sporadic attention, both here and 
overseas, may suggest only that such study is unlikely to contribute new and important 
information or ways of thinking about federalism. 
In response to this challenge, I posit four reasons for studying the bureaucracy of the federal 
system as a separate and distinct domain.  I will return to these objectives as the basis for my 
considerations of the implications of this research in Chapter 7. 
First, it is by no means a given that the potential benefits and advantages of federalism outlined 
above will necessarily accrue in the absence of effective, efficient and durable means for their 
achievement.  One of the most important of these may be characterised as ‘intergovernmental 
policy capacity’, a term coined and defined by Inwood et al. in primarily utilitarian terms as 
aiming to fulfil existing intergovernmental policy agreements and to develop new policies in 
policy areas where jurisdiction and resources are shared between levels of government (Inwood 
et al. 2011, p. 4). 
As an example of such ‘capacity’, we need to be able to assess how and to what extent the 
                                                 
7 Thus, for example, Brumby and Galligan have noted that ‘Australia’s concurrent federal system is strong on 
concurrency but weak on inter-governmental relations and management. Although these latter two are inevitable 
and ongoing, they are poorly articulated and rarely addressed (Brumby & Galligan, 2015, p. 91; see also Galligan, 
2008; 1995).  Similarly, Clarke noted that a lack of ‘systematic evaluation processes’ and a capacity to track 
successes and failures in implementation have undermined the American ‘laboratories of federalism’ framework 
(2007, p. 76). 
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federal system’s bureaucratic dimension can be expected to address the costs of federalism’s 
inherent problems of coordination, negative externalities, fragmentation and short-termism.  
There is evidence to suggest that, while a majority of citizens value federalism as a national 
framework for governance, they also see substantial room for improvement in the way in which 
this framework operates (Brown et al. 2006, p. 299; similar dissatisfaction is reported in Gray 
& Brown 2007, p. 42).  While 93 per cent of respondents to the Constitutional Values Survey 
agreed that it was desirable for different levels of government to collaborate on solutions to 
problems, only 41 per cent agreed it was being done quite well, or very well (Brown 2014, p. 
9).8  A significant part of the answer to this challenge lies in the nature and quality of the 
relationships between officials. 
While the public’s perceptions of inefficiency and ineffectiveness may, to some extent, be a 
response to the politics of intergovernmental relations portrayed in the media, such perceptions 
prompt a subsidiary research question: to the extent that officials need capacity and agency to 
address such problems and make intergovernmental collaboration successful, under what 
conditions are they able to deliver, and to what extent do such conditions obtain in the system 
today?  Thus, for example, Chappell and Curtin’s conclusion that federalism can provide a 
venue for learning and innovation is predicated on the effectiveness of ‘intergovernmental 
machinery’, such as policy coordination and fiscal institutions and formal and informal 
meetings of political and policy officials (Chappell & Curtin 2012, p. 27). 
Second, policy capacity contributes to the overall nature and capabilities of the federal system 
itself, not just its individual outputs.  Officials don’t just work in the system, they work on it 
and through it.  Officials are not passive or objective bystanders in the policy process (Smith 
& Brown 2017, p. 22); rather, although their work is largely unacknowledged and even less 
studied, they play a significant role in determining what is on the federal agenda or off it, what 
happens once decisions have been made, and how the totality of those decisions contributes to 
the health of the system overall.  As Soss and Moynihan put it, ‘bureaucracies are not only 
creatures but also creators of the political forces that impinge on them’ (2014, p. 320).  As an 
illustration of the bureaucracy’s importance for the outcome of policy implementation, the 
Productivity Commission’s recent five-year productivity review commented that ‘the 
commitment of individuals at both ministerial and bureaucratic level was crucial to the 
                                                 
8 Schneider et al. (2011, p. 6) report findings from the United States on a widespread preference for all levels of 
government to take on a more active role, but with a clear preference for different levels of government to take 
the lead in particular policy areas. 
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implementation and success of reform efforts’ (Productivity Commission 2017, p. 17).   
A third and related reason goes to the question of accountability.  My contention is that greater 
scrutiny and understanding of the bureaucratic operations underpinning federalism will 
enhance their accountability and systemic governance overall. 
In the face of what they saw as a weakened institutional capacity for intergovernmental 
monitoring and analysis in the United States, Conlan and Posner argued that ‘the capacity of 
our policymaking institutions to oversee the performance of the system and to take concerted 
action to strengthen that system has become a defining issue for effective governance in the 
twenty-first century’ (Conlan & Posner 2008, p. 5). 9   
State government administrators in Australia, as they do in other federal systems, have a wide 
latitude to make vital decisions in important public programs. And yet, ‘surprisingly little is 
known about this process’ (Schneider et al. 1997, p.240).  The latter study described a process 
of bureaucratic decisions, from those that were easily adopted and applyied to larger groups to 
those more difficult to implement and only benefiting special groups.  Just as understanding 
this scaling process has possible application to a wider range of bureaucratic decisions, we need 
to avoid turning what intergovernmental management officials do into a ‘black box’ that is 
similarly undifferentiated.  Opening up this black box for scrutiny may give us some insights 
into how agency may be more effectively applied to a range of policy issues and problems 
beyond the management of the federal system. 
A subset of these questions involves the bureaucracy’s ability to improve the federal system 
from within, given that any significant, long-term reform program is highly dependent on 
Commonwealth leadership, runs the risk of being overtaken by short-term Commonwealth-
state politics or, in the longer term, being overturned by succeeding governments (Bruerton & 
Hollander 2017, p. 11; Fenna 2012a, p. 33).  As Ken Smith, a former senior state official and 
the head of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government said recently,  
At the political level, reform has ground to a halt. We … cannot rely on a politically led grand 
settlement between states and the Commonwealth to reshape our federation, at least not in the 
short term. We need all levels of government to begin rethinking how we can make our federation 
                                                 
9 Their conclusion that ‘nowhere has the decline in federal intergovernmental expertise been more dramatic than 
in the elimination of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations…in 1996’ may be reflected in 
Australia by the abolition of the COAG Reform Council in 2014 and the transfer of a more limited set of 
responsibilities to the Productivity Commission 
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work (2017). 
Finally, there is a question of what we might learn from research on intergovernmental 
management about the constraints on and support for the exercise of agency by public servants 
more generally.  A number of the propositions arising from this research help to illuminate the 
broader shift from new public management models of public service to emerging paradigms of 
public administration.    
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theoretical settings for this research, based on the three 
domains of federalism, public administration and policy and the issues each raises in relation 
to the practice of intergovernmental management.  The chapter takes a close look at the latter 
term’s meaning; its differentiation from the broader study of intergovernmental relations; and 
the limited extent to which it has been studied in Australia.   
The chapter examines the theory of federal dynamics as the framework for this research, 
exploring the implications of federalism’s structural and ideational components for how the 
bureaucracy contributes to stability and change in Australian federalism.   
Chapter 3 sets out the methodology I have employed to gather and analyse the empirical data 
for the thesis.  The chapter discusses the discursive institutionalist framework on which the 
methodology is based, and provides details on the interviewees and the logic of the interview 
structure. 
Chapters 4 to 6 discuss the main empirical findings of the thesis.  Chapter 4 examines the 
practice of intergovernmental management as it affects and is affected by its formal settings in 
ministerial councils and working groups, national agreements, public service organisations and 
relations between the bureaucracy and ministers.   
Chapter 5 examines the informal elements of the federal system, examining the conventions 
and norms of meetings, policy work, network management, and practitioners’ views of 
intergovernmental management as a whole. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the federal bureaucracy’s cultures and values.  The chapter reports 
interesting and crucial aspects about the way federal structures and practitioners’ ideas and 
values are interrelated and inform their work, with implications for their role as change agents.   
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Finally, in Chapter 7, I discuss the implications of my research for the practice of 
intergovernmental management and for the theoretical fields the research has traversed. 
1.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has justified research on the bureaucracy of the federal system through its 
contribution to a broader assessment of the federal system’s capacity to deliver against the 
expectations of Australia’s citizens and their governments, both now and into the future, in 
relation to the array of complex problems and issues we face. 
It has foreshadowed the discussion in the next chapter of the potential role of the bureaucracy 
in delivering a better federal system, or at least potentially having the capacity to do so, based 
on four normative propositions: first, we need to understand the dynamics of the interpersonal 
relations that characterise intergovernmental management; second, we need to ask to in what 
ways the bureaucracy can address the inherent problems of a federal system; third, because if 
public servants play a significant role in the system, understanding what they do and why goes 
to the question of accountability to governments and the public; and fourth, because this 
research points to wider questions about agency, capacity and role, at a time when these are 
major questions for the future of public services generally.    
As I suggest in the final chapter, it may well be through opportunities that emerge in this 
bureaucratic domain, away from the vagaries, pressures and glare of the political domain, that 
we will find and fit ‘new wheels’ to the federation for the future. 
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Chapter 2 
Gardeners or engineers? A theoretical survey of federal dynamics 
and intergovernmental management 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a conceptual framework for the empirical chapters to 
follow, by linking three densely populated precincts of political science and the issues they 
focus on:  
(i) ‘public administration’ as a general field for the study of the bureaucracy;  
(ii) the policy design and implementation tasks bureaucracies carry out; and  
(iii) the context of federalism in which and for which those tasks are performed.   
Each of these is a huge theoretical domain in its own right. As summarised in Figure 1, this 
research explores the interfaces between these domains, and their differing but related 
perspectives on intergovernmental management.   
Figure 1: Theoretical domains: federal dynamics at the intersection of federalism, public administration 
and policy 
 
Source: adapted from Inwood et al. 2011, p.6 
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The outcomes from the study of such ‘identifiable spheres of theoretical and empirical overlap’ 
include: extending research in any one field beyond its typical scope; clarifying ‘theoretical 
black boxes’; and identifying hitherto undervalued causal factors (Weible and Carter 2017, p. 
23).  Taking the notion of overlap a step further, I add one more outcome.  The three domains 
depicted in Figure 1 are not only sites of ‘theoretical and empirical’ enquiry: each of them 
constitutes a context for bureaucratic practice, in which historical, long-term cultures (such as 
‘pragmatic federalism’ and ‘Westminster conventions’ of public service) inform and 
circumscribe issues and interests in a particular policy field to produce specific processes and 
tasks conducted by public servants.  Accordingly, there are practical outcomes for 
intergovernmental management from studying the interaction between these domains, such as 
assessing administrative capabilities and identifying new possibilities for governance and 
process.  I will explore these outcomes further in Chapter 7. 
As depicted in Figure 1, the three ‘spheres’ suggest a microscope with three lenses trained on 
what Inwood and his colleagues call Canada’s ‘intergovernmental capacity’ for developing and 
implementing policy (2011).   
In my research, however, the centre of the three rings is constituted by the theoretical and 
empirical research question of how the practice of intergovernmental management (the 
theoretical field of ‘public administration’) as it is applied in particular policy processes (the 
‘policy’ field) affects continuity and change in the federal system (the ‘federalism’ field). This 
chapter reviews each of these domains and the questions they raise for this research.   
I begin with a discussion of intergovernmental management as a distinct bureaucratic practice 
and the extent to which it has been studied in Australia.  I then briefly consider congruent 
theoretical insights on institutional resilience, policy entrepreneurship and questions of 
structure and agency.   
Finally, this chapter provides the basis for my research methodology, which is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 3. 
2.1 Intergovernmental management: the hidden dimension of Australian 
federalism 
Although the term ‘intergovernmental relations’ emerges as a substantial topic of public 
administration literature in the mid-1930s, it was not for another 40 years that the term 
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‘intergovernmental management’ appeared in response to the requirements of administering 
new and complex governmental programs in the 1970s (Box 1995, p. 24; Wright & Krane 
1998, p. 1162).  Thereafter it only occupied a tiny niche by comparison with the earlier term’s 
usage,10 even though, as Poirier and Saunders show in their comparative survey of 20 
federations, effective public administration is a key instrument in successful intergovernmental 
relations (Poirier & Saunders 2015, p. 462).  By way of illustration, a survey of the term’s 
usage in monographs depicted in Figure 2 shows its rapid emergence over the 1970s and 
through to the mid-80s, after which usage appears to plateau. 
Figure 2:  Use of the term ‘intergovernmental management’ in monographs 1970-200811 
 
Source: Jean-Baptiste et al. (2011) 
As late as 1990, intergovernmental management as an object of study in its own right was still 
described as ‘embryonic’ and ‘shallow’, having ‘recently emerged in the literature’ (Marando 
& Florestano 1990, p. 287; Yeatman 1991, p. 41); while almost a decade later, Wright and 
Krane describe it as:  
an important "hidden dimension" of interjurisdictional and interorganizational activity that is 
extensive, significant, and largely unrecognized within public administration/management 
literature and practice(s) (Wright & Krane 1998, p. 1165). 
A further decade on, intergovernmental management had all but disappeared as a focus for 
                                                 
10 Leach notes that the need to consult with the administrators of federal programs was first recognised in 1955, 
when the Committee on Government Operations of the U.S. House of Representatives submitted a questionnaire 
to state and local officials to elicit information on the operation of grant-in-aid programs (1976, p.3).    
11 I have not included a scale for the y-axis, as the actual percentages of all the books published over this period 
are, of course, infinitesimally small; the point is merely to underline the general emergence and plateau in the 
term’s usage. 
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better practice in US public administration, as a result of the abolition or marginalisation of 
federal offices and agencies established to help improve and rationalise intergovernmental 
management and the system of intergovernmental subcommittees (Conlan & Posner 2008, 
p. 4).  Similarly, Inwood et al. note that intergovernmental decision-making is ‘relatively 
understudied’ in the Canadian system (Inwood et al. 2011, p. 7). 
As for Australia, little has changed over the quarter of a century since Yeatman expressed 
concern over the lack of a focus on intergovernmental management, particularly in program 
evaluation.  She noted that, for all the emphasis placed at the time on program evaluation, there 
was a corresponding lack of focus on evaluating ways of improving the collaborative aspects 
of intergovernmental management, which she attributed to the preoccupation of coordinate 
views of federalism with the division of jurisdictional roles (Yeatman 1991: 43).  
The distinction between intergovernmental relations generally and intergovernmental 
management is significant for my research in four ways.   
First, Anderson argues that ‘It is human beings clothed with office who are the real determiners 
of what the relations between units of governments will be. Consequently the concept of 
intergovernmental relations necessarily has to be formulated largely in terms of human 
relations and human behaviors’ (1960, p. 4).  Although this definition is now almost 60 years 
old, its emphasis on actors’ relations and behaviours, rather than formal structures and 
processes, and its focus on the dynamics and dialectical relations between the formal and 
informal aspects of the federal system, as central to my approach to the research questions. 
Second, the lack of research on intergovernmental management detailed below means we know 
little about how decisions are being made in this context.  Bureaucrats play an important role 
in governance, policy design and its implementation, service delivery, regulatory frameworks 
and their application and the provision of competitive settings for labour and capital and so on.  
Accordingly, ‘what intergovernmental actors see and how they respond within the framework 
of their perceptions about the organizational world are an important dimension of 
intergovernmental reality’ (Cho & Wright, 2004, p.451).  Numerous studies of Australian 
federalism have criticised what Kildea and Lynch call ‘the democratic deficit’ that results from 
the lack of transparency with which agreements are made between executive governments at 
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) and the risk that legislatures may be sidelined 
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by such deals (2011, p. 104).12 
Third, even if there been a more sustained research tradition in this area, there is no guarantee 
that analyses, frameworks and conclusions of the past continue to be fit for purpose, given the 
changes that have taken place and that we would expect to take place in any federal system and 
in public administration since the term was first distinguished.  Indeed, as argued in the review 
of the literature on Australian intergovernmental management below, standard elements of 
these past analyses are debatable in the current context. 
Finally, the role of beliefs, values and norms in shaping practitioner behaviours foreshadows 
the discussion in the next chapter of a discursive institutionalist methodology. 
2.1.1 Defining ‘intergovernmental management’ 
An initial ontological query might be whether, and to what extent, the federal bureaucracy 
operates as a distinct element in the federal system, or whether it represents no more than a 
series of ‘incremental adjustments in managerial activities that enhance effective service 
delivery’ (Wright & Krane 1998, p. 1162). 
If the best solution to the problem of concept formation is to rely upon norms of established 
usage (Gerring 1999, p. 362), we have a problem in defining intergovernmental management.  
Even where intergovernmental management has been studied more consistently, it is by its 
nature protean and hence has neither a fixed nor a consensual definition.  As Agranoff found, 
IGM is ‘considerably more involved than earlier studies suggested’, involving ‘deeply 
complicated governmental processes’ (2007, p. 282). 
Despite the lack of a strong research tradition on which to base my research, I nevertheless 
propose five characteristics to differentiate intergovernmental management from its settings in 
intergovernmental relations.   
First, the approach is primarily utilitarian, adopting Agranoff and Lindsay’s definition of 
intergovernmental management as a process by which cooperating officials ‘develop a solution 
to the problem at hand while recognizing the importance of the substantive, jurisdictional and 
political issues’ (Agranoff & Lindsay 1983, p. 228; Marando & Florestano 1990, p. 288).   
Second, the ‘problem at hand’ is one that by definition involves both federal and state 
                                                 
12 But see Menzies for a more balanced view.  She concludes that ‘executive federalism has served Australia well, 
particularly since the mid-1990s’ and that these criticisms understate the accountabilities that do exist (2012a, 
pp. 1-2). 
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governments (and occasionally local governments) in a mix of policy tasks and responsibilities, 
including identifying and prioritising the policy goals themselves in process of influencing, 
bargaining and persuading (Haas 1992, p. 2).  Accordingly, I argue that intergovernmental 
management encompasses a broader range of tasks than Wright and Krane, who suggest that 
the chief task of intergovernmental managers is to overcome goal conflicts (1998, p. 1163).  As 
my findings indicate, these tasks encompass the full range of policy functions, from identifying 
issues and options and preparing agendas for decision to the implementation of national 
programs, the establishment and maintenance of regulatory regimes and street-level 
administration, in a multi-jurisdictional context.   
Third, continuous, regular personal relations and informal interaction between officials are an 
integral part of the way such tasks are conducted (Wright 1974, p.2).  As I will show in the 
general findings, the degree to which intergovernmental relations are formalised in processes, 
structures, agreements and so forth has an important effect on such relations.  However, they 
don’t tell the whole story; intergovernmental management is a ‘process of solving 
intergovernmental problems under conditions of high uncertainty and complexity through the 
creation and use of governmental and nongovernmental networks’ (Wright & Krane 1998, 
p. 1162; Agranoff 2007, p. 271).  Elsewhere, Wright has concluded that, at least in the 
American case, ‘the evidence reveals that state administrators are firmly fixed "in the middle" 
of IGR and their contacts extend in many directions with variable strengths’ (Wright 1978, 
p. 256).  (I will explore personal networks in the Australian case in Chapter 5.5.)  In the 
Australian case, Weller suggests there is some value in considering a diplomatic analogy when 
referring to COAG and the Special Premiers Conferences that preceded it:  
interaction is continuous; some level of relations must be maintained, even at those times when 
political dynamics cause a hiatus in the process; negotiations take place simultaneously across a 
range of issues; difficulties in one area may have an impact in unrelated policy areas; hence the 
necessity for honesty and trust (one bad experience may sour the whole process) (1996, p.  103). 
Fourth, in performing these tasks officials have to balance and adjudicate between sets of 
values and interests at the national or systemic level with those that apply at the jurisdictional 
or organizational levels.  Consequently, I depart from Wright and Krane (1998) in their strict 
delineation of intergovernmental management as an incremental activity that takes ‘systems, 
structures, policies and programs’ as a given, while the contextual federal structures, systems 
and programs are stable and outside the scope of day to day intergovernmental management.  
As Agranoff points out, IGM requires officials to jointly solve jurisdictional-legal and political 
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issues in addition to technical problems associated with their projects (2007, p. 271).  As I will 
show, these wider concerns have a direct bearing on the way intergovernmental management 
is conducted and the reasons it is conducted that way. While problem solving takes place in a 
domain that is distinct from the political dimensions of intergovernmental relations, it is the 
dialectic between the two and the way these matters are included in the policy calculus that has 
a direct bearing on the exercise of individual agency. Accordingly, Chapters 4 and 5 detail 
findings regarding the impact of the federal system’s formal structures and settings on the roles 
and approaches of those working on intergovernmental management, and vice versa.  Chapter 
6 examines the values and norms that underpin such practice, and how the ideas that such 
values give rise to are embodied in bureaucratic practice. 
Finally, intergovernmental management represents a particular, distinct set of public 
administration skills and knowledge.  To some extent this varies according to the policy area 
and the policy instruments employed (McGuire 2013, p. 109), but all forms of 
intergovernmental management begin with requisite knowledge of the relevant structures, 
processes and practices before moving on to the actual bargaining, negotiation, management 
of informal relationships, trust building and ultimately knowledge of when and how to refer 
back to the political arena.  As the analysis of the craft of intergovernmental management 
detailed in Chapters 4 and 5 indicates, many interviewees commented specifically on the 
applied skills involved in intergovernmental management.  Accordingly, Chapter 5 also 
considers the characteristics and impact of the bureaucratic dimension of federalism as an 
institution in its own right. 
In summary, intergovernmental management is defined here as a set of policy-related tasks, 
processes and choices, carried out or made by officials (as distinct from other participants in 
the federal process such as politicians) through formal and informal networks to develop and 
implement approaches to problems that require the joint involvement of federal and state 
governments. 
2.2 Federalism, public administration and public policy: analytical and 
theoretical frameworks  
2.2.1 Federal dynamics and intergovernmental management 
The study of federal dynamics which underpins my research reflects Friedrich’s concerns, in 
his work over the 1950s and 60s, with federalism as 'a process rather than a design', particularly 
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in the initial stages of federalisation.13  Friedrich argued that focusing on any 'particular design 
or pattern of competencies or jurisdictions' is only a snapshot, 'a phase, a short-run view of a 
continually evolving political reality…the institutionalizing of a dynamic process in which the 
pattern of structure is continually undergoing change' (cited in Burgess 2012, pp. 146,153).  
Similarly, Elazar gives primacy to the processes of government, particularly their ‘political-
cultural dimension’ compared to their structures in determining whether the latter are in any 
sense ‘meaningful’ (1987, p. 67).   
Accordingly, the study of federal dynamics aims to contribute a systematic approach to the 
study of federal systems by understanding what changes within federal systems, and what 
remains stable; why they change in a particular way; why continuity may prevail over change; 
and how they change in and over time, with respect to the direction, pace, duration, and scope 
of change (Benz & Broschek 2013, pp. 3-4).   
Federal dynamics involves two characteristic concerns that are relevant for my research.  The 
first relates to the direction of change, in the form of dynamic centralisation and 
decentralisation, ‘upwards’ to the central government or ‘downwards’ to the constituent units 
(Dardanelli et al. 2018, p. 1; Colino 2010, p. 20).  Elazar predicted that Australia, along with 
most other federations, would see continuing decentralisation after the mid-1980s, if only 
because of a lack of leadership at their respective national levels (1987, pp. 206).  This forecast 
now seems misplaced, both generally and for Australia in particular (Fenna 2019; Dardanelli 
et al. 2018).  However, his argument for the need to see centralisation and decentralisation as 
varying and assymetric manifestations of a complex matrix polity, rather than a simple 
hierarchy, suggests that a wide range of factors is involved in facilitating or slowing the 
tendency to centralisation (Fenna 2019, p. 30).  The extent to which some of these factors may 
lie in the bureaucracy of the federal system itself is a key issue explored in the empirical 
chapters that follow. 
Second, the study of federal dynamics treats continuity and change as a continuum, rather than 
binary opposites.  Too much flexibility risks exposure to the vagaries of politics, while too 
much stability risks a sclerotic rigidity that fails to react to changing environments.  
                                                 
13 Friedrich’s particular focus on the relationship between federal dynamics and constitutionalism more generally 
(Burgess 2006, pp. 35, 285) is reflected in the emphasis placed by federal dynamics theory on ‘the conditions 
under which constitutional change and reform are possible’ (Benz & Colino 2011, p. 382; see also Behnke & 
Benz 2009). 
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Accordingly, it is the interaction of change and continuity in differing patterns of adjustment 
that shapes the performance of federal regimes within a given period of time, and of course 
links back to my primary research interests. 
The epistemological and methodological framework for this research is provided by Benz and 
Broschek’s four ‘layers’, or sources of pressure for change within federal systems, with the 
interaction between these layers generating the combinative variations inherent in federal 
dynamics (2013, p. pp5ff).   
The first layer sees federal institutions as manifestations of deeper social conflicts, linked to 
territorial differences where these are significant.   
The second institutional layer relates to formal institutions and informal routines that establish 
and distribute authority relationships within and between jurisdictions and, of particular 
importance for this research, establish regular patterns of behaviour within those institutions, 
including the system of intergovernmental relations.  Accordingly, this layer provides the basis 
for the findings on the formal and informal structures discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.   
Benz and Broschek’s third layer, drawing on Friedrich’s approach to federalism as a composite 
body of congruent and divergent ideas (Burgess 2012, p. 150), refers to ‘the normative or 
ideational constructs that actors employ in order to interpret their social and political 
environment’ (2013, p. 6).  Data relating to these ‘interpretive frameworks’, their sources and 
their impact, is explored in Chapters 5 and 6. 
The fourth layer of Benz and Broschek’s conceptualisation of federal dynamics is constituted 
by the distribution of power amongst ‘political actors’ (2013, p.7), particularly governments 
and parties.  In this case, I have taken this layer to include the intergovernmental bureaucracy 
at the heart of executive federalism.  The way officials negotiate the constraints and 
opportunities that form the federal landscape, and in doing so are informed by the institutional 
and ideational context, is at the heart of intergovernmental management and consequently, 
again, is a major focus for the findings on practice discussed in the subsequent chapters.   
The contribution this research aims to make to the theory of federal dynamics lies in the 
exploration of intergovernmental management as an element of the institutional and ideational 
layers. 
A number of researchers have drawn attention to the interaction between ideational and 
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institutional elements of federal systems as a source of change (Béland & Lecours 2011; 
Broschek 2011a; 2010) and in polities more generally (Lieberman 2002).14   
However, although bureaucracies are frequently mentioned as part of their second layer, Benz 
and Broschek say little about bureaucracies as political actors in their own right, subsuming 
bureaucratic capacities under the institutional resources of governments in their fourth layer 
(2013, p. 7).15  Clearly, however, the bureaucracy itself is an institution which, like federalism, 
undergoes its own patterns of continuity and change over shorter and longer time frames which 
may or may not fit with developments in the federal system at any time.  Consequently, 
intergovernmental management may be a locus for the kind of misfit between institutions and 
ideas that generates divergent forms of federal adjustment (Benz & Broschek 2013, p. 10).  
Accordingly, this research begins from the proposition that the relationship between the 
institutional and ideational parts of a federation is a driver of change, both in terms of frictions 
or disjunctions between them, but also where they display mutually supporting directions and 
goals.  One potential source of such friction lies in the discursive content and channels in which 
such ideas are communicated and transmitted.  Coordinative discourse that takes place amongst 
policy actors themselves tends to be much more elaborate in ‘compound polities’ like 
federations (Schmidt 2008, p. 313) than the communicative discourse that takes place between 
the political executive and the public.16  Consequently, Australia’s formal position on the inter-
federalism trajectory and the ‘paramountcy’ of the Commonwealth government is coupled with 
the essentially concurrent nature of Australian federalism (eg Galligan 1995, p. 191) and an 
ideational layer that promotes cooperation.  I would expect to hear echoes of this in the 
communications between officials, a matter I take up in the discussion of the ideas and cultures 
of Australian federalism throughout the findings. 
One further element of federal dynamics theory that bears on the research relates to the question 
of what constitutes ‘change’, and the distinction between ‘non-deliberate evolution and 
                                                 
14 Simeon had already drawn attention to this interplay in his classic study of Canadian intergovernmental 
management, referring to policy making as an outcome of the interplay between ‘(a) broad social and cultural 
characteristics, (b) institutional and constitutional factors, and (c) the particular norms, attitudes, goals and 
perspectives of decision-makers’ (1972, p. 8). 
15 Thelen and Karcher, for example, note that longevity amongst their bureaucrats gave Germany’s state 
governments relatively greater power than the federal government in the post-war period (2013, p. 126).  I will 
examine the issue of longevity in more detail in Chapter 5. 
16 I discuss these terms in greater detail at Chapter 3.1; I have introduced them here to underline the areas in which 
I am in dialogue with the general field of federal dynamics. 
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deliberate design’ (Goodin, quoted in Benz and Colino 2011, p. 388).   
Federal dynamics theory generally tends to focus on constitutional reform as the outcome of 
interest (see, for example, Benz and Colino 2011; Benz & Broschek 2013).  Given the inherent 
difficulties and improbabilities of significant, let alone constitutional reform in Australia, 
however, my research is predicated on the assumption that change at the incremental level is 
also of interest, such as whether important processes such as negotiations and agreement-
making provide a potential venue for such change.17  
The history of pragmatic and incremental adjustment in Australian federalism described above 
means that reformers in the Australian context ‘are often institutional gardeners more than 
institutional engineers’ (March & Olsen 2009a, p. 15).  Most scholars of Australian federalism 
note that the reform priorities of public officials place more importance on improving the 
operation of the existing federal system than on reshaping the federation through constitutional 
amendment (Bruerton & Kildea 2017, p. 219). 
Accordingly, the focus here is as much on processes of adjustment as on deliberate strategies 
of reform and innovation.  As defined by Benz and Colino, adjustment is a process of ‘non-
deliberate, spontaneous change, which affects some parts or specific institutions of the 
federation or different policy sectors by means of the daily occurrence of formal or informal 
modification of rules, structures or legitimizing beliefs’ (2011, p. 390).18 
Given the lack of a strong legitimising platform for decentralisation in Australia, it becomes 
important to understand why and how such beliefs change, how they are embodied in 
bureaucratic practice, how the bureaucracy ‘thinks’, and why it does so, not least because 
bureaucrats have a significant role to play in shaping the system, whether as cultivating 
‘gardeners’ or transforming ‘engineers’. The methodological implications of a focus on the 
ideational context are explored in Chapter 3, and the content of these ideas and values, as they 
                                                 
17 The distinction between the concerns of this research and federal dynamics more generally need not be drawn 
too finely, however, as even substantial changes in federations are normally the result of ‘pragmatic non-
constitutional political adaptation’ (Watts 2005, p.251). 
18 In contrast, historical institutionalists like Streek and Thelen emphasise that incremental endogenous change 
depends on deliberate strategies adopted by institutional actors who exploit the gap between rules and their 
implementation (2005, p. 13). Whether deliberate or not, my research is predicated on the shared recognition in 
these conceptual frameworks that studying incremental change requires ‘special attention’ to be paid to policy 
makers, ‘if their rationale, goals, beliefs and ‘technical’ capabilities and their impact on policy dynamics are to be 
properly understood’ (Howlett & Migone, 2011, p.60).  These factors are all explored in detail in the empirical 
findings below, reflecting the close relationship between policy and federal dynamics, as summarised in Figure 
1 and its discussion above. 
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arose in the course of the research, in Chapters 5 and 6. 
2.2.2 Australian studies of intergovernmental management 
More than three decades have passed since Warhurst described an emerging role in 
intergovernmental management for central agencies, in response to policy problems that 
increasingly crossed traditional functional silos.  He compared what he called these ‘gossamer 
threads’ with the ‘rods of iron’ exercised by a closed technocracy in the line departments that 
applied its expertise to policy problems ‘in an atmosphere of consensus and common purpose’ 
but whose main focus was to defend and if possible increase spending on that function and 
which ultimately led to policy making that was ‘segmented and uncoordinated’ (1983, p.2).   
Similarly, it is now almost 25 years since Galligan noted the relative neglect in federalism 
studies of intergovernmental relations, ‘despite their significance for Australian politics and 
public policy’ (Galligan 1995, p. 189); it is even longer since Galligan, Hughes and Walsh 
argued that the policy and administrative aspects of intergovernmental relations at the 
bureaucratic level are “less well known” than the formal institutions and processes of the 
federal system and the political relationships between Commonwealth and state leaders (1991, 
p. 4).   
This is not to ignore the long tradition of federal scholasticism in Australia, by individuals such 
as Davis, Sawer and others; it is merely to acknowledge that such studies have often reflected 
the prevalent concerns of political science at the time with formal structures and processes of 
authority, governance and finance.   
Thus, for example, Fenna’s overview of the academic study of federalism since the 1930s, 
including the contributions by Wheare, Sawer and Davis, notes that ‘A good part of the running 
on Australian federalism…has been done by those based in other disciplines, particularly 
constitutional law and economics’ and concludes that the treatment of Australian federalism in 
Australian political science has generally focused on normative critiques of federalism’s 
legitimacy (2009, p.146).  Fawcett and Marsh conclude similarly that ‘the literature on 
Australian federalism has been concerned with either normative issues, such as the 
compatibility between federalism and responsible government, or more institutional and legal 
issues’ with, more recently, an ‘overwhelmingly statecentric’ literature that has focused on the 
‘high politics’ of executive federalism, but less so on matters of governance or the operations 
of networks (2017, p. 64). 
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Only a handful of studies has explored the interface between public administration and 
federalism in Australia, since the concept of intergovernmental management began to be 
widely used, and despite the broadening and deepening of the relationships between 
governments that has taken place since the 1990s (Phillimore & Harwood 2015, p.42).  These 
studies are summarised in Appendix 1. 
This sporadic research history may reflect the ‘pragmatic’ nature of Australian federalism, 
adopting Hollander and Patapan’s seminal definition of pragmatic federalism as characterised 
by ‘a direct engagement or confrontation with pressing problems, an engagement unmediated 
by larger theoretical concerns’(2007, p.281).19  The history of significant reforms to the 
Australian federal system demonstrates their distinctly utilitarian nature, with key phases of 
federalism’s evolution occurring in pursuit of (micro)economic reform — the Closer Economic 
Partnership with the States (1990), National Competition Policy (1995) and the National 
Reform Agenda (2006) — leaving the key centralising dynamic of the federation intact.   
There is, thus, a distinctly pragmatic flavour to the small number of studies of 
intergovernmental management conducted to date even though, as Inwood et al. point out in 
describing the framework summarised at Figure 1, ‘a deeper understanding and application of 
theory and analysis at the interface of these literatures is required to better understand and 
address the policy challenges of today and of the future’ (Inwood et al. 2011, p. 4).   
Consequently, most of the Australian studies aim not just to understand the nature of 
intergovernmental management in Australia but to assess and enhance its effectiveness: to 
achieve ‘optimal workability’ (Leach, 1976, p.12); ‘improv(e) the organisational arrangement 
and processes for inter-governmental relations’ (Weller, 1996, p.95); assess whether there is 
sufficient ‘strategic capacity’ in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Menzies 
2012a, p.409); identify those conditions ‘that allow senior officials to exercise the greatest 
influence’ (Davis & Silver, 2015, p.468); improve cross-jurisdictional collaboration on mental 
health policy (Smullen, 2017); and identify barriers to reform (Bruerton & Kildea, 2017). 
                                                 
19 Earlier uses of the term ‘pragmatic federalism’ are also relevant, referring to ‘constantly adjusting 
intergovernmental relations, fashioned to current needs, with an emphasis on problem solving and a minimal 
adherence to rigid doctrine’ (Glendenning & Reeves, 1977, p.8).  Lépine has an interesting take on why federalism 
generally is not an object of study in its own right, arguing this is because many political scientists view federalism 
as a series of ‘idiosyncratic attempts to solve a political — or societal — problem by pragmatic compromise’ 
(2015, p. 35). 
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Apart from this generally limited body of research, a review of the literature to date shows that, 
until very recently, research focused almost exclusively on officials in central agencies but not 
those in line departments (very much in line with Australia’s executive form of federalism), 
and in the Commonwealth but not state jurisdictions.20  Accordingly, my research methodology 
and the findings below pay particular attention to the relative roles played by central and line 
agencies, at both the Commonwealth and state levels, in processes of policy development and 
implementation. 
Similarly, between Leach’s original foray on this issue and the 2015 Future of Australian 
Federalism Survey (Smith & Brown 2017, p. 20), there was little systematic research on 
practitioners’ attitudes towards federal arrangements generally, nor on the practice of 
intergovernmental management.  For example, a particularly important normative component 
of federalism is the idea of subsidiarity, and consequently Deem et al. argue that   
the different motivations with which each level of government approaches subsidiarity are 
likely to colour public servants’ attitudes towards the principle, leading to difficulties in 
translating the principle into reform (2015, p.422). 
Even the latter studies say little about where these attitudes have come from: are there prevalent 
ideas that influence the way public servants go about their work?  How do they change over 
time and how do they translate into day to day decisions and strategies in intergovernmental 
management practice, including the issues I am pursuing here on the question of agency?  As 
Kay summarises, ‘the existing literature provides little on the relationship between 
intergovernmental processes and the socialisation of public servants from different 
jurisdictions towards a shared problem- solving perspective in Australia’ (2017, p. 39). 
Finally, with the exception of Arklay et al. (2017), few of these studies do more than touch 
tangentially on the practice of intergovernmental management, the day to day ‘structural 
considerations’ and the ‘behavioral and intellectual challenges that any good manager must 
take into account’(Lynn 2012, p. 23) that characterise this area of public administration.   
In summary, this is the primary research gap to which my data responds.  I aim to contribute 
not only to the small body of knowledge on this issue, but also, at least in part, to remedy the 
tendency to focus on central agencies and the Commonwealth; the lack of differentiation 
                                                 
20 In relation to the latter, Painter’s analysis of the work of central agencies in state governments (1987) is focused 
on intra-state coordination; he treats the overlapping responsibilities and agreement making processes of the 
federal system as a contextual challenge for the coordinating departments in his study but does not explore them 
in any detail. 
Gardening or engineering? A theoretical survey of federal dynamics and intergovernmental management 
28 
between policy areas; and the need for a discussion of the agency officials exercise and its 
implications of for broader questions about the federal system’s capacities. 
2.2.3 Federal dynamics and public administration 
Having explored the central element of the diagram in Figure 1, the remainder of this chapter 
explores the implications of federal dynamics for each of the major theoretical domains this 
research traverses. 
A starting point for this analysis is the dominant role played by Commonwealth and state 
government executive branches in managing the federation.  It has been argued that Australia 
has developed the institutions and processes of this ‘executive federalism’ more extensively 
than any other federation (Watts, cited in Menzies 2013, p. 383),21 with the normative 
consequences for Australian democracy I have described above.   
More recently, however, a developing focus on ‘governance’ in public administration has 
suggested a closer look at the way decision makers work and respond to a context of increasing 
interdependence between governments and other sectors (Clarke 2007, p. 55).  Issues of 
relevance to my research that arise from the executive branch’s domination include the 
implications for the practice of intergovernmental management, in terms of the relations 
between central and line departments, the way policies are made and by whom and the 
importance of networks amongst officials.  Accordingly, in this section I will link the earlier 
discussion of the ideational context inherent in federal dynamics to the bureaucracy of the 
Australian federation. 
The arena in Australian federalism for such strategies to form and play out is made up of a 
closely interlocking number of formal and informal elements.  The formal side comprises 
organisations and structures (COAG, ministerial councils and their supporting working groups, 
the Grants Commission, Productivity Commission and so on) and the processes and systems 
that constitute, give life to and support these structures (COAG’s National Agreements, 
Performance Reports and Dashboard, the vertical and horizontal processes of fiscal 
federalism). 
The informal side includes a stable system of networks and relationships that persist beyond 
the incumbency of particular individuals who inhabit particular offices; the interests, values 
                                                 
21 Simeon notes a similar centralisation in Canada, ‘undermining the potential agreement on substantive issues 
that might be achieved by line ministries sharing common policy objectives and political constituencies’ (2006, 
p. 326).  
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and norms that suffuse those networks and relationships and guide the behaviour of actors 
within them; and the history and culture of the Australian federal system that shape and are in 
turn shaped by the other elements listed here (perhaps ‘cultures’ is a better term, to differentiate 
the varying narratives, discourses and perspectives that obtain in different jurisdictions or 
organisational components). 
All of these components combine to form the ‘institution’ of federalism, noting March and 
Olsen’s caution that ‘the disentanglement of institutional effects is particularly difficult in 
multilevel and multicentered institutional settings’ (2009a, p. 8). Their use of the term 
‘institution’ specifically refers to  
a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in structures of 
meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and 
relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and changing 
external circumstances (2009a, p. 3). 
The components of this definition — the ‘rules’ and ‘organized practices’ that inform one 
another and, in turn, inform and are informed by ‘structures of meaning’ — are an important 
starting point for my analysis of the role of intergovernmental management in federal 
dynamics.  For the purposes of the analysis that follows, I have adopted a definition of rules as 
‘shared normative understandings about what a participant in a position must, must not, or may 
do in a particular action situation’ (Aligica & Tarko 2014, p. 64) which, consistently applied, 
generates the ‘organised practices’ of intergovernmental management. 
The interface between federal dynamics and public administration, with a focus on continuity 
and change in the federal system, brings together two sets of issues which I explore in the 
findings.  First, it raises questions about the reciprocal relationship between the federal 
system’s formal structures and processes and the broader ‘ideas’ that underpin and inform and 
are informed by them.  Second, such continuity and change reflects the way ideas become 
codified as norms and conventions in intergovernmental management, and thereby serve as 
cognitive filters through which officials understand their goals and interests and develop their 
strategies (Hay 2011, p. 69). 
There is, of course, nothing particularly new about this nexus of concepts.  Simeon’s classic 
study of intergovernmental management in Canada, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The 
Making of Recent Policy in Canada, is now almost half a century old.  And yet the questions 
he explored then, and in that context, around the relationship of federal structures to the 
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behaviour of decision-makers and ultimately to the kinds of policy which result (1972, p. 3) 
were ‘largely uncharted territory’ at the time, and still appear so today.22 
2.2.4 Federal dynamics and policy-making 
If the interface between Australian federalism and public administration is highly under-
researched, the same could not be said for the interface between federalism and Australian 
policy-making, at least since the 1990s.23  Writing in Publius in 1990, Chapman described how 
‘a recent resurgence of Australian interest in federalism has emerged from concern with the 
consequences of public policy, which has directed attention to outcomes rather than inputs’ 
(Chapman 1990, p. 70). This resurgence appears to reflect a broader trend in political science 
at the time of growing interest in the study of policy processes, outcomes and capacity in a 
federal context (Inwood et al. 2011; Béland & Lecours 2016, p. 684).   
 ‘Public policy is different in a federation’ concludes one such study (Davis et al. 1993, p. 67).  
Through its distribution of policy-making responsibilities, federalism ‘creates at least the 
possibility of greatly extending and complicating the stages of the policy cycle’ (Franks & 
Olson 1993, p. 17).  More recently, Béland and Chantal note that ‘a growing number of 
institutionalist scholars have explored the way in which federalism and other territorial 
arrangements shape regional identities while creating constraints and opportunities for interest 
groups and policy-makers’ (2004, p. 242).  These identities, at a jurisdictional level, form an 
important framework for the strategies and interests at play in intergovernmental management, 
as explored in the findings below. 
The study of federal dynamics adds further causal and temporal dimensions to the policy 
making cycle, because it is through specific policies and policy fields that the effects of federal 
dynamics are largely felt.  Thus, for example, Capano compares the impact of federal dynamics 
on the governance of education systems in federal states, focusing in the Australian case on the 
centripetal development of national education policy via intergovernmental relations (2015, 
p. 335).    
Much of the research in Australia on policy making in a federal setting has focused on the 
                                                 
22 It is interesting to note that the theoretical fields depicted in Figure 1, and their intersection, largely reflect 
Simeon’s framework comprising ‘a set of interdependent actors, or partisans; they operate within a certain social 
and institutional environment; they have an issue or set of issues on which they must negotiate; none has 
hierarchical control over the others; they have varying political resources; they use these resources in certain 
strategies and tactics; they arrive at certain outcomes’ (1972, p. 12). 
23 Although this area had previously experienced the same ‘general neglect of intergovernmental relations’ noted 
by Galligan, Hughes and Walsh at that time, by comparison with the US and Canada (1991, p. 4). 
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Commonwealth’s capacity to prevail where it has differences with the states in the formulation 
and implementation of particular national policies (Parkin 1996, p. 4).  Thus, in the area of 
economic reform, cooperation in the development of national regulatory frameworks has 
waxed and waned in the context of the prioritisation accorded to it by successive federal 
governments and their approach, seen by some as ‘creeping centralism under a collaborative 
guise’ (Painter cited in Stewart, 2000).   
However, other approaches have taken a more balanced approach, reflecting Poirier and 
Saunders’ call for greater ‘nuance’ in recognising the capacity for sub-national governments to 
influence federal directions in what they call the ‘federal balance’ (2015, p.494).  For example, 
Parkin and Summers note that ‘the quite distinctive South Australian history of public housing 
provision, though it has been significantly funded under [the national] tied grant scheme, is 
explicable largely by policy developments and priorities at the South Australian level’ (Parkin 
& Summers 1996, p. 60).  Smullen argues that ‘States/territories and professional actors in civil 
society have been formative in shaping the [Australian] national mental health agenda, thus 
challenging simplified notions of centralisation’ (2015, p. 280). Chappell’s work on the impact 
of feminist bureaucrats on social policies like child care, safe refuges and women’s health 
funding suggests they have tended to concentrate efforts at one level or the other as the 
overarching federal intergovernmental relationships and the preparedness of individual states 
to ‘go it alone’ have varied (Chappell 2002, p.163).   
Accordingly, a key issue raised in the relationship of federal dynamics and policy-making is 
the way periodic shifts in the centripetal or centrifugal nature of policy-making reflect changes 
to federalism’s structures, processes and political culture, both at any point in time and over 
time.  However, the way policies are developed in federal systems is generally analysed as an 
outcome either of the adoption of policies by political executives, or of blockages through the 
mobilisation of interests or formal systemic veto points.  Consequently, the role played by 
bureaucratic relationships and processes in policy formation is less well understood, including 
why they conceived of such alternatives in the first place, and how and why policies change in 
response to the changing views of policy actors, including bureaucrats (Béland 2009, p. 703).24  
A second issue in this nexus relates to the interaction between the content of policies and the 
federal structures and processes in which they are implemented.  Important research on this 
                                                 
24 Kingdon’s multiple streams analysis is an exception, which I discuss below. 
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issue by Peterson, Rabe and Wong (1986) proposed that the effectiveness of policies was a 
product of whether they were redistributive as opposed to developmental, and the extent to 
which their administration was by apolitical professional administrators rather than political 
appointees.  Their analysis is limited because it does not include regulatory-type policies, which 
are of much greater significance in Australian intergovernmental relations; regulated entities 
such as businesses have a much greater capacity to influence the policy agenda than the target 
populations for redistributive and developmental policies (Wanna 1991, p. 316). In general, 
then, we need to pay attention to the specific content of the policies over which officials are 
negotiating in looking at how these processes are affected by their federal settings. 
A third issue linking federal dynamics and policy-making relates to the way policies move 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and are taken up by the national system overall.  Hollander 
points out that, although policy transfer ‘forms one of the standard ‘bullet points’ in any 
description of the strengths of federal systems…few Australian scholars have directly explored 
the connection between federalism and policy experimentation’ (Hollander, 2013, p.129). 
Indeed, it took more than 40 years for the first comparative study of state political and 
administrative traditions in 1960 to be followed up (Wanna 2003, p. 418).   
The policy challenges I alluded to in the previous chapter, and the concurrent nature of the 
federal system, highlight the federal system’s capacity for policy transfer, experimentation and 
the role of the states as mediators and coordinators.  In turn, this points to an important role for 
the bureaucracy, as choices are made about inter-jurisdictional processes by which ‘knowledge 
about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political setting (past 
or present) is used in development of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and 
ideas in another political setting’(Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000, p.5).  These processes challenge 
the tendency for research on federal dynamics to focus on the impact of critical junctures and 
path dependency.  The processes of policy transfer and diffusion require the exercise of policy 
leadership at different jurisdictional levels and a role for policy entrepreneurs generally in 
policy learning, conducting research, experimentation, trialling, pilots and evaluation.  An 
interesting issue is the nature of shared regulatory space in a federation, particularly given 
Australia’s federal concurrency, and how policies reflect whether such spaces are overlapping, 
related, interacting or concurrent (Freeman & Rossi 2012, p. 125).25  
                                                 
25 Although they are not specifically applying these terms in a federal setting, Freeman and Rossi are nevertheless 
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A final issue raised in the research relates to the role and significance of vertical and horizontal 
policy networks (within and across the Commonwealth-state boundaries), in particular policy 
domains, including network characteristics such as policy actors and their tradable resources, 
preferences, strategies and perceptions of problems and solutions, plus any network-specific 
rules of interaction (Compston 2009; Smullen 2017). 
2.2.5 Policy and public administration 
The third nexus, between policy and public administration, involves questions of how the social 
and institutional environment of the federal system affects bureaucratic practice, and 
conversely how practice interacts with the substance of the policies on which 
intergovernmental managers are working.  As the policy agenda has grown in reach and 
complexity, the federal system has required and reflected broader developments in public 
administration that involve a shift from hierarchical to networked forms of governance, the 
negotiation of interests and the management of interdependencies and relationships (Painter 
1987; Rhodes 2016).  One implication of this development is a need for more research on how 
intergovernmental managers deal with divided and partial responsibility and shared 
accountabilities (Agranoff & McGuire 2004, p. 506). These issues are explored in detail in the 
findings that follow, including questions about how officials manage processes of control, 
coordination and innovation in an environment of overlapping policy and administrative 
complexity.   
The interface between policy work and public administration also raises issues about how the 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical aspects of intergovernmental management are related and 
negotiated, rather than focusing on one at the expense of the other.  For example, Colebatch 
(echoing Painter’s analysis described above) draws attention to the tension between a ‘vertical’ 
dimension in policy work structured through formal hierarchies of authority, and a ‘horizontal’ 
dimension focused on structured interaction (Colebatch 2006, p. 10).   
This corresponds well with the focus in this research on the way formal directions and 
frameworks, set by Commonwealth and state governments and central agencies, form a context 
for the networks of individual officials and their interactions.  Similarly, the findings here 
                                                 
addressing the shared regulatory space that results from the fact that in the US, as I have already alluded to in the 
Australian case, ‘all of the results that the federal government strives to achieve require the concerted and 
coordinated efforts of two or more agencies’ (US General Accounting Office, cited in Freeman and Rossi 2012, 
p. 1134). 
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explore the issue of when and how discretionary boundaries in intergovernmental management 
are set, particularly as officials exercise a range of policy roles that are not completely 
determined by the politics of the day but are vital to intergovernmental management: 
information gathering, communication, network management and so on.  Important parts of 
this lower level work contribute to higher level policy functions, such as the information 
gathering and collaboration necessary to support harmonisation initiatives.  
More recent work on the public administration/policy nexus by Sowa and Lu argues that 
questions about collaboration at higher or earlier stages of the policy cycle are quite different 
from those looking at collaboration used to deliver services on the ground (2017, p. 90).  This 
distinction is particularly relevant to federal systems, where collaboration is only one of many 
modes of interaction in a multi-jurisdictional structure.   
The issue of how policy problems are prioritised, defined and framed, at any one time and over 
longer periods, leads to a focus on federalism’s discursive aspects.  Hoppe describes policy 
making as the outcome of a ‘never-ending series of communications and strategic moves by 
which various policy actors in all kinds of forums of public deliberation and…policy 
subsystems construct intersubjective meanings’ (2011, p. 61) based on their desire to move 
politically salient problems into the ‘structured problem’ category.  This process highlights 
both the importance of framing and agenda setting in the federal setting (Menzies 2012b, p. 2) 
and the fact that such policy work is inherently a contested exercise requiring processes of 
negotiation between jurisdictions.  Accordingly, the application of a discursive perspective on 
federal dynamics is described in detail in Chapter 3.   
2.2.6 Federal dynamics and institutional resilience 
I indicated above that a particular question raised by federal dynamics is its focus on the 
relationship between the institutional and ideational layers of a federation.  In that context, 
Thelen and Karcher draw attention to a puzzle with implications for the study of federal 
systems overall, although they are specifically looking at the Bundesrat’s characteristic display 
of ‘surprising stability through unsettled times, and significant changes in periods of ‘normal 
politics,’ even under the guise of considerable formal institutional stability’ (2013, p. 136).26 
                                                 
26 For example, the decentralisation of Spain’s health system appears to present a case of major change coupled 
with stable institutions (Rico and Costa-Font 2005, p. 247).  In the Australian case, major change (such as the 
Commonwealth’s expanding use of its fiscal capacity and the reinterpretation of its powers) has tended to involve 
centralisation, while equally maintaining institutional stability. 
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These authors briefly refer to ‘the mechanics of reproduction’ as a possible explanation.  This 
term suggests we take a closer look at the issue of institutional resilience and what insights it 
might offer to a consideration of continuity and change in a federal setting. 
Broadly defined, institutional resilience is the capacity for reacting and adapting to sudden, 
unexpected environmental changes.  An institution is resilient to the extent that, despite such 
internally or externally generated shocks, it maintains its effectiveness over time (Aligica 2013, 
p. 109; Steinberg 2009, p. 65).   
Institutional resilience is still a relatively new body of work, emerging from the study of how 
ecological systems and societies interact (Aligica & Tarko 2014; Sjöstedt 2015; Steinberg 
2009).  A number of researchers, however, have pointed to its potential contribution to 
institutional theory more generally, particularly in relation to the Ostroms’ work on managing 
common resource problems (eg Aligica 2013, p. 103; Aligica & Tarko 2014, p. 54).   
First, from a normative point of view, the concept of resilience couples the temporal 
perspective of federal dynamics with the notion of performance and institutional long term 
viability (eg Aligica 2013, p.105).  Institutional resilience contrasts equilibrium and stability 
over the longer term against ‘pervasive political, economic, and cultural change and associated 
institutional turnover’ (Steinberg 2009, p. 63).  Similarly, a federation is ‘robust’ to the extent 
it maintains its functionality over time and despite internal or external shocks (Bednar 2014, 
p. 234).  This reflects the questions around Australian federalism’s performance and its 
capacity to respond to longer term challenges, as outlined in Chapter 1. 
Second, studies of federal dynamics generally focus on the process of constitutional 
amendment as an indicator and outcome of federal dynamic processes (Behnke & Benz 2009, 
p. 214).  Institutional resilience, on the other hand, is interested in how processes of 
institutionally fostered and incentivised learning and adaptation provide a balance between too 
much and too little change.  For example, Bednar points to policy subsidiarity as an opportunity 
for the federal system to learn more about its environmental challenges through 
experimentation and data collection (2014, p. 239).  These are matters of profound interest for 
the study of how the bureaucracy, as an institution in its own right, responds to challenges and 
shocks emanating from the federal system and from the polity more generally.  A particular 
focus for the interviews discussed in Chapters 4 to 6 is on the capacity for learning across 
intergovernmental networks. 
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Third, the body of work on institutional resilience lends a counterweight to the tendency in 
studies of federal dynamics to account for both institutions and ideas using the conceptual 
framework of historical institutionalism (eg Broschek 2013; 2010).27 Institutional resilience 
introduces an alternative set of explanations for change arising from the values that stimulate 
and guide actors faced with a choice between stasis and active institutional maintenance.   
This brings us to the final conceptual insights from institutional resilience, its focus on the rules 
that govern such adaptation and innovation.  This focus is derived from the new 
institutionalism’s general interest in formal and informal rules and their relationship to 
institutional change (Crawford & Ostrom 1995; Lowndes 1996; March & Olsen 2009b).  
Accordingly, rules (as defined in section 2.2.3 above) provide ‘the basic operational element 
in building or supporting resilience’ (Agilica & Tarko 2014, p. 64).  The latter authors note the 
risk of oversimplifying the complexity of this rules-resilience nexus, and counsel an approach 
based on trying to understand the dynamic problem of how these rules emerge (2014, p. 65).  
Accordingly, a discussion of the ‘rules-in-use’ formed an important component of the 
interviews I conducted with practitioners: the nature of these rules, how they reflect norms and 
values relevant to the federal system, how they inform actors’ strategies in the context of 
intergovernmental management and how they emerge and develop.28 
2.3 Structure and Agency 
2.3.1 Agency in a federal framework 
The proposition that the agency of officials has an important role to play in Australian federal 
dynamics raises the tectonic theoretical divide between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’.  Many 
prominent social scientists describe this as ‘the most important theoretical issue within the 
human sciences’ (McAnulla 2002, p. 271), although, as I have indicated, my research is also 
predicated on its practical significance. 
If the individual agency of officials matters, an important research question arises about how 
the relationship between federalism’s ideational and institutional perspectives bears on such 
agency, and how officials respond to those settings in their work.     
                                                 
27 Similarly, Simeon’s ‘postscript’ to his classic study of intergovernmental relations in the 1970s highlights path 
dependence as the cause of ‘this continuity of intergovernmental relations, in the face of the extensive changes 
that we have seen in Canada's social structure, economy, and international position’ (2006, p. 328). 
28 In effect, I was following Ostrom’s precept that understanding how rules-in-use structure an action situation 
requires the interview ‘to ask nonthreatening, context-specific questions about rule configurations’ (2007, p. 39).  
I discuss some issues involved in the concept of ‘rules-in-use’ at Chapter 3.2. 
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The relationship between structure and agency, and particularly how institutions structure 
behaviour but are themselves structured by behaviour, is a central analytic concern for 
institutionalism generally (Hay & Wincott 1998, p. 951; Hall & Taylor 1996, p. 939) and more 
specifically for the study of governance (Grin & Loeber 2007, p. 202).  Dowding considers the 
agent-structure problem as ‘solved’ by placing agents in highly structured contexts, while 
leaving room for agency in structural explanation (2008, p. 33).  Similarly, Hay suggests the 
relationship between structure and agency is not a ‘problem’ to which there is, or can be, a 
definitive solution, but as ‘a language by which ontological differences between contending 
accounts might be registered’ (Hay 2002, p. 91).  Thus, the relationship between structure and 
agency should not be seen as binary and exclusive, or one in which either structure or agency 
has primacy, but a way in which the relative impact of each side of this relationship has to be 
understood in terms of the specific context or problem being studied.   
However, if we are to use Hay’s ‘language’ in a way that contributes empirically to our 
understanding of the research question, we need to avoid what Archer calls ‘the fallacy of 
central conflation’, making structure and agency so inseparable that we are unable to identify 
whether their distinctive qualities bear differentially on the research question.  This would 
make it difficult, for example, to determine the relative contribution each makes to particular 
processes of change that a federation is undergoing (Archer 1996, p. 688; Rocco & Thurston 
2013, p. 56). 
Keeping the warning in mind that ‘conceptualizing agency is one of the oldest challenges 
within social science’ (Leipold & Winkel 2016, p. 1), I have defined agency as the abilities and 
capacities (the preconditions) and the strategies and actions (the outcomes) of individuals or 
groups to realise their intentions in an institutional context and, in so doing, to affect that 
context in ways that affect the possible actions of others.   
My definition of agency responds to Lieberman’s caveat that solely focusing on ideational 
accounts of change run the risk of getting it wrong: ‘ideas alone do not create the incentives or 
opportunities for action,’ he warns, ‘and not all holders of alternative political ideas act on 
them’ (2002, p. 698). Instead, I aim to leverage what Lieberman calls the ‘strengths of 
institutionalism’ by providing an account of what bureaucrats do as ‘purposive agents under 
structural constraints, of the aggregation of interests, of the distribution and exercise of power, 
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and of the social construction of political rationality’ (2002, p. 699).29  These constraints define, 
guide and motivate the range of actions available to these actors but are, in turn, affected and 
modified by these individuals and groups.  Accordingly, the findings that follow address the 
respective components of Lieberman’s ‘account’ in the above quote. 
A central concern of the research is the question of whether the federal system itself is to be 
treated as an exogenous factor or as ‘interpreted’ by officials.  On the one hand, there is clearly 
a federal ‘tradition’ that has shaped the Australian constitution, Senate, High Court decisions 
and fiscal processes (Rhodes 2005, p. 140).  But how officials understand that tradition, what 
they see as important in the federal system, and what it means for their work in 
intergovernmental management, was a central focus for the interviews and the findings 
reported below. 
Some insights into this question are provided by data from the Australian Constitutional Values 
Survey on the attitudes to federalism of people with experience working in government (Deem 
et al. 2015).  The data suggests that those who have worked at both the Commonwealth and 
state/territory level have a more ‘federalist’ view of the principles of subsidiarity, whereas 
those who have worked for the Commonwealth alone are more uncertain on the matter.  For 
my purposes at this stage, what I draw from this study is the way officials’ perceptions of the 
federal system, and the norms arising therefrom, are closely related to the jurisdictional and 
policy settings in which and on which they have worked, a matter that I explore in detail below. 
A second research question prompted by the relationship of structure and agency is the relative 
significance of the formal and informal institutions that constitute the federal system for the 
exercise of agency, and consequently for change or continuity in the federal system.  What, if 
any, is the relationship between the formal elements of the system and the agency of actors 
within it?  Do the informal elements of intergovernmental management allow greater individual 
interpretation of the relevant rules and conventions, and hence encourage the exercise of 
agency?  This is a specific focus for the discussion of the role of formal and informal structures 
in Chapters 4 and 5, including the impact of structural changes in the federal system such as 
                                                 
29 I note Power’s argument that ‘it is time that we put aside the distinction between Old and New Institutionalism. 
When the distinction was introduced in the 1980s…it was a useful one, but its continued use has made it too easy 
for valuable works to be ignored if they are cast in somewhat formalist terms. But we cannot gain a fuller 
understanding of governance without careful attention to formalities’ (Power, 2009, p. 383).  
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the abolition of a number of ministerial councils in April 2013.   
More broadly, the interviews explore the interrelationships between critical components of 
intergovernmental management such as the formal structures of the federal system, the way 
resources such as power, policy leadership and funding are distributed and allocated, and 
legitimacy expressed through communications between officials and between the executive 
and the public.    
Third, how is the capacity for the exercise of agency distributed within and across the federal 
system?  Can we simply assume that agency works differently at different levels, with higher 
levels of agency at the individual official’s more immediate, micro level, but with much less at 
macro levels of the federal system; or within jurisdictions, do officials in central agencies have 
a constraining capacity over the agency of those in line departments and agencies?  Again, 
these questions have implications for the dynamics of the Australian federation, not least 
because they suggest that change and continuity are not necessarily working in the same 
directions or with the same intensity in different parts of the system.  Moreover, such questions 
raise the issue of the implications of participants attaching different meanings to issues, 
agreements or events. 
Fourth, does change depend on the policy area (noting the discussion of policy content at 
section 2.2.4)?  For example, Encel hypothesises that the less a particular policy issue is a 
matter of electoral concern to the government of the day, the more bureaucratic agencies have 
the power to define the priorities in that area, or to reshape decisions made by politicians (Encel 
et al. 1981, p. xix).  Similarly, in analysing how the perceptions of US State government 
administrators ‘or how administrators view the world guides their actions and their 
relationships to other actors’, Cho and Wright find that different policy arenas, such as social 
security versus transport, and different types of state agencies, produced different forms of 
involvement with intergovernmental relations (Cho & Wright, 2004, p.452 n.1).   
The policy transfer literature has identified a number of significant constraints on the process,  
such as reluctance and resistance by the ‘receiving’ jurisdiction, practical difficulties in 
transferring policies from one jurisdiction to another, contextual factors such as path 
dependency and application constraints such as high transaction costs (Benson & Jordan 2011, 
p. 372).  Looking at policy transfer through the lens of practitioner agency and policy brokerage 
allows me to ask whether certain constraints are more prominent for particular practitioners as 
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part of the ‘rule’ structure or the decisions they have to make. 
Fifth, the context of public administration raises a set of issues specifically related to the nature 
of bureaucratic agency itself.   
Despite the limited study of intergovernmental management to date, a clear theme in these 
studies has been the differential roles played by central and line departments, and their different 
interests and perspectives (for example, see Poirier & Saunders, 2015; Harwood & Phillimore, 
2012; Botterill, 2007; Painter, 2001; Weller, 1996; similar issues in the Canadian case are 
discussed in Bakvis & Juillet 2004).  Painter, for example, attributes much of the greater 
collaboration during the 1990s to the leadership of central agencies at the Commonwealth and 
state levels, while at the same time describing how ‘officials in state government line 
departments such as health and education often have to be pulled back into line by central co-
ordinating agencies for being too cosy with their intergovernmental partners, to the detriment 
of their own government’s political strategy’ (2001, p. 140). 
Noting that ‘the evidence remains …quite inconclusive about the effects of formal structural-
organizational factors on the autonomy of agencies’ (Maggetti & Verhoest 2014, p. 247), a key 
issue relates to agency exercised not just as a matter of ‘actor level autonomy’, but the relative 
organisational autonomy exercised by officials working in central as opposed to line 
departments, or portfolio departments as opposed to statutory authorities.  Again, I have 
specifically discussed this issue in the findings below.   
Finally, in the discussion of my methodology in the next chapter, I distinguish the discursive 
institutionalist approach from other forms of institutionalism that de-prioritise agency, 
emphasising the ‘creative relationship’ between officials and their institutional environment 
(Grin & Loeber, 2007, p. 206). 
2.3.2 The role of change agents in intergovernmental management 
An important cluster of issues explored by federal dynamics that is relevant to my research 
relates to the interaction between the formal structures of a federation and its policy actors, 
particularly the extent to which the latter are ‘enabled to encounter institutional rigidities and 
to exploit their reconfigurative potential’ (Broschek 2011a, p. 540).  A focus on the role of 
change agents raises a different set of dynamics of change and stability from those typically 
examined through the lens of path dependency (Broschek 2013, p. 96; 2011a, p. 553); while 
the latter focuses on exogenous sources of change, the role of change agents highlights 
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endogenous change arising from their response to institutional constraints. As Aligica and 
Tarko put it in their discussion of institutional resilience, ‘what makes change endogenous and 
everlasting is the fact that people do not just passively obey the existing rules, but they also 
actively try to change those rules’ (2014, p. 57).  
One strand of such actor centred explanation focuses on actor-centred institutionalism which, 
in turn, is derived from rational choice theory (eg Scharpf 1997), and explains policy change 
in terms of the different resources and opportunities institutions afford actors in the policy 
making process (Boessen 2008; Sheingate 2003).  In the case of federal dynamics, the 
processes and outcomes of stability, change and adjustment are, to some degree, seen as a result 
of the ‘push and pull’ between status quo defending actors and entrepreneurial agents 
(Broschek 2011b, p. 666). 
There is an interesting dynamic at work in the role change agents play in intergovernmental 
management, as will be apparent when I look more closely at their roles and motivations in 
Chapter 6. Broschek suggests inter-state federations, with their dualistic allocation of 
responsibilities, weaker veto possibilities and high levels of statutory interpretation, are more 
amenable to conversion and hence offer more scope for individual agents of change (2011b, 
p. 679).  This suggests that if, as I have argued above, Australia’s federal culture tends towards 
an intra-state model, the role of change agents might be more constrained to a ‘layering’ role 
involving amendment and change to existing institutions, at least in terms of the historical-
institutionalist depiction of change agents (eg Mahoney and Thelen 2010, p. 15ff).  This 
proposition is tested in Chapters 4 and 6. 
My use of the term ‘change agents’ raises the cognate term ‘policy entrepreneur’, not least 
because of its use by Broschek and others in their discussion of federal dynamics (Broschek 
2011a, 2011b).  Wright makes an early reference to ‘intergovernmental relations entrepreneurs’ 
in his discussion of the importance of state government administrators (1978, p. 249).  More 
recently, the concept of policy entrepreneurs has appeared in ‘American Political 
Development’ theory in framing issues, defining problems, and influencing agendas (see, for 
example, Sheingate 2003, p. 188).  Agenda-setting raises Kingdon’s multiple streams analysis 
as the most common theoretical framework for understanding the role of policy 
entrepreneurs,30 and, consequently, it is in that context that I distinguish my use of the term 
                                                 
30 Cairney refers to policy entrepreneurs as ‘the heroes of the M[ulitiple] S[treams] A[nalysis] story’ (2018, p. 200) 
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‘change agent’ from that of ‘policy entrepreneur’.   
Kingdon’s approach to their role is predicated, first, on his interest in agenda-setting; he is 
generally not interested in bureaucrats as policy entrepreneurs because he is at pains to point 
out that bureaucrats, in his view, are not influential or active at that stage (Kingdon 2003, p. 30; 
Winkel & Leipold 2016, p. 110).  As a result, critiques of his analysis point to the lack of a 
detailed understanding of what agency means and how it actually works to open and couple 
streams and respond to policy windows (eg cf Mukherjee & Howlett 2015, p. 66). An example 
of this limitation is provided in the discussion in section 4.4.3 of the policy brokerage carried 
out by officials in intergovernmental bargaining and negotiating. 
Second, policy entrepreneurs in multiple streams analysis are typically coupling ‘problems, 
policies and politics’ during policy windows that open briefly because of a major political event 
or policy crisis (Kingdon 2003, p. 168; Ackrill et al. 2013, p. 873; Cairney 2018, p. 200).  
However, my focus on the practice of intergovernmental management is over much longer 
periods of institutional stability.   
Finally, Kingdon is only interested in ideas from an institutionally Darwinian perspective; ‘we 
focus on a more productive theoretical preoccupation’ he writes; ‘not on where ideas come 
from, but what makes them catch on and survive’ (2003, p. 226).  Again, from the point of 
view of federal dynamics’ incorporation of an ideational layer, it is important to understand 
where ideas came from too; as Schmidt argues in her critique of multiple streams analysis from 
a discursive institutionalist perspective, ideas don’t just float around waiting for policy 
windows to open; they may be opening because certain events or conditions are understood as 
an opportunity for change (including a reinstatement of stability) (2011, p. 108).  Consequently, 
a major focus for my interviews was on understanding where and how officials developed their 
understanding of the federal system and its processes and opportunities for change, which 
called for the discursive methodology described in the next chapter.31 
2.4 Chapter summary 
In Chapter One, I set out the normative basis for my research, in the potential for changes to 
the way intergovernmental management is practiced in Australia to contribute to its federal 
system; essentially, fitting ‘new chariot wheels’ to the directions Australian federalism might 
                                                 
31 A similar critique of the notion of the ‘hero entrepreneur’ is made by critical realist theory that emphasises the 
importance of understanding how such entrepreneurs discover or develop their ideas (eg Leca & Naccache 2006). 
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take in the future. 
Beginning with the proposition that understanding change in federal systems is intrinsically 
difficult, I have turned in this chapter to the theoretical handholds and footholds by which we 
might address that difficulty.    
This research is predominantly based on the concept of federal dynamics as a systematic 
approach to understanding what changes within federal systems.  I have noted two important 
research gaps that might constrain the application of federal dynamics theory to bureaucratic 
practices.  The first is the tendency for research on federal dynamics to highlight the political 
aspects of intergovernmental relations, subsuming bureaucratic agency and capacity within that 
context.  The second is the absence of a systematic tradition of research into intergovernmental 
management in Australia.  The chapter has addressed the proposition that this research gap 
matters; that is, that this lack of research into intergovernmental management in Australia is 
not simply because this aspect of the federal system has little of interest for scholars of 
federalism and public administration. 
The importance federal dynamics theory accords to the relationship between the institutional 
and ideational layers of the federal system also generates a research question about how this 
applies in Australia’s case, and consequently what implications this might have for the practice 
of intergovernmental management.   
I then linked the study of federal dynamics to broader research traditions in public 
administration, policy development and on federalism generally. A key theme arising from the 
interface between federal dynamics and those theoretical domains relates to the question of 
how individual agency relates to, is constrained by and depends upon the structures and 
processes of the federal system.  Relates issues canvassed in this chapter include the role of 
ideas and values in generating change or maintaining stability and institutional resilience, and 
congruent research on policy entrepreneurship.  
A key issue in the theoretical interface between federal dynamics and policy-making is how 
the federal system’s structures, processes and political culture affect the way policies are made 
and applied, at any point in time and over time.  Accordingly, this chapter has explored the role 
played by bureaucratic relationships and processes in cross-jurisdictional policy formation, 
including how officials identify policy priorities and alternatives, and how and why policies 
change in response to these changing views.  The chapter has also explored questions about 
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when and how the boundaries on discretion in intergovernmental management are set, and how 
officials manage coordination and innovation in a federal environment characterised by policy 
and administrative complexity.   
Finally, I distinguish between the traditional emphasis placed by federal dynamics theory on 
exogenous sources of change, as highlighted by historical institutionalism, and how the role of 
officials as change agents switches the focus to endogenous sources of change as they respond 
to institutional constraints.  That shift introduces the discursive methodology discussed in the 
next chapter.      
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Chapter 3 
Methodology and Data: a discursive institutionalist approach to 
intergovernmental management 
The preceding chapter discussed the theoretical settings for this research in the study of federal 
dynamics.  That body of research focuses both on the formal institutions and frameworks of 
federal systems, particularly constitutions and formal intergovernmental rules, and the informal 
processes and dynamics that make up much of the ‘real-life practice of administrators, policy-
makers, groups and citizens’ (Colino 2010, p. 22).   
As outlined in this chapter, the methodology adopted for this research approaches the practice 
of intergovernmental management from a discursive perspective in which officials are 
constrained, supported, informed and guided by prevalent discourses in federalism, policy and 
public administration.  The strengths and risks of this methodology are canvassed, and 
alternative methodologies are briefly examined.  
3.1 A discursive institutionalist methodology 
3.1.1 The application of discursive analysis to federal dynamics  
Much of the federal dynamic literature focuses on macroscopic systemic changes: 
constitutional change, judicial interpretation, formal intergovernmental agreements, fiscal 
federalism, delegation of powers from one level to the other, and asymmetry (Simeon 2001, 
p. 147ff).  The methodology that accompanies such analysis typically adopts a historical 
institutionalist framework (eg see Broschek 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2013) that sees federal 
dynamics characterised by path dependency and periods of equilibrium punctuated by critical 
junctures brought about by exogenous factors in ‘the economic, cultural, social, and global 
environment in which federalism is embedded’, embodied in a crisis or external shock where 
‘citizens and leaders alike come to perceive that the institutions designed to serve them are 
failing to do so’ (Simeon 2001, p. 145).  As noted in Chapter 2, this raises the question of why 
some institutions remain stable despite ‘massive’ periods of upheaval, and how gradual change 
may still take place despite apparent institutional equilibrium (Thelen & Karcher 2013, p. 118). 
A second stream in the federal dynamics corpus relates to the endogenous sources of change 
arising from informal institutional processes and interactions that take place in federal systems, 
often in response to the formal constraints posed by constitutions, legislation and rules (Colino 
2010, p. 22).  Colino notes that ‘Bureaucrats and politicians have frequent interactions and 
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working relationships in the course of adopting and implementing policies. Actors develop 
informal strategies and norms within intergovernmental decision structures through 
administrative or partisan arenas or through personal contacts’ (2010, p. 22).  Accordingly, this 
stream focuses on change emanating from specific strategic decisions or policies adopted by 
concrete political actors at certain moments in time (Colino 2010, p. 18; Broschek 2013, p. 96).  
Such change is characterised by the incremental development of institutional components of 
the system.32  The associated methodology consequently adopts the incrementalist aspects of 
historical institutionalism that emerged in response to critiques of the methodological 
constraints of path dependency and punctuated equilibrium (Broschek 2013, p. 96).   
At this point, however, a shortcoming arises in the capacity of the older forms of neo-
institutionalism to deal with personal agency, because they posit institutions as structures 
external to agents, with rules set exogenously as constraints, whether as rationalist incentives, 
path-dependent trajectories or cultural norms.  A focus on bureaucratic agency, in particular, 
goes beyond the mechanisms of change posited in the institutionalist tradition for the following 
reasons. 
First, in line with its general adoption of a historical institutionalist lens, federal dynamics 
research subsumes bureaucratic agency and capacity within the general framework of 
collective political actors, occluding the bureaucracy’s specific contribution and role.  Second, 
federal dynamics places a priority on understanding how the institutional and ideational layers 
are related.  How this works in Australia, and consequently what implications this might have 
for the practice of intergovernmental management, requires a methodology that is particularly 
responsive to the ideational component of federalism.  Finally, Thelen and Karcher’s question 
about the possibility of change despite (or even possibly leveraging) formal institutional 
stability raises similar questions about the role of ideational factors and their effect on federal 
institutions and processes in generating such change. 
Accordingly, if we are to focus on individual practice and agency, explanation lies in the 
interaction between ‘the consciousness of agents and the relevant strategic, that is to a large 
extent discursive, context’ (Marsh 2010, p. 219 - my emphasis; Schmidt 2010, p. 14).  
Similarly, Wright considered ‘the human dimension - the activities and attitudes of the persons 
                                                 
32 In the Australian case, Galligan similarly contrasted processes of punctuated equilibrium with those of 
incremental change, although he was writing about constitutional developments (2008, p. 621). 
Chapter 3 
47 
occupying official positions in the units of government under consideration’ to be a defining 
feature of this system (1978, p. 9).  In so doing he echoed Anderson’s call for a focus on the 
human dimension of the federal system that I have already noted at Chapter 2.1.33 
Ostrom provides a good summary of what institutionalism in general offers to support a focus 
on agency.  She defined institutions as "the shared concepts used by humans in repetitive 
situations organized by rules, norms, and strategies." (Schlager 1999, p. 308).  How these 
concepts arise in a federal setting, how they relate to the ‘formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity’ (Hall 
& Taylor 1996, p. 938) and are then used in policy work, is precisely the problem of interest 
here.   
More broadly, Schmidt’s four elements of discursive institutionalism are particularly apposite 
for the study of intergovernmental management: in the discursive framework, ideas and 
discourse ‘are taken seriously’; they are set in an institutional context with one or more of the 
older forms of institutionalism as background; discourse follows a ‘logic of communication’; 
and discursive institutionalism takes ‘a more dynamic view of change, in which ideas and 
discourse overcome obstacles’ that the older institutionalisms posit as insurmountable (or at 
least take as a given set of constraints on agency). 34 As Schmidt argues, ‘institutions are 
internal to sentient agents, serving both as structures (of thinking and acting) that constrain 
action and as constructs (of thinking and acting) created and changed by those actors’ (2008, 
p. 304; 2010, p. 14). 
Over the past decade, a burgeoning body of work in discursive institutionalism has illuminated 
and explained major processes of policy change.35  A number of these studies have looked at 
these policies in a federal setting, including multi-level governance studies of the Eurozone 
(Schmidt, 2017a) and EU trade policy (De Ville & Orbie, 2014).  However, there has been very 
                                                 
33 In a similar vein, Burgess notes that ‘change and development remain the most difficult aspects to explain and 
understand in the study of federal political systems’ and suggests that ‘the notion of federalism as political 
ideology can provide a useful route into this complicated area’ (1993, p.107). 
34 I would briefly note here the congruence between the notions of ‘discourse’ and ‘ideas’, with ideational 
approaches, in Carstensen’s formulation, being ‘less reluctant’ to focus on strategic, actor-oriented change in 
policy processes (2011, pp.603-604).  
35 Including environmental and climate policy (Gillard, 2016; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Leipold, 2014; Lorenzoni 
& Benson, 2014; Mert, 2009); domestic and multinational economic policy (De Ville & Orbie, 2014; Hope & 
Raudla, 2012; Schmidt, 2017a); transport (Palmer, 2010); housing (Jacobs, Kemeny, & Manzi, 2003); drugs 
(Lancaster & Ritter, 2014); immigration (Boswell & Hampshire, 2016) and even Brexit and Trump’s election 
(Schmidt, 2017b). 
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little application of a discursive lens to federal dynamics in particular, or even of federalism 
generally (Borriello’s & Crespy’s study (2015) of French and German approaches to EU 
integration is an interesting exception).  I have not identified any discursive institutionalist 
studies thus far of intergovernmental management.36   
In their cross-country study of trends and dynamics in intergovernmental financial relations, 
Eccleston et al. conclude that ‘an ‘actor-centred’ institutionalism approach will provide rich 
insights into the path ways to federal reform’, but note that more research is needed to 
understand how actors exercise their agency in interpreting the political and institutional 
context and constructing strategies for change (2016, p. 13).  In her work on EU public policy, 
Saurugger argues similarly for an ‘actor-centred constructivism’ to help conceptualise 
institutional complexity (2013, p. 901). 
A discursive methodology is also particularly relevant for examining the subset of issues on 
institutional resilience introduced in Chapter 2.  Institutional stability may be the product of 
path dependency; however, as we have seen, stability may not deliver institutional resilience.  
The interviews illustrated the choice many officials face in intergovernmental management 
between stasis and a more active form of institutional maintenance, requiring them to take steps 
to maintain networks and policy productivity where they perceive these are becoming 
degraded.  Such choices are patterned by the ‘rules-in-use’ which, as I have suggested, are the 
focus of the discursive approach adopted here.  
Accordingly, this research aims to contribute both to our insights into federal dynamics, and 
on the methodological front to the development of discursive institutionalism through its 
application to, and testing in, a comparatively new field for the framework. 
3.1.2 Discursive content and process 
Discursive institutionalism is interested in the content of ideas, but also in the way ideas are 
communicated and exchanged as a stimulus for political change (Schmidt 2010, pp. 2-3).  
Discursive practices are informed by ideas at the systemic and cross-jurisdictional level, down 
to organisational and even sub-organisational levels, generating what Hajer calls 
‘communicative networks among actors with different or at best overlapping perceptions and 
understandings’.  The way such networks operate, and the content of their frameworks and 
                                                 
36 In correspondence with me, Professor Schmidt confirmed that she ‘had not seen a piece on DI focused on 
intergovernmental relations in a federal system per se’ (correspondence dated 23/2/17) 
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outputs, are ‘the prime vehicles of change’ in the multi-jurisdictional governance frameworks 
of interest to my research (Hajer 1995, p. 63) and form the basis of the findings detailed in 
Chapters 4 and 5.  For example, the networks discussed in Chapter 5 illustrate Hajer’s notion 
of ‘discourse coalitions’ as particular communicative networks bound by a common set of 
‘story lines’ and acting on that understanding (1995, p. 58ff.).   
The federal system offers a fruitful and varied set of discourses for examination, and 
consequently the different forms such discursive content and discursive practice can take, and 
the interplay between them, are a useful element in the discursive methodology employed here.   
Discursive institutionalism sees federal structures as embodiments of ideas which, in Blyth’s 
terms, ‘give substance to interests and determine the form and content of new institutions’ (as 
discussed in Bell 2011, p. 887).  Federalism as an ‘idea’ is more than just a set of constitutional, 
legal and political structures and processes that determine the interests and motives of the 
political and bureaucratic actors within it; it is, in Hay’s terms, an ‘irredeemably ideational’ 
environment (2011, p. 67) in which ideas and discourses are an engine of change during periods 
of both uncertainty and crisis (eg Blyth, 2002) and stability (eg Carstensen, 2011).   
Discourse as content and as process operates at different levels of generality and influence that 
Schmidt categorises as ‘policies, programs, and philosophies’ (2008, p. 306).  These help 
explain one of the key themes emerging from my interviews, the way public servants draw 
from higher-level federal perspectives and narratives, and the policies and programs these 
generate (‘states’ rights’, ‘subsidiarity’, ‘harmonisation’, ‘cooperative federalism’ and so on).  
They then apply these to specific policy processes using ‘paradigms that reflect underlying 
assumptions or organizing principles’ (Schmidt 2008, p. 306).  These policy solutions 
correspond closely to the ideational strategies adopted by actors in a federal dynamics 
framework.   
It is also important to note that, as potential areas for the exercise of agency, policy ideas are 
more labile, or at least open to change, than programmatic ideas, and both policy and program 
ideas change more rapidly than the more fundamental philosophies from which they emerge 
(Schmidt 2011, p. 108).  Some of these ideas operate at Schmidt’s higher ‘philosophical’ level 
and some at lower programmatic and policy levels, allowing us to see individual agency 
working differently and with wider or narrow possibilities at these different levels.  For 
example, Deem et al. find that public servants make a clear distinction between their view of 
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subsidiarity in principle (corresponding to a ‘philosophical’ paradigm in Schmidt’s terms), and 
their more practical concerns and approaches when thinking about particular policy problems 
(2015, p. 432).  At the meso-level and particularly at the issue-based policy levels, the potential 
for agency is at its widest and hence the possibilities for change are also most apparent.   
My approach has therefore been to examine how these discursive levels are reflected in the 
way the interviewees understand their roles and are guided by norms and values that are not 
uni-dimensional but require choices to be made amongst them (such choices themselves 
representing a form of agency).  
Discursive institutionalists also distinguish coordinative discourse, between ‘individuals and 
groups at the center of policy construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration, and 
justification of policy and programmatic ideas… on the basis of shared cognitive and normative 
ideas about a common policy enterprise’ from communicative discourse, a political process 
involving ‘the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the general 
public’ (Schmidt 2008, p. 310). Again, such differences generate a potential space for the 
exercise of agency where different governments adopt different ‘communicative discourses’, 
or different coordinative and communicative discourses, requiring a ‘discursive space’ in 
which to sort this out.   
Differentiating between these discursive forms and levels suggests one approach to the problem 
of change occurring in federal systems despite apparent systemic stability.  Different rates of 
change are recognised at different levels of the ideational layer, suggesting at least the 
possibility of a systemic capability for incremental improvement and individual creativity, even 
if overall change in the federal system is glacial and highly exposed to political interests and 
dynamics.37 As illustrated in the findings that follow, change occurs as individuals engaged in 
intergovernmental management generate cognitive and normative ideas about their work that 
are disseminated and guide the work of others; or, in terms of content, where different elements 
are added to existing ideas, ‘thereby bringing about change in ideas incrementally even in times 
of stability, and not just at critical junctures during ‘paradigm’ shifts’ (Schmidt 2010, p. 14). 
 
                                                 
37 For example, Schmidt (2017a, p. 460) argues that rapidly changing policy ideas in the Eurozone crisis  
‘demonstrate the creativity of agents’ ideas, beyond what might have been expected within the context of long-
accepted frames and paradigms, let al.one the deeper, slowly evolving philosophical ideas’. 
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3.2 Methodology and data 
3.2.1 Research method 
The research methodology focuses on elite interviews, as these are used ‘whenever it is 
appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic at hand’ (Leech 2002, p. 663) and 
there is a need to move beyond the official recorded version of events in order to understand 
the underlying context and its role in guiding participants’ actions (Tansey 2007, p. 8). 38   
At the heart of the question of agency are the informal ‘rules-in-use’ in the practice of 
intergovernmental management, the ‘distinctive ensemble of dos and don’ts that one learns on 
the ground’ (Ostrom, cited in Lowndes & Pratchett 2005, p. 10).  In other words, these rules 
are specifically distinguished from the ‘rules-in-form’ that are formally constructed and written 
down, such as constitutional clauses, intergovernmental agreements or the general framework 
of policies and regulations that govern the public sector (eg see Lowndes & Roberts 2013, 
p. 53).   
It is how, where, when and why these rules-in-use are applied that helps us to understand how 
agency arises, is configured by and works with the structures and processes of federalism.  As 
March and Olsen put it in their defining work on institutionalism, ‘describing behavior as rule 
following is only the first step in understanding how rules affect behavior’. They point to a 
panoply of actions and constructions by which a logic of appropriateness is implemented in the 
face of conflict and ambiguity (March & Olsen 2009b, p. 694) — conflict and ambiguity being 
very much characteristics of intergovernmental relations in a federal system.  Agency in 
intergovernmental management is, therefore, about public servants asking themselves the 
following kinds of questions March and Olsen raise: what kind of a situation is this? Who am 
I?  How appropriate are different actions for me in this situation? What is most appropriate?  
Rules-in-use also reflect a ‘logic of consequentiality’, in terms of how they guide a choice 
among potential outcomes in terms of one’s values or goals, whether they be personal, 
organisational, or programmatic.   
A key focus for the interviews was the nature of the relationship between these two logics, their 
relative importance in different settings, how public servants assess their options against each 
                                                 
38 See Littig (2009) for a discussion of the commonalities and differences in the respective traditions of 
interviewing experts in German-speaking countries, and of interviewing elites in Anglo-American countries.  
Interestingly, this corresponds to the practices in the former that are tied to the logic of appropriateness, while 
practice in the latter is tied to the logic of consequences (March & Olsen 2009b, p. 701). 
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set of criteria and what resources each requires.   
The interviews aimed to get practitioners to reflect on those questions, and to ask, in relation 
to intergovernmental management practices, ‘how are things done around here?’ and ‘why did 
you do this and not that?’(Lowndes & Pratchett 2005, p. 8; Rhodes 2016, p. 645).  As Ostrom 
explains: ‘In settings where the rules-in-use have evolved over long periods of time and are 
understood implicitly by participants, obtaining information about rules-in-use requires 
spending time at a site and learning how to ask nonthreatening, context-specific questions about 
rule configurations’ (Ostrom 2011, p. 21).   
Or, as a state government department head put it more succinctly, 
If there is no manual for the federation, then there is no professional development program related 
to the manual for the federation. It is very much on the job and it’s l-o-r-e, not  
l-a-w. (Interview 18, State central department) 
The interviews served as primary ‘texts’ for identifying the way practitioners construed the 
intergovernmental policy and public administration problems to be solved; how in 
collaboration, or at least communication with other actors, they applied discourses operating 
in the federal system generally, and within the particular policy fields in which they working, 
to identify and pursue what they saw as appropriate courses of action; the practices and 
strategies they devised and applied; and how they evaluated the outcomes of those decisions.   
As an illustration of the complexity of these issues and ideas, Figure 3 provides an example, 
taken at random, from the coding of one interview.  The bars to the right of the text represent 
themes and ideas to which codes were allocated, on the basis of their relevance to the research 
(the coding process is discussed further in the next section). The ideas contained in the text, as 
highlighted by these coding bars, are overlapping, numerous and concentrated, suggesting that 
particular ideas are a product of more than one narrative or level of discourse, and may contain 
intrinsic tensions and balances.  What officials said and how they said it, in terms of the 
complex, interwoven ideas, values and terminologies they traverse, provided a direct insight 
into the research questions and issues, in words and voices the following chapters bring to the 
fore. 
3.2.2 Selection of interviewees 
It was axiomatic that more senior public servants will have more organisational and 
institutional resources at their disposal and hence more personal agency, potential or actual.  
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With hindsight, this appears to have been a simplistic assumption.  This issue is explored 
further in the findings, particularly in relation to setting up and participating in networks at 
lower organisational levels. 
Figure 3:  Example of thematic density in interview data 
 
Beyond seniority, the selection of interviewees was based on a ‘vertical’ jurisdictional 
distribution and a ‘horizontal’ policy distribution.  The former involved a selection of public 
servants from the Commonwealth, state and territory governments, ensuring comparisons 
could be made between those from larger and smaller sub-national jurisdictions, and testing 
the proposition that factors such as resourcing might differentially enable the exercise of 
agency.  In other words, the research explores the extent to which smaller jurisdictions, because 
they had fewer resources they could allocate to intergovernmental management, had to follow 
the lead of the larger jurisdictions.  The research also explores issues of whether there are 
jurisdiction-specific cultures that affect and inform individual strategic choices.39 
A second criterion in the vertical axis of selection related to whether the interviewee worked 
for a central or a line department (with agencies such as Environment Protection Agencies 
included in the latter, although the distinction between line departments and statutory 
                                                 
39 While I might have included additional interviewees from the remaining states, there was a clearly diminishing 
return on the number of new issues that that would have identified.   
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authorities is examined in detail in section 4.5.2).  This sampling balanced the greater attention 
paid to central departments in the literature to date, as discussed in Chapter 2 above, and 
allowed a number of propositions to be explored around the comparative levels of agency 
exercised by officials working in central as opposed to line departments and agencies.  Issues 
here included whether officials in central agencies had greater scope for their personal initiative 
because of the influence central agencies wield, and because they had access to jurisdiction-
wide perspectives and strategies.  The research also tested the extent to which officials in 
central agencies across the Commonwealth-state divide might make common cause against 
their respective colleagues in line departments (Harwood & Phillimore 2012, p. 7; Botterill 
2007, p. 195; cf Inwood et al. 2011, p. 68 for the Canadian example of this issue). 
A total of 42 interviewees ultimately formed the interview sample.  A summary of the 
jurisdictional distribution of interviewees is at Table 1.  A de-identified list of interviewees, 
including details on their seniority, department type and policy specialisation is provided at 
Appendix 3. 
In addition, four retired officials who had been very senior in their respective jurisdictions were 
interviewed to test the propositions coming forward in the main interview data.  Where 
appropriate, I have included some of their comments in the empirical findings below. 
Table 1: Interviewees by jurisdiction and agency type 
Jurisdiction 
 Central 
departments 
Line 
departments 
and statutory 
agencies 
 
Totals 
Commonwealth 
 
3 8 11 
NSW 4 5 9 
Vic 3 7 10 
SA 2 6 8 
Territories 2 2 4 
States & 
Territories 
 
11 20 31 
Total 14 28 42 
 
The interviews were generally an hour long.  Interviewees were provided with an indicative 
questionnaire beforehand to encourage them to reflect on the issues that would be explored at 
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the interview (Appendix 2).  After the interviews, they were given a copy of the transcripts to 
provide any additional comments or clarify matters they felt had not come through clearly. 
Remarkably, all but two of the 33 interviewees who provided information on the length of time 
they had been working on intergovernmental management had done so for more than 5 years; 
just over half of them for more than 10 years (with no difference between the Commonwealth 
and states in this regard).  In other words, longevity and specialisation in the role is a 
characteristic of intergovernmental managers generally, and this particular cohort of 
interviewees was typical in this regard.   
The contribution mobility provides for the establishment of networks and the development of 
interpersonal trust was discussed in the conclusions to Chapter 5.  In terms of their mobility 
across jurisdictions, 16 of the 29 interviewees who provided information on how many 
jurisdictions they had worked for at any level reported working for more than one; in other 
words, an important part of their specialisation in intergovernmental management had probably 
been developed through working for more than one government.  Of that group, 13 had done 
so by working for both the Commonwealth and a state or territory government.   
3.3 Data coding 
The interviews were coded using NVivo software (2015) around Lynn’s tripartite framework 
for public management, comprising ‘structures’, ‘craft’ and ‘institutions’ (2006).  ‘Structures’ 
were further divided into formal and informal elements of the federal system.  Coding around 
‘craft’ included the more quotidian concerns of the practices of intergovernmental 
management, detailed further in Chapter 5.   
Within these broad dimensions, coding was applied to the interviewees’ ideas, values, 
assumptions and perceptions about the federal system, and the appropriate role of government 
and bureaucracy in that framework. 
As the coding progressed, additional codes were added, based on what the interviewees 
themselves were saying that appeared again and again across the interviews, eventually 
forming a framework of themes for the findings presented and discussed in subsequent chapters 
(these are listed at Appendix 4).   
These additional themes included how officials thought about particular policy problems; their 
ideas about which policy ends and objectives should be pursued; and about the appropriate 
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policy ‘means’ to achieve those ends.   
Discursive analytical techniques were used to identify the prevailing discourses themselves, 
particularly as they divided into the three levels at which they operate posited by Schmidt 
(2008).  Coding encompassed conflicts between discourses as noted by the interviewees 
themselves, and for discourse-related practices such as consciously crafting and disseminating 
discursive content. 
Finally, an important part of the coding effort was applied to the particular examples and 
narratives interviewees supplied of where and how they had personally developed and 
implemented strategies in their work. 
3.4 Methodological limitations and caveats 
‘There is nothing inevitable about discourse’ as Schmidt argues succinctly; it can exert a causal 
influence on policy change, but may at other times simply reflect the interests of key 
stakeholders or echo institutional path dependencies (2002, p. 169). 
Using a discursive methodology therefore has a number of limitations and associated caveats 
related to this research.  
First, discursive institutionalism has been criticised for downplaying, or completely eliding the 
role of agency in allowing actors to choose between strategies and ideas rather than simply 
somehow absorbing them from the surrounding institutional settings.40 
The opposite critique is that discursive institutionalism overplays, rather than downplays, the 
role of agency, by focusing too much on the transformative power of the ideas that individual 
agents have and use and not enough on the immediate or wider social and political structures 
which shape and channel agents’ powers.  As a result, discursive institutionalism fails to pay 
sufficient attention to where such ideas come from, and how they possess an intersubjective, 
structural quality derived from material and objective interests (for example, Larsson 2015, 
p. 191).  Indeed, Schmidt acknowledged that discursive institutionalism can ‘go wrong’ when 
it fails to pay sufficient attention to the issues of power and position and the way institutions 
and cultural frameworks affect how ideas are expressed and where they come from (Schmidt 
                                                 
40 For example, Checkel warned that ‘Without more sustained attention to agency, [constructivist] scholars will 
find themselves unable to explain where their powerful social structures (norms) come from in the first place and, 
equally important, why and how they change over time’ (1998, p. 339; see also Carstensen 2011).  This question 
about the causal mechanism of change is, of course, of primary interest for federal dynamics. 
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2010, p.21).   
A related critique might therefore be that the methodology adopted here has failed to harness 
the insights from other forms of new institutionalism, or other theories more generally, to flesh 
out the structure/agency relationship.  Rational choice theory, in particular, might contribute 
insights into the bargaining behaviours and strategies adopted by officials in the course of their 
work.  
As Blyth puts it in his critique of rational choice theory, however, ‘structures do not come with 
an instruction sheet’: specifying interests, and hence what people do, is less about a priori 
structural determination and more about the construction of wants as mediated by beliefs and 
desires (i.e., ideas) (2003, p. 697).  The meaning and ramiﬁcations of structural dynamics need 
to be worked out ‘‘on the ground’’ by the agents in question.  Consequently, while structures 
are significant, their account of interests or preferences is incomplete and, in understanding 
intergovernmental management, ‘what government policymakers actually think and the inter-
subjective contexts in which they operate is a crucial part of the equation’ (Bell 2012, p. 665).  
As the data from the interviews makes clear, officials are not asking themselves ‘what are my 
interests?’ (or at least, only asking that as a very minor part of their overall calculus), but rather 
‘what is my role in this system and how am I expected to behave in circumstances such as 
this?’ (representing, in theoretical terms, the difference between a logic of consequence and a 
logic of appropriateness [March & Olsen 2009b, p.701]). 
As noted in Chapter 1, federalism is not a static set of institutions but a process.  Consequently, 
a further problem with rational choice theory is its failure to deal with the temporal dimension, 
whereby systemic changes over time might change the relevant actors’ interest calculus (Bell 
2002, p.478).     
Finally, a substantial proportion of interviewees specifically mentioned the importance of trust 
as a form of social capital in intergovernmental management.  There is a question about the 
extent to which rational choice theory can help us to understand the role trust and other 
collaborative values might play in shaping behaviour, particularly in the settings of the 
Westminster system.41   
                                                 
41 Thus, Zey argues ‘trust itself is a relationship between individuals, and cannot be presupposed without violating 
the tenets of rational choice theory’ (1992, p.18).  It is telling that there appears to be very little interpretive content 
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Responding to the risks of either under or overplaying the role of individual agency requires 
showing ‘empirically how, when, where, and why ideas and discourse matter for institutional 
change, and when they do not’ (Schmidt 2010, p. 21); in other words, the task is to show how 
the institution of federalism has both constraining and enabling effects, limiting some forms of 
agency and enhancing other forms. Accordingly, the methodology adopted here gets down to 
a level where we can examine both how agents deal with and are embedded within what Bell 
calls an ideational realm, while also showing ‘how such agents shape and in turn are shaped 
by wider institutional and structural environments’ (Bell 2012, p. 666).   
A second issue arises from the risk that ‘bottom up’ findings are too idiosyncratic to allow for 
generalisation, let alone add to the theoretical underpinnings of either federal dynamics or 
discursive institutionalism (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 547).  A related criticism, particularly from a 
historical institutionalist perspective, might be that this research is a snapshot of a particular 
set of federal institutional dynamics at this time.   
There are two points that might be made in response to such critiques.  The first is that if the 
system only changes incrementally it is likely that the factors affecting agency will change 
incrementally as well.  Second, and more broadly, adopting a discursive institutionalist 
methodology does not preclude an analysis of significant systemic developments over time; 
indeed, by making discourses themselves a focus of study we may have a window onto change 
that other methodologies deny us.  As the authors of a recent study of European integration 
have argued 
while part of leader’s discourse is inherited from history and national political cultures, thus 
entailing a path dependent logic, discourse is also strategically used by political actors in order to 
reconfigure their interests and can thus explain institutional and policy change (Borriello & 
Crespy 2015, p. 506). 
A third methodological critique points to the risk of post-hoc rationalisation by the actors, given 
the complexities of the issues and situations they were confronting (Mikecz 2012, p. 491). 
Interviewing very senior officials in their capacity as experts on intergovernmental 
management has both benefits and risks.  With over one-third of interviewees being either the 
head or deputy head of their organisation, and all but a handful of interviewees in the senior 
executive services of their respective jurisdictions, they have a systemic perspective on and 
                                                 
in the vast rational choice literature being produced, suggesting that, pace the counterarguments provided here, 
there is as yet little co-contribution between rational choice and interpretive social theory (Hampsher-Monk & 
Hindmoor 2010, p. 50). 
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role in the federation’s forums and councils that their subordinates do not.  On the other hand, 
one runs the risk of defensive, post-hoc justifications for their actions, suggesting causes and 
effects that a more objective analysis might not. 
On balance, the methodology was predicated on the expectation that interviewees would be 
able to articulate complex notions about federalism and the federal system, and would have 
thought long and hard about the issues I wanted to explore.   
The standard correction for this issue through comparison with some objective set of data is 
not available in this research.  Accordingly, the alternative approach of triangulating the views 
expressed has been adopted, by making a detailed comparison of interview transcripts as they 
have focused on closely related meetings, events or particular policy developments.  This has 
generated comments and views from a number of perspectives to glean meanings that do not 
rest on any individual perspective (Rhodes, t’Hart & Noordegraaf 2007, p. 221). 
Even where some conversion of ad hoc to post hoc strategy-making has taken place, the 
resulting rationalisation has its own interest, as it may inform and constrain subsequent 
decisions through its internal logic or path-dependent interest calculus. 
Despite the limitations of a point-in-time, small-n study, its conclusions might serve as a 
motivation and justification for further research in this field.  Some suggestions in that direction 
are provided in the final chapter of this thesis. 
3.5 Chapter summary 
Chapter 2 emphasized the need to understand how the interaction between the structural and 
ideational aspects of federal dynamics affects the practice of intergovernmental management.  
This chapter has detailed why a discursive institutionalist methodology was adopted with that 
aim in mind, and how it was applied.  This approach broadens the application of discursive 
institutionalism as a methodology, given the limited extent to which it has been applied to 
federalism itself. 
The following chapter now begins an analysis of the data, in line with the framework for data 
analysis outlined in Chapter 1. 
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Chapter 4 
‘He does know we’ve got red lines, doesn’t he?’ The formal 
institutional frameworks of Australian federalism 
4.1 Introduction 
I now turn to the empirical findings on the sources and processes of change and stability in the 
Australian federation, in so far as they relate to the practice of intergovernmental management.  
This chapter’s focus is on federalism’s ‘institutional layer’, the ‘formal institutions and 
informal routines that establish authority relationships among territorially defined political 
entities’ (Benz & Broschek 2013, p. 6). In terms of bureaucratic practice this institutional layer 
corresponds with governance structures whose design Lynn identifies as ‘the paradigmatic 
problem of public management’ (2012, p. 21). 
Before analysing the interviewees’ perceptions of the values, norms and interests at play in the 
federal system and how these affect their practice, it is important to consider how such views 
reflect key developments in the federal context.  Whether explicitly or implicitly, these settings, 
and the way they change, are of fundamental importance to collective and individual decision 
making: who gets to make decisions, how power is allocated to make decisions, on what basis 
decisions are made, and how decision-making takes place in intergovernmental settings. The 
data examined here comes closest to the notion of ‘interests’ as the motivations for individual 
officials’ strategies, as these interests play out across individual, departmental, jurisdictional 
and national factors.  These issues are front-of-mind for the interviewees whose views are 
analysed below; consequently, they are an important factor in understanding why or how 
intergovernmental management affects the federal system. 
The establishment of formal and informal councils, committees and conferences are common 
to all federations as ways of managing ‘the changing scope, character and varied dimensions 
of interdependence among governments’ (Watts 2003, p. 4). 
The interviews were particularly focused on the effect that changes in federal structures, such 
as changes to the ministerial councils, have on intergovernmental management; whether, for 
example, this frees up innovation, or makes it harder to get things done, and consequently how 
managers react to such changes.  This was an opportunity to consider whether such changes to 
the way they worked reflected the modes of incremental change (layering, conversion and so 
on) identified by historical institutionalists. Given the longevity most of the interviewees had 
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in the intergovernmental space, this was an issue they were able to explore in detail. 
If the ministerial councils and their sub-committees are the skeleton of the federal system, the 
inter-government agreements are its nervous system.  National agreements and national 
partnership agreements set out objectives, outcomes, outputs and performance indicators, 
particularly for the transmission of funds between the federal and state governments, and 
clarify the roles and responsibilities that guide the federal and state governments in the delivery 
of services in key sectors and the management of their performance.  The governance of these 
agreements is one of the key responsibilities in intergovernmental management, particularly 
for central agencies, many of whom have specialised and highly experienced units to deal with 
this matter, whereas policy areas in line departments are only intermittently involved in 
negotiating agreements in their policy field. 
A third formal element in the federal structure comprises the departments and agencies in 
which officials work, and how those organisational elements affect their role. Issues identified 
here include the dynamics of the relationships between central and line departments and 
agencies and their impact on intergovernmental management.  Inwood et al. note an important 
distinction between intergovernmental officials working in central agencies and those working 
in intergovernmental units within line departments. They found that, while the former are 
strongly process-oriented, the latter come from more policy-oriented positions within their 
respective sectors (Inwood et al. 2002, p. 258). 
4.2 The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) 
4.2.1 Background 
COAG was set up in 1992 with a deliberate and enunciated focus on intergovernmental 
cooperation, as distinct from its predecessors (Painter 1996; Keating & Wanna 2000).  In 
contrast with the tight deadlines and unequal participation of the financial premiers’ 
conferences that preceded them, COAG’s meetings involve considerable cooperative behind-
the-scenes preparation and negotiation, which form a principal arena for the bureaucratic 
practices examined here.  
COAG’s focus is pre-eminently on the coordination of national policy reform and responding 
to urgent matters of public importance (Menzies 2012a, p. 2).42  As Figure 4 indicates, the 
                                                 
42 This doesn’t mean, however, that the pace of change is always maintained; one Liberal Premier complained 
COAG had become a ‘parking lot for tough decisions’ under the Rudd Government (Williams & Kildea 2011). 
‘He does know we’ve got red lines, doesn’t he?’ The formal institutional frameworks of Australian federalism 
62 
major focus of COAG’s activity since its establishment has been on national economic and 
social reform. Two-thirds of the 423 individual policy announcements in COAG’s 
communiques between December 1992 and December 2018 relate to social and health policies 
and macro or microeconomic reform, deregulation and infrastructure development; the 
remainder of COAG’s announcements are divided between matters relating to federal 
machinery, such as reviews of the ministerial council system and fiscal federalism; national 
security; the environment and climate change, and individual issues that span a number of the 
other categories (for example, the development of a national population and planning 
framework) or are one-off items (Australia’s bid for the World Cup).   
Figure 4.  COAG Communique items by policy area 
 
Source: Author analysis of Council of Australian Governments communiques 
COAG has seldom considered issues that touch on the constitutional allocation of 
responsibilities and proposals for reform that go beyond instrumental improvements to the 
existing federal system.  On only ten occasions since its establishment have matters come 
before it that had the potential to do so; these are itemised at Table 2.  With the exception of 
the IGA FFR, all simply slipped off the radar without an outcome.  Consequently, despite 
Australia’s extensive system of intergovernmental relations, Fenna and Phillimore argue that 
‘with COAG there is much less than meets the eye. COAG is not an ‘institution’ in any 
meaningful sense of the word…COAG is not really something that exists, but merely 
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something that happens’ (Fenna & Phillimore 2015, p. 55).43 
In short, COAG is, first and foremost, a mechanism for policy change, but not a mechanism 
for changing the federal system overall, other than through incremental developments in 
individual policy areas. COAG’s communiques are prosaic, couched in terms of a work agenda 
rather than the principles of the federal compact; they are couched in terms of work ‘noted’, 
‘progress reported’, ‘ a working group of Commonwealth, State and Territory officials to be 
established’, and so on.  Although the communiques may refer to previous work, there is no 
process for ascertaining or evaluating whether previous commitments have been made or — 
whether by design or omission — failed to be implemented in part or in full.  Consequently, 
there is a degree of cynicism about these processes and their outputs; this state official’s view 
was typical: 
There’s always a communique, and when you get a bunch of ministers together, they want to be 
seen to be effective at making decisions. So the whole bureaucratic machine that sits beneath that 
actually works and it aligns itself to make sure that things happen. (Interview 14, State line 
agency) 
Figure 4 also illustrates how COAG’s priorities shift to reflect those of incumbent federal 
governments.  The priority given by the Hawke and Keating governments to economic reform 
has not been maintained to the same extent by subsequent governments; indeed, over roughly 
the same number of years, the earlier Labor priority on economic over social policies has been 
reversed by the current Coalition incumbents, such that the Coalition governments of the past 
five years have given a lower priority to economic reform than all their predecessors in the 
COAG era, at least in terms of COAG’s agenda.  There has also been a decline in COAG’s 
prioritisation of environment and climate change policies, and the emergence, particularly 
under Howard, of national security as a major preoccupation.   
 
Much of COAG’s work is aimed at establishing nationally consistent and occasionally uniform 
systems, through legislation, regulation, national standards, model clauses and harmonisation 
frameworks.  While it is impossible to conceive of a functioning economy today without such 
effort, the countervailing task before officials is to avoid unduly constraining the states’ 
                                                 
43 An earlier discussion of COAG by Agranoff similarly argued that COAG focused on primarily non-financial 
matters, and so was a forum for dealing with long term issues involving matters that clearly involved state 
government responsibilities, ‘where norms of cooperation prevail over those of competition and/or conflict’ 
(2007, p. 264).  While that may have been the case at the time, the Commonwealth’s involvement in such policies 
since, and its move away from the IGA FFR’s aspirations would suggest the distinction Agranoff draws between 
norms is less clear today. 
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capacity for the very diversity and innovation that is needed to deal with new challenges 
through 'competitive federalism' (Kildea & Lynch, 2011).  Consequently, the federal system’s 
ability to balance national interests and objectives with state, regional and local needs, 
approaches and preferences — what Bednar refers to as ‘the control dial of federalism’ 
(Bednar, 2014) — and how the system negotiates that balance is an important focus for how 
intergovernmental managers negotiate objectives and interests.   
Table 2: COAG meetings considering federal reform 
COAG 
Meeting 
Communique Item Outcome 
June 1993 Commonwealth-state roles and 
responsibilities 
The Council agreed to establish a Working Group to 
identify those functional areas which exhibit inefficiencies 
in existing intergovernmental arrangements and where 
there is scope for clarification of the roles and 
responsibilities 
February 1994 Commonwealth-state roles and 
responsibilities 
The Council did not have the opportunity to conclude its 
consideration of the report from the Working Group; it is 
deferred until the August meeting, and the Working Group 
is given a continuing role in monitoring and assessing 
current reviews, and in considering areas for possible future 
reviews.  However, no further reports from the Working 
Group are recorded 
March 2008 Commonwealth-state financial 
arrangements 
COAG agreed on the key elements of a new 
Intergovernmental Agreement on Commonwealth-State 
financial arrangements, to be finalised by the end of 2008 
following work to settle outputs, outcomes, reforms, 
performance indicators and funding arrangements. 
July 2008 Commonwealth-state financial 
arrangements 
COAG noted the preliminary Statements of Objectives, 
Outcomes, Outputs and Performance Measures for the new 
funding agreements 
November 
2008 
Commonwealth-state financial 
arrangements 
IGA FFR agreed; new funding for specific purpose 
payments and National Partnership payments 
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COAG 
Meeting 
Communique Item Outcome 
May 2014 White Papers on the Reform of 
the Federation and Taxation 
Reform 
COAG considered draft Terms of Reference and 
establishes a Steering Committee to oversee the 
development of the Federation White Paper 
October 2014 White Papers on the Reform of 
the Federation and Taxation 
Reform 
COAG resolves to conduct a wide-ranging review in a 
spirit of partnership in order to achieve consensus as far as 
possible on reform directions 
April 2015 White Papers on the Reform of 
the Federation and Taxation 
Reform 
Statement of principles: COAG agrees that federation 
reform will need the states, territories and Commonwealth 
to work together to meaningfully address long-term 
funding pressures and also look at structural reforms to 
ensure services can be delivered in the most efficient way 
December 
2015 
Northern Territory statehood Foreshadows a report by NT Chief Minister on progress 
towards statehood  
April 2016 Northern Territory statehood Foreshadows a proposal to the next COAG meeting (did 
not eventuate) 
Source: COAG meeting communiques 
How this balance plays out in COAG’s shifting priorities represents both a tangible driver for 
individual strategies and a constraint on them, as organisational and jurisdictional priorities 
shift in line with national and sub-national political directions.  The extent to which such 
priorities drive and constrain intergovernmental management was therefore a key question the 
interviews explored. 
4.2.2 The norms and conventions of COAG meetings  
A number of officials drew attention to COAG’s pre-eminence as key to shaping 
intergovernmental relations.   
I think the economic and fiscal context is really important to understanding the different types of 
conversations that happen, particularly at COAG. COAG conversations really set the agenda for 
all Commonwealth-state interactions. So in most respects, ministerial councils and the officials’ 
structures that serve them get their mandate from COAG. (Interview 17, State central department). 
The Commonwealth’s formal role in convening and chairing COAG meetings and finalising 
its agenda is reflected in a culture that appears to leave little room for sub-national initiatives 
in agenda formation and policy development.  Even state officials commented on the states’ 
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passivity, ‘waiting for the Commonwealth to lead’ as one of them put it (Interview 10, State 
central department).   
Part of the top down dynamic here appears to be the absence of an alternative forum or process.  
Although the Council for the Australian Federation (CAF) was established in 2006 as an 
alternative to COAG for state and territory first ministers only, it has met sporadically and has 
not lived up to initial hopes that it would drive alternative policy prioritisation and policy 
development (Weissert 2017, p. 96).44  The few officials I interviewed who actually mentioned 
CAF dismissed it as largely irrelevant and tending to operate only in response to rare national 
initiatives such as the federation review.  If anything, officials felt there was a disincentive for 
politicians or officials at the sub-national level to take the lead on big federal policy matters. 
There’s no particular interest in taking a forward position on federal issues here in Victoria. Mike 
Baird did so in New South Wales, particularly on the GST, and he got kicked in the head, as did 
Jay Weatherill. (Retired senior official, Interview 3) 
An important corollary of this powerful, centripetal policy dynamic around COAG is the 
tendency for central agencies to dominate the policy making process (as noted, for example, 
by Kildea & Lynch 2011, p. 116).  Only the heads of central agencies attend the Senior Officials 
Meeting (SOM) and Deputy SOM that take place around COAG.  These meetings have a 
distinct dynamic that is driven by the Commonwealth:  
At COAG SOM the Commonwealth has always got a sense of what the Prime Minister wants 
achieved; so, too, have the states and territories. Sometimes there’s a need to develop new ideas. 
Sometimes there’s a need to find a negotiated settlement. Sometimes there’s a need to squabble 
over how much money is going to be spent by both sides with what protections. (Retired senior 
official, Interview 3) 
This can put the states at a disadvantage; their central agencies often lack the technical 
knowledge to provide much input or even push back when items come onto the agenda that 
they are not prepared to support.  Consequently, an important aim for state officials is to 
reengineer such processes, in order to have more input on the nature of a policy problem and 
its solution: 
to start earlier in our conversations with the Commonwealth and agree on where we can work 
effectively together to solve a particular problem rather than grappling with a model that’s been 
lumped upon us.  It’s kind of a solution in search of a not very well articulated problem and not 
an agreed problem. Two weeks out there’s a new idea put on the table and it’s not been agreed 
                                                 
44 CAF’s occasional communiques replicate COAG’s agenda items, presenting the Premiers’ views on the latter, 
rather than enunciating and communicating alternative policy agendas, priorities and directions. 
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that there’s a problem (Interview 16, State line department). 
Equally, central agency officials complain that the intense focus on upcoming COAG agendas 
prevents them from developing an in-depth understanding of the relevant policy fields, 
particularly when it comes to identifying best practice.  Most state central agencies have 
developed tight communication arrangements with their line departments to ensure their state’s 
interests are not undermined by this lack of in-depth knowledge on their part. This has 
important ramifications for the differing interests of central and line departments (see section 
4.5.1).   
While this divergence has been a long-standing focus of research into Australian federalism, 
the data here suggests that overarching jurisdictional interests for both central and line agencies 
are often greater than the policy divide between them. 
Often we get accused in COAG from the line agencies’ perspective of being a bit detached from 
service delivery directly and things we agree to have downstream effects. So we take really 
seriously the need to make sure we test with the line agencies whether there are going to be any 
unintended consequences or concerns about things we agree at COAG. (Interview 19, State 
central department) 
Another important aspect of COAG’s dominance by the central agencies noted by interviewees 
has been the erosion of standardised, consistent practices for the development and negotiation 
of intergovernmental agreements.  This erosion has a number of causes, including the tendency, 
under the IGA FFR, for state portfolio departments to have far less to do with agreement 
negotiations on a regular basis while, on the other hand, the Commonwealth has tended to adopt 
a more piecemeal approach to national reform (‘they want to do discrete things; there’s not 
necessarily a driving desire to achieve change in outcomes’ one official complained, while 
another bemoaned the fact that ‘We have the marginal conversation, the incremental 
conversation each and every time’ [Interviews 15 and 17, State line department]).  Many 
officials remarked on the proliferation of input/output focused agreements that did not meet 
the IGA FFR’s standard of ‘nationally significant reforms or service delivery improvements.’ 
As a result, negotiations tend to follow idiosyncratic pathways that are highly dependent on the 
politics of the issue. This allows ambiguities in the ‘rules-in-use’ on agreements to be exploited 
by change agents and reformers.45     
More generally, the minimalist formal rules for COAG allow it to be instrumentally deployed 
                                                 
45 This illustrates Mahoney and Thelen’s argument that problems of rule interpretation and enforcement open up 
the space for actors to implement existing rules in new ways (2010).   
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as Prime Ministers see fit.  Many of the ‘old timers’ who have spent years in intergovernmental 
management have seen each successive Prime Minister take a very different approach to 
COAG; from Howard’s hands-off approach  
I remember the last years of the Howard government and there wasn’t very much interaction at 
all. There weren’t many COAG conversations (Interview 17 State central department) 
to Rudd’s reforming zeal 
hopefully we’ll never see a Rudd period again where we have four COAGs a year. I think I spent 
that year on the plane for pretty much 90 per cent of my time (Interview 19, State central 
department]) 
and to Abbott’s shift away again from using COAG: 
Tony Abbott kicked a whole lot of subject areas out of the COAG space (Interview 20 State line 
department) 
Some state officials, particularly where they have experience of working at both the 
Commonwealth and state levels, have used such malleability to try to push back against the 
perceived passivity of the states.  As the head of one state public service explained, 
We’ve tried to change that dynamic. I will always start from the position in a multilateral 
negotiation by saying: ‘If I was making the final decision, what decision would I like? Let’s try 
and think that through and move in that direction,’ whereas you do see with a lot of states that 
their default position is, ‘I’m waiting for the Commonwealth to put the position and lead the 
conversation.’ (Interview 10, State central department). 
Some analysts have pointed to the lack of formality in COAG’s rules and Prime Ministerial 
domination of its agendas as evidence that COAG has little standing as an institution.46 My 
interviews suggest officials distinguish the malleability of its role and rules from a broader 
view they have of COAG as an enduring institution above and beyond the politics of the day.  
On the contrary, many of them felt that malleability was an advantage that served the 
pragmatism I discussed in Chapter 2: 
The strength in infinite adaptability means that if you can come up with a good idea about how it 
operates, then there is nothing to stand in the way. There’s no defence of the status quo because 
the status quo is so minimalist. (Interview 18, State central department) 
The prevailing view amongst officials is that COAG operates most successfully on a balance 
of policy initiation, consent and acceptance. That is the aim of the underlying processes of 
                                                 
46 For example, Phillimore and Fenna argue that ‘the degree to which COAG exists as distinct from merely occurs 
is a moot point. COAG is…simply the occasional summit meetings of first ministers from across Australia rather 
than an ‘institution’ in any meaningful sense’ (2017, p. 602; italics in the original). 
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intergovernmental management and consequently —out of ‘respect’ for COAG as an 
institution, as one official put it (Interview 10, State central department) — officials’ meetings 
tend to avoid overt politicisation, even where their governments’ political directions were a 
constraint.  If, as they see it, central agencies are doing their job, COAG’s agendas must reflect 
national outcomes and priorities, not just the Commonwealth’s. This introduces an important 
point about the nature of intergovernmental management as an institution in its own right that 
I will examine in detail at Chapter 5.6. 
4.3 Ministerial councils 
4.3.1 Background 
The number, roles and functions of COAG’s intergovernmental ministerial councils in 
debating, mandating and implementing policy reform has varied over time.47 In 1992 their 
number had grown to 45.  Consequently, in line with the view that COAG was seen as a way 
of reducing the importance of these councils, COAG’s first communique ‘noted that concerns 
have been expressed about the growing number of ministerial councils, the apparent overlap 
and duplication in their coverage and blurred lines of accountability to Governments’ (COAG 
communique of December 1992). While the number of ministerial councils was halved to 21 
in June 1993, it had crept back up again to 31 by October 2009.48  COAG agreed in April 2010 
to a reduction to 11 or fewer councils but this had doubled by 2013.  Accordingly, COAG 
announced a further reduction to the current eight councils in December 2013, with ministers 
meeting on an ad hoc basis ‘where there are important areas of Commonwealth and state 
cooperation outside the Council system’ (COAG communique of December 2013).   
Phillimore and Fenna describe the role of ministerial councils in Australian federalism as 
‘explicitly designed as a system with COAG at its apex with the councils bound to it’ (2017, 
p. 608).  In essence, the councils are COAG’s executive arm, and relations between COAG and 
its ministerial councils are close and extensive.  The councils’ purpose is to ‘focus on national 
priorities…and progress COAG priorities and referrals of work’ (COAG 2019).  Most of the 
councils are chaired by the relevant Commonwealth minister.49 The councils are expected to 
make decisions and progress work within their remit but are expected to raise issues with 
                                                 
47 See Phillimore and Fenna (2017) for a review of the history of ministerial councils 
48 Interestingly, Simeon notes a similar tendency under Canada’s ‘collaborative federalism’ of the 1990s (2006, 
p. 324) 
49 The exceptions are the Health, Attorneys-General and Education Councils which inherited a rotating Chair from 
their pre-2013 predecessor. 
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COAG that ‘genuinely’ require the attention of Premiers and the Prime Minister (Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2014, p. 2). 
Phillimore and Fenna describe great variance in the councils’ outcomes, ranging from conflict 
to inertia and occasionally to the facilitation of important reforms (2017, p. 609).  They suggest 
that councils are more likely to be successful when they minimise incursion into existing state 
approaches, deal with jurisdictional spillovers in the relevant policy sphere, allow the states to 
participate in emergent delivery infrastructure and bring an injection of Commonwealth 
funding to underwrite new agencies and facilities (2017, p. 610).   
My research highlights the importance of understanding when and how the way officials 
worked on intergovernmental management contributed to COAG and its councils, particularly 
in a way that helped them deliver reforms.50  A particularly salient issue relates to the way 
variance in the performance of ministerial councils reflects the role officials play in their 
operation, how they were viewed and how such perceptions affected their practice.   
The aim to make COAG a high level strategic forum, with ministerial councils to manage the 
technical details, is illustrated by the otherwise surprising fact that only four communiques 
since the 2013 changes explicitly refer to a ministerial council, whether by way of noting a 
referral from a council, or through an explicit referral of work to a council.51  Reflecting the 
low formalisation of COAG’s rules-in-use, there is no formally prescribed set of bureaucratic 
arrangements to support the councils’ work, with the exception of the Department of the Prime 
Minister’s pre-eminent role in providing COAG’s secretariat.52  Accordingly, a range of 
permanent, semi-permanent or ad hoc working groups and secretariats has been established, 
reflecting in some cases the legacy of older and more formal networks.  The latter include the 
Australian Education Senior Officials Committee (AESOC), comprising the heads of the 
                                                 
50 Watts’ international survey of intergovernmental councils demonstrates that the Australian experience with 
COAG and its ministerial councils mirrors the establishment over recent decades of formal and informal councils 
and conferences in most federations.  Watts concludes that in most cases they have been of considerable value for 
helping to manage the growing interdependence of governments and facilitating intergovernmental collaboration, 
with many federations introducing reforms to make these bodies more formal and more effective as coordinating 
institutions (2003, p. 4). In Germany, for example, despite their critique of a lack of research on the subject that 
echoes Phillimore and Fenna’s  in the Australian case, Hegele and Behnke conclude that councils play a strong 
horizontal coordination and information exchange function (2017, p. 544) 
51 The exceptions refer to a Ministerial Council on Indigenous Affairs to manage ‘Closing the Gap’ targets and a 
Murray-Darling Basin Ministerial Council to manage the Murray-Darling Basin Plan. 
52 Elijah makes a similar point, describing the emergence and growth of Australian ministerial councils not as a 
designed institution but ‘a logical response to the contradictions of [concurrent] Australian federalism’ (2018, 
p. 13). 
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Commonwealth and state departments responsible for school education and/or early childhood 
and chaired by jurisdictions on a revolving basis.  AESOC is supported by a number of 
subgroups working on schools, early childhood and data. The Education Council and AESOC 
are supported by an independent Secretariat funded by all member governments to provide 
advice and support to the Chair of the Council, and the AESOC Chair.   
Similarly, the Australian Health Ministers’ Advisory Council (AHMAC) has four principal 
committees which report directly to it, comprised of chief health and medical officers, the 
jurisdictional directors of mental health and the deputy secretaries of the health departments.  
These committees are also supported by secretariats.  The Energy Council is supported in 
developing national energy market policy by a committee comprising senior officials from 
council members and is chaired by the Commonwealth. 
Technical policy work is done in these committees, rather than in and through COAG itself, 
and officials noted that ‘they actually do a lot of work that doesn’t necessarily result in a big 
first ministers’ agreement’ (Interview 15, State line department). 
4.3.2 Ministerial councils and the practice of intergovernmental management 
In terms of their role, power, significance and perspective, there are differences between 
COAG, COAG’s ministerial councils or their equivalents, and the institutionalised and ad hoc 
meetings of officials that support their political executives.  As their purposes vary, the work 
programs and practices adopted by ministerial councils also varies, so that ‘some have been 
consultative, others more active; some have acted as information exchanges while others have 
been charged with responsibilities to develop national agreements’ (Arklay et al. 2017, p. 
104).53 
COAG is the preeminent policy forum, with some officials questioning whether much of 
significance emerges from the ministerial councils.  As one retired senior official put it, 
most of the stuff in these ministerial councils and the officials’ committees which support them 
is very incremental. It is very seldom that you see the big picture reforms being promoted through 
those ministerial councils. Those things tend to get flicked up to COAG because the Prime 
Minister wants to announce a substantial piece of reform on a given area. (Retired senior official, 
Interview 3)  
A number of interviewees suggested that, with little stimulus from COAG itself for major 
                                                 
53 I note a similar variety reported in other federations, such as the 18 sectoral ministerial conferences in Germany 
(Hegele & Behnke 2017, p. 530). 
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reforms, the ministerial councils had become stagnant, similarly lacking a policy reform or 
innovation agenda.   
I think it is very much now on a cycle of just constantly renewing existing agreements. I think 
years ago they would have been very much more at the cutting edge of coming up with solutions 
to complex problems, really thinking through reform longer term. I think they’re very much more 
about the machinations of the architecture of agreements. (Interview 19, State central department) 
Even the councils’ limited technical agenda was hampered by the lack of any requirement to 
report back to COAG or the absence of formal endorsement and mandate.  For example, an 
official from a state environmental regulator described the agreement on national 
environmental remediation programs as  
just a document which people can choose to adopt or not adopt. Whereas a National Environment 
Protection Measure that’s come down from the Commonwealth where everyone’s participated, 
it’s a much stronger position, like the old days of the National Environment Protection Council 
where there was a group of people that could lead things and people from the states subscribed to 
participate in it to get an outcome. (Interview 32, State line department) 
I have noted the Commonwealth’s domination of the agenda and proceedings at COAG, 
particularly where major political and financial agreements are involved.  Similarly, the 
agendas of the ministerial councils tends to reflect the priorities of the relevant federal Minister: 
If the national agenda is running fast, has a lot of interest, priorities and our minister thinks it’s 
important then we’ll think it’s important. If the national minister doesn’t think it’s important, ours 
won’t think it’s important, because they don’t sit down and talk to each other about it at the 
meetings. (Intereview 20, State line department) 
Botterill noted this tendency at work in the then Primary Industries Ministerial Council,54 with 
officials telling her they regarded preparation for ministerial council meetings as a ‘part-time 
activity after the real work is done’.  Consequently, she argued that that Council was only 
effective at ‘handling technical, cross-border issues of a non-controversial nature’ particularly 
as ministers in these meetings often did not have backing from their cabinets for the funding 
necessary to effect significant reforms (2007, p. 196; Phillimore and Fenna (2017) make the 
point about federal domination of ministerial councils across the board). 
However, the effects of such domination vary; as we will see shortly, different Ministers may 
use councils and their supporting infrastructure in different ways, opening different 
opportunities for change to the officials who support them.  Consequently, this domination by 
the Commonwealth of the ministerial councils’ agendas has important implications for policy 
                                                 
54 This council was abolished altogether, with no replacement, in 2013. 
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generally, and for the negotiation processes carried out by officials.  As one official from a 
state line department noted,  
The actual ministerial meetings themselves are rituals. Everyone knows what’s going to happen 
and everyone knows what their position has been. That’s all been negotiated beforehand. 
(Interview 15, State line department) 
The importance this gives to the negotiation process and the rules and conventions associated 
with it are explored in detail in the section on bargaining and negotiating at section 4.4.3.  In 
particular, the comment presages the discussion there of the extent to which officials in their 
policy work try to balance their representation of their ministers’ and jurisdictions’ positions 
with a general, depoliticised approach to securing an effective and efficient process overall.  
(Indeed, officials noted the similar skills sets involved in managing cabinet and COAG 
processes.) 
Once they are not dealing with first-order funding and policy priorities set by the 
Commonwealth, interviewees felt that councils and semi-formal ministerial meetings operated 
on a more consensual basis, particularly where the Commonwealth has no financial incentives 
or sanctions at play:55 
big money deals tend to go into first ministers. So the other ministerial councils have to be very 
deliberate about doing reform together, because it’s not being driven by a deal necessarily in quite 
the same way. They might get together for political reasons because one minister is really excited 
about their reform agenda and wants to share it with their colleagues. (Interview 15, State line 
department) 
This lower formality can occasionally produce tensions with ‘senior’ forums or political 
executives: for example, where a ministerial council or a less formal meeting adopts a position 
that has fiscal impact for a state that hasn’t been considered in its budgetary process.   
Differences in the role of ministerial councils are reflected in the different ways officials 
organise and work in support of the federation’s councils and forums.  Below SOM and Deputy 
SOM meetings, bureaucratic structures are differentiated by the extent to which Ministers are 
engaged and driving the agenda, compared to opportunities for officials to play a bigger role 
in determining what’s on the agenda. 
The instrumental malleability of these arrangements, and the impact on the federal system 
                                                 
55 This appears to reflect a common differentiating factor in all federations, where the purpose and operations of 
intergovernmental councils varies widely depending on the degree to which the national government and national 
objectives are driving the meetings (Behnke & Mueller 2017 p. 521). 
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when they are changed, is illustrated by the introduction of a new form of working group by 
the Rudd government.  These working groups were chaired by a Commonwealth minister 
working directly with state officials, a classic example of the Commonwealth adapting the 
federal system to drive reforms.56   
One Commonwealth interviewee recalls that ‘officials were really freaked out’, at least 
initially, but notes that at least a couple of these working groups worked well because of the 
relationships that developed between the relevant Commonwealth minister and the state 
officials, while others were less productive (Interview 21, Commonwealth line department).57  
Despite these positive relationships, however, the outcomes were undermined by what a state 
official describes as the ‘weird dynamic’ whereby ‘Commonwealth ministers were meeting 
with state bureaucrats and our ministers weren’t involved in any way’ (Interview 19, state 
central department). As a result,  
the line ministers who’d been involved in them, both at the Commonwealth and at the state level, 
felt very disenfranchised because things then just went into the COAG arena, and despite things 
having gone through their internal cabinets and our Commonwealth strategic policy and budget 
committee, they were not at the table for when the final decisions were made. (Interview 21, 
Commonwealth line department) 
The interviews suggested ministerial council structures and processes have both positive and 
negative effects on the practice of intergovernmental management. There did not appear to be 
any conclusive difference between the number of times interviewees expressed positive as 
opposed to negative views about ministerial councils.58   
The interviews highlighted the benefits of formal organisational structures in promoting 
personal relationships between ministers and bureaucrats, prioritising and getting work done, 
providing a corporate memory on major policy processes and decisions and a governance 
structure for tracking outcomes.  The formality of council proceedings, and the resources 
provided by their independent secretariats, give smaller jurisdictions the opportunity to have 
an impact on policy making they would otherwise be denied. Finally, the seniority of COAG 
                                                 
56 And an example of what Meyer calls an ‘environmental jolt’; not a critical juncture per se, but a transitory, 
disruptive event that can potentially benefit a resilient institution, particularly where organisational learning 
ensues (Meyer 1982). 
57 It should also be noted that the relevant state ministers did not participate. 
58 I coded 43 positive references compared to 38 negative references. Breaking this down further, the numbers 
suggest that there might be more negativity about the Councils from officials working in policy areas where they 
had been abolished, and conversely that officials in the Territories were more positive than those from the other 
jurisdictions, both of which issues I explore further in the following sections.  Of course, numbers are too small 
in this study to do more than note these as possible questions for future research. 
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and the standing councils encourages longevity and stability in their membership at the 
officials’ level, contributing to the relationships between them and the depth of their technical 
expertise.   
The formality of council organisation provides procedures and a mandate for handling 
disagreements and suppressing divergent interests, even where this constrains the individual 
agency of ministers and their officials. At the highest level, the conduct of COAG in the full 
public eye puts some pressure on states to sign up to bilateral agreements where other states 
have already done so.  More generally a council 
can come in over the top and reach an agreement about how they want to handle the most thorny 
issues and that can facilitate another discussion at my level, and then we can use that and go 
'Okay, here are our running instructions for resolving these issues, let's keep the conversation 
going', and we solve the problems. It's almost like the rules of engagement, they set the direction 
that they want to head in. (Interview 1, Commonwealth central department) 
Many interviewees drew attention to the amount of work performed for these councils that did 
not necessarily surface at COAG, but nevertheless contributed to policy development.  For 
example, the routinisation of council work ensures better outcomes when the political 
executives meet: 
basic things like agendas and papers and time lines. Rushing that stuff really shows you up when 
it gets to a ministers meeting because no-one can agree on anything because there’s the pre-work 
hasn’t been done to put something meaty on the table to agree. (Interview 15, State line 
department) 
In the case of the federal and state treasuries, jurisdictions volunteer to coordinate this work 
and to facilitate the discussion of previously unforeseen issues arising from national partnership 
agreements, or producing a consensus on the future of those agreements that are expiring.59  
Similarly, the Murray Darling Basin ministerial council appointed a national water reform 
committee of officials to work with the Murray Darling Basin Authority because the authority 
appeared to be unaware of decisions that had previously been agreed between the states and 
the Commonwealth.  
Less formal ministerial meetings provide an important opportunity to develop working 
relationships and trust without impinging on jurisdictional interests; exchange information and 
data; test ideas and explore the finer details of policies in a less constrained manner, to inform 
                                                 
59 National Partnership Agreements are time limited agreements and would normally identify expiry dates, with 
the expectation that their performance and outcomes will be reviewed beforehand. 
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their consideration at a higher level.   
In terms of policy outcomes, officials described a ‘ratchet effect’ as councils provided a forum 
for states to compare and drive reforms higher in incremental steps that did not provoke 
opposition from jurisdictions that were less advanced on that policy front.   
Similarly, officials pointed to NAPLAN and the national curriculum as outcomes of these 
structured responsibilities in the more formal councils.  I have left the introductory qualification 
in the quote that follows to illustrate how such views contribute to an overarching narrative 
about the councils that exists independently of any individual’s direct experience: 
There was this story that I heard—it was before my time—where [the then Education Minister] 
threw all the officials and all the political people out of the room and it was called the Night of 
the Long Bottles, because bottles of wine kept coming into the ministerial council, but he achieved 
measuring literacy and numeracy on a national scale, having common data definitions. A 
nationally agreed data definition is only there because of this history. (Interview 41, 
Commonwealth line department) 
At the time of these interviews, the Northern Territory was chairing the Education 
Council/AESOC.  The availability of secretariat support means that smaller jurisdictions are 
able to play an equal role in chairing and leading council work, where they would otherwise 
lack the human and financial resources to do so. 
it gives us an opportunity to influence in a different way and facilitate in a different way. It ensures 
that you’ve got probably a perspective where it’s not just a single lot of dominant voices from 
very large jurisdictions that take the leadership role. (Interview 28, Territories Line Dept) 
Finally, many officials argued that formal structures provide a platform for the development of 
interpersonal relationships, allowing for more effective approaches to policy reform and a 
quicker response to crises and challenges. One official compared the more formal COAG 
Energy Ministers Council with the informal meeting of environment ministers: 
The COAG energy ministers meetings, they’re quite a deal. They get up the night before, meet, 
have a dinner. We talk with our colleagues, then the next morning ministers will get together for 
a private breakfast and then there’s a meeting. COAG energy, that’s quite a splash. But the other 
ones are pretty skinny affairs, the environment ones. We just turn up and there you go. (Interview 
20, State Line Department) 
Interviewees also discussed the costs, risks and problems associated with ministerial council 
work.  In particular, ministerial councils can allow jurisdictional and organisational interests to 
prevail over outcomes.  The other side of the purposive routines noted above is empty 
procedure, where the outcome of negotiations is pre-determined: 
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The actual ministerial meetings themselves are rituals. Everyone knows what’s going to happen 
and everyone knows what their position has been. That’s all been negotiated beforehand. 
(Interview 15, State line department) 
Councils can become incremental and bogged down: one particular ministerial council and the 
meetings of officials who supported it became known as ‘the Sargasso sea’ of public policy: 
‘For some reason, the lawyers just loved these jamborees with very finely drawn attention to 
detail, but it was often not very strategic’ (Retired senior official, Interview 3).   
If you give someone a job of organising a secretariat, of organising meetings of ministers getting 
together, well, there will be meetings. There will be agendas. There will be things for them to do. 
That’s potentially lots of busy work that doesn’t deliver a lot of outcome. So structures are set up, 
then there’s a level of servicing cost for that which may or may not deliver good outcomes. 
(Interview 27, Commonwealth line department) 
Getting bogged down in this way appears to be a particular risk for the more highly formalised 
councils where their history and conventions can become a deadweight, particularly to the 
extent that their conventions preclude the kind of ‘crash through’ by a minister described above.  
One such council, an official complained, hadn’t changed in decades: 
They still do the ‘Call for nominations,’ ‘Here’s the agenda,’ and everyone writes papers and the 
recommendations always get reduced down to the lowest common denominator of what you can 
get across the line. And despite every minister – because they usually chair it for 12 months – 
saying they want their conversations to be more strategic, the bureaucracy has not been able to 
find a way to enable that desire.  (Interview 5, State line department) 
Similarly, while councils can provide an authorising platform for reform, they can also ‘give 
you a formal mandate not to get things done, because you can defer things to the process. You 
all talk about the process. If something’s in the process, we’ve got to wait for the process’ 
(Interview 2, Commonwealth central department).  Part of this slowing includes excessive 
downward delegation, particularly from senior officials to their deputies and beyond, to the 
point where there are so many of these meetings the network becomes fragmented and 
relationships fail to develop. 
Conversely, some ministerial councils fail because they have become ‘battlegrounds’ where 
‘people want to play big ‘P’ politics, you can actually not go anywhere at those meetings’ 
(Interview 31, State line agency).  Rather than burying the potential outcome in progress, such 
councils refuse to make a decision, preferring rather to ‘pass it back up the line again’ to 
COAG.  Senior officials’ meetings can adopt a similar culture, either because they are locked 
into positions taken by ministers or because ‘people in that meeting are not the people who 
have the views’: 
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It’s very much, from my experience, a forum to say no. It’s not used as a forum to solve problems. 
I have learnt through experience the best thing to put through those formal structures is something 
that’s already been informally settled. (Interview 39, State line agency) 
Individual agency plays a role in overcoming these problems or even preventing them from 
arising in the first place.  For example, officials from the central agencies block lower priority, 
technical matters from clogging the agenda at more senior meetings, and at COAG itself, albeit 
with mixed success: 
you've got a chance to say "No, that's not what we're after, what we're after is you guys to sort it 
out."  Our senior officials can agree that something not be considered by COAG again, but it 
doesn't always lead to the ministerial council going "Okay we're going to have to sort it out."  
(Interview 2, Commonwealth central department) 
In most cases, it is the jurisdiction and formal organisational role that provides the official with 
influence.  However, personal reputation may give some officials greater standing than others, 
and such standing is an important form of institutional capital that can be used to find a way 
through blockages.  As the following suggests, such standing is frequently a function of 
longevity and experience rather than the individual’s formal position: 
when some jurisdictions speak people tend to cut them off more, or dismiss them, whereas when 
the manager from New South Wales speaks, he is very experienced and everyone seems to listen 
and no-one cuts him off, and certainly at my end no-one's rolling their eyes.  So the same level of 
respect is not just given freely to everybody, there seems to be a differentiation between people 
who've been in the game, if you'll call it, longer than others.  (Interview 3, State line agency)60 
4.3.3 A critical juncture: the abolition of ministerial councils  
The streamlining in 2013 that led to the abolition of a number of COAG ministerial councils 
forms a critical juncture in historical institutionalist terms; that is, a relatively short period of 
time during which actors face a broader than usual range of feasible options and consequently 
the probability that their choices from among these options will have a significant impact on 
subsequent outcomes (Cappocia & Kelemen 2007, p. 348).  How and why these choices were 
made tells us much about the role of individual agency in intergovernmental management 
practices, how officials respond to the opportunities and constraints of formal structures, and 
how agency contributes to systemic change and resilience.   
On the one hand, a perceived effect of losing official council status is the loss of ‘gravitas’ it 
entails, meaning ‘profile and clout and the level of seniority and resourcing that goes along 
with the need to service a ministerial committee,’ resulting in a shift from a structured agenda 
                                                 
60 See also the discussion on ‘longevity’ at 5.5.2. 
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and process to ‘working politely across jurisdictional boundaries on things that are largely of a 
non-threatening nature’ (Interview 20, state line department).  Interviewees nominated specific 
policy areas that had been affected by this loss of momentum, including the listing processes 
for threatened species, the development of model OHS legislation and housing policy.61 
We’re working through a structured process, with a bit of discipline associated with that. Now 
with the change of ministerial responsibilities and with the drift away from it being a real formal 
structure, it’s kind of just dropped off the agenda. (Interview 20, State line department) 
In some cases, when ministerial meetings lost their official council status, ministers stopped 
attending, and, as a result, so did their department heads or chief executives, delegating 
attendance to their subordinates.  There was even a suggestion that the less formal, relationship-
building meetings that took place on the margins of formal councils, such as the dinners 
officials held around their meetings took place less frequently, or had less status, following a 
council’s abolition. 
However, other officials (across the Commonwealth/state divide) felt that the abolition had 
changed little in practice.  This was because, first, the formal abolition of the council was 
followed by its effective continuation as those ministers continued to meet, dealing with 
policies on agriculture and the environment, children, families and housing (Phillimore & 
Fenna 2017, p. 609). In many, if not all cases, such meetings are supported by the same 
structures of senior officials, their deputies and working groups as the official ministerial 
councils.  Thus, in the case of the environment ministers, 
Minister Hunt as the responsible minister, and Minister Frydenberg after, said, ‘I’ve got plenty to 
do here, and I’m going to get on and do it.’ So it made no material difference. (Interview 30, 
Commonwealth line department) 
Second, abolition of a council’s formal status may not have had much of an impact if there was 
little Commonwealth money on the table for reform in the first place. 
The loss of official status may even, to some extent, have freed these meetings from the 
tendency to get bogged down noted previously.  A state environmental regulator felt that the 
abolition of the Environment Council gave his informal network  
a chance to reset, refresh and absolutely be certain about what the priorities are going to be, if 
we’re going to do the cross-jurisdictional collaboration. The ministerial council was an 
                                                 
61 Following abolition of the standing committee on community, housing and disability services, housing ministers 
did not meet until three years later in 2016 (Housing and Homelessness Ministers’ Meeting Communique, 31 
March 2016) 
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opportunity to have a discussion at the federal level with all the ministers. Nothing’s changed 
from that perspective. It wasn’t any more effective or speedy in doing things than what we’re 
currently doing, because a lot of it comes from the good will of all the agencies that are 
participating, and they’ll only put in the good will where it’s a particular problem. (Interview 33, 
State line agency) 
A number of officials commented on the opportunity to work more productively in the absence 
of the formal, Commonwealth-driven agendas at the ministerial councils.  As a result, ‘they 
actually do a lot of work that doesn’t necessarily result in a big first ministers agreement’ 
(Interview 15, state line department).  Officials from smaller jurisdictions also felt that they 
had more of a role to play in the less formal arrangements, where there was less at stake and 
hence less domination by the bigger states. 
The primary ‘option’ officials chose to navigate this critical juncture was by replacing the 
formal council infrastructure with other meetings of varying levels of formality.  This was 
particularly the case where ministers and officials saw the benefit of continuing to discuss 
policy issues with one another, to commission and receive information inputs and to explore 
options for harmonisation and policy transfer. 
Networks re-emerged as a result of individual endeavours at senior levels, such as between the 
heads of the Environment Protection Authorities (HEPA), and amongst mid-level regulators 
and technical specialists.  In the case of the former,  
when there was no longer a regular meeting of senior officials, environment officials and 
environment ministers, the heads of EPAs across Australia and New Zealand decided that there 
were issues that were not being addressed and we formed a group called HEPA.(Interview 12, 
State line agency) 
Similarly, the various state government representatives maintained the contaminated 
environments network (CEN)  
when the ministerial group got disbanded and we really had no direction, it was the interest of the 
representatives on that kept it going, because it didn’t have to keep going. The CEN was able to 
sustain itself in that period where there was nothing really running it. (Interview 32, State line 
agency) 
A different strategy officials adopt, where a structure is in place but is not providing sufficient 
support for what they perceive as a priority, is to elevate the group’s seniority to provide it with 
policy ‘ballast’.  For example, officials decided to elevate a low-key network that was 
monitoring indigenous sexual health into a group with ministerial representation and the 
involvement of senior officials from the portfolio ministries: 
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having representation on that group who are decision-makers and who can make decisions in the 
room rather than this thing of having a group that can have a conversation but don’t actually have 
any ability to make decisions or commit funds. (Interview 4, Commonwealth line department) 
Descriptions of the ministerial council system frequently refer to the ‘proliferating’ 
organisational infrastructure as if it were some natural outcome of the system.  It should be 
recognised that exercising agency to change or restore formal structures requires vision and 
commitment; it is a very particular form of agency, where substantial personal resources and 
organisational capital will have to be harnessed, particularly as there are no well-worn 
pathways for actors attempting to establish new structures in the federal system; ‘creating a 
mandate from thin air’ one official put it.  One official described her considerable personal 
investment in establishing a network of environmental regulators, in the absence of a formal 
mandate from a ministerial council and in the face of doubts from her manager:  
I had to argue quite strongly for a period of about eighteen months to two years to my manager 
that this network was still worthwhile, and that it was bringing the organisation and the unit that 
I'm in benefit.  He could see that it was bringing the organisation benefit, but he didn't share the 
same view that we should be running it anymore.  And he also wanted to know where the authority 
for it was coming now that that standing committee had disbanded.  So I undertook to get HEPA’s 
approval, and that took a considerable period of time, because they meet I think six-monthly, and 
have a lot of things on their agenda.  (Interview 3, State line agency) 
The nature of these network-building actions and strategies has interesting implications for 
federal dynamics theory and its historical institutionalist methodology.  They appear to be a 
particular example of Benz and Colino’s ‘adjustment’ process described in Chapter 2, and what 
Jabko and Sheingate refer to as ‘order preserving innovations’ where agency is associated with 
the maintenance of institutional structure (2018, p. 313).  Such work is 
an important source of institutional dynamism that standard approaches often miss. As they 
frantically strive to preserve the status quo, actors typically re-engineer order in complex ways 
(Jabko & Sheingate 2018, p. 313).  
None of the modes of incremental change posited by historical institutionalism appears to 
equate to such strategies.  Neither ‘displacement’ nor ‘conversion’, which involve removal or 
changes to rules apply, nor does ‘drift’, which requires actors to choose not to respond at all; 
the closest appears to be ‘layering’, which involves the introduction of new rules ‘when 
institutional challengers lack the capacity to change the original rules or set up a new system 
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010, p. 17).  As in the case of the abolished COAG councils, ‘layering’ 
is a course adopted by actors in an environment where they face strong veto powers over their 
actions and a low level of discretion in interpreting the existing rules.   
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Mahoney and Thelen suggest layering strategies are carried out by change agents they 
designate as ‘subversives’, who are committed to institutional displacement but can only do so 
from within (2010, p. 25).  However, the officials I have described are strongly committed to 
federalism; the crisis, in this case, ‘lead[s] to a process of creative adjustment rather than an 
unraveling of authority’ (Jabko & Sheingate 2018, p. 316).  The latter argue that ‘efforts to 
preserve order extend beyond veto points or selective rule following to include a wider array 
of creative gambits that contribute to institutional change’ (2018, p. 322).  Perhaps a more 
appropriate metaphor for these officials who are working to keep their networks and channels 
open is that of ‘diplomacy’, particularly in the way Rhodes describes this as a traditional 
bureaucratic skill involving negotiation and persuasion (2016, p. 644). 
Accordingly, I argue that a new set of factors, beyond historical institutionalist accounts of veto 
powers and interpretational discretion is needed, along with a new understanding of the modes 
of actor response and motivation.  I will argue that these are ideational in nature, and 
consequently I will leave that discussion for Chapter 6.  
4.4 Agreements 
4.4.1 Background 
As noted in Chapter 1, the main areas of state government expenditure are governed by a series 
of national agreements with the Commonwealth.  Tied funding represents just under half (47%) 
of the total funding from the Commonwealth to the states.  Consequently, fiscal federalism is 
perhaps the single most important driver of intergovernmental management behaviours, rules 
and norms.  It plays out in every one of the areas I have hitherto discussed.  
Australian federal financial arrangements have followed a distinct institutional trajectory of 
their own, alongside the general vicissitudes of operational Commonwealth-state relations. 
Parker’s comparative study of intergovernmental agreements between 1945 and 2008 found 
that a total of seventy-eight agreements were created in Australia over that period, making 
Australia the third most prolific in the formation of agreements, behind Canada and Germany 
(2015, p. 47).   
Following the Rudd government’s lead, COAG agreed in December 2007 to focus more on 
outputs and outcomes, underpinned by a commitment from the Commonwealth Government 
to provide incentive payments to drive reforms. The IGA FFR is primarily an aspirational 
framework, couched in terms of objectives which aim to deliver  
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enhanced public accountability through simpler, standardised and more transparent performance 
reporting by all jurisdictions, with a focus on the achievement of outcomes, efficient service 
delivery and timely public reporting; reduced administration and compliance overheads; and 
stronger incentives to implement economic and social reforms (Council of Australian 
Governments 2009 )62 
Accordingly, the IGA FFR rationalised the number of specific purpose payment grants from 
over 90 to five, and tied these to outcomes-focused National Agreements. National Partnership 
payments were introduced to ‘reward those states that best deliver the services and outcomes 
to their citizens, and not reward those that don’t’ (Swan 2009, p. 6). 
Notwithstanding an initial period from July 2009 to July 2012 in which the number of 
agreements almost doubled, in response to the global financial crisis and an active COAG 
reform agenda, the number of agreements has since declined to 54 as at July 2017 compared to 
82 in 2009 (Australian National Audit Office 2018, p. 14).  Many commentators on Australian 
federalism have noted, however, that the Commonwealth has maintained its dominance in the 
relationship, and the Abbott Government’s review of federalism concluded that the IGA FFR 
had had only limited success in affecting the extent to which the Commonwealth is involved 
in directing how large tranches of state government funds are expended (Australia. Department 
of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 2014, p.37).  Fenna notes that some National Partnership 
Payments ‘are truly trivial, others seriously substantial; many apply the kind of intrusive 
conditionality that was so deplored in the old-fashioned SPPs’ (2012b, p. 19).  The COAG 
Reform Council (CRC) also noted that, although National Partnerships were meant to cover 
only significant policy matters relating to national objectives or expenditure priorities that had 
ramifications beyond any single state’s interests, many were of only medium or low national 
significance, and many included significant specification and monitoring of inputs and 
activities (COAG Reform Council, 2013; McClintock, 2013). This growth led to ‘a wider range 
of Commonwealth requirements and controls not dissimilar to what was in place for SPPs in 
earlier times’ (Gallop, 2012, p. 45). In the view of the National Commission of Audit, the 
Commonwealth had ‘progressively moved back towards more detailed reporting arrangements 
in order that Commonwealth Ministers and the broader public can have certainty that 
                                                 
62 This normative content is noticeably lacking in the IGA FFR’s predecessor, the Intergovernmental Agreement 
on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial Relations 1999, which was primarily a vehicle for the 
introduction of the GST while recognising, if not advancing, ‘the need to pursue on-going reform of 
Commonwealth-State financial relations’. (See Carroll & Head (2010) for a detailed discussion of the changes 
introduced by the IGA FFR). 
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taxpayers’ money was being spent efficiently and in the areas required’(2014, p. 77).   
The CRC also reported that there was ‘disagreement between the Commonwealth and states 
about the extent to which recent policy development has been genuinely collaborative. State 
government stakeholders considered that much recent policy development was driven largely 
by the Commonwealth. …On balance, the review found that over time there was less focus on 
collaborative policy development, particularly in the initiating phases’. The Council also drew 
attention to the short-term nature of the National Partnerships, quoting state government 
representatives concerns that in five years, no successful National Partnership Agreement had 
been rolled into ongoing funding (2013, p. 45).   
Just as the ministerial councils are structured in a hierarchy with COAG at its apex, Australia’s 
federal agreements are also structured in their precedence.  The principal agreement is the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on Federal Financial Relations 2009 (IGA FFR), which covers 
both the conditional and unconditional tranches of intergovernmental financial transfers, with 
the exception of the National Health Reform Agreement.  In accordance with the IGA FFR, six 
National Agreements govern outcomes and performance indicators in the health, education, 
skills and workforce development, disability services, affordable housing and Indigenous 
reform sectors.63  The Commonwealth also provides National Partnership payments to the 
states and territories to support the delivery of specified outputs or projects. 
Under the IGA FFR framework, officials described three levels of agreement-making; each 
brings a distinct set of jurisdictional interests into play, and accordingly each is characterised 
by concomitant levels of constraint.   
At the highest level, negotiations on a national reform agenda, generally involving large 
funding tranches, are conducted and finalised through COAG.  These agreements often involve 
policy harmonisation, reciprocal legislation and standardised approaches by the states.  The 
high political stakes involved suggest less scope for individual agency in the work leading to 
such agreements, although as I will show this may not always be the case. 
                                                 
63Each of these National Agreements specifies that it is ‘created subject to the provisions of the IGA FFR and 
should be read in conjunction with that Agreement’.  The federal government specifically decided not to apply 
the IGA FFR to the Health Reform Agreement, which therefore does not bear these words, reflecting its difficult 
trajectory including ‘an 18 month independent inquiry into the health system, a Prime ministerial listening tour of 
the nation’s hospitals, several fraught Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meetings and one unsuccessful 
attempt’ (Boxall 2011). 
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Agreements at a lower ‘meso’ level might identify an outcome to be achieved, but make fewer 
specifications as to the means.  At a lower level still there is a recognition that work is underway 
across some or all jurisdictions to achieve an outcome, but without necessarily committing 
funding or involving any one approach to doing so.  These lower level agreements are most 
likely to involve the ‘ratchet’ effect noted in the ministerial councils section above, in which 
reform takes place at varying rates according to capacity.  Officials were also more likely to 
describe their personal role and effect in these lower-level processes, compared with the top 
level agreements.   
The development, negotiation and management of agreements is second only to the support 
provided for ministerial councils and working groups, in terms of its significance for the 
practice of intergovernmental management.  The negotiation of National Agreements and 
Partnerships forms the basis for direction setting and resourcing in the federal system. National 
Agreements play an important role in defining the borders, as it were, of a zone of active and 
substantive collaboration between the Commonwealth and states. Such negotiations are a 
framework and a mechanism for determining the extent to which policy making and 
implementation are delegated, while maintaining and achieving nationally consistent and 
integrated frameworks.64  
They provide a platform where many of the issues that affect institutional continuity and 
change play out, including inherent tensions between accountability, performance management 
and reporting, on the one hand, and collaboration and flexibility on the other.  These tensions 
are embodied in the interests that shape intergovernmental relations and management: both 
jurisdictional, as federal and state governments negotiate over their optimal relative roles in 
particular policy spheres; and organisational, in the deployment and recasting of central versus 
line agency relationships and roles across jurisdictional boundaries. 
Importantly, from an ideational point of view, all three levels of agreement-making take place 
in a normative context in which certain values and goals are prescribed that are relevant for the 
particular process in play. 
As the following analysis demonstrates, these objectives and the tensions they contain are at 
the forefront of the way officials understand the environment in which they are working, 
                                                 
64 Indeed, Weissert uses the term ‘negotiated federalism’ to draw attention to the significance of ongoing 
negotiations for the character of the federation overall (2017, p. 88). 
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occasionally in ways that challenge the academic orthodoxy on how intergovernmental 
relations work. 
4.4.2 Jurisdictional interests in bargaining and negotiating 
The primary normative framework governing behaviours and roles in agreement-making 
relates to the classic question of federal design, the allocation of national and sub-national 
governments’ respective responsibilities and accountabilities.  How far should the 
Commonwealth’s policy interests give it a role in their design and implementation, and require 
performance measurement and reporting by the states?  How free should the states be to 
prioritise and develop their own approaches, and how are their accountabilities to be acquitted, 
in a relationship of sovereign equals?   
The IGA FFR provides a normative arena for how these questions play out in negotiations, 
particularly over who shapes the agreements’ conditions, and to what level of detail. 
Almost a decade on from its commencement in January 2009, which they described as the 
embodiment of a ‘cultural change’ in Commonwealth-state relations, officials in both 
Commonwealth and state jurisdictions still felt those normative settings were relevant to their 
work, in requiring the Commonwealth and states to consider systemic policy issues and 
outcomes in funding arrangements, rather than maintaining traditional funding silos by or even 
within portfolios (occasionally with the agreement of federal line departments).65   
In essence, the agreements framework sets out the terms and conditions for an 
intergovernmental bargain which may be honoured or from which a party may defect.  Officials 
in both the Commonwealth and state governments described such defection in normative terms, 
as a failure to achieve the IGA FFR’s objectives.   
For example, state officials felt the IGA FFR regime should be producing more streamlined 
agreements with greater clarity on roles and responsibilities and what funding is meant to 
achieve. Similarly, many of them were concerned that Commonwealth line ministers and 
agencies were developing agreements with provisions that did not comply with the IGA FFR, 
and not taking these through the federal cabinet process. 
                                                 
65 Although there are obviously interests at play in the way Commonwealth and state officials cite the IGA FFR 
as a factor in their motivations or discontents, I was nevertheless left with the strong impression that it continues 
to have a strong normative effect on the federal culture, pointing to the ideational aspects of federalism that I 
examine in Chapter 6. 
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The extent to which sub-national governments are active participants in designing and 
implementing national policies is particularly important for such a highly centralised federation 
as Australia’s, and the extent to which this changes over time is an important indicator of 
federal dynamics.  The growth of conditional funding in particular has been a constant source 
of irritation, by imposing Commonwealth control or at least purview over traditional state 
functions, even though the Commonwealth broadly acknowledges it does not have a detailed 
knowledge of what goes on at ‘the ground level’, in hospitals, schools, environmental matters 
and so on.  The quantum and conditions of tied funding, particularly tensions over 
accountability, reporting and performance, are at the forefront of the interests and strategies at 
play in intergovernmental management. 
Federal scholars have pointed to a number of potential adverse outcomes from this bifurcation.  
First, a number of researchers have argued that the states’ responsibilities for implementation 
have allowed them to resist centralisation through ‘administrative non-compliance’ (Fenna 
2019, p. 37). Conversely, however, it may have encouraged closer relationships between 
federal and state counterparts in particular policy areas, who have interests and expertise in 
common and in distinction from their respective central agencies (Painter, 1998b, p. 48).   
The interviewees were, not surprisingly, very exercised on this point.  I broadly discerned two 
counter-narratives in the interviews, or two normative frameworks that govern negotiations. 
One narrative is based on adversarial conflict and distrust.  The Commonwealth end of the 
spectrum of views on this issue contends that the states will typically cheat in a principal-agent 
relationship. A common complaint was that  
if the states can cost shift they will. If they can rip off the Commonwealth, they will. If they can 
get the money and use it for something else, they will, and that’s still my view. Indeed, because I 
hired some of my colleagues from state governments they told me about the cost shifting unit in 
the [state] government. They’ve got a whole unit, and they all do, apparently. (Interview 41, 
Commonwealth line department) 
The states’ end of the spectrum, which draws to some extent on the tropes of coordinate 
federalism, emphasises the states’ drive for independence, within the constraints of fiscal 
federalism: 
The factors that are important to us are getting as much money out of the Commonwealth as 
possible; policy autonomy, which is us as a state deciding what’s the best way to achieve the 
investment outcome; concepts around state sovereignty as well which play out in how much 
reporting we’re going to do. (Interview 15, State line department) 
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State officials felt they had experienced a decline in the recognition of ‘states’ rights’:66 
I haven’t heard that being invoked for a long time. But, at the same time, there’s a resistance to a 
stereotyping of the state role as merely service agencies of the Commonwealth. So the states’ 
rights rhetoric has disappeared but equally there’s a resistance to a characterisation of our role as 
simply being the service agency of the Commonwealth. (Interview 18, State central department) 
Key points of contention based on this narrative that shape intergovernmental negotiations 
include: 
 state officials seek fewer milestones and reporting mechanisms in payment structures 
and, wherever possible, greater tranches of funding up front.  The Commonwealth is 
suspicious that the latter is a way of the states managing their cash flows, and sees the 
payment regime as a way of ensuring accountabilities. 
 the Commonwealth often offers short term funding for projects through national 
partnership agreements.67  The states are concerned that more permanent funding 
arrangements are not considered when limited-duration national partnerships come up 
for review, thereby reinforcing vertical fiscal imbalance and allowing the proliferation 
of minor national partnerships with the attendant transaction costs. 
 The states are wary of being left ‘holding the bag’ when these payments run out, but 
programs are expected to continue by their beneficiaries.  On the other hand, the 
Commonwealth is cautious about the budget risk involved if the states interpret its 
interest in some policy area as an opportunity for them to step back and defund or 
otherwise reduce involvement in some area of policy risk 
 The states are concerned that short term funding can be diversion from their own policy 
priorities 
in some of the really strong reform agendas that we’ve got running in New South Wales, 
you definitely wouldn’t want to divert your effort and your direction for a bit of 
Commonwealth money. But if the Commonwealth wanted to come and talk about how 
it could add value rather than divert, that would be good (Interview 8, State central 
department) 
                                                 
66 The concept of ‘states’ rights’ in Australia has been described as ‘archaic’ (Brown & Bellamy 2007, p. 7), but 
periodically emerges, perhaps most notably under the ‘New Federalism’ of the Fraser Government at the end of 
the 1970s, when a state Premier is said to have told his Japanese hosts that he is ‘not from Australia, but from 
Queensland’ (Brown & Bellamy 2007, p. 27); more recently, the commitment ‘to ensuring that our Federation 
results in States and Territories being sovereign in their own sphere’ was fundamental to the Abbott Government’s 
Review of Federation (2014, p. 5).  
67 These payments facilitate and reward the delivery of nationally significant reforms by the states.  They are 
usually made against a schedule of specified outputs or projects, and are for a fixed period of time. 
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 The Commonwealth, on the other hand, argues that the states’ own money is being 
redirected to less productive purposes (in the words of one official, smaller class sizes 
and more teachers instead of better education outcomes).   
 the need for long term stability in policy settings, to allow the states to set up the 
infrastructure and services needed for delivery and performance measurement, is 
frequently undermined by short term policy reversals at the Commonwealth level.  This 
is a major driver of the push by the states for the ability to set their policy priorities.  A 
number of officials commented on the risk of ‘travelling at a hundred miles an hour 
down the highway’ to progress particular policy priorities, only to be undercut by a 
‘bright idea’ by the Commonwealth (Interview 8, state central department).  As one 
official recalled,  
We had under the Rudd government the major health agreements. There was a change 
of government, a new government comes in in Canberra and cuts the money out of the 
forward years of these agreements. So you’ve had jurisdictions that might have changed 
their service delivery systems to support that particular direction in that agreement, and 
then the money’s pulled out from underneath them. (Interview 6, State central 
department) 
A counter-narrative to this adversarial view, reflecting the concurrent nature of Australian 
federalism, contends that negotiations are a more complex phenomenon than simply an 
alignment behind opposing sets of interests.   
Such views inform negotiating positions that see individual state interests as being best served 
by a collective outcome: 
Last year we were contemplating whether we would get rid of the national housing agreement. 
We were contemplating genuinely whether it would just be rolled into a broader sort of GST 
financial relations deal. So none of us would get the housing agreement but we’d get the share of 
an increased GST which would go into the whole thing. (Interview 10, State central department) 
As an example, a senior state official described moving from the aim of ‘a brilliantly negotiated 
health funding deal’ from his state’s perspective, which might have delivered nine to ten 
percent growth but would nevertheless be unsustainable, to adopting a broader perspective that 
delivered a lower rate of growth for his state but reduced the growth rate of health expenditure 
overall.   
we have to get a national interest outcome because if we don’t get a national interest outcome the 
brilliant deal we’ve got on paper will not be sustainable. (Interview 10, State central department) 
Although he came from a state with a culture of collaboration with the Commonwealth (as 
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recognised by his own officials and those from other states), such a view was not unusual.  The 
key to achieving this perspective was not its enforcement through formal or informal rules, but 
the trust between officials in the negotiation process that allowed for what he called ‘an open 
book negotiation’ to take place. 
Another factor in favour of collaboration is the recognition that regulatory and micro-economic 
policies in the states have complex spillover effects on other states.  For example, a report to 
the Queensland Government found that the low cost of waste disposal there was responsible 
for large amounts of waste being transported from New South Wales and Victoria (Lyons 2017, 
p. 9).68 
Consequently, a corollary of this systemic approach is the rejection of coordinate federalism, 
with its clear boundaries between responsibilities, (particularly as this philosophy was recently 
articulated as the basis for the Abbott government’s federalism review) and an expectation that 
collaboration was necessary for the achievement of policy outcomes. 
In the Commonwealth-state-territory disability agreement way back when the clean line was that 
the states would take disability accommodation and the Commonwealth would take disability 
employment. As soon as you’ve got a boundary, you’ve got boundary disputes, and that means 
you’ve got cost shifting. So the NDIS is now finding that the states defunded whatever they’d 
had. They had accommodation, so you don’t see any group houses much. It’s all gone, whereas 
employment stayed on and there’s a big disability employment system. (Interview 41, 
Commonwealth line department). 
On balance, most interviewees appeared to hold that the system was one of ‘cooperative 
centralism’, in the sense that COAG and its councils are implementing national objectives set 
by the Commonwealth and imposing policy uniformity (Anderson 2008, p. 507; Kildea & 
Lynch 2011, p. 114), rather than demonstrating truly cooperative federalism which is 
characterised by joint goal-setting between the national government and the states (Conlan 
2006, p. 667).69  In part, this is an outcome of the states’ fiscal dependence, as well as the 
pragmatic character of Australian federalism, which means the opprobrium for exiting 
negotiations or agreements falls more often on the leavers: 
We very, very rarely get the opportunity to walk away from a bad agreement.  The Australian 
community doesn’t really buy into the principles of federalism in the way that communities 
overseas do. There’s no push back about infringement on state rights like there might be in the 
                                                 
68 It should be noted that this report also found that the Constitutional requirement that interstate trade be free (s 
92) meant legislation to restrict such movement could be challenged (Lyons 2017, p. 28). 
69 In the Australian case, examples of cooperative federalism appear to be more limited to the development of 
particular policies such as Labor’s 2007 national framework for school education (Keating & Klatt 2013). 
Chapter 4 
91 
United States or Canada or Germany. My mother doesn’t care; she just wants services delivered. 
That means we just can’t say, “Well, this doesn’t look like the IGA would suggest it should look 
like, therefore, we’re not doing this deal.”(Interview 17, State central department) 
Amongst the interviewees, there was a tendency for officials from line departments to hold the 
interest-maximising position more often, whereas officials from central agencies tended to take 
a broader view that included systemic and national objectives.  However, this may have been 
a random effect; certainly many interviewees from line departments acknowledged the national 
perspective.70 
How we get from such recognition of a national outcome to the hard positions and distrust 
described above is very much an outcome of the political executives’ disagreements at a higher 
level, and theatrics at COAG.  In other words, even if such shared outcomes appear rational at 
the officials’ level, ‘it gets to premiers and discussions at COAG and it often comes down to 
money and distrust’ (Interview 6 state central department). Consequently, collaboration by 
officials is not without its risks.  Politicians may hold their own officials responsible if they 
feel their interests, political or jurisdictional, have been undermined.  One official recounted 
how, in the course of the negotiations over the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), 
the Prime Minister had publicly castigated a state minister.  As a result, 
the bureaucrats got a lot of heat from the political players, whose view was, ‘We’ve allowed you 
to go off and play with the Commonwealth and yet this is the sort of outcome and this is the sort 
of process that is occurring.’ That was not easy for us. (Interview 42, Commonwealth (Interview 
42, Commonwealth central department) 
Both the adversarial and collaborative narratives have direct implications for national reform 
agendas.  The adversarial narrative, reflecting a rational-choice type of calculus in seeking and 
achieving political and fiscal benefits, focuses on the incentives and disincentives for 
introducing reforms inherent in fiscal federalism.  Interests are perceived to trump principles 
in this set of views, whereby there is an incentive for individual line departments, or whole 
states, to pursue financial benefits even though this may lead to input controls or other 
conditions that depart from the overarching objectives of fiscal federalism set out in the IGA 
FFR. 
                                                 
70 This preparedness to balance national and sub-national interests tests Woods and Bowman’s contention, based 
on their study of interstate compacts in the United States, that institutional arrangements are protected by 
jurisdictions with the most to gain, while those who are disadvantaged either seek reforms or exit (2018, p.491). 
As these authors subsequently acknowledge, even in the United States there is evidence of a more ‘externally 
collaborative’ culture in some states that does not simply reflect an interest calculus (2018, p.504). 
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In pursuit of such interests, different states are perceived to take quite different negotiating 
positions, undermining their collective capacity to influence the negotiation process.   
A general starting proposition is that if New South Wales and Victoria agree on a proposition, 
it is usually a ‘done deal’ (although individual states may occasionally hold out, such as 
Western Australia’s demurrals from health or occupational health and safety national 
agreements).  For example, Commonwealth officials were particularly cognisant of those 
states’ positions in negotiations over the NDIS, and dismissive of inputs from the smaller states: 
at one point—this sounds disrespectful and I don’t mean it to be—we got these smart-arse 
comments from Tasmania. I remember us going up with the comments from Tasmania and 
[Deputy Secretary] smiling anodynely and saying, ‘The mouse that roared.’ (Interview 42, 
Commonwealth central department) 
Temporary alliances between the Commonwealth and one or more of the states are frequently 
established on the basis of particular roles and personas states have adopted in the federation,71 
independently from any political congruence between the Commonwealth and state 
governments.  Commonwealth officials will attempt to line up a state — possibly with a 
funding incentive — to break down the states’ opposition to their position.  Those states will 
often be New South Wales and Queensland (particularly, as I will show in Chapter 6, in view 
of the former’s ‘statesman’ role in the federation); Victoria frequently leads the recalcitrants. 
Many interviewees were critical of these side deals that individual states were making with the 
Commonwealth: 
Victoria has some very strong views around the future of public hospitals and the future of 
coordinated care in this country in terms of trying to bring together primary and secondary health 
care systems. So throughout that debate we were very much about the outcomes for patients 
whereas New South Wales was about getting a deal because they knew how important it was to 
the Commonwealth about getting a deal. (Interview 19, State central department) 
In terms of prospects for reform more generally, divisions between the states are a major barrier 
to policy transfer. While competition between states need not preclude inter-jurisdictional 
learning and imitation (for example, see Shipan & Volden 2008), the literature also points to 
the importance of ‘yardstick competition’, where the performance of each government is 
subject to comparative evaluations, as the basis for innovation and policy learning (Benz 2012).   
In Australia’s case, the COAG Reform Council, one of the most important institutional 
                                                 
71 These are discussed further in Chapter 6. 
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developments under the IGA FFR (Phillimore & Harwood 2015, p. 60), supported such 
yardstick competition by providing an independent avenue for COAG to discuss and report on 
the attainment of national objectives.  Its abolition in 2014, at a time when it was developing a 
capacity for national evaluation and benchmarking beyond its initial remit on performance 
measurement and reporting by the states, makes interstate competition less productive: 
I am surprised at how much time, when we do comparative performance reporting, states end up 
seeing themselves as competing against each other.  Whereas actually what we're trying to do is 
to highlight where things are going well and encourage them to seek out why the other 
jurisdictions are getting good results.  Historically I don't think that jurisdictions have been 
inclined to share data with each other, and potentially learn from what's happening in other 
jurisdictions.  They've been very much "Oh no, we wouldn't want you to look at what's happening 
in our space. (Interview 2, Commonwealth central department) 
One outcome from this pursuit of individual jurisdictional interests is reform stasis, the 
opposite of the upward ratchet effect I have previously noted, where there is a perceived 
disbenefit from leading reforms: 
in order to get consensus, in order to do anything together, you end up with lowest common 
denominator kind of reform.  We put a lot of effort into reform only for the states that have not 
invested in this area to get all the money because they’re the ones who are further behind. We 
have often felt that we have been punished. It’s first mover disadvantage. We’ve invested in our 
systems and we’re ahead of the game. Therefore, we don’t get our estimated per capita share of 
funding. (Interview 15, State line department) 
Others saw agreements as a ‘race to the bottom’ whereby states who had failed to invest in 
reform received a larger share of the funding to help them catch up. Similarly, officials were 
sometimes uneasy about whether national reform programs slowed things up: 
Currently in Victoria we’re progressing reforms around nurse-patient ratios. If some other 
jurisdiction came and said, ‘Let’s have a national approach to how we deal with nurse-patient 
ratios,’ we might go, ‘Mmm, actually, we’re doing our own thing. We’ve made political 
commitments and we’re comfortable with doing that. We don’t see the value of delaying our 
process and putting aside our political commitments to join a longer time frame that could draw 
out to who knows where if it goes to a national process.’ (Interview 15, State line department) 
The long term perspective afforded by federal dynamics suggests that the tension between 
Commonwealth and state interests, embodied in these issues, is not in stasis or equilibrium.  
The process of agreement-making is iterative, with the possibilities of recurrent funding 
opportunities down the line requiring strategies for longer term gaming and positioning.  Thus, 
the salience of such issues varies over time and between policy fields; as funding for particular 
policies is shifted elsewhere, because of a change of government for example, opportunities 
open up for the states to shift their priorities as well. 
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States and territories generally look at the Commonwealth and say, ‘Well, if you want us to do 
something, we’ll take the money and we’ll do it.’ But as the money has dried up for those big 
grant programs, states are in a better position to drive stronger outcomes now because they can 
influence more strongly the approach to doing the work if they’re expected to be the funding 
agency for doing the work. (Interview 7, States Line Agency) 
Officials have developed a range of ways of defusing, or at least managing, fiscal tensions.  
Most importantly, face to face negotiations are informed by a constant information gathering 
effort in the background to ascertain respective positions and ‘red lines’.   
At the officials level you might have the discussions outside over a cup of coffee or you might 
have made a special effort to speak to a few people before the meeting or send a senior official to 
see them to try and get everybody on the same page. (Retired senior official, Interview 3) 
Many of these discussions will be an attempt to find a compromise in which both levels of 
government secure an acceptable outcome.  I found little evidence that the states were using 
their administrative responsibilities to subvert the centralised policies of the Commonwealth. 
It was far more common for officials to accept that  
It’s really a shared reform objective.  At the state level, if we’re doing something, say, for out-of-
home care services for youths, you’re trying to prevent them from taking a more dangerous and 
less desirable path in life. You’re keeping them out of corrective services and out of the prisons 
and getting them into a job market. That’s going to impact on Commonwealth payments for 
unemployment benefits. (Interview 6 State central department) 
These discussions feed into the preparations for COAG and ministerial councils and meetings 
so that, as far as possible, much of the decision making has already taken place by that time, 
and as much ‘heat’ as possible has been taken out of the issue.   
Ministers’ meetings should be short. The things should have been settled beforehand and the fight 
should have been had to allow them to do their political stuff so that they don’t have to stand up 
and wax lyrical about something that is not actually something that they need to do at that level. 
(Interview 34, State line department) 
4.4.3 Rules, norms and conventions of bargaining and negotiating 
A discussion of the norms and conventions of intergovernmental bargaining could arguably 
have been linked to Chapter 5’s discussion of the informal rules of intergovernmental 
management.  However, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ in this case is closely bound up with the 
formal content and process of agreement making, and the logic of consequences derived from 
the political and jurisdictional interests discussed in the previous section; accordingly, it 
appears more useful to further the analysis of this set of rules in this context.   
As one official put it, ‘designing agreements is a mixture of an art and a science’ (Interview 1, 
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Commonwealth central department) and consequently, as in the operations of the councils, 
agreement-making offers opportunities to exercise agency in the drafting and implementation 
of agreements, and in terms of the role agreements subsequently play as legitimating structures 
for further work by officials. 
The role of individual change agents is an important example of how the formal structures of 
the federation both generate and constrain policy innovation in intergovernmental 
management.72   
Middle ranking officials tended to argue that there was more capacity for autonomous 
behaviour at more senior levels 
I would say that as officials’ conversations become more senior there’s more scope for the kind 
of frank discussion that you were talking about which would be less formal and more open in 
terms of the real priorities and prerogatives of different jurisdictions. (Interview 17, State central 
department) 
Such autonomy might, for example, be exercised by departing from previously-held positions 
in one’s own jurisdictions and, in so doing, changing the course of individual policy 
negotiations. For example, officials from one jurisdiction involved in negotiating the health 
funding agreement at the April 2016 COAG meeting decided to depart from the stance taken 
by other jurisdictions in seeking a restoration of previous levels of funding.   
We took the approach of saying, ‘Okay, we’re going to go with a principles-based approach 
acknowledging that the Commonwealth’s fiscal position is not what it was previously. Therefore, 
there’s going to have to be a bit of give and take.’ But, basically, we got the authority to go out 
and be an honest broker. Rather than pitch an opening bid, it was, ‘Let’s pitch a proposal that we 
think is principles-based that we think might be where we end up landing’. (Interview 9, State 
central department) 
As an example an initiative aimed at deliberate, broader systemic change,73 officials from a 
small jurisdiction were concerned by the piecemeal, iterative annual process for reviewing 
expiring agreements.  They took the lead in drafting an alternative letter from state Treasurers 
to the Commonwealth Treasurer proposing more permanent arrangements, as envisaged by the 
IGA FFR in these cases.   
Similarly, his colleagues in the states spoke approvingly of the ‘pivotal role’ played by one 
                                                 
72 A reminder that my use of the term ‘change agents’ is discussed at section 2.3.2. 
73 Categorised by Benz and Colino as ‘innovation’, a deliberate reshaping or partial modification of some 
institutions and rules (2010, p. 389) 
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head of DPMC,  
because he had the benefit of not being burdened with much Commonwealth-state experience. So 
the sort of trench warfare that sometimes comes up - arguing the details or the last war about who 
was done over in which agreement and whether HFE is fair and does it suit my state - was really 
not part of his baggage. (Interview 10, State central department) 
Policy brokerage, as an important form of change agency, is frequently described as a search 
for national or systemic outcomes as distinct from narrower organisational or jurisdictional 
interests.  Consequently, the conditions for the exercise of such brokerage, the manner in which 
it is exercised and the outcomes from such endeavours are important indicators of federal 
dynamic trajectories at any point in time.   
First, brokerage is exercised in problem-solving, mediation and finding a way to resolve 
sticking points.  Officials tended to describe their agency to do so as bounded, first, by formal 
rules (or ‘rules-in-form’ to use the institutionalist terminology), such as those requiring clarity 
in agreements on when payments can be made to a state, in order to avoid a breach of the 
constitutional clause governing appropriations.   
Second, their agency is bounded by mandate, bestowed normatively by the policy outcomes 
being sought on behalf of the political executive, and/or more generally by the policy settings 
established by their jurisdiction’s political executive, central agencies or ‘running instructions’ 
set by senior executives in their organisation.  These policy bearings are ‘almost like the rules 
of engagement. They set the direction that they want to head in’ (Interview 1, Commonwealth 
central department).   
Thus, in the example given above of a change in a jurisdictional stance regarding a health 
funding agreement, there was a political mandate from the Premier to adopt this position, 
which meant this official could ‘have a lot of phone conversations with my colleagues in other 
jurisdictions, but before I had picked up the phone I didn’t have to run it all the way up the 
chain to make sure that it was okay to have that sort of conversation’.  Second, there was a 
jurisdictional mandate, via the tradition in this jurisdiction of working cooperatively with the 
Commonwealth on national reforms.  Third, there was an organisational mandate: this official 
had developed a level of expertise in this policy field that allowed his senior officers to be 
‘comfortable for me to play quite a front seat role on that’ (I will have more to say on 
organisations in the next chapter).  Finally, there was a policy specific strategy: this approach 
did not apply in other policy areas, such as in education, for example, where 
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we are sitting back saying, ‘Okay, what you’re offering, Commonwealth, is not sufficient, and 
we’ve got all of these problems.’ We’re doing our work here ourselves on what we think might 
work, but we’re not proactively putting that out to other jurisdictions. (Interview 9, State central 
department) 
In this latter case, the brokerage role was not mandated, whereas in the earlier example of the 
changed approach to the health agreement, ‘the Premier was very happy for us to take that 
approach’ (Interview 9, state central department). Once these boundaries are set, it becomes 
possible for more junior officers to exercise discretion on matters such as performance 
measurement and payment design.  Indeed, a degree of autonomy is built into the negotiation 
process to avoid the need to constantly seek approval for minor points.74 
However, such autonomy only works up to a point.  For example, on deliberating over up-front 
payments or payments by milestones,  
we have to make a judgement about how much money, and under what circumstances we're 
willing to take financial risk.  In some spaces it's easier than others, but that's not a call for junior 
officers. (Interview 1, Commonwealth line department)  
It is important to note that this is not a simple top-down dynamic; agency may be exercised in 
advising ministers or more senior officials, and in collaborating with other jurisdictions, before 
negotiations are underway or concluded: 
I had a team and we worked with our line agency and the Department of Treasury and Finance to 
develop up those options and then we shopped it around to jurisdictions individually and then 
together. There’s an agreement from senior exec and from our minister that this was a bad deal. I 
think she wanted to sign just because they needed some money. We’re like, ‘Hang on, hang on, 
hang on; let’s see if we can do better.’ (Interview 15, State line department) 
Agency and ‘veto power’ are closely aligned in agreement-making.  Although the states only 
have a very limited power to walk out of a negotiation or to refuse to discuss a proposal, it can 
happen, at least when the states dig in to the point that the Commonwealth is forced to 
negotiate: 
[the then Victorian Premier] signed a health reform agreement just before the 2010 election that 
gave away a portion of our GST. A new state government came in and said, ‘We’re prepared to 
walk away if you don’t change the GST element.’ That kind of approach, ‘We’ll walk away,’ has 
to be really huge. And GST is huge. That’s a state sovereignty kind of issue. That’s really rare. 
                                                 
74 These different forms of mandate illuminate what Howlett and Migone refer to as ‘the strategic role of agency, 
as advantage has to be taken of any ongoing momentum if change is to occur’ (2011, p.60).  As I pointed out in 
my discussion of change agents in section 2.3.2 above, such interplay between the structural and ideational context 
and the strategic response by the bureaucracy tests the assumptions of multiple streams analysis.  The discussion 
here sits comfortably with the actor-centred historical institutionalist analysis of incremental change, such as that 
by Mahoney and Thelen, in their attention to whether change agents are seeking to preserve and abide by 
institutional rules (2010). 
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So it’s more about, ‘What are we really going to hold the line on to a point before we’re actually 
going to sign, because really we need the money.’ (Interview 15, State line department) 
An important factor in such power plays is the extent to which the states adopt a unified 
position.  In the case of a negotiation over an early childhood agreement, one state corralled 
the others: 
 
we ran a state and territory process where we basically got states and territories to agree a state 
and territory position. We held the line and held the line and held the line, and it was on the lunch 
of COAG that the Commonwealth said, ‘Fine. We’ll put the full funding in for another 18 
months.’ That’s also rare, but it goes to show that another factor is: can the Commonwealth pick 
you off bilaterally? If the deal is actually so bad that all states and territories are in agreement that 
it’s so bad and it can’t be lived with, that can also be an important factor which changes the deal. 
(Interview 15, State line department) 
Even smaller states can exercise a degree of power out of proportion to their size where the 
approval of all the jurisdictions involved is sought.  In the case of water planning, for example, 
officials complained that smaller jurisdictions had held up agreements for two years.  
However, the ability to ‘walk away’ is very context-specific, and may depend entirely on the 
particular policies involved, the prioritisation by Commonwealth and state governments, and 
the personalities of the ministers and officials.  Not only can the Commonwealth call the states’ 
bluff by threatening to withhold funding for services that citizens expect (especially where 
programs are already running), the budget cycle means that Commonwealth money is often 
only on the table at a point in the states’ budget cycle when they have little capacity to hold 
out.  
Even where a formal veto is not at play, jurisdictions may have an opportunity to provide an 
important input: 
Everybody in the heads of treasuries or heads of treasuries deputies gets to speak and they go 
round the table. Everyone is listened to and in a way has equal weight in these forums. While 
strictly speaking you don’t really have equal weight to a New South Wales or Victoria, we have 
weight more than our actual per cent of the population. (Interview State central department) 
Negative agency is also at play at the individual level, where individual officials can veto 
negotiations, although this may require a degree of authority, generated by personality, position 
or experience, for its exercise. 
4.5 Public service organisations 
4.5.1 Central and line departments 
The departments and agencies in which individuals work form an important part of the material, 
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formal structures in which intergovernmental management is practised.  In particular, the 
limited study of intergovernmental management to date has highlighted the different roles 
played by central and line departments, and their different interests, perspectives and impact.75   
Warhurst’s early study on this issue (see the discussion at Chapter 2.2.2 above) effectively laid 
the groundwork by distinguishing between line department technocrats, who collaborated with 
one another across Commonwealth-state lines to defend and, if possible, increase spending on 
that function.  He argues these ‘rods of iron’ were ‘broken’ by the mid-70s by the increasing 
need for coordination across and between governments, leading to the emergence of what he 
describes as ‘gossamer threads’ of central agency coordination of intergovernmental relations 
by a small specialist elite.76  Consequently, Painter attributes much of the greater collaboration 
between governments in Australia during the 1990s to the leadership of central agencies at the 
federal and state levels, while at the same time describing how ‘officials in state government 
line departments such as health and education often have to be pulled back into line by central 
co-ordinating agencies for being too cosy with their intergovernmental partners, to the 
detriment of their own government’s political strategy’ (2001, p. 140). 
In the findings that follow, I will argue that there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that both 
perspectives — the ‘rods of iron’ of line department interests and the ‘gossamer threads’ of 
central agency collaboration — continue to play a dominant role in intergovernmental 
strategising and organising. However, I also want to show that the demands of complex policy 
challenges, and the resultant need to apply technical expertise to the concerns of national 
harmonisation and coordination, have generated a third mode in which central and line agencies 
collaborate in conducting negotiations and supporting the work of ministerial councils. 
To some extent, the bifurcation between the role of central and line departments reflects the 
distinction between COAG and ministerial councils.  Central department officials tend to focus 
on the former, line department officials on the latter (although I will shortly demonstrate why 
it is important not to oversimplify this division, particularly as national policies move from 
COAG to a council and its working groups for their development and implantation). 
                                                 
75 Galligan and Fletcher, for example, argue that there is an interrelationship between the way intergovernmental 
arrangements may stimulate changes within state administrations, while the latter can affect intergovernmental 
arrangements by changing the way policies are made and coordinated (1993, p. 26). 
76 It should be noted that Fletcher and Walsh took a different view of the emergent coordinating units in the 
Premiers’ departments as a form of resistance to the Whitlam government’s centralisation (1991, p. 6). 
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Central agencies provide support and guidance in four key ways: setting the general directions 
and strategic framework for particular negotiations; providing training and support, particularly 
for those officials who have very limited experience with federal agreement processes; 
providing specific advice on the content of agreements, such as the appropriate milestones or 
payment schedules, differentiating between outputs and outcomes and so on; and helping to 
resolve blockages in in the negotiation process, or subsequently in the operation of agreements 
(particularly where, again, these arise from the portfolio departments’ relative inexperience or 
infrequent interjurisdictional contact).77   
The central agency officials’ first role is to develop an understanding of the ‘red line issues’ 
for their ministers’ agreement and, on that basis, optimal, preferred and fall back negotiating 
positions.  ‘If you were to go beyond these red line issues, that would require you escalating’, 
one official suggested (Interview 15, State line department). 
At more senior levels, there is a greater potential movement beyond those red lines, particularly 
where there is a national outcome at stake.  The head of one state central agency described how 
I could see the way to resolve the issue and get to an agreement. So I put the idea on the table of 
how we could actually get there. I could hear the two more junior staff behind me flicking 
vigorously through the negotiating mandate and I heard, ‘He does know we’ve got red lines, 
doesn’t he?’ It was sort of a situation where I was sufficiently confident that this was in the 
national interest if we got that outcome. Did it to the last letter fit within what the negotiating 
brief may look like? Well, probably not. I think that was pivotal in getting us to the end of actually 
getting the negotiations successfully resolved. But would I want too many of my officials going 
on that frolic themselves? Probably not. (Interview 10, State central department) 
Central departments may then begin the negotiation process with a teleconference or meeting 
where they take the portfolio representatives through the steps, and/or subsequently review 
draft agreements.  In that context they will often critique the draft based on its compliance with 
guidelines and templates: 
somebody will draft an agreement and it will have a lot of these problems; they don't follow the 
template, they mix up outcomes and outputs, they include input controls - which we can't 
have.  The other thing that they tend to require guidance on is payment design - states often like 
large, upfront, untied payments.  We don't like those (Interview 1, Commonwealth central 
department). 
Occasionally, if central agency participants perceive it as necessary, they may override the 
                                                 
77 I suspect that many, if not all, of the ‘uneasy and underachieving’ aspects of the Commonwealth bureaucracy’s 
relationship with other jurisdictions noted by the Australian Public Service Review Panel (Rimmer et al 2019, p. 
15) may be due to such inexperience, rather than a general cultural malaise. 
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portfolio to direct the negotiating strategy in accordance with the ‘red line issues’.   
Another important role for central agencies in assisting their line department colleagues is using 
their knowledge of the overall agreements framework to overcome sticking points, frequently 
around performance requirements. 
So what we need to do is know enough about what they're trying to achieve and say to them 
'Could you say something like this?  Could we craft a milestone or - that looks like this? And once 
we start having a conversation, we can usually come up with something that works. (Interview 1, 
Commonwealth central department). 
This division of roles introduces some interesting dynamics, not least the coalitions that emerge 
between central and line departments across jurisdictional lines.  A state government line 
manager noted, somewhat admiringly, that 
the connections between the central agencies are so efficient that by the time I’ve rung my 
counterpart in [the state government] Treasury to talk about a new national partnership agreement 
we’re negotiating, they’ve seen a first draft from the Commonwealth Treasury, and the same 
happens from [the Commonwealth] PM&C to Premier and Cabinet as well. (Interview 36, State 
line department) 
These coalitions form in response to a variety of drivers.  First, central agencies work with one 
another across jurisdictions to persuade or negotiate with their respective line agencies to get 
them over the line to an agreement: 
if there's a particularly intractable issue between a Commonwealth and a state portfolio agency, 
the Commonwealth portfolio agency might come to us and say 'We've got this problem that we 
can't solve, we're not making any headway with our counterparts, are you able to have a discussion 
with your Treasury [counterparts] so that they can have a discussion with their state portfolio 
agency and we can try and find some way through?' (Interview 1, Commonwealth central 
department)  
Second, central agencies are a conduit for the political executive to impose its objectives on 
the process, guiding line departments to conform with government aims, and managing this 
‘not very sequential’ process ‘all the way along until we reach a landing spot’ (Interview 1, 
Commonwealth central department). Thus, although the IGA FFR is a primary reference point, 
one Commonwealth central agency official noted that  
if there is a decision that a funding arrangement will operate in a particular way which is 
inconsistent with the IGA, then we need to be responsive to the decision rather than the IGA. 
(Interview 2, Commonwealth central department)78 
                                                 
78 Of course, the expression and implementation of such views by Commonwealth officials contributes to the 
distrust expressed by many state officials 
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Third, central agencies see themselves as stewards of the overall framework and its objectives, 
and here it is the outcome that is the primary driver.  Many central agency officials described 
this as a motivating factor in their involvement, without reference to any particular 
organisational or jurisdictional interests; rather, it is about making sure the system works and 
the process is effective.  This shared interest between central agencies generates a particular 
community of interest amongst them: 
we often are struck by how similar the interests and perspectives of other Treasury officials are 
because we’re all doing very similar work overseeing other portfolios and providing advice on 
similar sorts of areas using similar sorts of frameworks. (Interview 17, State central department) 
Commonwealth and state Treasury officials felt that their role was a particular example of this 
stewardship, as they tended to have responsibility for the overall fiscal framework, and hence 
‘we have the opportunity to be in agreement more often’ (Interview 17, State central 
department).  Officials from central departments overall frequently commented on their 
adoption of a COAG perspective, in distinction from their line department colleagues’ focus 
on the particular policy dynamics in the ministerial councils.   
Thus, while Commonwealth and state line departments might be keen to get the money flowing 
in return for a high level of input controls, they are resisted by their central agency colleagues: 
Across some of the national partnership agreements we can find ourselves in a similar situation 
where if it came to treasuries first, we’d be putting a line through all the input controls and those 
sorts of things and saying, ‘No, that’s against the IGA. No, no, no.’ (Interview 25, Territory central 
department). 
Particular normative issues kept cropping up in the interviews on this point.  First, a sore point 
with central agency officials at both the Commonwealth and state levels was that their line 
departments were prone to accept input controls that violated the spirit of the IGA FFR because 
they were in too much of a hurry to get their hands on the money.  Indeed, a state Treasury 
official felt that ‘Commonwealth Treasury officials are looking out for us and pushing back 
wherever they can ’(Interview 25, Territory central department).   
More broadly, performance measurement is one of the issues that captures the different 
perspectives and interests central and line agencies bring to these negotiations.  Central agency 
officials, at least in the states, are often critical of their line department colleagues for 
acquiescing too quickly to onerous or intrusive reporting.   
Even if the Commonwealth could be persuaded to relinquish micro-management, the 
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performance measurement process was criticised for being inaccurate or ineffective because it 
assumed under-performance, rather than reflecting that the circumstances in which the original 
agreement had been negotiated had changed, or service delivery arrangements had changed.   
Finally, the different central and line department roles generate an information asymmetry that 
flows on to agreement negotiations.  Central agency officials confirmed that, as they 
approached the final stage of an agreement negotiation through COAG, the information they 
would share with the line agencies ‘starts to dry up. You deliberately tighten it up’ Interview 
9, State central department). 
Consequently, central agency officials sometimes felt that their line department colleagues did 
not see the bigger picture.  To take a specific policy example, state central agency officials 
complained that their colleagues in the education departments were solely focused on funding 
quanta, whereas they wanted to argue that money was not the solution to the policy issues in 
the education field. 
Let’s start to talk about the real reform and the outcomes we want to see in education as opposed 
to just arguing about a bucket of money that no longer exists. That would play out in most states 
and territories. Most central agencies want to start talking about the changes we need to see in 
teacher quality or STEM or more generally local empowerment of schools. (Interview 19, State 
central department): 
Similarly, central department officials felt that they were not being allowed to provide the 
appropriate input to discussions between portfolio departments, particularly where such 
discussions took place in the context of ministerial councils.  As one territory official put it,  
From the first minister’s agency perspective, you sometimes can feel like the line agency is trying 
to shut you out of the process without really having as good an understanding as you have of how 
the political dynamics work and how things are going to pan out when they get into the COAG 
system as opposed to the ministerial council system. (Interview 22, Territory central department) 
As a result, she felt that sometimes ‘there’s even more collegiality between first ministers’ 
officials from other jurisdictions than there are between the line agencies and the first minister’s 
department from that jurisdiction’.  
On the other hand, line department officials criticised the elitism (or ‘snobbishness’ as one 
official put it) that excluded them from negotiations, particularly as they, rather than the central 
departments, had the technical knowledge:  
we’re supposed to be negotiating quite detailed and technical agreements and you’ve got this 
bunch of people around who don’t necessarily know what they’re talking about and negotiating 
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something that can have a very significant impact. It might be unimplementable or it can have a 
significant impact which actually harms service delivery. (Interview 15, State line department) 
Officials in line departments also complained about state budgetary strategies that allocated 
priorities on the basis of information that they were not privy to and could not critique; ‘so they 
fundamentally drive everybody crazy because it’s opaque’ (Interview 7, State Line Agency).   
In summary, my interviews provided some support for the earlier analyses I have discussed 
that pitted vertical, cross-jurisdictional interest and advocacy coalitions of central and line 
departments against one another.   
However, I also found a diversity of views, interests and strategies at play within and between 
central and line departments that cautions against a simplistic ‘central vs line’ department 
bifurcation.  This bifurcation rests on a number of simplistic assumptions.  First, it assumes 
that departments and agencies adopt unitary strategies; second, that such strategies are broadly 
divided into those of central or those of line departments; and, third, that central departments 
necessarily have a more strategic, long-term view than line departments.   
Officials described differing perspectives between and even within central agencies; for 
example, in the form of 
different voices within the Prime Minister’s Department that would come to the fore, like 
economic division, that might have a view that was a bit independent of the deals that other parts 
of the Department were trying to strike (Interview 21, Commonwealth line department). 
First ministers’ and Treasury department officials mutually distinguished their cultures and 
interests, between the politicised, short term perspectives in the former and the more collegiate, 
‘rationalist’ and open Treasury culture.   
 PMs’ [Departments] and D[epartment of] P[remier and] C[abinet]s tend to believe that Treasuries 
work in a world that’s perhaps not politically aware and Treasuries then have the view that those 
people operate in a way that is simply just, ‘How high do you want me to jump,’ and not injecting 
broader, longer term policy views into things (Interview 25, Territory central department). 
An interesting example of the different cultures that exist within central agencies emerged from 
the negotiations between the Commonwealth and the states over school funding arrangements.  
State officials reported being ‘pushed very hard from the Commonwealth because we had 
Prime Minister and Cabinet in there going really hard’.  At the same time, however,  
The Treasury bureaucrats from the Commonwealth were to one side and said absolutely nothing. 
They didn’t want to buy into it and diminish their reputations (Interview 35, State central 
department) 
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Many officials from both central and line departments critiqued the view that only central 
departments take the longer-term view.  This is an important issue that goes to the question of 
the ideas that motivate officials’ behaviours and perspectives, and consequently I will return to 
this issue in Chapter 6. For now, however, I would simply note that the research found ample 
evidence that line department officials understand and accept that broader strategic 
perspectives might run counter to their portfolio interests, while central agency officials 
recognise that their colleagues in line departments frequently adopt this broader view.   
Finally, officials in every jurisdiction commented on the importance of collaboration between 
central and line departments in order to take a solid, informed negotiating stance, the third 
mode beyond Warhurst’s ‘rods of iron’ and ‘gossamer threads’.   
Such collaboration is based on the tendency for portfolio ministers to take the lead on particular 
policies and hence for central agencies to deal with their departments on the details.  Both 
central and line departments need a good joint understanding of the red-line issues described 
above, and to avoid being locked in to downstream problems in implementation or otherwise 
difficult policy consequences. This shared interest informs the respective roles officials play 
and their reliance on one another: 
Only first ministers’ people may attend senior officials meetings - no line agency people. But 
we’re supposed to be negotiating quite detailed and technical agreements and you’ve got this 
bunch of people around who don’t necessarily know what they’re talking about and negotiating 
something that can have a very significant impact. It might be unimplementable or it can have a 
significant impact which actually harms service delivery. What’s best is if at the senior level there 
is a tripartite agreement on positioning and a functioning, working coalition between the 
Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Treasury and the line agency. (Interview 15, State line 
department) 
Such central-line department collaboration was widely regarded as essential for obtaining a 
good outcome in negotiations.  For example, an official felt that their state had obtained the 
best of the bilateral deals on the NDIS because ‘we worked basically as one team across the 
line agency and central agency to achieve it, so one negotiating team’ (Interview 22, Territory 
central department).  Another official described working on a health agreement on a team 
comprised of the state health department and its Treasury and Premiers’ Departments. 
We understand the numbers implicitly. In the past, Health may not have done that because they 
were concerned if they gave the information over to the centre, Treasury might cut them in the 
next budget round. But because we had that good working relationship, we knew our numbers 
back to front, and we were much more effective in the negotiation because we had such 
confidence in the numbers, because we’d had that open sharing of information at the state level. 
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(Interview 10, State central department). 
Similarly, central agency officials remarked that they relied on the networks between their line 
department colleagues for ‘fleshing out’ other jurisdictions’ views, to inform their own 
bargaining position; this was more important to them than the risk of any line department 
collusion.  As a general proposition, state officials perceived less friction at the state level in 
formulating an intergovernmental position than there is at the Commonwealth level, largely 
because there is less political friction. 
This raises a more general question about whether and how the general settings for public 
administration at any time affect particular bureaucratic practices.   
For example, one official noted that ‘in my three years here I’ve seen a real change – this is 
about Team New South Wales’ (Interview 5, State line department).  Such change may be the 
outcome of a number of local and service-wide developments.  These include, first, the 
incumbency of a new team of senior officials in that state’s Department of the Premier and 
Cabinet who had experience at both the Commonwealth and state levels.  More broadly, 
divisions between central and line departments reflected, to some extent, the New Public 
Management’s prescriptions for a split between policy and service delivery organisations.  
Such divisions may have weakened, particularly as the general collaborative and cross-
boundary settings of what Osborne and others have called ‘the new public governance’ have 
gathered pace (2010). 
4.5.2 Departments and statutory agencies 
A second organisational setting that affects the opportunity for change agency is the divide 
between policy departments and statutory agencies.79  This is an important organisational 
framework for intergovernmental management, because it frequently reflects a differentiation 
of regulatory and policy-making roles across the federation, both vertically as well as 
horizontally.   
This divide can both encourage and constrain the capacity for officials to effect innovation and 
adjustment, in federal dynamics terms.  The arms-length relationship between ministers, their 
departments and agencies can leave agency officials even more isolated from big picture policy 
                                                 
79 The significance of the distinction is in terms of the degree of ministerial control.  Departments are under direct 
Ministerial control and generally communicate directly with their Ministers.  Governments may also set up semi-
autonomous statutory agencies and corporations for reasons of efficiency, to drive innovative delivery, or because 
the agency needs to be able to make decisions free of ministerial intervention.   
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making than their line department colleagues.  Similarly, role differentiation can lead to 
frequent changes in the allocation of responsibilities, particularly when it is embodied in 
organisational restructuring.  One EPA official complained  
Something goes horribly wrong, so they put you [ie the agency] back in the department. Then it 
goes horribly wrong again and they pull you out to the department. I’ve been here six years - it’s 
been in, out, in and then out again, because they seem to think that the problem is about how close 
you are to ministers or something. (Interview 13, State line agency) 
In at least one state, its EPA officials felt they had had the lead say in policy under previous 
COAG arrangements where there was a Standing Council on the Environment, whereas 
currently under the less formal meeting of environment ministers the state department of the 
environment has taken over the lead.80   
However, change agents can exploit such organisational role ambiguity.  First, agency officials 
are less constrained by the need to represent their ministers’ views.   
They see themselves less as a branch of government - still public service, but we recognise our 
independence, whereas departmental regulators I do think are often hindered somewhat through 
the fact that they are also the policy maker and are very much more linked to ministerial policy. 
(Interview 13, State line agency) 
Second, officials in agencies at both senior and middle management levels respond to their 
position on the policy chain by taking the responsibility to establish networks within and across 
jurisdictions and for conducting policy advocacy outside the roles specified for their agency.  
Agranoff and Radin have remarked on such ‘boundary spanning’ that takes place in 
intergovernmental relations, whereby ‘Government agencies have both retained some of their 
main line functions and also have felt the need to operate outside of their bureaucratic structures 
in classic boundary spanning fashion’ (2014, p. 13).81   
It would be hard to overstate the importance of the cultivation of personal relationships in such 
boundary-spanning, in order to overcome organisational constraints and inertia.  For example, 
the department-agency relationship is frequently tested by principal-agent dynamics, or 
performance measurement and requirements; one state’s EPA was being reviewed by the 
relevant policy department, that was in charge subsequently of rewriting its legislation.  
I know what it feels like when there is no trust and respect. That means you’re second-guessing 
                                                 
80 I did find evidence that, at least in the case of the EPAs, it was they rather than the state environment departments 
that were briefing ministers on the contamination of Department of Defence land; this may have been an unusual 
instance of such direct links, given the sensitivities. 
81 I will illustrate such boundary spanning behaviour and its ideational sources in Chapter 6. 
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each other. You’re needlessly writing stupid briefs about things that need to be done. Whereas 
now not only does the department have our back; we operate as if we are just part of the 
continuum. We do the regulation; they do the policy (Interview 12, State line agency) 
Evidence from a survey of agencies in the Australian Commonwealth suggests those at lower 
levels of the organisation are less constrained in their contacts with departmental colleagues, 
meeting with them far more frequently and informally than those in charge of their agencies 
(Smullen & Fawcett 2018, p. 52). 
4.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has canvassed the impact of the federal system’s formal structures and settings on 
the roles and approaches of those working on intergovernmental management.  It has done so 
through an examination of how intergovernmental management is conducted in the formal 
elements of the federal system: COAG and ministerial meetings, the negotiation of federal 
agreements and the role of departments and agencies.  
The data demonstrates that policy prioritisation and development takes place at a series of 
levels and responds to a variety of interests and contexts.  Individual officials — particularly 
those that I interviewed at senior levels with systemic steering responsibilities — have to 
negotiate amongst and between their individual departmental positions, their jurisdictional 
positions, the national federal policy context and, of course, the directions, priorities and 
strategies set for them by the political context at all three levels. 
As a general point, this complexity tests a number of conclusions researchers have drawn about 
Australian federalism, most notably those that conclude executive federalism and vertical fiscal 
imbalance close down the options and opportunities available to federal reformers, and leave 
the story there.   
‘Structures only get you so far’ argued one Territory official: 
Even if your structures aren’t great, if you have the right agency - in other words, if you have the 
right players around the room and the right relationships and the right windows of political 
opportunity to do various things, if you have those ingredients - that actually is more important 
than whether you have the right structures in place. (Interview 22, Territory central department) 
For intergovernmental managers, stability does not mean stasis.  The abolition of ministerial 
councils and the restorative networks that replaced them are an example of agency at the service 
of systemic resilience and restoration.  Indeed, a key contention arising from the description of 
the post-abolition environment is that more attention needs to paid to what happens on the 
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periphery of the formal meetings.  As one state government official put it,  
There’s a whole world of intergovernmental relations which I’m involved in now that never go 
anywhere near COAG, and nor should they…. There’s this whole other world where lots of good 
stuff gets done. (Interview 16, State line department) 
Agency is not always subversive; it may be conservative and corrective, retaining momentum 
and institutional memory.  Order-preserving innovations are themselves an important source 
of institutional dynamism that standard approaches often miss. These findings support Benz 
and Broschek’s conceptualisation of federal dynamics as involving both change and continuity 
over time (2013, p. 467), a matter to which I will return in the theoretical conclusions at Chapter 
7.4. 
Second, this chapter has reflected the interpretivist project of understanding how actors operate 
within webs of meaning that are derived from and inform the formal structures in which they 
work.  Rational choice and historical institutionalist explanations work well in explaining stasis 
in intergovernmental management, as the outcome of national/sub-national interest equilibria 
and path dependency respectively embedded in institutional frameworks.  However, it is to 
individual, or at least organisational change agents that we might look for an explanation of 
change in the practice of intergovernmental management. 
As Hays puts it, ‘structures should be understood as enabling as well as 
constraining….structures not only limit us, they also lend us our sense of self and the tools for 
creative and transformative action’ (1994, p. 61).  Agency, therefore, reflects the particular 
structural settings in which it is exercised, and their configuration at a point in time.   
Rules-in-use underpin COAG itself, its councils, the agreement-making process, the 
relationships between the political and administrative arms of the executive, and so on.  But 
federalism’s formal structures and the processes that go on in them are imbued with values and 
norms that guide the work of officials.  Consequently, this chapter has demonstrated that the 
rules-in-use governing the practice of intergovernmental management are themselves a way of 
balancing norms and values: between collaboration and conflict, jurisdictional versus systemic 
interests, the primacy of outcomes versus the integrity of processes.   
In effect, there are two rule sets: one which guides officials in supporting systemic stability and 
process, and the other one which supports them in finding opportunities for change and 
innovation.  Both are derived from broad value sets that inform public administration in 
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Australia.  The first value set is derived from what Hood and Lodge call the ‘serial loyalty’ 
public service bargain between public servants and the government of the day in the 
Westminster tradition (2006).  The second value set is based on the notion of what those authors 
call ‘trusteeship’ in which public servants possess a degree of autonomy in which they exercise 
stewardship over the system that runs alongside, and may conflict with, their services to the 
political executive.  As I will demonstrate in the next chapter, such stewardship is closely 
related to the strong perception officials hold of intergovernmental management as a domain 
that is separate from political concerns or the interests of their jurisdictions. 
In short, federal structures are more than just a set of constitutional, legal and political 
structures and processes that determine the interests and motives of the political and 
bureaucratic actors within them. Rather, these structures form an ‘irredeemably ideational’ 
environment in Hay’s terms (2011) in which officials play an active role as ‘rule takers’ but 
also rule makers, breakers, shapers and keepers.  Consequently, this chapter points us in the 
direction of the ‘ideational layer’ of federal dynamics, which I will turn to in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5 
‘Swimming Between The Flags’: the craft of intergovernmental 
management 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter shifts the empirical focus from the formal to the informal elements of the 
institutional layer of federal dynamics.  In terms of the practice of intergovernmental 
management, we are moving from looking at a set of operationalised, formal structures and 
processes to intergovernmental management as a craft: ‘what managers do or should do in 
specific settings’ (Lynn 2012, p. 23).  This craft is embodied in the routines and relationships 
that take place in and around the formal structures discussed in the preceding chapter.   
In essence, the task is neatly summarised by Kay’s distinction between a ‘structuralist account,’ 
in which exogenous factors explain formal changes in the Australian federal system, and an 
account based on the way practitioners adapt to such challenges, requiring an ‘active process 
of governing across multiple levels and jurisdictions with attendant uncertainties and 
contingencies’ (2015, p. 410).   
For example, to what extent and in what ways does the relative weakness of such formal 
structures in certain circumstances affect the way officials can exercise their agency; do they 
have more autonomy where meetings are less official? 
The specific context for this consideration is the federal policy process.  ‘Complexity and 
uncertainty would make policy choices hard enough even if they could be made purely on 
technical grounds. But policies are not made in a vacuum’ wrote the then head of the 
Productivity Commission (Banks 2009,  p. 112).  Accordingly, this chapter examines the salient 
elements of the federal policy cycle as practitioners discussed them, including how they 
understand federalism to matter in a policy-making sense.   
Unlike the formal rules and guidance underlying Australia’s federal system, such as the IGA 
FFR or the guidelines on ministerial councils, there are no formal rules or guidelines to help 
practitioners navigate policy problems and the varying degrees of discretion and scope for 
reaching agreement.  Instead, it is necessary to identify and understand what institutionalists 
call the ‘rules-in-use’, ‘the do’s and don’ts that one learns on the ground that may not exist in 
any written document’ (Ostrom 2007, p. 23).  Many of these rules respond to the context for 
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intergovernmental management in which ‘information, trust and negotiation among 
interdependent actors become as salient as constitutional frameworks in reaching decisions’ 
(Clarke 2007, p. 57).  
This chapter also provides data on the rules-in-use relating to intergovernmental meetings of 
varying levels of formality; how intergovernmental policy work is performed; and the 
establishment and maintenance of networks.  Finally, as an introduction to the ideational 
aspects of federal dynamics in the next chapter, I examine the nature of intergovernmental 
management as an institution in its own right, and what we can learn from this about the way 
its practitioners contribute to continuity and change in the federal system. 
As the focus shifts to the core practice of intergovernmental management and the ideas that 
shape and are shaped by it, the discursive methodology I have employed comes to the fore in 
the way officials use metaphors and ideas generally to help them think through their context 
and the strategies they adopt in response.  March and Olsen describe the development of a logic 
of appropriateness through processes of reasoning by analogy and metaphor (2009b, p. 694); 
similarly, Rocco and Thurston describe metaphors as labels for complex processes of gradual 
institutional change (2013, p. 38).  Consequently, their use throughout the interviews is an 
important source of data on the mechanisms at work relevant to federal dynamics.   
5.2 Relations with Ministers and political constraints 
No discussion of the craft of intergovernmental management is complete without considering 
the institutional settings for public administration generally, and their implications for 
bureaucratic practice.  The Westminster tradition had a formative effect on the development of 
the Australian state governments at the time, and, subsequently, on the Commonwealth 
government (Parker 1978, p. 349).  The tradition includes the principle that the public service 
is accountable to ministers, and ministers are individually and collectively accountable to 
parliament and the electorate.  The Westminster tradition clearly distinguishes between the 
political role of ministers who ‘have the last word’ on all matters for which they are responsible, 
and a bureaucracy that is non-partisan, in that it can only be appointed and removed according 
to legislated rules, works loyally for whoever occupies the ministry regardless of their political 
stance and strenuously avoids active political participation (Rhodes 2005, p.147). 
Within that context, Australia’s highly centralised federal system tends to push policy issues 
upwards for their resolution, frequently to COAG itself.  Simeon, noting a similar tendency in 
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Canada, suggested this made it easier to reach quick agreement on such matters.  However, he 
also warned that ‘conflicts become much more sharply defined and therefore more intractable’ 
(1972, p. 144). 
A key characteristic of Australian federalism that increases the reform options available to 
ministers and their departments is the fact that political party symmetry between the 
Commonwealth and states is not strongly binding, making jurisdictional interests less 
constrained on that score.  Australia runs counter to Burgess’s view that, while ‘partisan 
harmony’ has a ‘binding impact’ on federations, asymmetry between the central and sub-
national governments has a centrifugal effect leading to support for decentralising reforms 
(1993, p. 107).  
Vertical party-driven policy making does happen, of course, but the evidence appears to be that 
it does not happen frequently and is restricted to particular policy issues.  Generally, state 
politicians do what is best for their states, regardless of who is in power in Canberra (Weissert 
2017, p. 98).82  Very few interviewees suggested that party congruence across the 
Commonwealth and states affected their work to any significant extent; indeed, many argued 
that individual state interests override political allegiances.  One reason for this is because, with 
federal funding a zero sum game, finding more Commonwealth money to appease a premier 
might require a reduction of funding for other policy areas that one’s cabinet colleagues 
consider a priority, or cause a reaction from other premiers, regardless of their political 
orientation.83 
Given the complexities explored in the previous chapter, Weissert’s conclusion that it is simply 
a case of ‘states against the Commonwealth’ appears simplistic.  Rather, the balance between 
adversarial/coordinate and collaborative/concurrent objectives and interests described there 
plays out more generally in the way relations between the political and administrative arms of 
the executive inform intergovernmental management.   
The simplest manifestation of these relations in intergovernmental management is one where 
                                                 
82 A recent example saw a ferocious attack by South Australia’s Labor Water Minister on the Victorian Labor 
Water Minister over the Murray-Darling Basin Plan; a ‘remarkable initiative commenced by a coalition 
government … sealed by a Labor government and agreed to by all the states, with their varying platforms and 
regional interests’ (Hamilton & Kells 2019). 
83 A notable exception raised in the interviews was the disagreement in 2018 between Labor states, who wanted 
the development of national employment standards to include provisions for domestic violence leave, and the 
opposition from Coalition governments in power in NSW and the Commonwealth. 
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officials are directed to pursue a course of action.  For example, in the bilateral negotiations 
over streamlined national processes for environment assessment and approval, state 
administrations were haggling over the extent to which they would be required to change state 
legislation to deliver the outcomes COAG was seeking. 
The Queensland government officials were just given directions by their government to get on 
with it and do it. Their government decided, ‘Yep, we’re up for this.’ Their Premier and their 
minister just said, ‘Just fucking get on with it.’ I think that made a significant difference to their 
willingness to get on with it. They didn’t get that in New South Wales and that made things 
significantly harder. (Interview 27, Commonwealth line department) 
In the case of domestic violence policies, political divergence, rather than congruence, became 
a driving factor in the reform process, as the Howard government pursued policies that 
circumvented the role of the Labor states.84  This divergence disrupted what had been 
collaborative working arrangements amongst officials: 
it became difficult to navigate those things, and the Commonwealth definitely made decisions to 
go directly to local entities rather than necessarily have conversations and funding coming 
through state and territory governments. The meetings that guided Partnerships Against Domestic 
Violence became more and more fraught. You had a point in time where every jurisdiction was 
Labor with the federal government being in the coalition. So you can just imagine the big ‘P’ 
politics operating in that. (Interview 31, State line agency) 
The Westminster conventions directly inform the practice of intergovernmental management.  
Officials describe their role in terms of the loyalty they offer to the government of the day, 
whose broader policy choices inform the subsequent negotiating stance taken by officials.  As 
I noted above, even the principles set out in the IGA FFR may be subordinated to the 
government’s political directions if so directed.   
Political direction setting also extends to the detailed and technical aspects of the policy 
process.  Ministers are not only required to sign off on the communiques that record COAG 
meeting decisions, they are also actively involved in drafting them, working with senior 
departmental representatives on the wording that they hope encapsulates their preferred 
outcome.85  Some Ministers are known for doing so in discussion with their interstate 
counterparts.  They are also involved in developing and agreeing their negotiating stance before 
the COAG meetings and, if the matter is one that involves other portfolios, they may take that 
                                                 
84 The Partnerships Against Domestic Violence program was announced by Howard in November 1997 at the 
National Domestic Violence Summit attended by all Heads of Government. 
85 This is an example of the important role communiques play in translating the coordinative discourse within the 
executive to communicative discourse between the collective political executive and the public. 
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to a jurisdictional cabinet meeting beforehand.   
So you’ll say to the minister, ‘To what extent do you want me to go hard in this meeting?’ around 
some of those issues you know they’re fighting their own agenda about, and get a lay of the land. 
But you’ve got to be an official that feels comfortable in actually asking that question of your 
minister and getting their backing. (Interview 31, State line agency) 
The political stance taken by ministers and chief ministers can significantly restrict the 
negotiation options open to officials, particularly when they make commitments highly public.  
Commonwealth officials complained that  
there are times where we don't have room to move.  That doesn't win us any friends in the states 
when we say 'We can't move on that,' because they say 'Well how can you do that?  You've agreed 
to do this, and now you're suggesting something which is different to it'.  That's one that we can't 
engage on.  There's always room for them to refuse to sign up to something, for their political 
masters to protest. (Interview 2, Commonwealth central department) 
In the case of the NDIS, for example, the then Prime Minister’s public criticism of a state 
government for holding back on a national scheme obtained that state’s compliance, but 
undermined relationships between the relevant bureaucrats. 
Equally, however, the Prime Minister’s commitment limited the options available to her own 
Commonwealth negotiators as well. 
Gillard went out publicly and said, ‘We’re going to do this.’ Well, we had just set the terms of 
our defeat with states and territories. We had our riding instructions written for us, but, more 
particularly, they’d been made public, and the states then were emboldened. So what had been a 
state problem, not providing services to people with disability, became a Commonwealth 
problem. In one fell swoop she transferred responsibility of this issue from the states to the 
Commonwealth. We became term-takers from the states, and they extracted the most 
extraordinary terms from us. (Interview 42, Commonwealth central department) 
The relationships between departments and ministers may override the collaborative tendencies 
I noted earlier between central and line departments.  While central departments may take a 
whole of government perspective on particular policy issues or even on the relationship overall 
between a state government and the Commonwealth, that view may not be shared by a 
particular minister who wants to push a particular line. 
This counterweight to the role of first ministers, treasurers and their departments mitigates, to 
some extent, the criticisms of ‘executive federalism’ that see COAG’s operations as driven by 
powerful central agencies and the primacy of a ‘whole of government’ approach to policy 
issues (Anderson 2008, p. 506). In practice, as I have shown, neither central nor line department 
perspectives are homogenous or consistent, and the role played by the central departments must 
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be more deft and facilitative than directive, steering cautiously through situations where 
ministers have strong views about what they want to see in agreements.  As one central agency 
official put it,  
Portfolio ministers have policy responsibility for agreements. We don't typically get involved in 
that.  We can provide guidance and advice on the side, but we have to work within the framework; 
their departments are the connection between the framework and us, and what the minister's trying 
to achieve.  And so there can be this constant movement all the way along until we reach a landing 
spot. (Interview 1, Commonwealth central department) 
The interview data highlights a more general point about the strong self-identification by 
officials as ‘technocratic trustees’, in Hood and Lodge’s term,86 reflecting their role as 
‘impartial experts or technocrats making decisions on behalf of society as a whole rather than 
according to the interest of any single lobby group’ (2006, p. 39); or, in this case, as the 
technocrats in charge of making sure the federal system operates effectively rather than in the 
interests of partisan politics.  This was a perspective common to all intergovernmental 
managers, whether in the Commonwealth or states, and whether they were in central or in line 
departments.   
For example, officials frequently expressed discomfort and impatience with the political 
dimension of their work.  One official described the political tensions between ministers (of 
the same government) that emerged in a working group: 
it was awkward, actually, that it played out in front of officials, too. It was a bit untidy. It would 
have been preferable had they had the opportunity to have a quick meeting in the cabinet room or 
something like that and have a discussion about it rather than have this horse trading in front of 
officials who were trying to draft bits of the communique and wrap up each session of that COAG 
meeting. (Interview 21, Commonwealth line department) 
I will come back to this stewardship role in more detail in the discussion of intergovernmental 
management as an institution in its own right at section 5.6.1 below.  My point here is that a 
large part of the craft of intergovernmental management is exercised in support of making the 
system work despite the politics, as well as in the direction set by politics.  Indeed, officials 
expressed a distaste for the politics of the process. 
Your jurisdiction might be advancing a proposition that is largely illogical, not evidence driven 
but is fundamentally something about the politics of it. So you then can’t ignore that in your 
contribution to the debate. But, equally, you are looking for a pathway to the resolution of the 
issue rather than simply amplifying the politics around whatever the issue is. Politics always, of 
                                                 
86 Hood and Lodge associate technocratic trustees with the German bureaucratic tradition; it is interesting to 
consider whether the traces of it I detect here reflect both German and Australian federal traditions. 
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course, influences positions, but people respect the institution of COAG. (Interview 18, State 
central department) 
Officials adopt a range of strategies to conserve this space and keep it open for communicating 
and negotiating, another example of the order-preserving innovation described in Chapter 4. 
As I have illustrated in the discussion of agreement-making, an important process is the 
communication channels and networks that that operate between peers. Some officials describe 
their roles as being a mediator between political executives. 
As much as I can I try to keep the dialogue open with the Commonwealth to try and work through 
what’s really important from their perspective and what are their non-negotiables and then try and 
work through with our Premier and his office what is not negotiable from their perspective and 
see if we can reach a middle ground. (Interview 19, State central department) 
Another approach is by drafting agreements and decisions in a way that leaves them open for 
negotiation, rather than closing them down. 
A third approach actually drafts ministers into service.  Occasionally, officials will get their 
ministers to work with their counterparts in the other jurisdiction to overcome local blockages.   
I was on the phone several times with the minister himself in the lead-up to COAG drinks the day 
before COAG and he basically used his personal relationship with the then Victorian Premier, 
went up and said, ‘You know, we’re just about to land our MOU. This is the final sticking point. 
If I give in on this point will you agree to that point?’ He could do that because I had given him 
the latest from our negotiations with Victorian officials. The Victorian Premier was a bit cornered 
and said yes. Minister called me and then I relayed it back to Victorian officials saying, ‘It’s a 
done deal with your Premier.’ (Interview 22, Territory central department) 
5.3 Intergovernmental committees, working groups and meetings 
5.3.1 Background 
In addition to the formal committees that underpin COAG, such as the Senior Officials and 
Deputy Senior Officials Meetings, a highly diverse landscape of committees, meetings and 
working groups carries out functions in relation to particular areas of policy and regulation.   
Simeon’s early study of intergovernmental management in Canada drew attention to the 
importance of this sub-stratum, describing the shared backgrounds and experience of their 
members and the resulting ‘tight-knit group with an esprit of its own’ (1972, p. 135).  Warhurst 
similarly noted the ‘innumerable’ contacts between Commonwealth and state governments in 
Australia (1983, p. 2).87  Such bureaucratic esprit de corps means that officials are motivated 
                                                 
87 Parker’s comparative study of a number of federations similarly notes that Australia, along with Canada and 
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to find agreement and sort out minor disagreements; it means that governments are fully aware 
of the others’ positions, leading to better preparation for ministerial meetings; and it allows for 
a build-up of consensus on future policies. 
5.3.2 The norms and conventions of intergovernmental committees and 
meetings 
The interview data suggested five distinct functions for this layer of the intergovernmental 
bureaucracy.88 
First, meetings are a conduit for information to be gathered and fed into formal federal 
processes.  Line departments are able to glean intelligence on positions and sticking points 
from their more frequent contacts with their colleagues in the other jurisdictions; this 
intelligence informs the central agencies’ strategies and priorities, and highlights areas of 
potential discord that can be addressed before the formal ministerial meetings occur.  
Conversely, these meetings, particularly within a particular jurisdiction, are an opportunity for 
the central departments to inform their line department colleagues of the formal rules of a 
particular negotiation process, and of the political constraints and dynamics that shape 
negotiating positions and tactics. 
More generally, almost all of the committees and working groups consciously set aside time 
for sharing and comparing policy-relevant information, often in a ‘Chatham House’ format and 
at the dinners that accompany meetings (I will have more to say about these dinners shortly).  
Second, committees and working groups are a venue for establishing cross-jurisdictional 
positions and alliances, particularly for the states.  For example, officials from the state central 
departments regularly meet before the formal SOM or Deputy SOM to make joint decisions 
about briefing their ministers and adopting a coherent states’ points of view.  Similarly, a 
meeting of state and territory Treasury officials always precedes the Heads of Treasury 
meetings.  
It’s often quite short, possibly informal. It might be something they do before dinner prior to 
having the conversation with the Commonwealth. They might agree, for example, what state is 
                                                 
Germany, possesses ‘a vast network of forums’ facilitating agreement-making (2015, p. 197); more recently, 
Elijah noted that ‘these working groups and committees are a significant part of Australia’s intergovernmental 
institutional machinery’ (2018, p. 4).   
88 This analysis aligns methodologically with the recommendations by Rhodes, t’Hart and Noordegraaf that 
committees should be studied and their purposes documented as organisational phenomena with their own 
characteristics as distinct from those of their individual members (2007, p. 209). 
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going to lead a certain conversation with the Commonwealth and what kind of things they might 
pursue. They might just try to give each other a sense of what their own governments’ priorities 
are and what they need to get out of the meeting. (Interview 17, State central department) 
Third, much of the process work for policy development and implementation is carried out 
through these lower level frameworks and is then referred back to higher level governance 
forums such as COAG or a ministerial council.  To take one example, the implementation 
methods that may have been envisaged at the time that a particular national partnership 
agreement was signed may become overtaken by events or new approaches, rendering the 
performance management and resourcing regime obsolete.  ‘Large, more complex agreements 
can require maintenance during their life’ one central agency official noted (Interview 1, 
Commonwealth central department), and such maintenance is largely carried out through these 
channels.   
Fourth, these meetings are an important opportunity to generate the trust between officials that 
is needed to reduce the risks of information sharing.  Discursive institutionalist literature draws 
attention to the importance of the institutional and social contexts in which ‘coordinative’ 
discourse takes place (eg Gillard 2016; Borriello & Crespy 2015).  Even when participants 
have not, as yet, had the opportunity to develop trust or consensus, what Schmidt calls the 
‘rules of the forum’ (2011, p. 119) help to create a set of understandings that allows work to 
proceed. 
Finally, committees and working groups are an opportunity for organisations to induct officials 
into the intergovernmental management world, exposing them to the processes and conventions 
that will govern and guide their work.  The head of one central department actually made a 
point of having junior officials attend the senior officials meetings ‘just to see how business is 
executed. And you graduate.’ (Interview 18, State central department). 
Official meetings of COAG and its ministerial councils are usually preceded or accompanied 
by dinners for the senior officials attending.89  These frequently happen the night before, 
allowing deals to be struck or at least negotiations to take place that facilitate inter-government 
agreement the next day.  For the states, dinners are also an important opportunity to develop 
                                                 
89 Edwards and Henderson had already noted this as a feature of COAG’s operations (1995).  My findings here 
reflect broader developments in the literature on policy transfer processes that take place in a variety of what 
McCann and Ward refer to as ‘situations,’ including temporary settings such as informal dinners (2012, p. 329).  
Inwood et al. (2011) note the importance of these dinners for building strong intergovernmental capacity, while 
the Davis and Silver study noted the importance of Heads of Treasury dinners for reaching agreement (2015, p. 
476). 
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their perspective on a policy matter before negotiating with the Commonwealth.   
Most of the formal business used to get done at the formal dinner. And I used to have to stay sober 
enough to make sure I got the notes down to keep the decisions. (Retired senior official, Interview 
4). 
More generally, dinners are an opportunity for an off-the-record sharing of problems or 
information, or simply a wide-ranging discussion: 
because it’s motivated by the fact there is a formal meeting, but it’s informal. We’re just going to 
chew the fat about what Brexit and Trump and income inequality mean. There’s no outcome from 
that, but it’s actually critical because it’s us connecting as a group of people who might 
collectively have to do something together and understanding where we coming from and 
building a better relationship. (Interview 10, State central department). 
However, these dinners are not always harmonious affairs, and may presage policy differences 
between jurisdictions.  One very senior Commonwealth official described being invited to a 
dinner to find it was ‘a beat-up session on me which was actually the most unfair interaction’ 
(Interview 41, Commonwealth line department). Notwithstanding such tensions, in which ‘hats 
are partially off; they’re never completely off’ (Interview 10, State central department), dinners 
play an important role in building personal relationships and generating trust between 
officials.90     
It was interesting to note that some interviewees felt that the abolition of some ministerial 
councils, as discussed at section 4.3.3 above, had resulted in a diminution in the number or 
status of such meetings.  This raised the risk of an associated attrition in the collegiality 
amongst this group of officials, as well as the impacts on the work program. 
All the committees and meetings reviewed here are physical spaces which, on the surface, 
appear to be unremarkable and prosaic.  However, they are infused with protocols, routines and 
conventions that reveal deeper dynamics about the distribution of power and interests across 
the system, confirming Simeon’s early reference to such interaction and the importance of 
personal relationships in the Canadian system (1972, p. 135).    
For example, meetings are usually arranged to place the Commonwealth at the head of the 
table, with NSW and Victoria on either side, reflecting the pre-eminence of those states’ 
populations and economic size.  As one official from a small jurisdiction noted,  
The name tags are distributed, people are seated, and you know there’s a kind of most powerful 
                                                 
90 Replacing dinners with video or teleconferences was generally considered a markedly inferior approach. 
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seat and a least powerful seat. I’m always in the least powerful seat in the room, right down in the 
corner. So if you want to actually say anything and engage with the person who’s chairing the 
meeting, you need to lean sideways and talk on an angle (Interview 22, Territory central 
department) 
In fact, this embodiment of the federal hierarchy in seating arrangements annoys officials from 
smaller jurisdictions, as it tends to obscure the leading role they may play in policy processes.  
As one official from a smaller jurisdiction put it, 
One of the things that always drove me crazy was that the Commonwealth always does everything 
in order of size. You know that thing about New South Wales carrying the day, they always do at 
every meeting and even in the way tables are set up for meetings, I found it really infuriating, it 
was so ingrained there and even if we were doing all the work on the modelling and leading the 
whole conversation, we get put at the end of the table. (Interview 38, State central department) 
Two key roles for change agents emerged from the dynamics of intergovernmental meetings.  
First, individuals exercise leadership in establishing the degree of formality around meetings, 
given that this is not determined by reference to a formal framework.  Individuals may persuade 
their colleagues of the benefits of moving to less formal arrangements and processes, allowing 
for a debate over policy that is less constrained by political or jurisdictional interests.   
Conversely, officials may also help to turn less formal meetings into something with more 
structure and process.  For example, officials turned an informal set of meetings in the area of 
science, technology, engineering and mathematics teaching in secondary schools into national 
working parties with formally minuted and resourced action plans. 
It’s really quite organic. It’s not like a system that’s established, but it comes out of opportunities 
like roundtables. For example, one I went to one in Darwin focused on the state strategies, what 
was working, what we were seeing, how we were getting the lift, and from there, national working 
parties have been established to continue driving that work. (Interview 37, State line department) 
A second key role for officials is in the way they discharge their duties in running these 
meetings and making them efficient and effective.  The capacity to exercise such initiative 
clearly depends on a number of factors, such as the individual’s personal standing, the 
likelihood they have primed other states beforehand, and, of course, their minister’s views.  
While some of these rules are indistinguishable from good meeting etiquette generally, a 
distinct set of issues arises from the federal settings for these meetings, and the task of allowing 
discussion to reflect federal concurrency in distinction to the hierarchical nature of formal 
meetings noted earlier: 
when you’re looking for consensus on complex topics, then it is around how you facilitate a 
conversation to have voices heard, to be able to synthesize the information and where you actually 
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insert your jurisdiction’s perspective. (Interview 28, Territory line department) 
Many officials commented on their role in chairing or attending intergovernmental meetings 
as an important venue for the exercise of their skills and agency as intergovernmental 
managers.  Part of this skill set involves giving other jurisdictions the opportunity to bring their 
views and interests to the table, without losing sight of one’s own jurisdictional objectives (the 
challenge introduces some nuance, at least at this practical level, to the notion of 
Commonwealth domination).  For example, one senior Commonwealth bureaucrat has a 
technique for meetings she chairs where she deflects the risk of a veto vote by a state by 
allowing it to indicate where political authorisation will be needed: 
I establish a code, an agreed signal that an issue is a hard barrier for a particular state, and may 
require approval from up the political chain, either formal or informal testing (Interview 4, 
Commonwealth line department). 
Another official described how, as chair of a committee developing a major national health 
policy, she deliberately distanced herself from the Commonwealth delegation, so as not to be 
seen to be ‘prosecuting their arguments from the chair’ (Interview 21, Commonwealth line 
department).  
Officials involved in domestic violence policy noted the difference that a change in the chair 
of the working group had made: 
there were at least three reps from every jurisdiction. It did flounder for a period of time, but then 
the Commonwealth changed who was chairing it and that brought a high degree of order and 
outcome focus at that time. Personnel is critical. (Interview 38, State central department) 
Senior officials who have developed a longstanding reputation for sagacity and bipartisanship 
in a federal policy field may play the role of ‘technocratic trustee’, leveraging the gravitas they 
have earned to smooth the way to a decision.  One official, for example, described her ‘non-
verbals’ and whispered confidences at ministerial meetings as a way of reassuring ministers 
from other jurisdictions to facilitate an outcome: 
if my minister is saying something and others ministers are not trusting what they’re saying, I just 
nodded and they’d know, ‘No, no, that’s believable.’ And then I might say to my minister, ‘Can 
I trot round and talk to the New South Wales minister because we could probably get them over 
the line if I explain what’s going on?’ They’d say yes, I’d crouch down at the table and whisper 
to them and to their Director-General, my colleague, and things might happen. It’s something that 
goes on amongst the players in a room which, over time, means you can work in ways that are 
really very, very subtle. (Interview 41, Commonwealth line department) 
A key convention for ensuring successful meetings generally can be summed up in the phrase 
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‘no surprises’; that is, much of the work that goes into a meeting is about identifying and 
marshalling sources of support, and notifying one’s colleagues in other jurisdictions of the 
approach one wishes to take, even if it is not shared.  
If you come with a position that nobody is particularly invested in or familiar with, it’s unlikely 
to be a fruitful conversation. A lot of the work of senior executives or senior officials would be 
about making sure that they’ve got support to be influential in those meetings. (Interview 17, State 
central department) 
Given the Commonwealth’s dominance of the policy agenda, and the risks (as noted in section 
4.4.2) that a shift in the Commonwealth’s position can expose the states to the costs of changing 
programs already underway and committed, ‘no surprises’ by the Commonwealth was 
considered a particularly important condition for meeting success: 
if you start with 12 months of work that has been done in the Commonwealth that we didn’t know 
about, then it’s probably going to be a difficult conversation. The conversations that start earlier 
and are more open in nature about how we achieve a shared outcome I think are the most 
constructive ones. (Interview 16, State central department) 
An important convention that foreshadows the discussion in this chapter of intergovernmental 
management as an institution and ‘discursive space’ in its own right (see section 5.6), isolates 
the committees and working groups from the politics between Commonwealth and state 
politicians.  It is accepted that what happens politically may undercut efforts at collaboration: 
whatever the agenda is that I may have been trying to take into a senior officials meeting, there 
could be a political overlay that just undercuts that. Nor are you held to account by your peers for 
your inability to ultimately deliver. You’re expected not to get it wrong all the time, but there is 
an acceptance that sometimes, as they say, stuff happens (Interview 18, State central department) 
Similarly, officials are there to serve and assist their ministers, but this is not generally seen as 
a barrier to the development of trust and open communication between them, particularly where 
gaming behaviour can be mitigated through an ‘open show of one’s hand’: 
I’ve never, ever stepped outside being completely loyal to the government of the day. So I’m not 
saying that I would have shared information that I shouldn’t have—not ever. It’s just the way you 
behave. You can say, ‘Look, I think the Commonwealth government’s disposition will be x,’ or, 
‘I think it will work better if you guys think about it from this perspective’ or, ‘No, no, you don’t 
need to react like that because what’s going on in the Commonwealth is x, y, z’— often it was a 
matter of translation of how the Commonwealth works which, of course, is an arcane and dark 
business. Somehow that openness seemed to engender a good sense of trust. (Interview 41, 
Commonwealth line department) 
5.3.3 Agenda-setting in a federal context 
Agenda-setting is a critical element in policy processes generally, and as a specific bureaucratic 
‘Swimming Between The Flags’: the craft of intergovernmental management 
124 
function in intergovernmental management.  Kingdon’s ‘multiple streams’ model pays much 
attention to agenda-setting.  In that context he distinguishes between a governmental agenda 
that captures priorities and a decision agenda, the specific list of subjects within the 
governmental agenda that are to be decided (Kingdon 2003, p. 4).   
Translating this to the federal system, agendas at COAG, its ministerial councils and lower 
working groups and meetings across the federation are an important device for signalling what 
the priorities are for the different levels of government and the differences between them, and 
for sorting when and how such priorities are to be handled, if at all.  Agenda outcomes are 
reflected in COAG’s communiques, intergovernmental agreements and the work programs of 
subordinate working groups.  Apart from these outputs, agenda-setting as a process also reveals 
something about the status of intergovernmental relations at any time, how well or poorly they 
are conducted and why they have taken a particular direction. 
The classic perspective on agenda-setting in the Australian federal system, captured in 
Deakin’s metaphor of crushing ‘chariot wheels,’ argues that the Commonwealth’s fiscal 
domination is mirrored in its capacity to dominate both the governmental and decision agendas, 
particularly at COAG and its ministerial councils (eg Phillimore 2013, p. 232; Kildea & Lynch 
2011, p. 104; Hollander & Patapan, 2007, p. 287).  For example, Jones points out that the 
Commonwealth’s drive for national consistency in education curricula and standards led to it 
raising 42 per cent of the agenda items for the ministerial council on Education, Employment, 
Training and Youth Affairs91  (2008, p. 166).  Consequently, reviews of the federation often 
recommend a greater role for the states in putting items on COAG’s agenda (for example, 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia) 2015, p. 3; Australia. Parliament. 
Senate 2011, p. 50).   
The experience of many practitioners supports this general contention about the 
Commonwealth’s dominance: 
It’s very difficult to get some things on the agenda at COAG because the Commonwealth just 
won’t agree to put it on. They just don’t want to talk about it. You can advocate through officials; 
you can have first ministers write to the Prime Minister, but if they don’t put it on the agenda and 
they don’t give you the space, it doesn’t get run. (Interview 16, State central department) 
At one intergovernmental meeting of officials the facilitator wrote the words ‘climate change’ 
                                                 
91 1993-2009 
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on the whiteboard.  Reflecting the then Commonwealth government’s strenuous opposition to 
climate change policies,  
within about 20 minutes a request came through from the Commonwealth saying, ‘Please, can 
you erase that. We don’t like that, we don’t use that word.’ (Interview 13, State line agency) 
Practitioners also pointed out that the Commonwealth’s dominance is reflected not only in what 
items are on the agenda, but those it keeps off the agenda, those it relegates to later meetings, 
or how they’re to be dealt with once they are included: 
The Prime Minister can determine whether they want to do it on a wholly retail basis or whether 
they want to deal with it as a strategic discussion. They can deal with it on the basis of do they 
want experts to come in and do briefings around particular matters and things like principals only 
or officials in the room. There was a period where there were principals only and then officials 
came in the room under Rudd. (Interview 18, State central department) 
Interview data, however, suggests that the agenda-setting process is more complex, despite the 
Commonwealth’s undoubted pre-eminence.  State premiers can be the source of, or a vital ally 
in major reform programs, such as the role played by state premiers in the Hawke 
Government’s ‘Closer Partnership with the States’ in 1990 (Hollander & Patapan 2007, p. 284).  
A number of analysts have also pointed to the mutual benefits derived from cooperative 
agenda-setting exercises.  For example, Davis points to opportunities afforded by the Closer 
Partnerships program for the Commonwealth to expand its sphere of influence, while the states 
gained a greater say on the policy agenda, with mutual benefits for national efficiency and the 
reduction of duplication (Davis, 2017, p. 149). 
Many interviewees recognised that it is in the Commonwealth’s interests, as well as the states’, 
to include alternative agenda priorities and approaches, allowing for a degree of ‘horse trading’.  
Consequently, the actual agenda for COAG is less of a Commonwealth-only exercise than 
many analysts suggest: 
While the final decision on the agenda for a COAG meeting is the Prime Minister’s, he or she 
will also be responsive to the states and territories - if they want a matter discussed, then it will 
often make its way onto the agenda, or the Prime Minister will propose an alternative way in 
which that matter can be progressed.  So there is an amount of the agenda setting which is a 
collaborative exercise. (Interview 2, Commonwealth central department) 
Representatives from the central agency teams responsible for intergovernmental management 
reported paying a great deal of attention to COAG’s discussions as a guide for them on general 
directions and priorities, and on state government priorities and views to be considered for 
meeting agendas: 
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Part of our role is to understand what all of the state governments are doing.  So we keep a 
watching brief on each one of them, so that we can suggest to the Prime Minister things that you 
could include on a strategic agenda, or a forward plan.  We could say 'These things are of 
particular interest to the Commonwealth, these things are of particular interest to the states and 
territories, here's where we've got a nice overlap.’ (Interview 2, Commonwealth central 
department) 
More collegiate agenda-setting happens at lower level meetings; while the Commonwealth 
tends to dominate COAG itself and ministerial councils, this dynamic is more balanced in less 
formal ministerial meetings, working groups or meetings between authorities and agencies 
across the federation that are not directly connected to a COAG or ministerial council meeting.  
Agendas for such meetings are frequently developed by discussion and negotiation amongst 
the supporting senior officials’ group. For example, the agenda for the environmental 
ministers’ meetings (not a formal ministerial council) is constructed with more collaboration 
than is involved for the formal councils:  
Last Tuesday we sat down with the minister and said, ‘here is the draft ministerial meeting. We 
think these items should be on there from Victoria. We think the other items should be there, but 
maybe this one from, for example, South Australia, we don’t actually think that’s worth going 
with yet.’ Then the Commonwealth will have a view about that and they’ll pull stuff off they 
don’t agree with, and there’s a bit of negotiating. At the end of that we’ll say, ‘Here’s the agenda 
for the forthcoming ministers meeting,’ and we agree to that. (Interview 20, State central 
department) 
A similar dynamic was reported (at least from the Commonwealth point of view) for the Heads 
of Treasury meetings. 
The Commonwealth would do the first draft of an agenda. The states or territories were free to 
come back with amendments and deletions and additions. My recollection is that invariably we’d 
take them on board. If someone said, ‘I want to discuss this,’ we’d say, ‘Fine, no problem. If you 
want to knock up a paper to get the discussion going, send it off to us and we’ll circulate it.’ 
(Retired senior official, Interview 4) 
Another aspect to this structural dimension involves the de-politicisation that officials use to 
maintain or further policy debates. While such de-politicisation is impossible to effect at 
COAG itself, even when the federal and state parties are aligned, this can happen at ministerial 
councils and meetings through the way agendas are constructed and work programs 
implemented.  For example, one official described discussing the possibility of putting the issue 
of interstate trade in industrial waste onto a ministerial meeting agenda with a colleague in 
another state whose minister didn’t support the discussion. 
And he said, ‘That would be great. That is an item I can’t put on the agenda, but I’d be relieved 
if another jurisdiction put it on the agenda because it would put the pressure on our state to justify 
its stance that says we won’t have a landfill levy.’ (Interview 20, State central department) 
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Consequently, the agenda-setting process is not always just about the interests at stake.  Once 
the political process has set the broad parameters, the craft of agenda-setting is about delivering 
a negotiated outcome: determining whether particular agenda items are ready for discussion or 
still need work before they can be presented, whether items have sufficient priority for the 
limited time available, whether the agenda items are pitched at the right level for a discussion, 
and the degree to which they encompass aspirational goals (this last point risking contention 
where the states feel they are being redirected away from their own preferred objectives and 
approaches). 
5.4 Policy work 
5.4.1 Policy drivers and constraints 
As discussed in section 5.2, the policies and strategies set by Prime Ministers, Premiers and 
Chief Ministers and their respective portfolio ministers form the primary framework for policy 
in the federal system, and hence a constraint on the agency of officials working on 
intergovernmental management. 
However, the interviews also provided data on a range of other constraints on policy making.  
Information from practitioners on how they handle these constraints provides additional 
insights into the two value sets identified in Chapter 4, and their effect on intergovernmental 
management.   
First, policies may be stimulated by specific developments or problems in a particular state or 
a number of states to which government responds, in line with Kingdon’s argument that 
‘problems are not self-evident…they need a little push to get the attention of people in and 
around government’ (2003, p. 94)).  For example, one official noted the importance of the 
media in generating such priorities: 
in the states you have an immediacy of accountability that you just don’t have in the 
Commonwealth. Talkback radio looms large for a state bureaucrat. When I was working in New 
South Wales government I used to listen to Alan Jones first thing in the morning because I knew 
that what he said would determine part of my day. (Interview 42, Commonwealth central 
department) 
Pressure groups, private and non-government organisations and stakeholder representatives 
may drive policy agendas directly or through their influence on politicians.  For example, 
tensions emerged between an informal network of environmental regulators and an industry-
led cooperative research centre. 
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the managing director contacted my agency, complained about me, complained about the 
network, asked for it to be shut down. And he and I had previously had quite a reasonable working 
relationship but he just kept hanging up on me. (Interview 3, State line agency) 
Another significant constraint on policy making relates to the jurisdiction’s size.  This can 
affect its general capacity to influence federal policies, as symbolised by the order in which 
state representatives are seated in meetings.  But size also affects the resources that can be 
turned to policy development, as opposed to simply adopting what other states have done. 
Organisations also impose constraints on policy makers: senior meetings of officials set out the 
limits to the discretion exercised by lower level working groups, and central departments set 
limits to the strategies to be adopted in negotiations by portfolio departments.  An interesting 
dynamic emerges between departments and statutory authorities, given that the latter are less 
bound by a minister’s direction, and departments need to be mindful that, as one line 
department official put it, ‘stat[utory] bodies hate being controlled, being told what to do by 
their parent department’ (Interview 20, State line department).  In the case of one of the state 
environment protection agencies, where policy making responsibilities were moved to the 
state’s environment department,  
there’s quite a healthy tension between us around what policy needs to be driven and what doesn’t 
need to be driven. Departments respond very well to their minister, but they need to respond also 
to the circumstances - the environmental need or the scientific need for policy as well, air quality 
being one of them, or maybe a market that’s not operating well and where there needs to be 
intervention (Interview 12, State line agency) 
A different mindset appears to be required to manage the department-agency relationship, 
focused less on control and direction and more on a sense of common goals achieved through 
mutual support: 
I’ve had to say to my team here, ‘Our job is to make those agencies successful. Provide clear 
direction but it’s not based on power. It’s not about that. This is about what should we be doing 
to make that particular stat entity successful.’ (Interview 20, State line department) 
Organisational cultures can act as a constraint, and may extend across jurisdictional boundaries.  
For example, particular department types or roles may create a community of interest, or at 
least similar outlooks, that are shared across Commonwealth and state boundaries.  Such 
cultures may also involve a meeting of minds that begins to build consensus on an issue: 
With treasuries, there’s a strong corporate culture which has brought Commonwealth and state 
Treasury officials together in a similar way of thinking and a fairly open exchange of views. It’s 
often a rationalist kind of informed view of things that is less political than the views that would 
emerge out of premier’s departments or PM&C. There is a bit of tension there. (Interview 25, 
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Territory central agency) 
The complexities and nuances I noted in Chapter 4 that apply to the relationships between 
central and line departments are a salient factor in how officials go about policy making and 
the constraints they face.  Many officials noted the potential tension between portfolio 
ministers’ sharp focus on policies relevant to their portfolio alone, and the broader perspective 
on the federation that central departments might take on behalf of the first ministers.  For 
example, NSW’s role as the ‘elder statesman’ of the federation and the negotiating stance that 
central agencies pushed for in support of that role could conflict with line agencies’ 
negotiations on behalf of their ministers. 
My relationship with Premier and Cabinet has been, ‘Well, it’s fine that you want to play the 
statesman, but my responsibility here is to my minister and delivering services for health.’ At 
times central agencies fall into the trap of thinking that they actually direct us or govern the line 
agencies. Occasionally we just have to point out to them that we actually don’t work for them; 
we work for a different minister. (Interview 5, State line department) 
From a central department point of view, line agencies may not get the bigger strategic cross-
portfolio picture in which tradeoffs between policy outcomes are common: 
it was very clear that we might not get the perfect outcome that would be our number one outcome 
on, say, higher education, but if it meant we got the outcome we were after in health, that was the 
trade-off worth making from a state perspective. You just have to weigh it all up and you have to 
be clear with the line agencies. (Interview 38, State central department). 
From a processing point of view, there is a natural information asymmetry in the negotiation 
process between central and line departments that acts as a constraint on the latter: 
When you get up to the near final agreement stage through a first ministers’ COAG process the 
information that you can share with the line agencies starts to dry up. You deliberately tighten it 
up, because at first ministers you’re looking to take a different view but if you talk to the agency 
it suddenly gets to the minister and the minister starts bombarding the Premier before you’ve had 
a chance to tell the Premier. (Interview 9, State central department) 
Longstanding practice in individual public sector organisations generates its own inertia that 
limits the policy options open for consideration or, at least, complicates negotiations and 
requires highly iterative policy processes. Many officials commented on the way the states had 
developed historically different legal or regulatory definitions that obstructed national 
harmonisation programs (I will return to this in section 5.4.3). 
I can remember one state had one definition of ‘child developmental delay’ and another had 
another definition, and the Commonwealth was trying to negotiate and facilitate agreement 
between the two. What’s driving that? That’s not a geographical kind of thing, but because they 
had had responsibility for disability for years, they’d developed their definitions of things.  All of 
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a sudden we couldn’t negotiate on the basis of first principles or what had been a logically 
considered process following an extensive inquiry. We had to cater to these multiple definitions.  
(Interview 42, Commonwealth central department) 
The preceding discussion outlined a number of dominant rules-in use in policy making that 
prioritise stability and efficiency.  Another set of rules, however, sanctions brokerage and 
innovation in policy and emphasises individual agency in that role. 
Officials identified the conditions that allow them to depart from the political priorities of the 
day, and to focus on longer term, systemic policy issues.  This can occur, for example, where 
the Commonwealth government has not taken a dominant role, either because funding levels 
have declined or because it is not a high priority for the federal government.  In such cases, 
portfolio officials working in the intergovernmental space may be freed up to work with their 
counterparts within the jurisdiction, or to work collaboratively across jurisdictions, on matters 
of specific concern for their state. 
Moving out from under the Commonwealth’s fiscal and policy penumbra may allow alternative 
priorities to emerge, and different ways of working that are not prescribed by national 
agreements: 
there’s not like this endless bucket of money where you can just put your hand up to get more. In 
fact, we’re finding that in delivering transformative projects we need to take new approaches. 
Engaging the market and engaging the non-government sector is really starting to become flavour 
of the month. (Interview 5, State line department) 
Despite their frustration at not having the resources to participate in some of the processes 
colleagues from larger states were able to pursue, officials from smaller jurisdictions also 
described such marginalisation as offering an space in which to shape policies of particular 
relevance to their jurisdiction.  For example, one official from a small jurisdiction described 
working on the implementation of the NDIS roll-out for Indigenous communities: 
I’d never done a genuinely collaborative piece of policy work where — out of the glare of the 
actual formal set piece meetings — you’re actually getting round the table and collegiately doing 
a piece of policy work to break new ground or uncover insights and come up with better ways of 
doing things. (Interview 22, Territory central department) 
Even on matters that are on the national agenda, smaller jurisdictions may have the ability to 
test policies and approaches more easily.  For example, officials from South Australia described 
their role in helping the Northern Territory and Tasmania to adopt their practices on domestic 
violence.  Similarly, South Australia took the lead in developing a national scheme for the 
certification of practitioners in the assessment and remediation of site contamination. 
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The ’two rule sets’ of stewardship and serial loyalty introduced at the end of Chapter 4 are an 
important source of legitimisation for moving beyond the boundaries of sanctioned policy 
development.  
A great deal of policy work is conducted outside the boundaries of formally mandated or 
commissioned work.  Such activity is carried out in all jurisdictions, large and small, 
Commonwealth and state; all organisations, both central, line and in agencies; and for all policy 
types.  Such work has, as its focus, the identification of the optimal policy options for design 
and implementation without reference to any particular set of political priorities or strategies, 
at least as a theoretical exercise: 
It’s that capacity to not ignore the political realities or ignore the fact that your political masters 
may have a particular perspective but to suspend that where you can and engage in a genuine 
dialogue with your colleagues, often on a no-commitments basis, so that there’s just a greater 
mutual understanding of the pressures each are under. Public servants step back from the political 
fray so they can try and bring the genuine state interests or the national interest to bear and try 
and work out a solution. (Interview 10, State central department) 
This apolitical stance informs much of the negotiation process, whereby officials maintain 
channels of communication with one another to ensure as much information is available as 
possible to reduce gaming behaviours.  The success of these endeavours depends heavily on 
the trust they have in one another, often born from long interaction over many years or 
negotiation processes. Such trust also depends on officials construing their role as honest 
brokers rather than jurisdictional advocates, or at least layering the latter role over the former. 
I try to keep the dialogue open with the Commonwealth to work through what’s really important 
from their perspective and what are their non-negotiables and then try and work through with our 
Premier and his office what is not negotiable from their perspective and see if we can reach a 
middle ground. But also advising the Premier where we think the issues are unlikely to be 
supported by the states and territories and whether or not from a strategy perspective it’s the best 
argument or fight to have across the myriad of issues COAG has to deal with. (Interview 18, State 
central department) 
Building policy alliances from existing inter-jurisdictional networks is frequently a way of 
operationalising a depoliticised policy process.  Such networking expands the range of actions 
that might be available to an official within his or her jurisdiction: first, by generating support 
for a policy strategy from the outside, as it were; and second, by giving officials in smaller 
jurisdictions a much greater ability to effect policy change than they would otherwise have.  In 
this way, networks subordinate what March and Olsen call the ‘logic of consequences,’ the 
expected utility, benefits and disbenefits of some course of action, to a logic of appropriateness 
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based on values and outcomes (March & Olsen 2009a, p.10). 
Another technique officials use to circumvent political sanctions is to change the process that 
applies to a particular piece of policy development.  For example, an important strategy many 
officials adopt for sensitive policy debates is to separate them from the development of specific 
agreements.  For example, an official persuaded her colleagues in other jurisdictions to think 
more openly about competition policy by separating those discussions from formal 
negotiations around an agreement. 
So we didn’t say, ‘This is to prepare us for the negotiation on the IGA.’ We said, ‘Look, this is 
completely separate. This is an unrelated piece of policy work that we think is really important.’ 
We were able to persuade New South Wales to it because they could see that it might actually 
help their future negotiations. (Interview 22, Territory central department) 
One federal official recalled working closely with Treasury officials in one of the states to 
consider options for federal reform outside of the formal processes and ‘under the radar’ of the 
relevant politicians: 
[The state officials] had done a lot of work with their own Treasury. They’d come up with a view 
around how we might reform Commonwealth-state relations. So they had worked pretty closely 
with us behind the scenes. I wasn’t telling ministers or treasurers about this; this was just sort of 
happening, cooperating and working together. They wanted to send papers to us. We’d comment 
on them, we’d criticise them, critique them, agree with them, whatever. (Retired senior official, 
Interview 4) 
The legitimation for this stewardship (in institutionalist terms, the ‘logic of appropriateness’ 
[March & Olsen 1989a]) is a matter I will address more fully in the next chapter, as it appears 
to arise from the respective officials’ commitment to the federal system’s outcomes as a whole, 
rather than any particular political, jurisdictional or organisational mandate.   
Most bureaucratic activity, of course, takes place somewhere on a spectrum between the two 
poles of highly mandated and constrained action at one end, and highly discretionary and 
individual strategizing on the other.  Uncertainties about ends and how to achieve them may 
require a more iterative mandate that only emerges over time, rather than at the outset of a 
linear policy sequence, as was the case, for example, with the latitude Commonwealth officials 
were given by the then Minister for Disability Reform to design the NDIS 
There was agreement about the goal and what the system should like and then quite a degree of 
autonomy. It was actually quite unusual but I think it was necessary because you can’t handle 
negotiation by checking every point. We were only getting to the next point well enough so that 
you could go to government for the next set of decisions. It was a very iterative process. (Interview 
26, Commonwealth line department) 
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5.4.2 Briefing 
Apart from the bargaining and negotiation roles examined in the preceding chapter, the 
preparation of briefings is another task for intergovernmental managers that offers scope for 
individual agency.  One state government IGM specialist estimated she was required to prepare 
briefings for around 40 meetings a year, or virtually one for every week of COAG’s work-year. 
Three rules around briefing were salient in the interviews, as a way of securing better outcomes 
from ministerial and the associated senior officials’ meetings.  The first is that, as far as 
possible, debate and discussion should take place before the ministerial meeting; only the most 
important and intractable issues should be on the table.92  As I have noted, the communiques 
are usually already partially drafted by the time of the meeting.   
The things should have been settled beforehand and the fight should have been had to allow them 
to do their political stuff so that they don’t have to stand up and wax lyrical. So you should have 
done your bits beforehand. It’s only when someone’s been really, really, really naughty that you’d 
address that at council. (Interview 34, State line department) 
Second, the briefing process is another opportunity to develop coalitions in support of policy 
positions, and particularly of course for the states to establish a common position in relation to 
the Commonwealth.  Thus, for example, state officials used senior officials’ meetings to 
develop a common position on the contamination of department of defence land across the 
country, even though individually they had had little success in engaging the behemoth 
Commonwealth department. 
Although HEPA is quite an informal grouping we will work as senior officials in a common way 
to similarly brief our ministers so that we’ve got the best chance of an MOU that doesn’t pick us 
off one by one but has a common approach across it. (Interview 12, State line agency) 
This point should not be overstated, however.  As we will see in Chapter 6, the states adopt 
different ‘personas’ in the federation, and New South Wales in particular likes to play a 
‘statesman’ role that generally adopts a less confrontational stance.   
Third, in sharing information with one another on their Ministers’ or their jurisdictional 
positions, as far as possible officials prefer to adopt an open book.  This helps to build the 
stewardship of the overall federal process by diminishing adversarial gaming. Not doing so 
undermines the interpersonal trust that feeds into effective briefing and network building.  
Moreover, ministers’ and jurisdictional interests are not served by poor preparation: 
                                                 
92 This is, of course, a hallmark of good preparation for intrajurisdictional cabinet meetings as well. 
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if you’ve got a fight to be had, you’ve carefully made sure you’ve done all your homework about 
what the situation is. You never send your minister in ill-prepared. It would be like a pirate ship 
with a plank out and at the end of the plank the sharks are circling. (Interview 34, State line 
department) 
Officials took their obligations to keep their interstate colleagues in the loop very seriously.  
They saw it as incumbent on them to ensure that issues that could potentially arise were 
signalled in advance to their state counterparts (the obligation did not appear to extend as 
strongly to the Commonwealth). 
The minister may choose to ignore it or the director-general may choose to ignore it, but you’ve 
at least said what you’re thinking at officials’ level and so the others are warned that your state 
might say ‘We don’t like such and such.’ You have had to do that. That’s your obligation to do 
that with your interstate colleagues. (Interview 34, State line department) 
Briefing, then, is a highly collaborative process, because good briefing work in the 
intergovernmental sphere — as it does for briefing generally — requires good intelligence from 
the other jurisdictions.  Ministerial and senior officials’ meetings are almost always preceded 
by a round of informal contacts between jurisdictional counterparts that feeds into a 
progressively tiered series of briefings up to ministerial level.  These briefings allow individual 
jurisdictional interests and directions set by the political executive to be put into a broader 
context through the identification of other jurisdictions’ preferences and negotiating ‘red lines’. 
I’ve done a good job if I have taken steps to ensure that there are no surprises for either, say, my 
secretary or my minister, and I’ve taken steps to either negotiate to get part of a consensus 
ourselves or to move our positioning to be part of consensus or have gathered the intel to say, ‘ I 
think I need a senior person to call another senior person to get an outcome,’ or we end up saying, 
‘Actually, we are going to push this one at the meeting,’ and we’re telling everyone (Interview 
15, State central department) 
In addition, tiered briefing is a way of progressively identifying and ironing out difficulties so 
that the next level is only dealing with those issues that could not be dealt with at the lower 
governance level.  In particular, many technical policy issues are dealt with through lower level 
briefings and decisions, because more senior officials don’t have that technical knowledge. 
5.4.3 Data gathering and reporting 
Data gathering for policy inputs is, by its nature, a collaborative exercise that requires data 
sharing between jurisdictions and organisations, particularly where complex social problems 
involve data generated by different levels of government.   
There are two broad purposes for which data is collected and used in the federal system.  The 
first is for policy inputs, such as supporting the work of intergovernmental working groups and 
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meetings, and providing the basis for comparative evaluation, trials and pilots.  The second is 
to fulfil the requirements of intergovernmental agreements and for performance reporting more 
generally.   
A good example of the difference between the two was drawn by an official who had worked 
on the evidence base for the Breast Cancer Screening Program and national health funding 
agreements respectively. The former program was one on which the Commonwealth and states 
worked collaboratively and productively,  
because at that stage we were still trying to demonstrate that regular screening reduced morbidity 
and mortality.  There was money to do that, so the policy and fiscal stars aligned.  I thought that's 
what Commonwealth-state relations was, in my naiveté.  And then I moved to work on health 
funding.  (Interview 1, Commonwealth central department) 
However, data gathering and reporting is frequently contentious.  For example, many officials 
drew attention to differences in data definition and measurement as a barrier to harmonisation.  
In the case of waste and resource recovery, for example, SA officials felt the state  
leads the table for resource recovery, and we’ve done some fantastic things and we’ve got 
something like about 80 per cent of all waste generated in [state] is recovered. But people 
interstate believe that we use different metrics, we have different definitions which artificially 
might look like our data’s better than what it actually is. The definitions are really important 
(Interview 33, State line agency) 
Political constraints on data gathering can also hamper the development of a comparative 
evidence base.  For example, politicians are wary of the emergence of public league tables on 
the basis of comparative data or even the use of data to highlight poor performance that might 
affect agreements and funding.  More generally, state ministers and their officials are wary of 
the potential role the transfer of data can play in the centralisation of policy. 
The Commonwealth has an appetite for data, and their approach has been to compel states to 
provide it. And, equally, if the Commonwealth was simply to come and ask for it, we would be 
asking, ‘Well, why? If this is the first step in you seeking to tell us how to run policy in a unilateral 
way’ - which has not been unknown - ‘then we’re not particularly interested in that kind of 
conversation.’ (Interview 17, State central department) 
Ministers and senior officials may veto data sharing and modelling where the scenarios and 
options being modelled run counter to their negotiating position.  Even sharing data internally 
can be risky if the data an organisation has provided for a different purpose is then used to 
reduce its budget. 
There is a sense amongst line agencies that we should keep stuff back because it’s better if central 
agencies don’t know too much about our business; only enough to do what they need to do. 
‘Swimming Between The Flags’: the craft of intergovernmental management 
136 
(Interview 5, State line department) 
Finally, as we saw in Chapter 4, the issue of cost shifting affects data sharing where it is 
conducted for the purposes of performance reporting.   
In summary, there are significant barriers to the use of data for policy development that reflect 
tensions over fiscal arrangements and/or overlaps in policy responsibilities between 
governments. 
As a result of these barriers, officials described data sharing between jurisdictions, particularly 
between the Commonwealth and states, as ‘embryonic’, ‘ad hoc’ and even ‘archaic’.93  
However, many interviewees detailed attempts to overcome these barriers to data sharing that 
they or their colleagues had made.  For example, senior officials in the Commonwealth and 
states mandated the sharing of data from the Medicare and Pharmaceutical Benefits systems, 
and data on individual hospitals, even though states risked exposing comparative inefficiencies 
in their health systems, on the one hand, while the Commonwealth risked a debate about 
whether levels of primary care expenditure increased hospital costs.   
Similarly, a state official described the decision by the head of the Commonwealth Department 
of Health to depart from his predecessors’ policies and share NDIS data with the states as a 
‘watershed’ moment (Interview 11, state line department).   
A number of factors were common to these and other instances of a departure from the standard 
operating model for data ownership. First, such instances usually involve officials who have 
experience of working for both Commonwealth and state governments, and who, as a result, 
may have seen things differently from their predecessors who did not have such experience.  
This interview cohort suggests there may be many such officials working on intergovernmental 
management, as thirteen of the forty-two interviewees, or just under a third, had worked at both 
levels (this is a conservative figure as not all the interviewees provided this information).  
Second, these officials established processes for gathering, analysing and reporting on the data 
outside of normal, formal channels and meetings, which they saw as too slow, or too hampered 
by the politics, to get much done by way of evidence gathering and analysis.  This strategy 
effectively operationalises the distinction between the two purposes of data gathering I noted 
                                                 
93 As noted in section 4.4.2, and by some interviewees, this has not been helped by the abolition of the COAG 
Reform Council. 
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above.  In the case of the NDIS, for example, officials described a process of actively engaging 
with the states on detailed analysis and development without mixing these issues up with 
funding negotiations: 
Tactical things, going right back to taws, having all-day seminars on one aspect, and allowing 
lead states to actually write stuff. We were pretty clear, too, that the other side, the 
intergovernmental agreement, was much more conflictual and done by economics people and the 
more Treasury-type people. We ran them quite separately, so it was really clear that there were 
different conversations happening and that the rules were different. You can’t just switch from a 
consensual discussion about what should the eligibility criteria look like to whether it should be 
60 per cent or 59 per cent. (Interview 26, Commonwealth line department) 
Third, as with all other policy processes, strong interpersonal relations and trust are a sine qua 
non for data sharing, at least for the evidentiary kind. For example, inter-jurisdictional policy 
learning is facilitated by trust, particularly where it involves material on less successful 
implementation, pilots and trials.94   Comparative performance reporting may become 
competitive and defensive rather than leading to collective learning.  Consequently, 
notwithstanding the support formal meetings can provide, successful policy learning operates 
as a process distinct from negotiations on agreements, and officials leading such work often 
deliberately differentiate the two streams of work: 
Out of the glare of the actual formal set piece meetings you’re actually getting round the table 
and collegiately doing a piece of policy work to break new ground or uncover insights and come 
up with better ways of doing things. We treated it as not connected to a set piece of the 
negotiations. So we didn’t say, ‘This is to prepare us for the negotiation on the IGA.’ We said, 
‘Look, this is completely separate. This is an unrelated piece of policy work that we think is really 
important.’  (Interview 22, Territory central department) 
Finally, reflecting the incentives and interests that shape the development of particular policies 
over long periods, some policy areas have a history that is less fraught, and therefore more 
congenial to data sharing than others.  For example, the Commonwealth’s enormous data-
collecting infrastructure is a vital resource in dealing with threatened species and other 
ecological risks that apply across state borders.  Leveraging those capabilities requires a 
common data set and ensuring the states do not build isolated data mapping systems.   
In other cases, such as in domestic violence policy, the longer history of states going their own 
way on social policy has prevented the development of comparable data sets, leading to the 
establishment of the Australian National Research Organisation for Women’s Safety 
(ANROWS), a not-for-profit independent national research organisation established by the 
                                                 
94 The issue of trust as a value is discussed in Chapter Six.   
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Commonwealth and all state and territory governments of Australia to produce and disseminate 
evidence for policy and practice addressing violence against women and their children. 
5.4.4 Policy harmonisation  
A further stage in the federal policy cycle that follows from data gathering and briefing is the 
process where such data leads national policy harmonisation.  A focus for the interviews, 
therefore, was the extent to which the rules-in-use around the intergovernmental management 
of policy harmonisation were similar to those that applied to the other policy processes 
discussed in this chapter.   
Processes of federal policy harmonisation have a long history in Australia, particularly through 
the implementation of National Competition Policy in the mid-1990s (Wanna et al. 2009, p. 13 
n.16).  Subsequently, in February 2006, as part of its National Reform Agenda, COAG agreed 
that all jurisdictions would take steps to reduce the burden of regulation, including through 
‘reforms that enhance regulatory consistency across jurisdictions’ (Communique of 
10 February 2006).   
For all its importance as an enunciated federal policy process, some interviewees echoed 
Fenna’s view that harmonisation, in its coercive forms, points to centralisation and a loss of 
sub-national autonomy and diversity (2012c, p. 590).  Others expressed doubt about the level 
of harmonisation underway and its prospects.  An interesting example of how both views of 
harmonisation can be held by officials working in similar policy fields emerged from 
interviews with those working on environment policies.  One official working on 
environmental policies at the federal level expressed doubts about the whole concept: 
Harmonisation, I don’t know what that means. It’s hard enough to simplify and make workable 
these arrangements within a jurisdiction let alone between them. And harmonisation is no goal in 
itself. All things being equal you’d have similar systems, because different systems implies one’s 
got to be better than the other. And if one’s better, that’s the one you think would be the model 
for the others. (Interview 27, Commonwealth line department) 
Some officials echoed concerns raised in the Hilmer Report on National Competition Policy 
‘that standards may be harmonised at the level of the most restrictive standard, rather than the 
most appropriate’ (Australia. Treasury, issuing body 1993, p. 198).  For example, Victoria is a 
leader in native vegetation policy, with developed systems of measurement and approval and 
a system of offsets purchase.   
Other states don’t have that. But if you want to have a discussion to harmonise native vegetation 
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policy nationally, that would mean Victoria switches off all of that because New South Wales and 
Queensland, by comparison, don’t have all that much. (Interview 20, State line department) 
At the same time, however, the environment protection agencies through the Australasian 
Environmental Law Enforcement and Regulators network (AELERT) were developing 
standardised authorisation training packages for field officers, as a precursor to mutual 
recognition of field officer credentials. Other regulators described work on lining up processes 
for contamination assessment, and for listing threatened species across states.95  In general, 
then, it would appear that the more front-line, hand-on the process, the more policy transfer in 
relation to that process takes place. 
We know that we will never be able to sustain and manage the total knowledge that we need to 
be an effective regulator in Victoria. The example would be the Hazelwood fire. We sought help 
from Tasmania. Tasmanian experts came across and helped us and they had some equipment we 
didn’t have and we’ve now adopted it. (Interview 14, State line agency) 
Although most officials saw the potential benefits of Commonwealth government support for 
harmonisation, this was often described as a ‘special role’ requiring a highly collaborative 
approach, as distinct from the coercive approach often taken in agreement-making, and the 
facilitation of an incremental, joint work program that built on the states’ expertise.  For 
example, the achievement of a national curriculum was attributed to 
a really carefully planned unfolding process of a step-wise approach to those reforms rather than 
a ‘We’re just hitting you with these reforms,’ whack, and a respectful approach to the states, 
which was about what’s in it for them, what’s in it for all of us—the shared objective, not just a 
piece of Commonwealth architecture that’s going to be whacked on them. It took a long time to 
get there; it took a couple of years. (Interview 41, Commonwealth line department) 
Officials working on environment policy similarly supported an incremental, bottom up 
approach that took harmonisation out of areas where politics could derail the process: 
 [AELERT’s chairman] really affirmed the role of AELERT to stay away from legislative 
alignment and work on practice, because they would be much better off working on how we put 
these things in place and working on how we actually regulate. Even at the end of it, I don’t know 
how much alignment there is. A lot of the detail in the codes of practice hasn’t been aligned. 
(Interview 33, State line agency) 
Much of this lower-level work is a product of informal networks, as officials sharing 
information discover opportunities for harmonisation efforts.  In the Contaminated 
Environments Network, for example,  
                                                 
95 This work follows some, but not all, states attaching their listing processes to criteria established by the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature. 
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As we got to know people who worked across the jurisdictions, we realised how ridiculous it was 
to all be doing the same work in a different way and different standards and different approaches 
and different requirements. So we’ve tried to harmonise it, which is the buzzword. (Interview 32, 
State line agency) 
5.5 Personal networks 
5.5.1 Background 
Some 35 years ago, Wettenhall noted ‘the great variety of arrangements, formal and informal, 
which has developed…to provide meaningful linkages between the three fixed layers of 
government, and the growing awareness of network management which emphasizes the 
dynamic nature of the IGR environment’ (1983, p. 179).  Since intergovernmental management 
emerged as a specific discipline within federalism studies, networking has been identified as 
an integral component of the craft (eg Wright 1997, p. 421), to the extent that some authorities 
simply describe intergovernmental management as ‘a series of network relationships’ 
(McGuire et al. 2013, p. 6), and a ‘process of solving intergovernmental problems … through 
the creation and use of governmental and non- governmental networks’ (Wright & Krane 1998, 
p. 1162).96  More recently, the survey by Inwood et al. of officials working on 
intergovernmental management introduced in Chapter 2 found that officials regarded their 
informal relationships as the most important contributor to intergovernmental policy capacity 
(2011, p. 417).   
It is not surprising, therefore, that the interviews uncovered a dense, layered complex of 
networks to which all officials who work in intergovernmental management belong, and which 
figures prominently in their view of the landscape.  Some of these networks are mandated and 
operate under formal and established rules; others work informally, without sanction or 
agendas, but like the formal variety provide critical avenues for transmitting information, as 
well as an opportunity for the development of interpersonal trust.   
5.5.2 Formal and informal intergovernmental networks 
Both formal and informal networks play an exceptionally important role in generating, 
                                                 
96 This development in IGM studies parallels the move from traditional direct delivery by governments towards 
networked delivery methods under the New Public Management of the 80s.  It should be noted, however, that at 
least until a decade ago the intergovernmental components of public administrative networks had as yet not been 
widely studied (O’Toole 2004, p. 471). Self-organising, autonomous interorganisational networks are central to 
Rhodes’ description of the British state (1996), although he appears to restrict this to the distinction between 
markets, hierarchies and networks in service delivery, while of course my analysis is focused primarily on policy 
development.  Some of the networks amongst environment regulators appear to be more in line with Rhodes’ 
analysis, given they are much closer to the ‘front line’. 
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conveying and changing narratives and discourses about the federal system itself.  Networks 
are an important conduit for institutional stability and for change, both in their formation and 
in their ongoing operation, and reveal a great deal about how and when officials exercise 
agency in pursuit of both. 
Formal networks are established under the auspices of ministerial councils and their working 
groups.  They are ongoing and instrumental, pursuing work agendas and routinised processes 
arising from formal decisions and agreements.  Their members often meet in the context of the 
dinners discussed above (section 5.3.2) that take place around ministerial and senior officials’ 
meetings.  The seniority of the officials who participate in these networks makes them 
important channels for officially communicating and signalling jurisdictional positions. 
It is really important for intergovernmental relationships that those officers are talking with each 
other to be able to test what’s practical and that they understand the operational context in which 
different ideas will need to be implemented, because we all work with different legislation. 
(Interview 28, Territory line department) 
The Commonwealth Treasury also chairs a national partnerships network that periodically 
convenes to discuss forthcoming agreements or problems that have arisen with agreements, 
and a network focused on horizontal equalisation, which provides the states with an important 
opportunity to understand the implications of Grants Commission decisions on the equalisation 
methodology for their budgets.   
In contrast with the formal networks, informal networks are often temporary, although over 
time they may morph into more permanent forums.  Rather than arising directly from federal 
governance structures, informal networks arise in the context of particular policy processes, or 
in a coalescence of officials with shared policy interests and roles.  They have no formal 
mandate; indeed, many informal networks form after the abolition of formal groups when 
officials decide they still need to meet with others in the same policy field, such as the 
Contaminated Environments Network:  
when the ministerial group got disbanded and we really had no direction, it was the interest of the 
representatives on that group that kept it going, because it didn’t have to keep going. (Interview 
32, State line agency) 
As one type of such network, strategic alliances form across formal intergovernmental 
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structures and boundaries with the aim of bringing about a specific policy outcome.97  This 
type of network illustrates an interesting question Agranoff and McGuire ask (without coming 
to a conclusion) about whether and how bargaining and networking relate to one another; 
whether one leads to the other and under what conditions (2004, p. 509).  My interviews 
suggest, as a proposition, that bargaining is more likely to take place in the formal, 
institutionalised networks, and is less common in the informal networks; indeed, as a misuse 
of their function, bargaining would be seen as damaging to them. 
Networking between the representatives of the smaller states and territories offers them an 
important way of balancing and resisting dominance by the Commonwealth and the larger 
states.   
You don’t ever want to go out there—especially as a small state—saying, ‘We want this.’ Like 
yesterday when the Premier announced the power thing, that’s very brave. Normally we don’t do 
that sort of thing in this patch. We would want to make sure there’s another state that agrees with 
us. (Interview 34, State line department) 
Strategic alliances also form along the ‘fault lines’ between central and line departments, along 
the lines suggested by Weller and others discussed in Chapter 4.  Officials described the 
formation of horizontal networks specific to each, based on the different perspectives central 
and line departments have on policy development.  For example, I have already noted a strong 
corporate culture amongst federal and state Treasury officials, characterised by their similar 
perspectives on and roles in fiscal management, and activated through an open exchange of 
views that tends to step back from the political fray.  This network, complete with a list of 
phone contacts for officials at both the Commonwealth and states that Victoria coordinates, 
provides a way for the Commonwealth and state treasuries to work together in guiding their 
line department colleagues towards agreements whose terms more closely reflect the 
overarching aims and spirit of the IGA FFR: 
Some of the state portfolio agencies are very far removed from the IGA FFR, they don't know, 
don't care about it.  They have their particular view about how they want things done. So what we 
did was, we had a conversation with the relevant state Treasury, and then we had a teleconference 
with the four parties on the line and we worked through the issues, and we got resolution because 
the state Treasury was able to say to their portfolio colleagues 'No, no, this is the way it works'.  
                                                 
97 There is nothing particularly new about this finding: Harman, for example, notes in relation to the successful 
development of national competition policy in 1994-5 that ‘a feature of the competition policy network was that 
it juxtaposed some newly emergent collaborative strategies alongside more traditional competitive and 
confrontational relationships…. The alliances and network relationships embedded in the Australian competition 
policy network were less formal and potentially more fluid than is implied by the European literature on 
corporatism’ (1996, p. 205). 
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(Interview 1, Commonwealth central department) 
Indeed, such is the closeness of this network, when I mentioned the tendency for the 
Commonwealth Treasury officials to take this line with their colleagues, state Treasury officials 
could identify the individual involved. 
A second common informal network is the epistemic community.  These are networks of 
‘professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas 
1992).  They operate more frequently at lower levels of the public sector and are instigated and 
managed by mid-level bureaucrats, with an emphasis on the application of their professional 
knowledge and expertise.  Their membership is more flexible than the formal networks, 
allowing experts from related organisations to be included. For example, the contaminated 
environment network includes membership from the Cooperative Research Centre for 
Contamination Assessment and Remediation of the Environment (CRC CARE), linking 
government officials in the Commonwealth and states with industry representatives and 
academic experts.98   
With their authoritative and policy-relevant expertise, these professional networks can have a 
significant bearing on policy processes.  However, their influence may be conditional on a 
range of factors, including their internal cohesion and professionalism (Cross 2013, p. 147).   
Sectoral networking forms a third type of informal network in Australia, particularly in its 
incorporation of non-government organisations.  While the Commonwealth-states policy 
agenda is managed by central agencies and is highly structured across COAG, ministerial 
councils and meetings, the horizontal cross-jurisdictional policy field is ad hoc and 
organisationally fragmented, making it difficult to develop and implement policies that involve 
central and line departments as well as ‘street-level’ regulators.  In response, a number of cross-
state peak bodies, such as HEPA have been established, on the initiative of the officials 
concerned, that coordinate discussion and inform conversations with colleagues in central and 
line departments.  As one environmental regulator put it, 
No two jurisdictions are the same in institutional arrangements or jurisdictional coverage. What 
EPA Victoria does is similar but different to what EPA South Australia or New South Wales does. 
                                                 
98 Agranoff and McGuire noted a similar phenomenon in the US, viz ‘the growing conjunctions of federal and 
state government administrators with nongovernmental organizations in networks that negotiate policy 
adjustments’ (2004, p. 495). 
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That makes conversations interesting in that on many items we’ll be talking to the relevant parties, 
but then on some items there’ll be others within the Victorian state government who might be 
having a relationship on that issue. In some other jurisdictions the regulator might not even be in 
some of these conversations. Then in other jurisdictions it is one holistic organisation doing the 
whole lot. (Interview 14, State line agency) 
Finally, informal networks among regulators play an important part in the federal system by 
preventing regulated entities from ‘jurisdiction shopping’: 
if you've got a business that's operating in multiple jurisdictions they’ll try to play you off against 
each other.  They'll come in and be like "You should let us do this, because New South Wales lets 
us do this." And then you ring New South Wales and they say "Oh no we don't let them do that". 
(Interview 3, State line agency) 
These regulatory networks tend, almost by definition, to operate without Commonwealth 
membership, involving line department and agency officials with long experience at the 
regulatory shopfront.  One official described the ‘us and them’ identification that underpins 
such networks: 
Rotation at the Commonwealth level puts people in who are experienced bureaucrats, whereas 
the states tend to have people who’ve got a little bit more of a lineage in their particular subject 
area. Policy seems to be the common thread. If you’re good at policy, you’re good at policy, so 
you can just go anywhere; whereas a lot of people at the Commonwealth level think that 
regulation is the act of making regulations, whereas the rest of us see it as the act of executing 
regulations. (Interview 13, State line agency) 
Interestingly, regulatory networks are divided between more senior informal networks and 
those operating at middle management.  Thus, HEPA — itself an informal network — is seen 
as a policy-making forum from the perspective of the middle level officials engaged in on-the-
ground work, leading to the further emergence of operational networks among the latter such 
as the Contaminated Environments Network and AELERT (although the latter also includes 
representatives from Commonwealth and state departments of the environment). 
Operational people don’t have meaningful ways to engage in cross-jurisdictions at that level. It 
may very well happen at HEPA, but the heads are so far removed from the actual issues in terms 
of how to manage a specific hazard that it’s not of interest; it’s sort of in the middle management 
area where we’re trying to address these things on a day-to-day basis and we have to make 
decisions and recommendations up to the CEO level, but you get that sort of ability to work with 
each other. (Interview 39, Commonwealth line agency) 
Similar operational networks operate across the intelligence and security community: 
I used to encourage the networks where people could talk because the worst way to go into a crisis 
is when all the known actors don’t know each other because they haven’t been talking. Things 
work better if there are networks and if the people in Victoria and New South Wales are familiar 
with their counterparts in Canberra and vice versa. (Retired senior official, Interview 3) 
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A feature common to both formal and informal networks is their interface with the non-
government and business sectors, as a way of building their links to policy stakeholders and 
communities, enhancing their access to information inputs for policy, and managing the 
political fall-out from policy announcements and implementation.  Thus, for example, the 
development of the Contaminated Environments Network was actually led by CRC Care, an 
independent Cooperative Research Centre with participants from academia, the CSIRO and 
businesses dealing with contaminated sites.   
They were really good at bringing together the regulators from all the different jurisdictions for 
the first time. It was that networking that occurred when we were participating in CRC Care 
forums that really started it off, and then after that the Contaminated Environment Network came 
(Interview 32, State line agency) 
Other examples that arose in the interviews included the indigenous health and education 
networks mentioned above and the strong relationships officials working on women’s health 
policies had developed with the non-government sector and women’s organisations in 
particular.  These links make an important contribution to the success of the networks, by 
providing information and feedback, and securing support for the government’s programs from 
stakeholders, clients and other service providers, as illustrated by the network on women’s 
health:  
even if we are seen as relevant in government, if we’re not seen as relevant from those non-
government people and the advocates and activists, if you are challenged at a time of change, 
your government stakeholders aren’t the ones that are going to have your back; it’s your NGO 
women’s sector that’s going to be the ones asking the questions (Interview 31, State line agency) 
However, the inclusion of such bodies is not without risk.  It may, for example, generate 
expectations of policy impacts and change that are unrealistic, or the network’s general culture 
can be affected by changes in the external environment that are transmitted through the external 
organisations.  Thus, a change in the Cooperative Research Centre’s role from purely research 
to one of advocacy has unsettled the Contaminated Environment Network in which it 
participates: 
they're primarily a research organisation, but in the network they've increasingly been trying to 
move into the policy development space.  And that shift has unsettled some members of the group 
so they would contact me and say "Oh have you received this request for information or 
participation from the Research Centre? What are you going to do about it?  We'll be led by 
you."  (Interview 3, State line agency) 
5.5.3 The role of intergovernmental networks in systemic change 
Informal networks are often more ambitious in their scope and aims than the formally mandated 
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networks, ranging widely in their discussions and seeking a broad remit on information 
gathering and advocacy.  However, their lack of political mandate means they have less 
capacity to carry out a work program.  As a participant in the Contaminated Environments 
Network found, 
What you need is the approval process, the endorsement process at a national level which says, 
‘This has the right to exist. This is recognised nationally. We can easily buy into that.’ That 
provides leadership as well and oversight of the process. All the jurisdictions are happy to 
participate and contribute, but we don’t have the time to lead it. (Interview 32, State line agency) 
By comparison, if informal networks are linked to formal structures, they have a firmer 
resource footing.  In the case of high school education roundtables, for example, where there 
is a long-established federal education infrastructure supported by a federal secretariat and a 
chairmanship that rotates amongst jurisdictions, a participant from a smaller state noted 
we will always ensure that there is room for me and resourcing for me to contribute to 
opportunities like that. And I will also always ensure that there are staff to engage in that formal 
follow-up that occurs as a result. (Interview 37, State line department) 
Networks formed by officials from central departments have a particular role in forming and 
pursuing systemic perspectives that may override the particular concerns and ambitions of their 
line department colleagues.   
The key part of the job, really, is having those alliances. First minister’s department people need 
to be able to recognise the big strategic issues from the jurisdictional perspective because the 
water people or the health people are always going to be particularly passionate about their thing. 
That’s the importance of the relationship, especially around a COAG discussion, between the 
deputy senior officers in the jurisdictions so that you can work out who’s got the shared interests 
and work out those alliances. (Interview 38, State central department) 
In that role, central agency networks, particularly those involving treasury or finance officials, 
can be called on to dampen the pressures for change and the expenditures that come with it, 
but this may be oversimplifying a more complex guardianship role.  First, central agency 
networks are often leveraged to help reach agreement to produce a policy outcome where, for 
example, the relevant state portfolio officials are unused to the agreements framework.  Second, 
central agency networks may try to generate more general cultural change amongst both the 
Commonwealth and state portfolio departments, with the aim of keeping the Commonwealth 
from becoming involved in input controls, in concert with state line departments keen to get 
their hands on the money.  Most state officials felt the Commonwealth central agencies still 
supported the IGA FFR’s normative effect on fiscal federalism: 
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Treasury officials still seem to have quite an idealistic view about the IGA and saw it as still 
setting the normative framework for relationships between Commonwealth and the states. I know 
they’re giving me the line, but I also feel that it was a genuinely held belief on their part that there 
was value in the IGA and its aspirations (Interview 17, State central department) 
The different varieties of networks all display trajectories of evolution and change.  While 
many informal networks lack a formal agenda or program, I noted that, as they became 
established with a stable membership, they tend to take on the characteristics of more formal 
networks, through the adoption of work programs and routines, and through their recognition 
and legitimation by senior officials and forums.   
HEPA is a good example of the characteristics I have described.99  HEPA began as a response 
by individual EPA heads to the revocation of the Standing Council on the Environment and 
Water in December 2013.  Its first meetings were largely about building relationships between 
them and exploring the issues and problems they had in common, but it had an ambitious aim: 
If we can get the federal department to play with us in the same way, we actually have a chance 
of giving our ministers, no matter what their flavour, no matter whether their Commonwealth or 
state, a very real action to actually change things. (Interview 12, State line agency) 
As a work program emerged that suggested HEPA might have value as a policy-design and 
delivery forum, it adopted more formal governance arrangements and ministerial recognition: 
while it does not have a mandate, the more we say things in the voice of HEPA and give work 
and make HEPA real, it becomes a value-adding organisation. It’s to the point now where at the 
next Meeting of Environmental Ministers meeting there will be report back which says that HEPA 
has agreed to do this and HEPA has agreed to do that. (Interview 14, State line agency) 
A similar dynamic is at work in the area of indigenous health, where the state and territory 
working groups on sexual health in indigenous communities have recommended to the federal 
minister for indigenous affairs that a more senior and formal governance network be 
established, in order to have a greater policy-making capacity: 
having representation on that group who are decision-makers and who can make decisions in the 
room rather than having a group that can have a conversation but don’t actually have any ability 
to make decisions or commit funds.  (Interview 40, Commonwealth line department)100 
As an outcome of their emergence without formal mandate or terms of reference, informal 
                                                 
99 I had the opportunity to examine HEPA’s history and operations from a number of jurisdictional participants’ 
perspectives, ‘snowballing’ a subset of interviewees from environmental regulators across all three state 
jurisdictions, with an additional perspective on environmental regulation from the Commonwealth. 
100 As networks become formalised or mandated in this way, they illustrate a form of ‘layering’ as one of the types 
of incremental change Mahoney and Thelen describe (2010). 
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networks tend to work across structural and organisational boundaries, ranging widely as 
members explore what resources the network has to offer.  For example, the volunteer middle 
manager heading one network described how 
everybody comes to me as the chair, and says "Oh I have this problem", or "I have that problem", 
but sometimes the problem might not even be related to things the network has discussed. 
(Interview 3, State line agency) 
As a result, informal networks help to break down the siloes that impede collaborative policy 
work.  For example, indigenous health networks bring together the state office, Department of 
the Prime Minister and Cabinet, state governments, the peak bodies of community-controlled 
health organisations, representatives from the primary health network boards (PHNs), 101 and 
local hospitals 
to share information, to troubleshoot anything, to talk through a new policy, to seek feedback.  
We want the PHNs to develop those really strong relationships with the community health sector, 
because if they can commission out, then we’ll actually pick up people who are falling through 
the gaps. (Interview 40, Commonwealth line department) 
5.5.4 Intergovernmental network management 
Institutionalism’s turn to the study of networks as stable and recurrent patterns of interaction 
and exchange between individuals and organisations provides a framework for formulating 
some general propositions about the role of network-building and management in the craft of 
intergovernmental management generally.   
The two types of relationships on which all intergovernmental networks are based are those of 
trust, on the one hand, and information exchange on the other.  These are closely interacting: 
without trust, the level of information exchange is sub-optimal and the process laborious, 
whereas good information exchange is a sine qua non for the development of trust.   
Not surprisingly, more than half (23) of the interviewees identified trust as an important 
attribute of their intergovernmental relationships.  Fostering such relationships and putting 
them into practice is an ongoing part of their role that they consciously distinguish from their 
involvement in negotiations and agreement-making: 
When you’re exploring new ideas and thinking innovatively about things, you’ve got to be 
prepared to be wrong, and you’ve got to be prepared to have those conversations in a way that is 
not a negotiation but everyone on the same side of the table is collaborating and exploring an 
issue. People are not that often prepared to let go of that negotiating-type role. That’s about trust. 
                                                 
101 Primary health networks are independent organisations working with local hospital networks, overseen by a 
board of medical professionals and advised by a clinical council and a community advisory committee. 
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You still have an agenda. We absolutely had an agenda but we went into that project very prepared 
to say, ‘Come what may, let’s see where the evidence takes us as we do that piece of work.’  
(Interview 22, Territory central department) 
Informal meetings are an important way of building the trust that makes more formal meetings 
and negotiations work, particularly by allowing jurisdictional positions to be clarified and 
agreements reached before the formal meetings take place.  One senior official described 
leveraging his history of working at both the Commonwealth and state levels in order to build 
that trust: 
So you’re partly trading off those relationships where you say, ‘Look, I’m not trying to do you 
over,’ and you’re being very frank and forthright, but it’s more effective in the end. (Interview 
10, State central department) 
Indeed, many officials considered that relationship-building was a distinct aim of their 
meetings: 
The first half of the day - it’s one day twice a year - we meet the night before for dinner, to get to 
know each other a bit better, because we don’t know each other that well. (Interview 12, State 
line agency) 
Similarly, officials discounted formal meetings as a venue for information gathering and 
dissemination, highlighting the importance of the informal meetings for that purpose (the 
reverse of the tendency for bargaining to be done at the formal meetings): 
Very rarely would an intergovernmental process be the relevant mechanism through which you 
have an opportunity to look at, say, for example what might be happening in another state and 
say, ‘Well, let’s have a look there. Maybe we can learn from what they’re doing’? (Interview 23, 
State line agency) 
Trust does not emerge without a conscious effort by officials to build relationships on the basis 
of what they can bring to the policy process and confidence that they can speak frankly.102 
Officials will regularly bypass official channels and venues to contribute to a general policy 
outcome, especially where this would be difficult in a ministerial or senior officials’ meeting: 
What you might do if you don’t feel able publicly to say, ‘Look, this is going on,’ is to have a 
bilateral conversation with a couple of jurisdictions. I have regular phone conversations with the 
Commonwealth on the side. For example, I had a side conversation with the Commonwealth to 
say, ‘Look, we haven’t got anywhere on the national affordable housing agreement. I said, ‘You 
need to talk to that immediately, otherwise that will be the elephant in the room and we won’t be 
able to go anywhere.’ And they took that advice and they worked it through. (Interview 31, State 
                                                 
102 I consider this an important rejoinder to the assumptions of rational choice theory or, for that matter, Kingdon’s 
multiple streams framework which only discusses the role of the bureaucracy in making policy suggestions or 
setting agendas in terms of protecting or expanding their ‘turf’ (2003, p. 114) 
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line agency) 
Such relationships reduce the transactional drag on negotiations caused by mutually adversarial 
perspectives, particularly around resourcing, described in the previous chapter. As one official 
suggested, informal networks provide a basis for more effective agreement-making in the 
formal structures: 
If you don’t have trust in the conversation, people might say, ‘The thresholds that the 
Commonwealth is proposing are more reflective of the liability that it’s facing rather than human 
health and the environmental risk that’s in front of you. If you don’t have the facility such as 
HEPA to have those conversations where you can build trust and relationships, you can see how 
an operational issue on the ground can become an issue which builds distrust. It means that 
nothing moves forward. (Interview 14, State line agency) 
This transfer of affect from the formal to the informal aspects of intergovernmental 
management highlights a key principle of what Ansell calls ‘network institutionalism,’ the 
assumption that network linkages are overlapping and cross-cutting (2006, p. 76). 
Although I have distinguished between formal and informal networks for analytic purposes, in 
reality they are interlaced and interactive.  Formal networks can take on aspects of informal 
networks through the agency of individual officials, such as the decision to work differently 
and outside the normal operational rules.   
On the other hand, informal networks can become institutionalised through adopting aspects 
of formality: agendas, routines, work programs and the like.  HEPA’s work on contamination 
from firefighting foams, for example, has become an agenda item for the environment 
ministers’ meetings: 
HEPA, while it does not have a mandate, the more we say things in the voice of HEPA and give 
work and make HEPA real, it becomes a value-adding organisation. It’s to the point now where 
at the next MEM meeting there will be report back which say that HEPA has agreed to do this 
and HEPA has agreed to do that. (Interview 14, State line agency) 
As a result, informal networks may gain a degree of recognition as part of the formal 
intergovernmental framework and a legitimate way to get things done and to reach agreement.  
Thus, for example, epistemic communities may be created by governments or through 
governance processes for the purpose of providing such advice which may give them greater 
access to decision processes than might be the case for more independent networks (Cross 
2013, p. 153).   
Officials are often asked by their first ministers to follow up particular issues with their 
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colleagues in other states or territories, which may begin an informal network around a 
particular policy issue.  More broadly, the informal networks often derive their legitimacy from 
formal structures such as ministerial or senior official meetings which bring officials together. 
we’re having a lunch just with principals afterwards, and we’re just going to chew the fat about 
what is Brexit and Trump and income inequality mean. What does it mean in our context? We 
wouldn’t do that if there wasn’t a formal meeting. The formal meeting, in a sense, authorises us 
all to hop on a plane (Interview 10, State central department) 
It is not always the case, however, that a mandate for a network is required or sought.  As I 
have shown, networks may operate without a formal mandate, generally on the basis that these 
networks are continuing arrangements rather than starting out; there is already a high degree of 
interpersonal trust; and there is a strong sense of personal mission amongst its members.  In 
the case of a middle management environmental regulators network, for example, an official 
recalled that a formal mandate had been essential to begin with.  However, subsequently, 
following abolition of the Standing Council of Environment Ministers, 
I had a meeting, and the agenda item for the meeting is ‘do we want to keep this going?  Cabinet 
authority is gone, what are people's views?’  And it was unanimous, ‘Yes we want to keep it 
going.’  One of the more respected jurisdictions said ‘let's just get going until someone tells us to 
stop.’ It's moved beyond the structure, because for a period of two, at least two years, maybe three 
years, we didn't have that authority anymore (Interview 3, State line agency) 
A good example of this flexibility is the discretion and autonomy given to technical experts.  
For example, experts in the environmental contaminants field are authorised to work with one 
another across federal boundaries with a significant degree of autonomy: 
They could interact with the Commonwealth or with any other state.  They might be working on 
these firefighting foams and they will interact with the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth set 
up a committee to establish new guidelines on these firefighting foams. Our people just joined it 
naturally. They were invited in their own right because they are experts and then they let us know, 
they certainly don’t need to seek my permission to do that. (Interview 12, State line agency) 
A further characteristic of network institutionalism is that networks are both resources and 
constraints on behaviour. As resources, they are conduits for information and assistance, and 
allow officials to get things done without getting caught up in formal jurisdictional positions.  
As constraints, they are ‘structures of social influence and control that limit action’ (Ansell 
2006, p. 76). 
Negotiating the tension and balance between networks as resources and constraints is a salient 
aspect of the craft of intergovernmental management.  Structural factors are an important 
context for determining this balance, in that officials in statutory authorities have more 
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independence to form and operationalise their networks than their colleagues in line 
departments, and particularly in central departments.103 
Statutory authorities and regulators tend to have a slightly better degree of independence and see 
themselves less as a branch of government - still public service, but we recognise our 
independence, whereas departmental regulators I do think are often hindered somewhat through 
the fact that they are also the policy maker and are very much more linked to ministerial policy. 
(Interview 13, State line agency) 
A line department official confirmed the tendency for policy department networks to be more 
constrained in their information-sharing: 
Random chats about things don’t happen that often in my role, mainly because my role is 
legislative. I don’t have a licence to just go off reservation in terms of a policy. A policy 
suggestion coming from me would be a bit left field. When we’ve had larger recommendations 
for reform, those have come out of reviews that governments have themselves initiated. So there’s 
not that much left field-type thinking in this space. (Interview 27, Commonwealth line 
department) 
Similarly, where networks have become institutionalised they can impede the development of 
newer networks, especially where there are hierarchical differences in the seniority of their 
personnel.  For example, an official noted how difficult it was to push work through non-
official channels due to the proliferation of networks in the occupational health and safety field.   
There’s senior officials, there’s [Heads of Workplace Safety Authorities] (HWSA), there’s 
HWSA working groups; it’s a lot more hierarchical in terms of governance groups. If I was to 
write to all the regulators in work health and safety and say, ‘Well, I’ve done this great research 
and I’ve identified these issues. Do you want to work with me?’ they’d write back and say, ‘This 
should go through HWSA.’ That would be their first response. They would defer it to a formal 
governance arrangement.  I’d have to negotiate my way into membership of a group that exists 
for a broader purpose. (Interview 39, Commonwealth line agency) 
The final meta-principle Ansell proposes is that networks provide varied access to resources, 
information, and support (2006, p. 76).  Networks can provide quick access to know-how or 
resources, such as Tasmanian experts helping Victoria’s EPA to manage a major fire in a coal 
mine, or the environmental regulators’ ability to identify regulated companies trying to ‘shop’ 
amongst the states for the most favourable rulings. 
Some researchers have argued that governments with fewer resources may not be able to join 
such networks, even though they would potentially benefit more from doing so than those with 
greater resources (McGuire et al. 2013, p. 8).  The interviews suggested that, at least as far as 
                                                 
103 Although I don’t want to overstate this; I have already mentioned a distinction between the Treasury networks 
and the role of officials in the Prime Ministers’ and Premiers’ departments. 
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the federal system is concerned, networks can provide an important way for smaller 
jurisdictions to compensate for their size, and to balance the power asymmetry in negotiating 
capabilities:  
Our strategic policy work needs the official channels but they need to have the networks through 
the unofficial ways too. Where are we, who’s like us, who can we learn from, what are we doing 
well and how do we know? For a small jurisdiction we’ve got to look out regularly. (Interview 
28, Territory line department) 
Similarly, networking provides ways for departments and agencies in smaller jurisdictions to 
leverage the research, policy development and communications work done in larger states.  For 
example, an EPA official from a smaller state was able to use the communications put out by 
a larger state’s EPA: 
the investment we put into some of these institutions pays off big time. I’ve got one of the major 
states’ EPA’s full communication statement. We’ll do it on the sniff of an oily rag, but they’ve 
got teams of people working on this stuff. It’s going to be better quality. It’s going to be more 
organised and more rational. And I’ve just got that without even asking for it. (Interview 33, State 
line agency) 
Notwithstanding Ansell’s argument that networks cannot simply be reduced to the attributes 
of their constituent individuals and organisations (2006, p. 76), I would argue that it is equally 
not possible to understand the processes of network formation and management without saying 
something about the personal characteristics of the officials engaged in this work.   
In the next chapter, I will look closely at how and why they are motivated to do so, and what 
ideas they tap into to develop their arguments and strategies.  For now, I would simply note 
that the effectiveness of intergovernmental networks depends heavily on the attributes of the 
individual officials operating in and across them.   
The risk of eliding the role of individuals in network formation is that it overlooks the personal 
agency involved in doing so, and overcoming the organisational inertia and the time and money 
involved that often prevent them from forming. 
An important issue that confronts officials engaged in building or maintaining networks is the 
cost of doing so, in terms of time, financial resources, and organisational capital relative to the 
information and support received.  (This is even before we get to the ‘acrimony, power 
determination, disagreement over problems and aims, impossibility in reaching agreement, and 
lack of implementation ability’ McGuire and Agranoff describe [2011, p. 266]).  One official 
estimated that setting up a network, at least in its initial phase, required one to two days’ work 
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a week.  But network management continues beyond this stage, turning from establishment to 
maintenance, which may involve organising work, resolving disputes among members, and 
building relationships with other organisations.  There are also the costs of overlapping 
networks: just as duplication between jurisdictional roles is a cost to the federation, overlapping 
networks are a cost and disincentive to collaboration: 
there are certainly executives that I have dealt with who have said "Well yeah that's great that you 
have your network but I've got my own network, so I'm not going to use your network." (Interview 
3, State line agency) 
McGuire, Lee and Fyall argue that intergovernmental managers require clear ‘guideposts’ for 
assessing the extent to which participation in intergovernmental solutions will outweigh the 
costs incurred by collaboration (2013, p. 12) and this applies to the formation of networks as 
well.  Not all managers, for example, are necessarily supportive of such investment if, as 
described by one official trying to develop a network, managers see this as a lower priority: 
the push-back from my manager was not because he didn't see value in the group, but because he 
didn't see value in the group now.  I had other things to work on, and this was distracting me and 
my colleagues from these other things that I could be working on.  So we're caught in this reactive 
cycle where we really struggle to get our heads above water to think about things more proactively 
(Interview 3, State line agency) 
Many officials described the personal leadership they had demonstrated in setting up a network 
as an example of the way officials foster change in the intergovernmental system. 
Basically I just used peer pressure to get people to participate. One jurisdiction took about three 
months to even work out who they would send. Another jurisdiction, I had to find my other 
contacts to give them a bit of a kick to come for that first time (Interview 39, Commonwealth line 
agency) 
The role of the network organiser, or chair, is a particular example of the personal agency 
officials enact.  Such organisers can play a significant role in steering the group, rather than 
passively accepting its directions from senior officials, ministers or COAG.   
I’ve been chair for the last three years, and I’ve looked at non-traditional areas where we haven’t 
collaborated well. One was around communicating with the public and engaging the public in 
what we call risk communication. It’s an area that we all talk about but we’re not good at. So why 
don’t we look at how we can learn together around what’s gone well, what’s not gone well and 
figure out where we might need to build capabilities in our organisations (Interview 33, State line 
agency) 
It is also important to recognise that the individual attributes of its members can affect and 
change the directions a network or an organisation might otherwise take.  For example, there 
is obviously a tendency for larger states to dominate the discussion in formal and informal 
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meetings.  However, the experience and longevity in the role that a smaller jurisdiction’s 
representatives may have can earn them a place at the table they would otherwise struggle to 
maintain: 
when smaller jurisdictions speak, people tend to cut them off more, or dismiss them.  There are 
people that sit around the table with me, and their eyes tend to roll over at the same 
jurisdictions.  [But] there seems to be more respect for [official] who is another person in Western 
Australia who has quite a lot of experience.  There does seem to be a differentiation between 
people who've been in the game, if you'll call it, longer than others (Interview 3, State line agency) 
A retired official recalled a period when the Australian Health Ministers' Advisory Council, 
which supports the COAG Health Council, was chaired by the secretary of a Tasmania’s health 
department.   
People would say, ‘How the hell could Tasmania provide leadership on anything?’ But he was 
very well respected by all the other heads of department. So the fact that he ran the Tasmanian 
department of health, which was two hospitals and a dog, didn’t matter. Everyone else highly 
respected him. He was very energetic, very far seeing and developed and ran a very good agenda 
of looking at reform and implementing that reform. (Retired senior official, Interview 1) 
Similarly, officials noted that the shared attributes of individuals working in particular sectoral 
networks, by way of shared training, background and experience, can generate an atmosphere 
of trust conducive to collaboration: 
Health doesn’t talk to transport; transport talks to transport, obviously.  Often the people you’re 
dealing with have a common academic background. If you go to a department like transport, 
you’ll find a coterie of engineers.  So you’re dealing with these officials and they’ve come through 
the same schools of economics or whatever. They’ve been forged in the same fires, so you’re 
talking to people who basically have very similar views generally as yourself about what’s good 
policy and what’s bad (Interview 35, State central department) 
There is a risk, however, that although a common background helps to generate trust, it can 
also generate complacency and group-think.104  Although Australia’s jurisdictions are not 
widely diversified along social or economic lines, there are nevertheless enough differences to 
make officials conscious of the need to understand where other parties in a negotiation may be 
coming from: 
why negotiations often take so long and are hard is because to negotiate well, you need to be able 
to put yourself in the other person’s shoes and understand what really matters to them. If 
someone’s grown up their whole time in New South Wales, a reasonably large and prosperous 
state, do you really understand where the Tasmanians are coming from? Or if you’ve only worked 
in the Commonwealth, do you really understand the pressure that the state official with the Daily 
                                                 
104 In their study of Flemish public administration, Oomsels et al. identify groupthink as ‘a potentially 
dysfunctional consequence of interorganizational trust’ (2016, p. 14) 
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Telegraph hammering on about something? (Interview 10, State central department) 
5.6 ‘We wear two hats’: intergovernmental management as an institution 
This final section brings together the empirical findings so far, in examining how officials 
understand the implications of the complex formal and informal processes and structures in the 
federal system, and their interrelationships, for their intergovernmental practice.   
Practitioners themselves recognise intergovernmental management as a distinct form of public 
administration.  They frequently use metaphors to describe the work, such as ‘stagecraft’, ‘a 
dance’, an ‘ecosystem’ or a ‘game’.  Such metaphors reveal a great deal about the way they 
think about their strategies and options and how they think of themselves as a distinct group 
within the bureaucracy, with a particular esprit de corps based on trust and commitment to the 
system as a whole, developed over long periods and reflected in a group culture: 
because you get people sitting around the COAG table for years, the relationships are actually 
pretty good. There’s a language, there’s a way of operating that’s kind of implicit that’s accepted 
and expected that can smooth the business end of things a bit. (Interview 22, Territory central 
department)105 
An initial foray into understanding the implications of this distinctiveness can be made using 
Parry’s approach to the British civil service culture in the context of devolution.  He is 
particularly concerned with ‘a ‘very elusive issue — the sense of identity felt by a public 
functionary, as defined not just by the vertical relation with a political mandate, but the 
horizontal relation with others doing the same task’ (2012, p. 289).   
Parry distinguishes between two styles of working in intergovernmental management.106  The 
first, in which he argues the role of officials is crucial, is the interdepartmental style, a policy 
process organised around briefings in which officials inform and warn one other about 
problems and support meetings of political leaders with constant discussion. Importantly, he 
links this style of working to what Australian public servants would recognise as the classic 
‘Westminster’ model of public administration. 
Parry distinguishes this style from the diplomatic style, defined by the interaction of sovereign 
                                                 
105 Note the discursive implications of the ‘language’ metaphor used here.  More generally, see Clarke (2007) for 
the importance of such metaphors in capturing the nature of jurisdictional interdependencies, how they emerge 
and change over time, and their role in mobilising supporters for change.  Shpaizman (2014, p. 1043) provides an 
example of the systematic study of metaphors in a case study of immigration policy. 
106 In Parry’s case, this is in the context of the UK’s devolved governance, but as I indicate below I think this is 
also meaningful in the Australian context. 
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powers whose relations are defined by procedures and protocols. These interactions are often 
highly formal, with choreographed meetings and outcomes in which questions of national 
interest and of gaining or losing position hang over the process.  Officials may not have a 
history of personal dealings and are defined by the offices they hold (2004, p. 51; 2012, p. 289).  
Parry’s work reflects the distinction Wright, Agranoff and others have drawn between 
intergovernmental management and intergovernmental relations that I explored in Chapter 2.1. 
More broadly, however, this distinction follows the distinction officials themselves draw 
between the formal style and functions of executive federalism, as enacted through COAG and 
its councils, and the informal relationships I have been describing in this chapter, with their 
emphasis on longstanding relationships based on trust. 
Interview data highlighted — to a surprising extent — the consistency and clarity with which 
officials reported their perceptions of intergovernmental management as separate and distinct 
from the political aspects and dynamics of intergovernmental relations.  Across jurisdictions, 
organisations, and policies, officials actively construct and maintain this distinction for a range 
of purposes and motivations, guided by the norms and values they derive from the federal 
system overall, and the cultures of their jurisdictions and organisations (as will be illustrated 
further by the data reported in Chapter 6).107   
For example, here is a Commonwealth official describing his role in a central agency: 
We wear two hats.  If we are considering a Commonwealth cabinet submission, then we are very 
much Commonwealth public servants working to the Prime Minister, and our Secretary; but at 
other times when we are organising and arranging the [COAG] meeting and trying to ensure that 
the COAG meeting is productive, we need to be considering not only what the Commonwealth 
wants out of the meeting, but also what other COAG members want out of the meeting (Interview 
2, Commonwealth central agency)108 
This coordinative discourse presents the federal bureaucracy as distinctive in two ways.  The 
first is normative, emphasising the elevation of the bureaucratic process out of the political 
mire, and placing this work in the context of a broader ‘Westminster’ set of public service 
values.  Officials describe the practice of intergovernmental management as a de-politicised 
embodiment of their respect for executive government more generally.  
                                                 
107 Apart from originally emerging as a concept in the US, this separation has also been noted in Canada (eg Johns 
et al. 2007). 
108 Simeon (1972, p. 136) similarly noted that officials in Canada had a ‘dual loyalty’ to the committee and to 
their own government. 
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In doing so, they are, of course, reflecting the broader Westminster culture of competing and 
overlapping ‘serial loyalist’ public service bargains between public servants and ministers, in 
which carefully apolitical bureaucrats, as agents, serve their principals, whoever happens to 
form the government of the day (Hood 2000; Hood & Lodge 2006).  Importantly, however, 
this normative view of intergovernmental management contains elements of what these authors 
call an alternative ‘technocratic trustee type bargain’, the implications of which I will describe 
and explore below. 
A second, if related, view of the bureaucratic dimension of federalism is process-focused, 
instrumental and ad hoc, rather than normative, seeing separation from politics as a way to 
ensure that the work of the federation is able to proceed even when there is conflict at the 
political level. 
People just see COAG and that kind of public face. And the reality is, for the other 11 and a half 
months of the year, we are just generally getting on with things behind the scenes in terms of 
trying to share best practice, talk about the pressures that we all face and how we can try and bring 
together some of our shared expertise. (Interview 19, State central department) 
In that role, the federal bureaucracy provides systemic stability and institutional memory.  
Echoing the academic view of the importance of networks, for example, one official saw them 
as a defining differentiation from the political space COAG occupies: 
The benefit of the public servants in this process is a little bit stepped back from the political fray; 
they can try and bring the genuine state interests or the national interest to bear and try and work 
out a solution. (Interview 10 State central department). 
Bureaucratic processes and relationships are seen as a vital element in the efficiency of the 
federal system’s day to day functions, including the preparation of agendas, policy briefings 
and ensuring that ministerial meetings are well informed.  The capacity for such systemic 
functioning even at times of political crisis depends on the relationships between officials built 
up over time, allowing for consultation and collaboration, ‘without prejudice’ in a political 
sense: 
This is one thing officials can do really well…You can have a private conversation or an informal 
conversation where you talk about what really are the issues around this matter, what would a 
good solution look like, what are we trying to achieve and then what are the policy or the financial 
or the other impediments and where would you find a way of dealing with them. You can have 
that sort of conversation without committing your government or without letting your government 
down in a negotiation (Interview 30, Federal Line Department). 
Officials in central agencies saw this separation as a particularly significant aspect of their work 
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in the grey area, as one official put it,  
between good public administration and the art of the possible.  Because of the politics that 
surround any particular matter and because of the positions we occupy, there is a really strong 
awareness of politics and a sensitivity to the politics around any issue, but it’s not an echo chamber 
of the politics. We will be looking as far as possible for compromise. It’s an interesting dynamic 
of not just bringing the politics of an issue to the table and then sitting on that and ruling lines; 
it’s a much more constructive engagement. (Interview 18, State central department) 
As shown by the data analysed previously in this chapter, the successful practice of 
intergovernmental management involves not only a preparedness to prosecute one’s own 
political executive’s policies, or one’s own jurisdictional and even organisational interests; at 
the same time, intergovernmental managers articulate and practise a commitment to the 
effective and efficient operations of the federal system overall.  The interviews presented a 
great deal of evidence for this support of the federal system as a goal in itself, with the following 
being a typical perspective:  
I have never been around a table where there has been overt politicisation in the room. Politics 
always, of course, influences positions, but people respect the institution of COAG. (Interview 18, 
State central department). 
Similarly, officials frequently described an ideal policy outcome from the point of view of the 
problem, rather than the political solution.  In the case of environmental policy, for example, 
one official described the sense of environmental guardianship around the table: 
what we’re really trying to do is beyond the political cycle. We’re trying to advance environment 
protection and community protection. We’ll do that with the best knowledge and skill our 
organisations can deliver to us at the table. But sometimes, as you well know, the politics mean 
we can’t go there. But before we get to that, let us have at the table a really open process where 
we talk about the issues and then we might have to have a secondary process where we talk about 
what it is possible to do. (Interview 12, State line agency) 
Even in the case of fiscal federalism, the most highly politicised aspect of the federal system, 
officials articulated the difference between their jurisdictional interests and a systemic 
outcome: 
I think Commonwealth-state works best when the highest proportion possible are genuinely 
starting from ‘What’s in the national interest’ rather than just trying to play, ‘I just want my little 
bit of the action.’ It’s the difference between distributive negotiation and integrative negotiation. 
Distributive negotiation is your classic zero sum gain arguing about the size of the pie. Integrative 
negotiation is, ‘How can I increase the size of the pie?’ (Interview 10, State central department) 
As a general principle of their approach, officials generally held that protecting one’s 
minister’s, or jurisdiction’s, or even organisation’s ‘interests’ or ‘turf’ requires at least some 
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sensitivity to those represented by officials across the table.   
This might mean, for example, that officials keep an issue alive, if only on the backburner, until 
a change of government or some other opportunity presents itself to restart the process.  Despite 
being ordered to cease the work that had been done in the new Commonwealth-state working 
groups under Rudd when his efforts failed to secure the new Prime Minister’s approval, this 
official maintained a low-level work program based on those collaborations: 
I didn’t feel like pulling the plug, quite frankly, so I tried to keep it alive to a certain extent. I 
knew it wasn’t going to go anywhere immediately but I said, ‘Let’s not throw everything out. 
Let’s just pause and wait and see what happens.’ We didn’t have a deal, but we had an 
understanding that we were in this together and we would actually try and do something positive. 
And that was my objective. That’s the best I could do in the process. I could have gone like some 
Commonwealth bureaucrat and said, ‘All bets off, see you later,’ and walked out the room. 
(Retired senior official, Interview 4) 
The separation of the bureaucratic and political dimensions of the federal system becomes even 
clearer when they are perceived to collide, to be operating in different and not necessarily 
compatible directions.  Officials expressed discomfort with political horse-trading and conflict, 
especially when it was carried out in front of them.   
It was awkward, actually, that it played out in front of officials, too. It would have been preferable 
had they had the opportunity to have a quick meeting in the cabinet room or something like that 
and have a discussion about it rather than have this horse trading in front of officials who were 
trying to draft bits of the communique and wrap up each session of that COAG meeting. 
(Interview 21, Commonwealth line department) 
A large part of the craft of intergovernmental management is about managing (and navigating) 
the tension between these political and bureaucratic domains.  Officials described the need to 
marry a sensitivity to and awareness of the political directions of their governments to the 
practical exigencies of managing their departments and agencies, such as work priorities, 
resourcing, and — more interestingly — how such political imperatives informed, but were not 
necessarily identical with, the strategic directions they had set for their organisations.  For 
example, the official quoted above on fiscal federalism goes on to describe the implications of 
this view for his negotiating strategy: 
 
if we do a cunning funding deal with the Commonwealth but at the end of the day the 
Commonwealth ends up with a budget problem because the health expenditure still blows out and 
they can’t afford it, I’m not going to have a cunning funding deal for long because the pressure is 
going to flow back. So we have to get a national interest outcome because if we don’t get a 
national interest outcome the brilliant deal we’ve got on paper will not be sustainable. (Interview 
10, State central department) 
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Not surprisingly, government and ministerial policy directions were frequently cited as a 
constraint on policy development and negotiation.  Within the Westminster convention of 
serving the minister, however, officials were prepared to exercise their agency in constructing 
or using that bureaucratic space to pursue public value outcomes they perceived as distinct 
from those of their political executives.  In effect, they appear to be drawing on an alternative 
coordinative discourse that reflects at least some of the key elements in what Hood and Lodge 
call ‘trustee’ type bargains between public servants and ministers in which public servants are 
expected to act as independent judges of the public good and not merely to take their orders 
from the executive. They conclude ‘the notion of a trustee relationship implies that public 
servants possess a domain of autonomy in which they exercise discretion in a way that is not 
subject to commands or control from elected politicians’ (2006, p. 26). 
In intergovernmental management practice this might occur, for example, through the 
negotiating process described in Chapter 4, where senior jurisdictional representatives had 
some latitude in finding solutions to achieve a deal, including exceeding pre-arranged 
negotiating strategies and briefs in the pursuit of an outcome that.   
Officials were disarmingly forthright about the highly discretionary approaches they took to 
drafting intergovernmental agreements, policy papers, and even legislation or regulations on 
the basis of their expertise and policy knowledge.  One official, for example, described 
inserting provisions into a draft bill that he knew would not be noticed by his superiors, ‘to 
protect the Commonwealth’s interests’ and because he was afraid they would be negotiated 
away if they came to light (Interview 42, CW Line Department). 
The most frequent exercise of personal agency in this separate space is through establishing or 
maintaining ongoing, safe, de-politicised networks.  If there is one element in the practice of 
intergovernmental management that is almost universally viewed as critical to capacity and 
effectiveness in that role, it is this process of communicating outside the political context, even 
though, in the end, political dynamics will determine the outcome of a policy process. 
Your jurisdiction might be advancing a proposition that is largely illogical, not evidence driven 
but is fundamentally something about the politics of it. So you then can’t ignore that in your 
contribution to the debate. But, equally, you are looking for a pathway to the resolution of the 
issue rather than simply amplifying the politics around whatever the issue is (Interview 18, State 
central department). 
Interestingly, the openness of such dialogue is often accepted by the political executive as 
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contributing important information on other jurisdictions’ standpoints. When the Heads of 
Treasury Departments held meetings, for example,  
we didn’t report the outcomes to the Treasurer. I can’t recall ever a minute or a brief going up to 
the Treasurer.  I can remember having a few chats about some of the discussions with his chief 
of staff, but there was no formal brief. Treasurers of the day said, ‘Okay, that’s great. You guys 
are getting together and having a chat. That’s fine.’ (Retired senior official, Interview 4). 
5.7 Swimming beyond the flags: agency and intergovernmental 
management 
Turning to the implications of these findings for the bureaucracy’s role in federal dynamics, on 
one proposition suggested by the data is that this separate institutional space for 
intergovernmental management reduces the effects of path dependency in the federal system, 
thereby opening possibilities for bounded agency.  At this bureaucratic level, there are lower 
costs to departing from previously held positions, by comparison with the political domain 
where such costs, in terms of public and media opprobrium can be very high.   
This dissertation’s concern with the relationship between structures and practice is 
encapsulated in one senior state official’s description of the relationship between them as 
‘swimming between the flags’.  The metaphor was adopted in subsequent interviews as a device 
for interviewees to describe how they provided administrative discretion to their subordinates 
or responded to such constraints (sometimes described as a matter of how widely-apart the 
flags had been placed) and — on important occasions — to describe how they had swum 
‘beyond the flags’.   
Accordingly, I use the term ‘bounded agency’ to refer to the institutional reality that officials 
are still, as the metaphor implies, swimming between flags set by their political and 
organisational executives.  Swimming between the flags must still follow a logic of 
appropriateness that is derived from those constraints, and from the norms underpinning the 
formal and informal structures and processes discussed so far.   
There was quite a wide gap between the flags, but you’re only ever swimming 25 metres because 
you were only getting to the next point well enough so that you could go to government for the 
next set of decisions. It was a very iterative process. (Interview 26, Commonwealth line 
department) 
The more significant the reforms, the closer the flags became because, as one official extended 
the metaphor, ‘the sharks are out there’ (Interview 34, State line department): 
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with the highest profile and most difficult pieces of work, it’s much clearer. You have negotiating 
strategies which go to cabinet and you operate within those. 16 
Another factor in determining the limits of agency is the form of the agreements process and 
its guidelines.  For example, in describing the impact of the Rudd Government’s changes to 
fiscal federalism on Commonwealth-state negotiations, and particularly in moving the 
Commonwealth to a focus on outcomes rather than inputs and outputs, an official recalled that 
they were given considerable autonomy, subject only to the agreements architecture, ‘and if 
people tried to break down the architecture, that was the point where we’d draw the line’ 
(Retired senior official, Interview 4). 
Within that logic of appropriateness, or the boundaries of legitimation, I turn from historical to 
discursive institutionalist methodology to understand how a range of alternative strategies and 
options becomes available for consideration.   
This was an area of particular focus for the interviews, even though few interviewees initially 
understood what I meant by the term ‘the rules of intergovernmental management’ that I 
adopted in my pre-interview communications with them.  (I had forgotten the multiple ways in 
which the simple term ‘rules’ can be understood, such as regulations, instructions, precepts, 
principles and strategies [Ostrom 2005, p. 17]).   
Four rules were prominent in their consistency throughout the interviews as a guide for 
practitioners.   
1. Information exchange must be conducted in an apolitical manner.   
This rule effectively sets up the separate space in which intergovernmental management is 
conducted and the trust it requires.  The rule may even require information to be kept from 
one’s minister; as one official recalled:  
We’d have to say, ‘This conversation, this bit only goes between us on an issue. You can’t take 
this to your minister because it will be used politically.’ (Interview 30, Commonwealth line 
department) 
Officials were very clear that allowing such conversations to be used for political purposes was 
not just a breach of trust in any particular case, but damaging to the system of 
intergovernmental management as a whole.  Consequently, such ‘defections’ were rare: 
there would be very few, if any, occasions where the confidence and the trust has been broken in 
that environment. If it does, it’s usually through inadvertence, like someone’s gone back and 
spoken to their premier’s office and they’ve gone, ‘Here’s something that we can take advantage 
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of.’ (Interview 18, State central department) 
One of the reasons why defections are rare is because of the shared vulnerability in adopting 
this open stance in negotiations, as a Commonwealth official described: 
I would have offered a sense of where the Commonwealth was heading and why.  Had they ever 
abused that trust that could have been awkward for me, but it was never abused, ever. (Interview 
41, Commonwealth line department) 
Interviewees were asked to provide examples of where or how they had made a personal 
impact; where they could see the ‘footprints in the sand behind them’, as it were.  Many of 
them referred to a skill in developing the means, and harnessing the opportunities, to share 
information within and between jurisdictions while bracketing political and organisational 
interests.  One official described getting phone calls from her colleagues in other states 
saying, ‘We’re proposing to do something. Have you done this? What have you done?’ And 
there’s a view that you can share that with confidence, which is very important because it’s 
basically allowing policy formulation and policy development to develop in confidence. There 
isn’t an adversarial view generally. (Interview 35, State central department). 
2. Agency shapes personal, organisational and jurisdictional strategies but does so subject to 
structural accountabilities.   
These accountabilities begin with the formal constitutional and fiscal frameworks.  These ‘set 
the flags’, as it were, particularly for state officials who are very conscious of the 
Commonwealth’s fiscal dominance: 
we have one or two choices - accept Commonwealth funding on the terms which the 
Commonwealth is willing to provide it when they decide to tell us they’re willing to provide it; 
provide it ourselves or start terminating services when cash flow means that we’re no longer able 
to provide funding certainty. So these are very compelling challenges for the ministers that are 
actually dealing with those stakeholders. And it becomes very difficult to have a kind of walk-
away strategy on agreements. (Interview 17, State central department) 
Government policies and the responsibility to deliver them are, of course, a major constraint.  
In a federal system, this has additional dimensions.  First, officials described the difficulties of 
reaching national agreements where one’s own government’s priorities differed from those of 
governments at other levels in the federation or horizontally: 
If some other jurisdiction came and said, ‘Let’s have a national approach to how we deal with 
nurse-patient ratios,’ we might go, ‘Mmm, actually, we’re doing our own things. We’ve made 
political commitments and we’re comfortable with doing that. We don’t see the value of delaying 
our process and putting aside our political commitments to join a longer time frame that could 
draw out to who knows where if it goes to a national process.’ (Interview 15, State line 
department) 
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The centrality of COAG to the general operations of executive federalism and the ensuing 
marginalisation of federal and state parliaments acts as a further constraint.  As one official put 
it,  
COAG can decide anything and the first ministers around that table can have a lot more mandate 
to decide things without having to come back and reference their cabinet. (Interview 17, State 
central department) 
The intergovernmental agreements arising from that framework form another important 
constraint, with state officials frequently complaining about their ongoing negotiation envelope 
offering them little more scope than an incremental debate about whether particular 
components or clauses have departed from the overall aspirations of that agreement or the IGA 
FFR. 
Finally, one should not underestimate the importance of resourcing for the conduct of 
intergovernmental management — or the lack of it — as a constraint on agency.  Resourcing a 
dedicated intergovernmental function is one of the most important ways the states can 
effectively partner the Commonwealth on policy rather than simply accept its directions.  One 
official worked in a jurisdiction that had allocated some 20 staff to a branch dedicated to 
intergovernmental relations, because not doing so meant 
where you’re grappling with big agendas that the Commonwealth are running it is really difficult. 
Ideally you would want to be not just keeping up with the agenda as it moves but actually be well 
ahead of it and have alternative agendas. I don’t mean that in the sense of having a rival thing; 
it’s actually about having other good ideas to put on the table so that it’s not all about what the 
Commonwealth is bringing forward. The capacity of the states to be generating intergovernmental 
reform hasn’t been very good. (Interview 16, State line department) 
In the absence of such resourcing, informal networks may be limited in what they do.  
Generating the demand for resources is one of the benefits of the formal council system, 
including the availability of secretariats who take on a lot of the coordination work, allowing 
smaller jurisdictions to take on revolving chairmanship roles in senior officials’ meetings. 
Similarly, there is naturally a degree of autonomy that comes with seniority, particularly where 
those higher up in the organisation have access to information that their subordinates do not.  
Or, to take another example, state governments often have rules about where, when and how 
to engage with the Commonwealth: 
Within the state we have comprehensive arrangements as it relates to the formalities and practice 
of engagement with the Commonwealth. So that’s very tightly regulated, so there’s no sort of 
freelancing. (Interview 18, State central department) 
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In summary, these accountabilities, together with the jurisdictional and organisational 
directions explored in Chapter 4, set the flags, as it were, within which officials have to swim.   
3. The capacity for agency is enhanced by experience and recognition.   
Officials tended to ascribe their capacity, or that of their colleagues, to change individual policy 
directions or more systemic processes to their credibility and/or longevity in the system.  
‘People listen to you because you’d actually been doing the work at the coal face’ as one official 
put it (Interview 31, State line agency).  Technical expertise is often a prerequisite for 
successful engagement with practitioners and other organisations in the regulatory context.  
Similarly, officials who had worked for both the Commonwealth and a state or territory 
government appeared to have greater personal ‘capital’ and were seen as game changers. The 
counterpart to this is that when people have spent much less time in the intergovernmental 
world, they don’t have the trust in others, nor do others trust them to the same degree, which 
reduces their capacity to take autonomous action. 
4. Trust is a necessary pre-condition for the exercise of agency. 
Many officials commented on the importance of trust as the sine qua non for effectively 
carrying out intergovernmental policy work.   
The capacity for agency is, first, heavily dependent on the mutual trust one has in one’s minister 
and more senior colleagues, including those in other jurisdictions.  A relationship based on 
mutual trust allows one to take risks, as one official put it when describing a negotiation process 
over a national partnership: 
All of the way leading up to that meeting I had no authority for the negotiations or the discussions 
that we were having. So I had to be absolutely upfront that it was completely without prejudice 
and I had no authority, but that it was the way I played it. (Interview 21, Commonwealth line 
department)  
Allowing for agency based on trust applies to one’s subordinates, as well as upwards.  It was 
common, for example, for officials to be given a degree of autonomy in negotiations based on 
compliance with an overriding directions and strategies.  One senior official described giving 
a subordinate 
complete latitude so long as it didn’t go outside the funding envelope and the proper evidence-
based outcomes that were required. So long as he didn’t do that, then I didn’t care how he 
compromised; I didn’t care how many meetings, I didn’t care. But I would expect him to tell me 
how it was going (Interview 41, Commonwealth line department) 
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While mobility within and between jurisdictions contributes to the development of networks, 
high rates of turnover were frequently identified as a barrier to the development of such trust.  
Turnover in personnel not only disrupts the establishment of personal relationships generally, 
but also makes it more difficult for the bureaucracy to provide the ‘corporate memory’ in 
support of the ministerial councils, particularly where established interpretation of earlier 
decisions taken in those forums were abruptly revised by ‘newcomers’; and because trust 
requires a shared expertise based on longstanding experience in a particular policy field. 
In the intergovernmental areas you find that every year it’s a different set of people who’ve got 
very little corporate knowledge or background in this type of work and they have to pick it up. 
The Commonwealth has got good people but they don’t have the knowledge or the feel for why 
certain arrangements were established. They can be struggling. It means that we sometimes feel 
that the Commonwealth, for example, don’t really know much about fiscal equalization or how 
their expertise can be used. (Interview 25, State central department) 
Interviewees were also asked to identify particular examples of how they had exercised agency, 
and with what outcomes.  Not all of them saw the exercise of agency as a significant part of 
their role, or at least not in all contexts.  Many officials struggled to think of examples where 
they had ventured ‘beyond the flags’ or the ‘red line’, and expressed the view that the systemic 
values of Westminster-style serial loyalism did not allow for that role, except where such 
agency might deliver better outcomes for their ministers.109  Consequently, some interviewees 
expressed the view that officials exercise little or no personal agency in pushing back against 
political, jurisdictional or organisational constraints. 
Indeed, some middle managers in particular felt that, given the limited information their 
positions allowed them on overall jurisdictional and organisational priorities and directions, it 
would be inappropriate to pursue individual strategies and goals.  Such boundaries on personal 
agency were particularly relevant for major policies that were high on COAG’s list of priorities: 
with the highest profile and most difficult pieces of work you have negotiating strategies which 
go to cabinet and you operate within those. Variations from that need to be really, really carefully 
worked through, both up the line within a central agency but also with line agencies and line 
ministers as well. So the flags are probably a little bit clearer there. With lesser profile items, you 
probably had a bit more autonomy. There would be more general principles of intergovernmental 
relations informing that. (Interview 16, State line department) 
Many officials, however, were at pains to present examples of where they had put their personal 
                                                 
109 In so doing, they are, of course, echoing the controversy over the concept of ‘public value’ and the critique by 
Rhodes and Wanna of the notion ‘that public managers should play the role of Platonic guardians deciding the 
public interest’ (2007, p. 407). 
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stamp on a policy direction or implementation.  Under certain conditions, they argued, officials 
were able to develop alternatives even where the directions appeared to be set by one or more 
of the factors enumerated in the research data.  In effect, to return to our central metaphor, these 
officials looked for ways to ‘set the flags’ more widely apart and even to swim with a degree 
of autonomy beyond them.   
In many cases this involved bringing about changes to a particular policy process through their 
personal intervention and peer communications.  This frequently involved wearing the ‘two 
hats’ described above, in pursuing national and systemic as well as jurisdictional interests and 
directions.  Officials may also convey information that they have gleaned from their colleagues 
in other jurisdictions to brief their ministers in a way that reflects such national systemic 
outcomes that go beyond that government’s political directives, or even that jurisdiction’s 
interests.   
Because we write the negotiation strategy as well and put it up, we do a lot of that thinking about 
what are our red line issues. We suggest that to the minister. It’s up to them to agree or not. We 
do try and always give ourselves quite a lot of - well, sorry, as part of that we have optimal 
positioning, our preferred positioning and then our fall back. (Interview 15, State line department) 
In the case of the NDIS, for example, officials from the larger states described how they had 
inserted smaller states’ interests into their first ministers’ briefings, to ensure a better national 
outcome. 
There are things as part of the NDIS that would absolutely be in New South Wales’s best interests 
or Victoria’s best interests, but would be to the detriment of a smaller state, where they don’t have 
the market and the providers within them. People don’t acknowledge that the biggest states do 
often take a step back and actually think, ‘If we want to make this work from a whole-of-country 
perspective, what do we have to step back from to encourage the smaller states to be part of this 
process?’ (Interview 19, State central department) 
Similarly, in environmental policy, the lack of substantial funding for agreements opened up 
the opportunity for a national approach to emerge.  One senior official considered they had 
played a pivotal role in this situation: 
I pushed that very hard. There’s always a lot of resistance in systems, especially when you’ve got 
to say, ‘Let’s do something across the federation.’ Others will say, ‘Well, what’s in it for me? 
Why should I bother?’ I overcame that through persuasion and saying, ‘This is good for the 
environment.’ (Interview 30, Commonwealth line department) 
At the systemic level, officials bring about change in the way they conduct intergovernmental 
management processes, and in that way affect policies more generally.  As one official put it,  
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by demonstrating that it can be done, I hope to embed it.  Other departments that are not related 
to us, are coming to talk to our department and us together to say, ‘We’ve watched how this is 
happening. How do we achieve this?’ The basis of it is culture. (Interview 12, State line agency) 
5.8 Chapter summary  
In examining how officials understand the practice of intergovernmental management, the 
interview data presented in this chapter contained two surprises.   
The first was the clarity and strength of the idea of intergovernmental management itself.  
Consequently, this idea formed the basis of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ with which 
practitioners pursued not only the given policy directions and roles, but adopted a range of 
strategies that demonstrated their commitment to the federal system as a whole. 
The conclusion to Chapter 4 summarised two rule sets that emerged from the structural 
analysis: one which supports systemic stability and process, and one which supports change 
and innovation.  As I foreshadowed there, the ‘two hats’ officials adopt and their perception of 
intergovernmental management as a domain that is separate from political concerns or the 
interests of their jurisdictions generates a sense of stewardship over the system that runs 
alongside, and may conflict with, their services to the political executive.   
The second surprise in the data lay in the extent to which officials adopt techniques and tactics 
to push back against the range of constraints on their personal agency.  (Not all of them do so, 
of course, at all times or to a significant degree; the role of such gatekeepers nevertheless plays 
an important stabilising role explored in the next chapter.)  These strategies and concerns are 
summed up in the metaphor of swimming between widely or narrowly placed flags, and 
sometimes beyond them, that the final section of this chapter described. 
The chapter has found a complex relationship between the structures and constraints detailed 
in the previous chapter and this one, and the individual agency of the officials who work in and 
with them, with the rules explored in this chapter providing the guidance as to how these 
relationships are to be navigated.  Four rules in particular emerged from the interview data as 
crucial guidelines: 
1. Information exchange, as a primary vehicle for the exercise of agency, depends on 
such exchange being conducted in an apolitical manner.   
2. Opportunities exist to shape organisational and jurisdictional strategies but are 
subject to structural accountabilities.   
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3. The capacity for agency depends on the experience and recognition one has earned 
in the intergovernmental system. 
4. Trust is a necessary pre-condition for the exercise of agency. 
As argued in Chapter 4, structures generate the very rules that are the basis for agency, even 
where they are being pushed against.  As we have seen, sometimes agency works with, and is 
supported by, structures and processes, using them as a platform.  Agency may be inherently 
conservative, directed at preserving systemic stability, retaining policy momentum, or 
institutional memory.  In such cases, innovation may be directed at preserving a normative 
status quo, and in order to do this, actors may need to re-engineer their organisations and their 
work in complex ways that, Jabko and Sheingate argue, may be overlooked in more standard 
approaches to incremental change (2018, p. 313).   
Moreover, as this chapter has shown, the effectiveness of federal structures and processes 
depends on the agency of officials working in and on them, to find ways past the constraints 
and, sometimes, to work against the prevailing direction set by political and jurisdictional 
interests. 
At other times, agency is exercised by working against the prevailing directions set by one’s 
government, jurisdiction or organisation, or to rebuild some part of the system that is not 
functioning well. 
How this personal agency is applied to strategies and practices in the formal and informal 
settings of the federation is a matter the next chapter examines in detail. 
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Chapter 6 
‘It’s l-o-r-e, not l-a-w’: ideas, norms and values in intergovernmental 
management 
6.1 Introduction 
The analysis conducted so far of the practices of bargaining and negotiation, joint problem 
solving and network building only provides a limited insight into the choices practitioners make 
between the alternative strategies and options available to them as they go about these tasks.  
Even routine aspects of intergovernmental management involve more than one overarching set 
of ideas and values, and consequently require choices to be made about them and between 
them. We therefore need to establish how and why officials choose their strategies and the 
implications of those choices for the federal system as a whole.   
Accordingly, this chapter explores the ideational layer and its manifestation in what Benz and 
Broschek call ‘the federal political discourse’ (2013, p.6).  They go on to note that tensions 
between this layer and the social and institutional layers within federal systems are an important 
source of federal dynamics (2013, p. 9).  Inwood and his co-authors also highlight the 
importance of the ideational context for policy making, arguing that ideas about 
intergovernmental relations, the economy, public service and particular policy problems ‘come 
to life’ in the context of the institutions in which they work (2011, p. 37).  They too see the 
interplay between ideas and institutions, mediated by the perceptions, opinions and 
perspectives of intergovernmental managers, as an important source of intergovernmental 
policy capacity and the trajectory of intergovernmental relations (2011, p.79).110   
Accordingly, this chapter explores how practitioners’ ideas and values reflect and are shaped 
by federalism’s formal and informal structures and processes.  Understanding how this works 
in the Australian context allows us to see how new policy ideas and management practices are 
introduced to practitioners as these structures and processes change.  At the same time, the 
chapter tests the proposition that changing the discourse changes the institution: when a senior 
official says ‘let’s do this differently’, others in his or her organisation, and colleagues in other 
                                                 
110 Although Benz and Colino suggest a limited role for ‘paradigmatic change of ideas and values regarding the 
constitution’ as a source of systemic change (2011, p. 395), the following discussion associates the ideational 
layer with Burgess’s much broader examination of ‘federal values and principles that inhere in the very idea of 
the federal state’ (2012, p. 21), not least among them being a commitment by the constituent units and their 
representatives to the overall needs of the larger system; very much in line with the ‘stewardship’ noted in the 
previous two chapters.   
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jurisdictions, are empowered to change the way things are done in ways that may extend 
beyond that specific policy process.  In effect, the argument here confirms Inwood’s and his 
co-authors’ view that ‘a richer definition of intergovernmental capacity…grows out of the 
intergovernmental officials' experiences and perceptions’ (2011, p. 415). 
The chapter is structured as follows.  First, findings are presented on the sources and content 
of officials’ ideas, values and norms about the federal system as a whole, and in relation to 
their respective jurisdictions.  The chapter then goes on to the specific ways in which 
practitioners apply these ideas, values and opinions to the policy problems and solutions that 
confront them.   
6.2 Ideas about the federal system 
An early study of Australian intergovernmental relations in the mid-1950s found that achieving 
cross-institutional co-operation is complicated by the fact that 'officials have conceptions of 
what their proper role is and they are often reluctant to deviate from this ‘role’ as they conceive 
it' (cited in Leach 1976, p. 9).  As recently as the Abbott government’s Federation Review of 
2013-15, de Carvalho attributes at least some of the reasons for its failure to ‘a genuine belief’ 
among Commonwealth officials  
that the default tactical position of states and territories is to take as much Commonwealth money 
with as little accountability for how it is spent, and that therefore states cannot be trusted to deliver 
better outcomes to citizens.  (2018, p. 8) 
Despite some empirical evidence to support this view, 111 other studies have found that officials 
strongly support the notion of shared responsibilities in the federation (Smith & Brown 2017, 
pp. 26-27). To test these propositions, the interviews explored the interviewees’ overall 
perceptions of the federal system and how their strategies were informed by these views.112 
On that basis, the data suggests that de Carvalho has simplified a much more complex and 
                                                 
111 For example, Bruerton’s and Kildea’s recent survey of officials found their attitudes posed more significant 
barriers to federal reform than any other factors, including structural (2017, p. 220).  However, it should be noted 
that they found such attitudes operating at both the Commonwealth and state levels, not just one or the other, with 
self-interest and an unwillingness to give up power the major issues. 
112 On a methodological point, I note Cho and Wright’s acknowledgement (2004, p. 452 n.1) of the need for 
further empirical research into the relationship between such perceptions and objective, measurable causal factors 
such as whether the fiscal relationships between levels of government has a causal effect on such perceptions; or 
the dynamics of different policy sectors, such as redistributive versus developmental (Peterson 1986).  However, 
I share Cho and Wright’s rejoinder that, pace the need for further research along these lines, ‘perception, or how 
administrators view the world, guides their actions and their relationships to other actors’ and is therefore an 
organisational reality worth exploring. 
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varied set of perceptions among Commonwealth officials, and the corresponding beliefs among 
their colleagues in the states and territories.  As a result, the adversarial view he confronted 
points to only one, albeit an important one, of many stances officials take in their work that 
leads to greater or lesser cooperation with other jurisdictions.   
Such variance is, first, the product of how such perceptions are formed.  Officials do not simply 
absorb or imbibe their attitudes in some way from the prevalent public service culture in which 
they work.  Their views of what is important about the federal system, its chief characteristics, 
issues, benefits and costs, are constructed, episode by episode, by the formal and informal 
structures and processes of the federation, and by their socialisation into the intergovernmental 
roles they play in these structures.  Consequently, there are distinct differences in how they 
view the federal system based on the particular structures and processes with which they are 
most concerned.  Analysis of the interview data indicated four key sources of practitioners’ 
ideas about the federal system.113 
First, the formal governance structures of the federation in COAG, its ministerial councils and 
their supporting officials’ meetings generate a distinctive set of ideas about the federation.  The 
bargaining and negotiations that such meetings entail, and the communiques that concisely 
summarise their outcomes, shape the perspective of officials whose work takes place in that 
context.  These officials, who are working predominantly in central departments or who have 
extensive experience of intergovernmental relations in particular policy areas, view such 
meetings as having an exceptional quality.   
You kind of get some of the best and brightest in the bureaucracies in the land involved in the 
COAG space, and it’s a cracking pace. Intellectually, the meeting process, the kind of calibre of 
the way issues are discussed and strategically thought through et cetera, it’s a really cracking 
pace. So you do get some of the best and brightest, I think, sitting around that table. (Interview 
22, Territory central department) 
There was a clear divide between officials on the implications of the adversarial conflict 
between the Commonwealth and states that looms large in their perceptions.  One group saw 
these tensions as short term, emerging routinely from senior executives’ meetings.  Such 
disagreements are not seen as the source of long-standing communities of interest from which 
jurisdictional identities and cultures might emerge. 
Our alliances are always temporary and always based on self-interest. It is entirely driven by the 
                                                 
113 I would add that although I have identified these sources separately in what follows, they are not, of course, 
mutually exclusive; I will return to this point below.    
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issue. (Interview 18, State central department) 
Consequently, disagreement is seen as a natural aspect of a federal system, which can be 
overcome through goodwill and good process.   
At the end of the day my feeling is we're all in it for the same thing.  All levels of government, all 
the different states, they're all trying to provide good outcomes for their citizens.  (Interview 2, 
Commonwealth central department) 
Another group, however, expressed some doubt about whether it was possible to appeal to 
shared interests as a way of overcoming the disjunctures of federalism.  They argued that the 
federal system’s allocation of different responsibilities to the Commonwealth and states 
generated intrinsically different interests.  The Commonwealth’s insistence on holding the 
states accountable for inputs and outputs rather than policy goals undermined the potential for 
meaningful partnership.   
The perception that the federal system is characterised by fragmentary, competing claimants 
for a limited share of resources was typically expressed by those with long experience of 
negotiations.  As in the case of this state government education department official, they tend 
to be pessimistic about the system’s capacity to deliver national policy outcomes: 
we can’t have a national dialogue with states and territories about education policy because we’re 
all different about what our shares are and what we might be entitled to and what deal we might 
have done (Interview 34, State line department) 
Finally, in commenting on the idea of the federal system as an arena, officials tended to dismiss 
the motivations attributed to them by public choice theory: 
It is commonly said that the Commonwealth and states often have a tussle over power. In defence 
of both parties, it’s not always just because people want power. I think often the officials as well 
as the politicians think, ‘If only I ran that system,’ whether it be schools or something else, ‘it 
would be better.’ I don’t think they just want to wield power for their own sake; I think they think 
they could do a better job. (Interview 16, State line department) 
A second fundamental source of practitioners’ perceptions lies in the agreements that structure 
the relationship between jurisdictions.  Commonwealth and state government specialists on 
intergovernmental agreements focus on the normative disjunction they perceive between the 
aspirations of the agreements framework and the realities of the documents before them.  In 
particular, the IGA FFR is seen by officials at both levels of government as the embodiment of 
cooperative federalism, with its emphasis on outcomes rather than input controls, as a way of 
giving the states greater flexibility in delivery.  
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Interview data confirmed previous research that argues the current practice of fiscal federalism 
in Australia falls short of those aspirations.114  Interviewees described one side of this tension 
as a national government attempting to over-prescribe delivery methods and impose onerous 
reporting requirements, or a national government forced to seek greater accountability and 
transparency because of state government cost-shifting and defection from the terms of the 
bargain.  The other side is characterised as states attempting to maintain a degree of flexibility 
and independence in service delivery, or as states acceding to the Commonwealth’s demands 
in order to get their hands on the money. Overall, then, most practitioners who commented on 
fiscal relations saw this dynamic tension as a key characteristic of the federal system.   
I don’t think you’d find many commentators who would think that the practice of 
Commonwealth-state relations reflects the principles that a reasonable-minded person would 
understand from reading it. That’s been something that was a known challenge since the IGA was 
agreed, and we’ve been moving incrementally away from that through individual negotiations 
since it was struck. We have the marginal conversation, the incremental conversation each and 
every time. (Interview 17, State central department) 
An important qualification to this perception is that it does not simply follow Commonwealth-
state lines; Treasury officials at both levels expressed the view that their line department 
colleagues were reneging on the IGA FFR’s spirit, by seeking or agreeing to detailed 
conditions: 
they’re nutting out these agreements and then it’s in our inbox and we sit there going, ‘What’s 
this? What’s this?’ So the idea of Commonwealth versus states is a bit too simplistic. There’s a 
bit of lateral line versus central. (Interview 25, Territory central department) 
However, many officials also take a more utilitarian view of intergovernmental agreements, 
and are dismissive of their normative aspirations.  For example, the competition and 
productivity reforms announced at the April COAG meeting were criticised because there were 
no resources provided for these collaborative endeavours: 
 It’s an IGA of principles. There’s no money attached. There’s no process attached. States and 
territories are generally quite cynical about intergovernmental agreements. There’s not much meat 
attached to them. It’s like every process: we try and work out where we’re going to win and fight 
our battles and things we’re just going to let go through to the keeper. (Interview 19, State central 
department) 
The collaborative tendencies noted earlier stemmed as much from a pragmatic desire to work 
                                                 
114 See, for example, Davis & Silver 2015; Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Australia) 2015; 
McQuestin 2014; Harwood and Phillimore 2012. 
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around this ongoing tension and deal with its implications for specific agreements than any 
philosophical commitment to the principles of federalism or subsidiarity.115  The problems in 
managing the agreements system are seen as problems of managing the boundaries between 
coalitions of rational interest, in so far as they play out in the practices associated with drafting 
agreements, ensuring they conform with guidelines and their provisions meet the executive’s 
requirements.  As a senior Commonwealth official put it: 
I have always felt that the worst thing you could do in a Commonwealth-state agreement was to 
have one level of government do something and the Commonwealth do another thing.  As soon 
as you’ve got a boundary, you’ve got boundary disputes, and that means you’ve got cost shifting. 
(Interview 41, Commonwealth line department) 
A third source of federal perceptions lies in the history, interests and issues that characterise 
particular policy sectors.  Officials who have worked with colleagues in other governments in 
a particular policy area over long periods, or at least intensively on a major policy process, are 
likely to view the whole system through the lens of that experience. Thus, for example, those 
officials who reported a successful process or outcome in one case tended to take a more 
optimistic view about collaboration overall and were more likely to describe their interest in 
finding ways to share evidence and data rather than finding ways to shore up their position.  
One state official was dismissive of the adversarial view of the policy formulation process that 
others saw as typical: 
you’ll get phone calls from your colleagues in Western Australia or New South Wales saying, 
‘We’re proposing to do something. Have you done this? What have you done?’ And there’s a 
view that you can share that with confidence, which is very important because it’s basically 
allowing policy formulation and policy development to develop in confidence. There isn’t an 
adversarial view generally. (Interview 35, State central department) 
In contrast, however, those working in policy fields characterised by a high degree of political 
salience and tension tended to hold more pessimistic views overall (suggesting that these 
philosophical frameworks have a temporal dimension and may change over time, particularly 
as perceptions are modified by the impact of other sources).  For example, infrastructure 
funding is a highly sensitive policy area because it is a key element in horizontal fiscal 
equalisation and an area in which the Commonwealth has significantly extended its control 
through funding agreements (see, for example, Pickernell et al. 2008). A Commonwealth 
                                                 
115 An example of the ‘pragmatic federalism’ Hollander and Patapan describe, characterised by ‘a direct 
engagement or confrontation with pressing problems, an engagement unmediated by larger theoretical concerns’ 
(2007, p. 281). 
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official expressed concern that a lack of collaboration over infrastructure announcements was 
generating intergovernmental tensions ‘which then permeate other Commonwealth-state 
discussions’.  
it encourages arguments between the two levels of government, because one level of government 
is seen as painting the other into a corner, they're going to be the baddies if this thing isn't 
delivered, because they're the ones that haven't come to the table.  (Interview 2, Commonwealth 
central department) 
Finally, the intergovernmental networks explored in Chapter Five are a fourth source of 
overarching ideas about the federal system.  Again, it is the experience officials have had with 
particular networks that colours these ideas, particularly because the management and 
maintenance of intergovernmental networks involves entrepreneurship and agency.  
Consequently, officials drawing on their networks for an idea of federalism in general tended 
to express more positive views about their role and the system generally than those officials 
whose ideas were prompted by other aspects of the system.   
At the most generalised level of thinking about the federal system, where intergovernmental 
relations and management are seen as separate but related domains of activity, relationships 
between officials are seen as a vital component of the system’s effectiveness: 
There’s a sort of planets aligning thing that when it works well, the officials’ structure and the 
MINCOs work really well together, regardless of the political complexion. Sometimes it’s a key 
relationship between a couple of ministers perhaps on the MINCO. It might be that there’s an 
alliance formed and a commitment to outcomes at the officials level as well so that they can work 
in harness together. Sometimes it’s despite the structures and the ministerial relationships that 
officials are determined to have something work. (Interview 21, Commonwealth line department) 
Many officials saw their networks as an embodiment of the separate bureaucratic space in 
which intergovernmental management operates, as described in Chapter 5.  An official closely 
involved with HEPA described it as 
the space where we actually say, ‘Actually, there’s no good or bad in any of this.’ Lift your gaze; 
there might be local personalities et cetera. But you can lift it all up so we can agree around how 
we communicate these things, what’s the language we use. (Interview 14, State line agency) 
6.3 Ideas about jurisdictional cultures and roles  
Officials’ ideas about the role their jurisdictions play in the federation, and the federal culture 
their individual jurisdiction displays, are an important influence on their practice and a guide 
to the appropriate exercise of agency. 
The interviewees described the role their jurisdictions play in the federation as more than just 
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instrumental responses to particular exogenous events.  Rather, officials felt they could identify 
a particular state’s federal ‘persona’ over time, as an overriding and consistent stance they and 
their colleagues adopted, that overrode individual organisational interests, and occasionally ran 
counter to the particular views of their political executives.  These jurisdictional personas were 
not always described in positive terms, particularly by colleagues observing such cultures from 
the perspective of other jurisdictions, although there was a remarkable congruence between the 
way officials described their own jurisdiction and how this was perceived from ‘outside’.  The 
one exception was the Commonwealth: it was difficult to discern a particular Commonwealth 
federal culture that could be distinguished from its role in particular structures and processes.  
(The significance of this finding will be discussed after the following analysis of the state and 
territory cultures.) 
As with the data on the federation’s structural factors, the interviews explored how these 
jurisdiction-specific cultures informed the interviewees’ individual strategic choices, and how, 
or why, these cultures went through trajectories of change.   
In terms of the most prevalent perceptions, New South Wales, because of its size, is seen as the 
go-to partner for national policy development.  This role, illustrated by the way New South 
Wales is always seated beside the Prime Minister at COAG, or beside the relevant 
Commonwealth minister in council meetings, is one that its own officials, and those in other 
states, recognise as a significant guide to the formation of their individual and organisational 
negotiating and networking strategies.  As one of its senior officials explained: 
There’s a bit of an element of what’s good for the nation is good for us, whereas if you were 
sitting in Tasmania, South Australia or Northern Territory, you might be much more in the world 
of saying, ‘Well, I get all that, but if I can shift the dial of my proportion of the action, that matters 
more for me sometimes than the national game.’  (Interview 10, State central department) 
The policy stance that emerges from this perception is that of being a contributor to the 
Commonwealth’s agenda, rather than an adversary, balancing the sub-national and national 
political agendas.  A Victorian official, sharing the view that the larger states have a role beyond 
simply pursing their own agendas, reiterated the idea of intergovernmental management as 
occupying a space of its own, distinct from the political agenda: 
We always reflect the views of our Premier, but both sides of politics have seen the role of Victoria 
and New South Wales through the lens of nation building.  What is often in our best interest might 
not be in everyone’s best interest.  It’s our job to play a role that the Commonwealth sometimes 
can’t in trying to bring some of our state and territory colleagues along with us on reform journeys. 
(Interview 19, State central department) 
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Such cooperation ‘has to be managed carefully’, as one official warned, given the risks of 
eroding the states’ capacity to push back against the Commonwealth’s domination of the policy 
agenda: 
New South Wales needs to make sure that we’re not either seen to be or actually just being a yes 
man for the Commonwealth. We could actually end up losing the support of our state and territory 
colleagues if we’re seen to be too much in cahoots with the Commonwealth. So that’s something 
that we’re consciously managing. (Interview 9, State central department) 
The opposite of the idea that a state is representative of a broader part of the national polity is 
the idea of its exceptionalism, based either on a jurisdiction’s particular characteristics or 
because of its policy leadership. Thus, although Victoria is second only to New South Wales 
in terms of its population and economic clout, Victoria sees itself — and has a reputation for 
— being less of a partner and more ‘bolshie’, as an official from another state put it: 
Victoria can afford to be out there. That’s the very nature of the jurisdiction. They’ve got a large 
population, they’ve got significant money. They can push things and afford to piss off the 
Commonwealth if they want. (Interview 31, State line agency).   
Again, these perceptions have an impact on the way state officials construe their jurisdictional 
interests, and consequently their negotiating and policy development stance.  ‘Victoria always 
thinks it’s the best at everything’ one official from the Commonwealth sneered, while a 
Victorian official described her state as being 
like that annoying very smart school kid who believes he always has the right answer, the best 
system and that nationally everyone should be - we take the principled approach et cetera, but 
we’re not necessarily the most popular because we don’t necessarily then get the good deal, which 
goes to factors that are important. Victoria’s persona has been very much about the nerdy school 
kid trying to do the good policy and maybe missing the trick on the ability to make the deals. 
(Interview 15, State line department) 
The idea that a state is ‘different’ can influence its negotiating stance in a number of ways.  It 
may result in a policy veto, as Western Australia is notorious for applying.  A state may resist 
efforts at harmonisation because that would mean a decline in what it perceives as its own 
higher standards, or simply signals its preference for pursuing its domestic agenda rather than 
being deflected to national (read ‘Commonwealth’) goals.  A ‘common Victorian refrain’, as 
one official from that state put it, is that the national agenda has a retrograde effect on its reform 
efforts.  In the area of harmonising policies on native vegetation, for example, a Victorian 
official argued: 
that would mean Victoria switches off all of that because New South Wales and Queensland, by 
comparison, don’t have all that much, Queensland very little now. So you end up harmonisation 
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is a foil for, ‘Well, we need not to switch a whole lot of stuff off here.’ (Interview 20, State line 
department)116 
Similarly, in relation to health funding, a Victorian official argued  
we put a lot of effort into reform only for the states that have not invested in this area to get all 
the money because they’re the ones who are further behind. Victoria has often felt that we have 
been punished. It’s first mover disadvantage. We’ve invested in our systems and we’re ahead of 
the game. Therefore, we don’t get our estimated per capita share of funding. (Interview 15, State 
line department) 
However, state exceptionalism can also mean, on the positive side, that it plays a leading role 
in policy development, trialling and implementation: 
what we try and foster as much as we can in all of our people is they feel they have the 
organisation’s backing not only to represent Victoria but to put on the table more interesting, 
innovative reform ideas.  (Interview 19, State central department) 
Ideas about the role of the smaller states are more complex than simply seeing them as passively 
accepting whatever the Commonwealth and one of the larger states have cooked up. South 
Australian officials, for example, see themselves — and are perceived by their colleagues in 
other states — as representatives of a bloc of smaller states who ‘punch above our weight’ 
because of their experience and initiative: 
We were seen as a mediating state between the east and the west and also between New South 
Wales and Victoria and Queensland. We brought a certain amount of comfort. We were seen as 
a sort of almost impartial party. (Interview 36, State line department)117 
This role for South Australia has led to it being perceived as a useful partner in particular policy 
development strategies and processes.  For example, officials from New South Wales and 
South Australia formed a partnership to work on policies relating to the GST, health and 
education, before these were discussed at COAG: 
There was a lot of analysis and rough thoughts and ideas that we were sharing bilaterally that we 
weren’t sharing with the other jurisdictions. We’d kind of use them as a critical friend. ‘Let’s 
make sure we understand what each other’s message is so that any response to that is informed.’ 
                                                 
116 A key example of such resistance to harmonisation is the perception by Western Australia and Victoria that it 
was not in their interests to adopt national model occupational health and safety and workers’ compensation laws 
that were originally foreshadowed in the National Partnership Agreement to Deliver a Seamless National 
Economy of 2008, on the grounds that (McClintock 2013, p. 68).   
117 In personal correspondence with me, a senior official from the Australian Capital Territory also described that 
jurisdiction as ‘punching above its weight in nearly every aspect of Commonwealth-State relations, whether it be 
at COAG and its supporting fora or the Council on Federal Financial Relations’.  He attributed this, at least in 
part, to the ACT’s unique circumstances as the national capital, home to the federal public service and partnership 
with the federal government in responsibility for the national institutions.  As a result, he noted that the Territory 
had made a rapid transition since it became self-governing in December 1988 to becoming a fully independent 
member of the federation (personal correspondence dated 12 April 2017). 
Chapter 6 
181 
(Interview 9, State central department) 
In the area of domestic violence policy a South Australian official compared her cooperative 
role with that of the Victorian tendency to being ‘bolshie’ noted above: 
That’s not the way we’ve done business. Because we’ve been in this space at the national level 
for a while we are sort of looked to as an ally, like someone you want to test things out with before 
things are floated in a bigger group. I get phone calls to say, ‘Look, just was wondering what 
you’re thinking about this, how we might want to play that?’ (Interview 31, State line agency) 
However, literally at the other end of the table from New South Wales, the Northern Territory’s 
officials struggle to resource an ongoing intergovernmental capacity.   
I’m always in the least powerful seat in the room, which is interesting: if you want to actually say 
anything and engage with the person who’s chairing the meeting, you need to lean sideways and 
talk on an angle. (Interview 22, Territory central department) 
This does not preclude them from playing an important role in policy development, because of 
the salience of indigenous policy for the territory, and because the rotating chairmanship of 
certain ministerial councils, supported by intergovernmental secretariats, gives them a capacity 
they could not support internally.   
In general, the strategies for smaller jurisdictions are based on a judicial choice of the areas in 
which they can best make a contribution, rather than being required to contribute overall.  As 
one senior official who had worked in South Australia put it, 
I was lot more selective in my contribution because you were a junior member, a relatively junior 
member, of the federation. It just meant that your contribution had to be unambiguously 
authoritative and well informed and persuasive, but you weren’t doing it as often as you would 
as New South Wales and Victoria. (Interview 18, State central department) 
Ideas about what role a state or territory should play in the federation may change over 
comparatively short periods, often because of changes to the political and fiscal environment. 
As a Victorian official recalled, the exigencies of budget repair and the need to maintain a 
domestic policy agenda changed her state’s federal culture: 
There was a culture from 2005-06 and then onwards to a declining degree, that Victoria saw itself 
as the state to set the agenda in terms of reform priorities. But the environment in which that plays 
out really affects it. At the time that we were seeking to lead a policy agenda, it was a very 
different fiscal environment, so we were dealing with a quite different Commonwealth 
government. Everybody had space to talk about policy reform. (Interview 17, State central 
department) 
These changes, as she describes them, lead to ‘very different conversations’, and officials play 
different roles in that conversation, with significant consequences for federal dynamics in 
Ideas, norms and values in intergovernmental management 
182 
changing the tone and the outcomes of intergovernmental relations. 
These changing ideas about a jurisdiction’s overall role in the federation presented one of the 
clearest examples of how officials thought about federal dynamics ‘from the inside’, as it were.  
Given the longevity such officials tend to display in their role, many of them were able to 
describe how these ideas, and the practices to which they gave rise, had followed trajectories 
of change.  For example, the relative roles played by New South Wales and Victoria have 
shifted over time, particularly as officials at the head of their respective Premiers’ Departments 
have brought in experience from working in the Commonwealth and/or other states.  Many 
officials recalled a time when Victoria led the push by the states for the National Reform 
Agenda in the mid 2000s, under the influence of its then head, Terry Moran, and a reformist 
Premier.118   
Victoria was the dominant player at the state level in the federation.  It was a deliberate attempt 
to position Steve Bracks as a national figure on the back of some very, very good work done at 
the state level. There was dysfunction in New South Wales from 2008 through to 2011 - the 
ineffectiveness of New South Wales in intergovernmental relations was apparent (Interview 18, 
State central department) 
The Victorian case highlights that ideas about what a state’s role should be, generated by the 
political executive or by senior central officials, often fuel the resources provided for specialist 
intergovernmental management units (rather than other way round, as the budget-maximising 
tenets of public choice theory would suggest).   
the type of resource I had in Victoria where they placed a high value on the intergovernmental 
work and in doing that really well compared to other jurisdictions was pretty significant. I had a 
branch of 20-plus people working on intergovernmental relations (Interview 16, State line 
department) 
These ideas about a jurisdiction’s role are not simply inherited or absorbed as organisational 
DNA; as with the ideas about the federal system overall, they are grounded in concrete federal 
structures and processes and change along with them.  Thus, for example, the notion of a ‘lead 
state’ is central to the way negotiations over agreements and the processes of policy 
harmonisation are conducted.  In developing major agreements, there are tactical advantages 
                                                 
118 Victoria’s leadership of the National Reform Agenda is detailed in Brumby (2009; see also Phillimore and 
Fenna 2017, p.605).  Other officials recalled that, under the anti-Commonwealth policies of the then Premier of 
Queensland, Bjelke-Petersen, they had very little freedom or ability to discuss, negotiate and exchange with other 
states, let alone the Commonwealth.  But that has probably changed and Queensland would probably be now seen 
as part of the eastern seaboard triumvirate of New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland. (Retired senior official, 
Interview 1) 
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for the Commonwealth to work with its selected lead state in terms of obtaining the necessary 
data, gaining intelligence and input on the issues that are likely to prove difficult, or simply to 
build a coalition of support.  From the states’ perspective, working as a lead state delivers early 
adopter benefits, such as concessions that are not available to other states when they sign up, 
or being able to shape the agreement in a way that suits the state that may not be available 
subsequently. 
One of the most important structural sources for these ideas about a state’s role lies in the 
history of particular policies as they are adopted and implemented by that state.  Over time, 
variation in approaches to policy and service delivery (particularly the degree to which a state’s 
services are centralised or decentralised) display path dependent characteristics that make them 
very hard to change, and a major obstacle to harmonisation and coordination.   
These individual policy histories can play a key role in determining when and how far a state 
may go in playing the lead state role, cooperating or applying a veto.  In the case of the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme, for example, interviewees involved in the scheme’s design 
described being confronted with a range of existing models and philosophies, ranging from 
Tasmania’s highly decentralised, low-level state involvement, through to New South Wales’ 
large investment in home-based care and institutional settings funded through the state 
government, with other states adopting a range of approaches in between these ends of the 
continuum. Officials were tasked with ensuring that the scheme could work for all jurisdictions 
despite these differences, giving the smaller states an equal say in its design. 
I think people often don’t acknowledge that the biggest states do often take a step back and 
actually think, ‘Well, if we want to make this work from a whole-of-country perspective, what do 
we have to step back a little bit from and what are the things do we need to actually do to 
encourage the smaller states to be part of this process?’ (Interview 19, State central department) 
The importance of consensus in COAG and ministerial council decision making more generally 
also gives the smaller jurisdictions more of a say than their size might otherwise dictate.  In the 
Heads of Treasury meetings, a Territory representative recalled 
I never felt that my view was passed over. It was a very collective group of people and although 
you’re always aware of the place of your jurisdiction, around the table there was never a sense of, 
‘Well, if you come from there, your idea’s not very good.’  (Retired senior official, Interview 1) 
Finally, as noted above it was difficult to detect a clear Commonwealth ‘culture’ in the way 
state and territory officials could discern and describe theirs.  One reason for this may simply 
be a matter of size – most state officials only get to deal with a small part of the Commonwealth 
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bureaucracy and are less able to perceive a general Commonwealth culture.   
A view by state bureaucrats that the Commonwealth is arrogant, intrusive, and uninterested in 
good faith negotiation and collaboration permeates particular policy sectors and programs.  For 
example, the requirement to design a common approach to the National Disability Insurance 
Scheme, given the variety of state arrangements mentioned above, may have resulted in a 
perception by the state officials that the Commonwealth was imposing a solution: 
the goodwill has, as I said, evaporated, particularly with NDIS where we thought at the time going 
into it was a genuine national Commonwealth-state partnership. It’s no secret what we think here 
in Victoria: it’s a Commonwealth takeover and a very Commonwealth-driven approach to a 
welfare entitlement as opposed to an insurance model. (Interview 19, State central department) 
Many state officials felt there was a culture of blocking initiatives and innovation at the 
Commonwealth level.119  The sources of this culture lie, first, in what is perceived as a 
generalised inertia, with no overarching direction for reform, particularly when seen in 
comparison with Prime Ministers who were prepared to use the federal system to drive 
reformist agendas.  Second, change is seen as being more deliberately prevented in particular 
policy areas where the Commonwealth government has sensitivities, such as climate change:  
at the federal level is there’s a pecking order and the environment is well down the pecking order. 
So you can’t do anything controversial because you’ll get jumped all over, whereas at state level, 
it doesn’t feel that hierarchical. It’s more about who gets to be bold and do big changes. (Interview 
13, State line agency) 
As for the future, when asked about a collaborative approach on data exchange with the 
Commonwealth, a state official was sceptical: 
I’m not sure there’s a bureaucratic culture of approaching state governments in that way at a 
Commonwealth level. And I think we’d probably have to own up to a reasonable degree of 
suspicion when we were dealing with that kind of response. That does come back to vertical fiscal 
imbalance and the kind of negotiating context we’ve had to date. (Interview 17, State central 
department) 
6.4 The ‘practice modes’ of intergovernmental management 
So far, this chapter has explored the sources and diversity of officials’ ideas about the federal 
system and how such ideas provide the basis for their intergovernmental practice.  However, 
                                                 
119 These findings support the survey reported by Arklay et.al. which found that Commonwealth officials are more 
positive about their interaction with their state colleagues than state respondents are about interacting with federal 
officials, and state officials are also more positive about interacting with other states and territories than they are 
about their interactions with federal officials (2017, p. 111). 
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the research also tested the manner and extent to which these ideas affected the practice of 
intergovernmental management. 
It would be all too easy to assume that these perceptions and ideas constrain individual agency, 
leaving intergovernmental management in a difficult, adversarial situation overall. The 
interview data, however, reveals complex, overlapping narratives and discourses that suggest 
at least the possibility of a systemic capability for incremental improvement and individual 
entrepreneurship, even if overall change in the federal system is glacial and highly exposed to 
political interests and dynamics.  Moreover, most of those working in intergovernmental 
management have enough longevity in the role and mobility across jurisdictions to know that 
ideas, norms and values change, sometimes quickly.  Consequently, the actions and strategies 
they adopt in response to a given situation are more varied, and the choices as to where and 
how they exercise their agency are wider than concepts of structural or cultural determinism 
might suggest. 
In line with discursive analysis techniques, the interviews put the individual practitioners at the 
heart of the analysis of policy change by closely examining how they performed the tasks of 
intergovernmental management, and why they chose to do so in those ways.  The interviews 
invited them to define the policy problems with which they were confronted; how they thought 
about the issues involved; what options they felt were available to them, what strategies they 
adopted, and upon what values and norms those strategies were based.  Such discourse, 
particularly in so far as officials try to work with and influence one another, is indispensable 
for understanding the nature of policy change generally and, more specifically, the role of 
intergovernmental management in federal dynamics (Zittoun 2009, p. 67).120 
The interviews were coded accordingly, paying particular attention to linked metaphors and 
themes that individual officials tended to use repeatedly as a way of making sense of their 
complex policy environment.121   
A set of five distinct and coherent ‘practice modes’ of intergovernmental management emerged 
from the textual analysis.  Time and again, officials would bring the interview back to particular 
                                                 
120 As summarised by Zittoun, discourse analysis ‘attempt[s] to reintegrate the subject, in this case the participant, 
into the heart of the analysis of policy change by taking into account not only the way a problem is constituted, 
but also the way a policy is defined. The actor’s discourse is considered to be the indispensable link which allows 
policy change to be understood’(2009, p. 67). 
121 The coding scheme I employed is detailed at Appendix A. 
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structures, processes or events that brought their role into sharp relief; they would do so using 
characteristic examples and metaphors that were distinct and very different from one another 
in describing options and approaches in the standard operating procedures of intergovernmental 
management.   
As summarised in Table 6 that is appended at the end of this chapter, these practice modes 
differentiate how officials relate to and apply their ideas and values about federalism generally 
to their work; how they adapt to their formal and informal context; and the processes by which 
officials rationalise their behaviours and the outcome of their behaviours to themselves and 
their colleagues.  Practice modes are lenses through which individuals perceive or recognise 
opportunities, and then ways in which such opportunities are exploited or used through the 
adoption of strategies and behaviours.122  
It bears repeating, at this point, that these are not Myers-Briggs type personality indicators, or 
behaviours that individual officials consistently adopt whatever the context.  Although officials 
tend to adopt a preferred, or dominant, ‘practice mode’ based on their broader perceptions of 
the federal system, the role of their jurisdiction, and their understanding of how a particular 
policy problem or issue should be dealt with, this is not locked in.  They characteristically adopt 
other approaches when the context or problem is different, or when the formal and informal 
settings suggest other strategies.  It may be more useful, then, to think of these practice modes 
as a palette of strategies, or, in Schmidt’s terminology, ‘policy solutions’; that is, ideas, values 
and norms about the federal system that legitimate, guide and shape their work in a given policy 
context. 
Accordingly, the following sections outline these dominant practice modes or roles that 
officials tend to adopt, given a particular context, process and problem of intergovernmental 
management.   
6.4.1 ‘We held the line’: partisanship 
Partisanship shares with the following practice modes the notion of intergovernmental 
management as a separate policy space; however, the partisan perception is, first, that this space 
is severely constrained by the adversarial politics of intergovernmental relations; and, second, 
                                                 
122 My use of the term is linked to a broader theoretical focus on ‘practice’ that has emerged over the last two 
decades, that links wider social structures and institutions (in this case federalism) to meaningful established 
patterns of organisational behaviour and activity (eg Thornton et al 2012).  Importantly, this body of work also 
sees practice as the locus for shifts in institutional settings and directions (Thornton et al 2012, p. 129). 
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that this has noticeably deteriorated over time.  For example, one official used the metaphor of 
seating at ministerial councils and senior officials’ meetings to tell its own story: 
eight years ago, if we went to a ministerial council, the ministerial adviser was actually on the 
table behind. So next to the minister was the senior bureaucrat. And then probably about five 
years ago we went to our first ministerial council meeting where next to the minister as well as 
the senior bureaucrat was their adviser. I think that’s a change and we will get more into it being 
very political and the decisions being based on politics. (Interview 36, State line department) 
The key concern for this practice mode is adversarial bargaining, based on a perception of the 
federal system as an arena for playing out different interests, particularly where there are 
clashes and disagreements between jurisdictions.  Intergovernmental management is seen as a 
zero-sum game in terms of resources and interests. 
The factors that are important to us are getting as much money out of the Commonwealth as 
possible; policy autonomy, which is us as a state deciding what’s the best way to achieve the 
investment outcome; concepts around state sovereignty as well which play out in how much 
reporting we’re going to do. (Interview 15, State Line Department) 
The structures in which partisanship comes to the fore as a practice mode tend to be the highest 
level formal meetings and negotiation processes, such as COAG, Ministerial councils and big 
funding negotiations.  The venues and processes of bargaining are at the forefront of how the 
federal system is perceived through this discursive lens and form its core concerns.  As this 
official sees it, the purpose of getting together with one’s colleagues is not to develop an 
evidence base or a community of experts, but as a protective device: 
I’ll call a meeting of my colleagues in other states and territories and we’ll have a discussion, so 
what do we need to do to get across the line to get a shared view, because the Commonwealth, 
they’ve got tried and true tricks, like trying to divide and conquer and do other things. (Interview 
5, State line department) 
This mode reflects the concerns of rational choice theory, with its emphasis on how strategic 
choices are constrained by an exogenous set of preferences and interests.  Not surprisingly, 
then, the practices coded as partisan involved noticeably fewer instances of personal agency 
and impact than those coded against the other modes; when officials talk about adopting this 
mode, it is often couched in agonistic terms, such as this official’s description of how and why 
they ‘stood up to’ the Commonwealth: 
We got this grant to implement the multifunction polis. I was looking at the numbers: ‘Where’s 
our $4 million?’ And we didn’t get $4 million because the Commonwealth needed a million to 
oversight the $4 million. I found it amusing at the time because it was very political. I actually 
rang up the Commonwealth (Interview 34, State line department) 
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At the highest level of coordinative discourse in which officials are thinking about the system 
as a whole, partisans tend to focus on the zero sum nature of fiscal federalism, the disbenefits 
of vertical fiscal imbalance, and the implications of this for accountability and performance 
management.  For example, a senior Commonwealth official described the length of time it 
had taken to negotiate the provision of data on school performance via a public website (despite 
party congruence between the states and Commonwealth), seeing this as an outcome of the 
states’ inherent interest in protecting performance data from Commonwealth scrutiny: 
I’m cynical about focusing on outcomes and just letting the states rip because they’re not going 
to tell you unless you really, really, really force them. And if you really, really force them, you 
have to put it in the agreement from the start, and they don’t like that, understandably. (Interview 
41, Commonwealth line department) 
The ‘free rider’ issue is a key trope in the partisanship approach to policy issues.  For example, 
this official describes her jurisdiction’s achievements in deriving efficiencies in education less 
as a potential resource for the system as a whole (as would the ‘policy drivers’ described below) 
than as another example of free riding: 
We’re operating up here a system that’s operating on $30 million or $40 million less than it was 
four or five years ago per year. We have just had the best set of outcomes in the Northern 
Territory’s history in terms of the number of year 12 graduates and average task scores. It’s not 
rocket science. Some of these other jurisdictions will keep arguing that they need more and more 
and more. My own view about this is they haven’t actually had to stand back and say, ‘What are 
we going to take out?’ They haven’t had to do the hard yards. (Interview 29, Territory line 
department) 
A Commonwealth official had a similar understanding of the drivers behind asbestos removal 
policy, basing this on the risks of cost shifting endemic to such a highly centralised system of 
fiscal federalism: 
the minister didn’t have concerns because the work that we were putting forward wasn’t good; it 
was because it could be interpreted that the Commonwealth was going to step up and do more, 
which would then allow the states and territories to step back. That would mean they wouldn’t 
have to manage the risk.  The state governments would be very happy for the Commonwealth 
government to fund that problem and try and resolve it.  (Interview 39, Commonwealth line 
agency) 
The partisanship mode assumes that intergovernmental cooperation is driven by money; unlike 
the networking and policy-driving modes, officials who adopt this mode assume there are few 
other incentives for governments to work together, as summed up by this official’s view of 
their state taking a policy lead:  
if we had an agenda we wanted to lead, we’d probably just lead it for our state. What do we gain? 
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It’s always interesting talking to other states: ‘What are you doing?’ But it’s not like we need to 
join up with them on a lot of these issues. why we would take on an issue nationally ourselves is 
that it would have to be something that we get payoff for from involvement of the Commonwealth 
and other states. (Interview 8, state central department) 
Consequently, a partisanship perspective tends to advocate the ‘clean boundaries’ approach of 
coordinate federalism, which informed the Abbott government’s federal reform objective to 
‘ensure that, as far as possible, the States and Territories are sovereign in their own sphere’ 
(Australian Government 2014, p. v).  One official had an interesting metaphor for this 
approach: 
the Commonwealth see themselves as the private school kids, and the States and Territories are 
public school kids.  And they're not really going to play with us unless they have to.  (Interview 
3, State line agency) 
Partisanship strategies aim to establish coalitions of interest, based on coalescent jurisdictional 
interests and the need to prevent the Commonwealth from making bilateral deals which will 
naturally disadvantage other states.   
The craft of intergovernmental management in the partisanship mode is motivated by and 
embodied in strategies of benefit maximisation for one’s jurisdiction or department.  In 
describing how she ended up working in intergovernmental management for a decade, an 
official ascribed this to the fact that  
This was my thing. It crystallised all the things that I really like to do, which was plot and plan 
how to get the maximum benefits from situations that I was in. (Interview 34, State line 
department) 
Personal agency is mandated by the political executive’s directions, and is expressed as 
‘playing hardball’, such as advising ministers about how to take on the Commonwealth or the 
states as adversaries, or ‘holding the line’(itself a militaristic metaphor) in terms of how tied 
and untied funding is allocated or performance reporting agreed. 
We try to hold the line in the design of tied grants and in the maintenance of our untied grants the 
way they exist. We spend a lot of time trying to do that. (Interview 17, State central department) 
The partisanship mode assumes that an official’s role in finding or developing policy 
‘solutions’, the lowest level of coordinative discourse Schmidt delineates, is about defending 
turf and building interest coalitions.  One official described her role in negotiating a national 
partnership agreement on education using the metaphor of ‘the line’ again: 
We ran a state and territory process where we basically got states and territories to agree a state 
and territory position. We held the line and held the line and held the line (Interview 15, State line 
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department) 
Building networks is not described as a goal in itself, as the networking mode described below 
tends to do; rather, networks are primarily for gathering intelligence about the deployment of 
interests: 
You’ve got to be vigilant in that Commonwealth-state relationship, really, really vigilant. You 
must go into it with your eyes open. You have to work on the relationships with the Australian 
government officials, so you have to know the people you’re talking to and understand where 
they’re coming from and what their imperatives are. You’ve got to put a bit of work into that. 
(Interview 29, Territories line department) 
6.4.2 ‘The most important part of a COAG is the dinner’: networking 
The networking mode is the counter-practice to the partisan mode.  Unlike the latter’s emphasis 
on adversarial bargaining, this value set is focused on building relationships and trust.  The 
networking mode aims to work around the conflicts that the partisan mode sees as intrinsic to 
intergovernmental management; networking tends to be dismissive of the hierarchies and 
formalities that, as I will show below, the agreement-making and processing modes welcome, 
or at least are prepared to adopt for their purposes.  Unlike the other modes’ adoption of 
negotiation and bargaining, formal agreements and formal systems and processes for issue 
resolution, networking aims to avoid issues arising in the first place or, once they have arisen, 
to find solutions in lateral relationships.123   
The networking mode tends to emphasise the collegiality that prevails across the bureaucracy, 
outside particular negotiation processes, rather than seeing the role of officials as simply to 
represent opposing sides in the federal process. 
One state central agency official highlighted the networking mode’s focus on people rather 
than structures: 
Even if your structures aren’t great, if you have the right players around the room and the right 
relationships and the right windows of political opportunity to do various things, if you have those 
ingredients - that actually is more important than whether you have the right structures in place. 
Structures only get you so far. (Interview 22, State central agency) 
Consequently, rather than the partisan view that politics is intruding on the bureaucracy, 
                                                 
123 In terms of coding frequencies, there was a clear distinction between officials I associated with the partisan 
mode and those who tended to display a networking mode.  The former mentioned Commonwealth-state 
disagreements on 30 occasions, the latter only 3 across the entire range of interviews.  However, while those 
focused on networking mentioned ‘communications between jurisdictions’ as the main problem they saw in 
Commonwealth-state relations, this was ranked as a comparatively minor problem by those working in the partisan 
mode (coded 8 times). 
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networking practice tries to reverse the process by pushing political executives into the same 
networked mode: 
the first thing I did with my minister when we took over was to get him to get out and network 
nationally. So he met with [the Commonwealth minister] as the chair of the ministerial council. 
He met with the chair of Education Australia. He met with the chair of the early childhood group. 
He met with the chair of the curriculum council. (Interview 29, Territory line department) 
The structures most conducive to networking tend to be epistemic communities, regular 
meetings of experts and the supporting frameworks for ministerial councils and working 
groups.  These networks provide a source for the agency of participant officials and the locus 
of its exercise.  Unlike the war stories that reflect the exercise of partisanship, agency in the 
networking mode focuses on relationships or network building, and how these were used to 
find ways to avoid disagreements, to just ‘pick up the phone’ to sort something out, or to 
facilitate policy projects and information gathering.   
The priority of personal relationships for the networking mode is evidenced by the fact that its 
practitioners often have to overcome considerable opposition to the introduction of a network-
building discourse to an organisation or policy area where it is not widely supported, requiring 
significant personal resilience and effort, as noted in section 4.3.3 above.   
The relationship networking has with formal structures and processes is ambiguous.  While 
networking, officials are conscious of the importance of the formal settings, but are also 
looking for ways through or around the formal structures to achieve their aims.  For example, 
in setting up an asbestos policy working group where there were no existing national 
governance structures, one official began by developing a network, despite the lack of a formal 
role for the Commonwealth: 
I spoke to the Commonwealth Department of Environment and asked them, ‘Geez, it would be 
so much easier if I had a senior officials meeting I could connect to.’ And they never said, ‘Well, 
you need to go to HEPA.’ It just didn’t occur to them. I went, ‘Okay, I’m going to work with a 
working group approach and I want to take forward the ideas that come out of your research,’ and 
they said, ‘Yeah, we agree.’ Basically I just used peer pressure to get people to participate. 
(Interview 39, Commonwealth line agency)  
Even at the most senior levels of the intergovernmental bureaucracy, networking officials give 
priority to what is happening on the margins of formal COAG and council meetings as well as 
in the room itself. 
The most important part of a COAG SOM or a COAG is the dinner.  You can say anything. Hats 
are partially off; they’re never completely off. But if it’s a big meeting the next day, there might 
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be a more formal dinner in terms of, ‘Okay, now where have we really got concerns and 
whatever?’ It might be just a genuine convivial social get together with people who face similar 
problems in different jurisdictions. Or it can be when there’s not much on the agenda, ‘Look, let’s 
just shoot the breeze and think about what’s really going to be happening in this space.’ (Interview 
10, State central department) 
Rather than the systemic outputs that mark progress for the processing or agreement-making 
modes, or the overarching outcomes that policy-driving aims for, the networking mode is 
focused on policy design and delivery as a specific network output.  The policy goals to which 
networks supply the means involve what Howlett refers to as ‘less abstract’ objectives expected 
to achieve very high level outcomes (2009, p. 74); in other words, they are policy instruments 
directed to particular intermediate policy goals.  For example, a state environmental regulator 
described the purpose of a nascent network on chemicals as the development of a national 
understanding of the risks:  
what do we need to do to address the chemical risks, what do we need to know? How are we 
going to inform our ministers, do we need further regulation, so on and so on? (Interview 12, 
State line agency) 
The purpose of networks, in this networking mode, is couched in terms of the early stages of 
the policy cycle, such as policy incubation, prioritisation, issues identification and information 
exchange, rather than higher level goals such as policy harmonisation.  Networks for them are 
places where 
the background work that needs to happen to be able to test those ideas and to know where you’re 
likely to have the different perspectives coming from and being able to ensure that you are giving 
an appropriate amount of time to the range of different stakeholders to come to some resolution 
and what that might be. (Interview 28, Territory line department) 
Networks are seen as opportunities to defuse or deflect potential conflict.  As distinct from the 
partisan mode’s focus on the end game of policy negotiations, networking uses networks as 
opportunities to reduce information asymmetry, to signal one’s own jurisdiction’s position and 
to receive intelligence about other jurisdictions’ positions, working through them until 
consensus is potentially found, or at least there is enough of a joint understanding of the issue 
to take it back to formal negotiations.  For example, HEPA emerged from the absence of a 
formal structure following the abolition of the ministerial council on the Environment, because 
a number of EPA heads felt they 
HEPA can be the space where we actually say, ‘Actually, there’s no good or bad in any of this.’ 
Lift your gaze; there might be local personalities et cetera. But you can lift it all up so we can 
agree around how we communicate these things, what’s the language we use. Are we using or 
adopting US standards or European standards? They’re very different. Why are they very 
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different? (Interview 14, State line agency) 
Finally, the networks that form laterally between central and line department officials have an 
important effect on the dynamics of the relationships between central and line department 
officials discussed above.  This networking practice contributes a great deal to the tendency, 
noted in the ‘traditional’ view of this divide, for central departments and line departments to 
form coalitions across jurisdictional lines: 
we’re finding with Commonwealth Treasury, we’ve got a really good network functioning at the 
national partnership level. Through that we gain more and more of an understanding that the 
Commonwealth Treasury officials are sort of looking out for us and pushing back wherever they 
can. (Interview 25, Territory central department) 
Other modes, however, push officials in different directions, another reason for my querying 
whether the traditional view of line/central alliances still holds (see the discussion at Chapter 
4.5.1).  The partisan mode, for example, is more likely to aim at the formation of central-line 
alliances within, rather than across, jurisdictions to shore up their bargaining positions and 
strategies.   
6.4.3 ‘A whole new language’: agreement-making 
This intergovernmental management practice is based on the formal intergovernmental 
agreements and their supporting processes.  A key difference between this practice and the 
partisan mode lies in its downplaying of the importance of ‘sides’: what is important is ensuring 
that the principles and aspirations embodied in formal agreements are upheld.   
As this official demonstrates, this practice mode is premised on the view that a clash of interests 
is endemic to the system, but the exercise of stewardship will help individual negotiations and 
agreements move towards meeting the framework’s aspirations: 
The agreement-making mode is derived from a highly normative view of the separate 
intergovernmental space, expecting intergovernmental agreements to embody norms, as well 
as specific terms.  Agreements set the directions and tone for the whole system, reflecting, in 
terms of the three levels of coordinative discourse, a higher level set of framework values which 
colours particular policy problems and solutions.  This perspective distinguishes agreement-
making from the other modes described in this chapter, which focus on more specific dynamics 
and trajectories of particular policy problems and solutions.   
The IGA FFR has a preeminent status because of its aspirations and overarching guidance on 
drafting agreements generally.  For example, a Commonwealth central department official 
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described herself as a ‘huge fan’ of the IGA FFR:   
I think it's a really beautiful, well thought out, cohesive policy. It is not perfect.  But it has survived 
for this many years when people thought it wouldn't, despite the changing political makeup of 
Commonwealth and state governments, despite the changing fiscal environment, despite different 
policy agendas (Interview 1, Commonwealth central department) 
Consequently, the agreement-making mode focuses on defections from the spirit of the IGA 
FFR as a key problem with the federal system: 
It’s challenging to make progress on the disconnect between the policy framework that we 
ostensibly have in place and the practice of individual negotiations which frequently strays from 
that. At a portfolio level there can be quite reasonable reasons for state bureaucrats and state 
ministers to be really keen to strike individual agreements because they have portfolio objectives. 
In aggregate, what that means is we have a range of agreements that don’t really look the way we 
foresaw at the time we drafted inside that overarching framework in the IGA. (Interview 17, State 
central department)124 
Of the five modes, this is the one most clearly shared between a self-defined group of officials, 
across organisations and jurisdictions, who are responsible for a discrete group of tasks in 
intergovernmental management; in this case, the central agencies responsible for agreement 
negotiations and maintenance.125  Officials specialising in agreement-making tend to think of 
themselves as a guild, keepers of a distinct art that their colleagues rely on them to practise: 
when I start talking about VFI and HFE and how does that fit in and how’s the IGA on FFR fit 
with the new IGA they’re developing on competition reform and what the sorts of things that we 
need to get,’ they kind of look at me blankly and go, ‘All right, so do you think that’s a good deal? 
Should we sign it?’ And I’m like, ‘Wow.’ It’s a whole new language and world. (Interview 5, 
State line department) 
The intergovernmental management practices characterised in agreement-making emphasise 
systemic ‘guardianship’ and the provision of guidance to other organisations in the federal 
system.  When these officials reflect on the impact they have had on the system, they tend to 
talk of their work as a mixture of art and science in the design of agreements, or ‘problem 
solving in a way that suits everybody’.  Problem-solving as a way of contributing to the federal 
system motivates these officials, rather than reaching a specific policy outcome that is the focus 
of the policy drivers discussed below.  Problems are solved deductively, using the overarching 
agreement framework to find a solution, rather than looking for it in the specific context as 
                                                 
124 Note the echoes here of Warhurst’s ‘iron rods’ discussed at Chapter 2.2.2 above. 
125 I note an interesting correspondence here with the concept of a socio-technological ‘regime’, a rule base 
embedded in institutions ‘providing orientation and co-ordination to the activities of relevant actor groups’ (Geels 
2002, p. 1259).  Pesch (2015) builds on this concept by exploring the nature of such regimes as discursive spaces 
and the role ‘regime actors’ play in managing conflicting meanings and tasks in those spaces. 
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policy drivers, processors and partisans tend to do. 
Intergovernmental agreements provide a very clear mandate for their agency, and a process for 
its exercise.  Protecting the agreement-making process is a paramount aim, even to the extent 
that this may require pushing back against the prevailing political direction, as one state official 
recalled in the context of the Prime Minister’s Department taking over responsibility for 
Indigenous policy.   
Being around in the agreement space for a long time, I know which sorts of things you actually 
have to really drive home.  I can say, ‘Look, I’ve never seen an agreement like this before. This 
smells to high heaven. Go away and think again about it.’ So with that experience and that sort of 
track record, you can actually say those kinds of things. (Interview 34, State line department) 
By comparison with officials working in the other practice modes who describe their impact in 
terms of a specific policy process, when officials talk about their role in agreement-making 
they focus on delivering systemic improvements.  For example, an official from a small 
jurisdiction took the initiative in attempting to change the cumbersome method of reviewing 
agreements: 
We’ve been saying every year for five years, ‘Please renew this agreement because of these 
reasons.’ So we decided, ‘Let’s change this and really highlight what the issue is here: that we’re 
operating in a policy vacuum and we have been for some years now and we need some sort of 
direction and we need serious consideration for more permanent arrangements for these sectors.’ 
(Interview 25, Territory central department) 
The normative aspects of agreement-making inflect their understanding of how the 
relationships between central and line departments work.  As noted at Chapter 4.5.2, central 
agency officials consider it an important part of their role to collaborate with one another across 
the Commonwealth-states divide to persuade or negotiate with their own jurisdiction’s line 
department officials to get them over the line to an agreement.  Part of the problem lies in the 
line departments’ relative unfamiliarity with the agreements framework and what it is trying to 
achieve.  As a result,  
They're engineers, or scientists that work in the middle of nowhere.  They don’t understand what 
the difference between an outcome and an output is.  So somebody will draft an agreement and it 
will have a lot of these problems, they don't follow the template, they mix up outcomes and 
outputs, they include input controls - which we can't have. (Interview 1, Commonwealth central 
department) 
The solution lies in cross-jurisdictional liaison between central agency officials.  Consequently, 
central department officials spend a lot of time in meetings and teleconferences talking through 
issues and explaining how the framework works (one central agency official was renowned 
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across jurisdictions for carrying a copy of the IGA FFR in her handbag).  They will often meet 
at the outset of an agreement process to explain the steps involved and to ensure they get to see 
draft agreements.  However, they often complain that, although they are supposed to be the 
‘gatekeepers’, as one official described it, many agreements come to them for checking too late 
in the process.    
6.4.4 ‘Anyone else could step into this role and perform it similarly’: 
processing 
The processing practice mode focuses on means, rather than ends, in distinction to the ‘policy-
driving’ mode I will discuss next.  The processing mode is based on the premise that good 
processes allow outcomes, which are vague and unpredictable, to look after themselves.  
Similarly, as distinct from the networking mode, the processing mode prioritises good 
processes over good relationships.   
As the quote in the section title suggests, highlighting process downplays the role of personal 
agency.  The processing mode focuses on the efficiency and integrity of processes, rather than 
the attainment of outcomes.  For example, an official described applying his expert knowledge 
to ensuring that meetings were efficiently run: 
In chairing, in directing the meetings, in driving some consensus, doing the pre-work to make 
sure that as much as possible agreement had been arrived at before the meetings took place, 
making sure that my minister was well briefed about other issues that jurisdictions may have had 
nationally. (Interview 29, Territory line department) 
Similarly, another official talked about an episode he felt exemplified his personal impact by 
recalling an orderly sequence of policy development (rather than pointing to its outcome): 
I had come up with a few ideas on how (health funding) could be distributed. It had been well 
tested. I then identified a variant to the options that had been tried. I rang around all jurisdictions 
and said, ‘Off the record, what are your thoughts on this one?’ But I did talk to the Deputy 
Secretary beforehand saying that I was going to have the conversations. (Interview 9, State central 
department)126 
The processing mode is often described in terms of the similarities between such work and 
other standard forms of executive governance, comparing getting a good outcome at COAG to 
getting a good outcome at cabinet meetings.  Managers personally intervene to fix problems, 
to test positions beforehand, to ensure there are no surprises for the political leaders.  By 
                                                 
126 The caveat at the end of this quote points to the characteristic muted role for personal agency this mode exhibits, 
which I will discuss shortly. 
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contrast with the partisan and agreement-making modes that pay close attention to the 
individual nuances of a specific meeting and its outputs, processing typically downplays the 
importance of the individual characteristics of such processes, emphasising adherence to the 
rules-in-use: 
Ministerial meetings themselves are rituals. Everyone knows what’s going to happen and 
everyone knows what their position has been. That’s all been negotiated beforehand. I’ve done a 
good job if I have taken steps to ensure that there are no surprises for either my secretary or my 
minister, and I’ve taken steps to either negotiate to a consensus or to have gathered the intel 
(Interview 15, State line department) 
As with the networking mode, but for different reasons, the processing mode tries to avoid the 
partisan nature of intergovernmental bargaining, preferring to work on incremental 
collaboration in policy development.  One official saw these differing practices and roles as 
requiring different rules: 
the other side, the intergovernmental agreement, was much more conflictual and done by 
economics people and the more treasury-type people. We spent a fair bit of time trying to build a 
culture where we had a trusted relationship with [the states] on the design. We ran them quite 
separately, so it was really clear that there were different conversations happening and that the 
rules were different. (Interview 26, Commonwealth line department) 
In terms of the problems that arise in intergovernmental management, agreement-making is 
concerned about defections from the spirit of the agreements framework, the partisan mode 
about a clash of interests and networking about difficulties in building and maintaining 
relationships.  The processing mode is focused on fixing poor processes.  Consequently, the 
patient backroom slog of data gathering and evidence building is seen as the context for 
incremental change to the relevant processes.  For example, an official noted that her minister 
had been very keen to secure funding for early childhood services in the context of a national 
partnership agreement.  However, she sought a mandate to ‘do better’ on what her department 
thought was a ‘bad deal’, through the development of a state consensus 
a lot of detailed work, understanding what the issues are and then what the options were to achieve 
an agreed approach. There were like A3 tables with lots of text on them. We were in [the 
Department of Premier and Cabinet] and we worked with our line agency to develop up those 
options and then we shopped it around to jurisdictions individually and then together. (Interview 
15, State line department) 
The processing mode views fiscal federalism through the same lens, prioritising the systemic 
impact of poor processes for which both sides are held responsible: 
The thing which is most frustrating and most difficult to deal with is when a government - and it 
can be either the Commonwealth or it can be a state or territory government - makes an 
Ideas, norms and values in intergovernmental management 
198 
announcement contingent on funding being provided by the other level of government, where 
they set out the quantum of funding and exactly what the project's going to be for, and do that 
without any consultation with the other party.  Both levels of government are guilty of doing that. 
(Interview 2, Commonwealth central department) 
As I have noted, giving pre-eminence to process tends to downplay the role of personal agency.  
Together with agreement-making and partisan modes, the processing mode sees the source of 
individual agency in external authority and mandate rather than personal autonomy (as the 
policy-driving mode does.  The following comment from a senior Commonwealth official was 
typical of this view:   
I’ve never seen the role I perform as having a personal level of input. I know that sounds a bit 
deflating in a way, but I’ve never seen that as a professional part of the role. Anyone else could 
step into this role and, if they’re competent, they should perform it similarly. At the end of the 
day, if you’re operating on the basis of evidence-based policy and just addressing things on their 
merits, things tend to play out in a similar sort of way regardless of who’s in the role. (Interview 
27, Commonwealth line department) 
Similarly, a senior official involved in negotiations with the Commonwealth over water 
legislation described their role — ‘one of the ones I’m proudest of from a state perspective’ — 
in hierarchical terms: 
I was taking matters to [state government] cabinet and getting for negotiating positions that we 
were taking.  Q. Where did you get that degree of autonomy? Was that by virtue of your level 
of seniority? A. It was more authority than autonomy. I was the lead New South Wales 
representative on the relevant intergovernmental committee. So it was delegated to me to lead it. 
(Interview 23, State line agency) 
The importance the processing mode ascribes to the legitimation of work through structures 
and processes comes through very clearly when officials are thinking about the formal 
structures of the federation.  Rather than viewing formal structures and processes as a 
frustrating, bureaucratic brake, as is the case for the policy-driving mode described in the next 
section, the processing mode considers structures as particularly conducive to its application. 
It’s about decisions. There’s always a communique, and when you get a bunch of ministers 
together, they want to be seen to be effective at making decisions. So the whole bureaucratic 
machine that sits beneath that aligns itself to make sure that things happen. The momentum that 
the ministers meeting creates drives action within the various jurisdictions. So it’s just that 
gravitational pull. (Interview 14, State line agency) 
In terms of the dynamics between central and line departments, it should not be assumed that 
the processing mode is more prevalent in line agencies.  As Table 4 indicates, the adoption of 
the processing mode was almost evenly distributed between central and line departments.     
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The emphasis on processing does, however, affect the perceptions officials have for one 
another across this divide.  Central department officials often complain that their line 
department colleagues don’t understand the importance of good process: 
At one stage we did some work on overlapping duplication between the Commonwealth and the 
states. The interesting thing I found was in the line agencies, they didn’t really see there was 
overlap and duplication and unnecessary paperwork and all that sort of stuff. The comments were, 
‘Well, we have to put this all together to get the money.’ (Interview 35, State central department). 
Conversely, many line department officials felt they were the guardians of good process in 
their particular policy field:  
If you’re good at policy, you’re good at policy; so you can just go anywhere, whereas a lot of 
people think that regulation is the act of making regulations, whereas the rest of us see it as the 
act of executing regulations. What it boils down to I think, particularly at the Commonwealth 
level, is there’s a lot of talk. There’s not a lot of enforcement being the focus.  (Interview 13, State 
line agency) 
6.4.5 ‘I’m going to Canberra to talk to them’: policy-driving 
The management practices and the personal agency policy-driving brings to the fore are about 
breaking through the constraints imposed by resources, frameworks and organisational 
boundaries.  There is an impatience here with the procedures and formalities that processing 
and agreement-making considers vital to a successful outcome.127  The adoption of the policy-
driving practice mode is not just about boundary spanning, it is about boundary smashing, 
removing or avoiding obstacles which, in the processing mode, might be regarded as helpful if 
not critical structural devices.   
The other practice modes ascribe a significance to exogenous factors in determining and 
legitimising strategies, in the form of an intrinsic clash of interests in the federal system, or the 
primacy of networks, agreements and processes.  Policy-driving, while cognisant of these 
factors, is more focused on how to overcome them, making one’s personal agency paramount. 
Thus, the policy-driving mode stood out by the number of times interviewees recalled and 
described instances of definitive and abrupt shifts in direction, particularly where they brought 
this about in opposition to the prevailing structural constraints.  For example, a state 
government official recalled a SOM where they persuaded their colleagues to take a very 
different, outcomes-focused approach (exactly the level of discussion the regulator quoted in 
                                                 
127 I coded only three mentions of a problematic process by interviewees focused on the policy-driving mode, 
compared to 27 such references by interviewees who focused on processing. 
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the previous section would call ‘a lot of talk’): 
We were getting to, ‘What’s next? Shall we have a session on health? We’ll get someone to draft 
a paper on health.’ I said, ‘No, let’s not do that. I wish you wouldn’t do that. Why don’t we get 
someone to give us a presentation on the issues of health and we can discuss it?’ In previous 
Commonwealth-state negotiations then there would probably have been a huge discussion about 
‘Well, who should give the presentation? If it’s from a state will that skew it?’ (Interview 10, 
State central department)   
He liaises with the head of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to get the head 
of the Commonwealth’s Health Department to lead the discussion, and succeeds in introducing 
a significant shift in the way this group worked: 
He just mapped out the issue and we had a fantastic discussion on health. We collectively all got 
a better appreciation of the issues and it was good. That then set the tone. At the next meeting 
with education we had [the Secretary of the Education Department] come in. We did housing 
policy and we had [Housing] do it. We just had really good conversations. (Interview 10, State 
central department) 
Policy drivers are noticeably impatient with hierarchies and formalities.  In wanting to get the 
Commonwealth Department of the Environment ‘to pull up its regulatory socks’ in relation to 
the contamination of Department of Defence sites by firefighting chemicals, a state  
environmental agency head jumped several organisational boundaries and levels to go direct 
to where she felt she had best chance of getting her hands on the policy levers: 
I’m actually going to fly up and talk to my colleagues in the Commonwealth. I’m not a 
hierarchical person. I could go to the secretary but I won’t get the outcome I want. I want change. 
The person who I actually know who owns the issue is the Dep Sec. So I’m going to go and talk 
to the Dep Sec. And it won’t be on record; we’re going to have a conversation here about whether 
we can do this differently. (Interview 12, State line agency) 
On a different policy issue, she went even higher: 
I want the department to consider moving into a better air policy space. They’re a bit cross with 
me because I spoke to the minister about it and the minister’s excited. They keep saying, ‘We’ve 
got no resources to do this.’ I’m saying, ‘I’m not asking for resources.’ (Interview 12, State line 
agency) 
Policy-driving also differs from the partisan mode in its determination to rise above the latter’s 
political and adversarial concerns.  There is an important distinction to be made between the 
partisan mode’s opportunism, on the one hand, and the opportunities policy-driving may 
leverage.  The term ‘opportunistic federalism’ draws attention to actors who pursue their 
interests, or perhaps more frequently those of their political or organisational executives, 
without regard for their systemic, collective consequences (for example, see Conlan 2006, 
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p. 667).  Policy-driving, to the contrary, prioritises these outcomes in balance with, if not in 
preference to, particular interests.  That balance is predicated on a combination of calculation, 
or preparation, and finding the appropriate window or opportunity.   
In an excellent summary of policy-driving practice, a front line manager in women’s services 
argued that she could easily have become discouraged by the time it took to bring the early 
consultations on domestic violence in 1986 to fruition in the form of the Women’s Safety 
Agenda in 2005.  However, she reflected, 
You go for what the long game. You try to build your influence and take your opportunities. I 
always describe that agenda—you’ve got to have at least five to 10 things in your back pocket in 
case you’re asked [by the Minister] “I’m speaking at a function. What do we need to fund? What 
do I need to announce?” We’ve got to have that leverage and opportunity that we can utilise. 
(Interview 31, State line agency)128 
There was a clear tendency for department and agency heads to display a policy-driving 
practice more often than those below them in the hierarchy, so one proposition that comes from 
this data is that senior managers are more likely to derive their motivation from systemic and 
more widely and structurally embedded frameworks, whereas those lower down the 
organisation are more likely to act in pursuit of specific policy goals. 
A hallmark of this practice is its appeal to the national interest, rather than narrower 
jurisdictional and organisational goals.   
We could do this Commonwealth-state stuff very differently if it wasn’t all about scrambling for 
the money. It could be very much around just strategic directions, strategic thinking, strategic 
conversations. As a federation, what have we got to offer each other when you come together and 
talk about the problems that we all face? It’s kind of that thing that interests me as much as, ‘We 
haven’t got any money; so why would you bother turning up?’ (Interview 8, State central 
department)129 
This preference for the systemic rather than localised view is not confined to central department 
personnel.  It is also adopted by officials in policy departments and at the front end of regulatory 
and service delivery.  Thus, a state official was critical of the Commonwealth Health 
department because it was focused on getting to another national agreement on health funding 
                                                 
128 There is also an interesting difference between policy-driving as a practice mode and the ‘opportunists’ 
Mahoney and Thelen identify as a type of incremental change agent.  They argue the latter are unlikely to try to 
change an organisation’s rules because of the costs involved, and prefer exploiting existing possibilities over 
‘riskier’ strategies of mobilising for change (2010, p. 27), which I have suggested is a hallmark of the policy-
driving mode. 
129 The discourse she is critical of is, in fact, one that partisans frequently adopt; they use precisely this logic to 
argue, as one official did, that ‘There’s a bit of money in the energy and the renewable space. So you play with 
them, otherwise why would you play?’ (Interview 33, State line agency) 
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(whereas, of course, the agreement-makers would see this as the goal, while the partisans would 
never begin with the following: 
This is a bit dull, because it’s just about money.  We’re just trying to get another agreement, 
whereas I’m much more interested in getting that out of the way so we can actually have a proper 
discussion around health reform and start as soon as possible so we’ve got, like, most of the term 
of government of the Commonwealth to really see if we can do anything in that space. I’m very 
interested in that. (Interview 8, State central department) 
At the regulatory end of the policy continuum, an environment agency manager saw HEPA’s 
value in these national, systemic terms, rather than the interests of a particular state: 
There are things which are Victorian interest issues. I know that for New South Wales EPA there 
are issues around [firefighting foams]. Rather than having a positional jurisdictional spat over it, 
I’ve used the voice of HEPA to say, ‘Why don’t we get HEPA to take this on as a collective 
issue?’ Rather than fighting for our own interests, what is the national interest? What is the 
multijurisdictional interest? What is the framework that’s needed to help us give confidence to 
the community around what we should be doing? (Interview 14, State central agency) 
A key problem in the federal system that the policy-driving mode tries to break down is the 
routine primacy of process over the ‘strategic’ issues, the very opposite of the disdain for 
‘navel-gazing’ expressed by those in a processing mode.  Similarly, a policy-driving role is 
construed, at times, in terms of pushing back against the interests that guide the partisan mode: 
I think I’ve played some role in reaching agreement across all the states and Commonwealth to 
have the same scientific process to do the threatened species listing. I pushed that very hard. 
There’s always a lot of resistance in systems, especially when you’ve got to say, ‘Let’s do 
something across the federation.’ Others will say, ‘Well, what’s in it for me? Why should I 
bother?’ And I overcome that by persuasion and saying, ‘This is good for the environment.’ 
(Interview 30, Commonwealth line department) 
As I noted in the earlier sections, processing downplays the role of personal agency, just as 
agreement-making and the partisan mode locate the sources of change in the external structures 
and processes.  However, the opposite is the case for policy-driving, which is all about an 
official’s personal role.  On a normative level, policy-driving seeks the autonomy that 
processing is only prepared to accept with far more guidance and mandate.  In commenting on 
the federal system as a whole, for example, a senior state official sought fewer constraints over 
outputs: 
I think there’s scope for more autonomy or authority to be passed on to officials to progress things 
than there is. What I tend to observe through the committees and even to COAG is that there’s an 
awful lot of updates that come to these committees with very detailed implementation plans and 
updates as opposed to a moderately detailed road map and then going away and working that up. 
COAG should agree the broad direction and commitment to when things are going to be done, 
with that then being passed down to the ministerial council and then further down to officials to 
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get things done. (Interview 9, State central department) 
This emphasis on ‘the big picture’ translates into how policy-driving interprets its job 
description, with a view that it involves ‘making waves’ and a concomitant impatience with 
incremental change: 
I could be a very good bureaucrat and write some very good reports and release them publicly 
and never bother the minister and all that sort of stuff and they’ll go, ‘Oh, you’re doing a good 
job,’ but I would never make any waves and nothing would happen. We wouldn’t achieve any 
significant change. It would be very, very incremental (Interview 39, Commonwealth line agency) 
Personal agency is therefore played out in a way that emphasises personal autonomy and 
impact; those officials who adopted a policy-driving mode like to tell stories about how they 
swam ‘beyond the flags’ or at least managed to have them set wide apart: 
All of the way leading up to that COAG meeting I had no authority for the negotiations or the 
discussions that we were having. So I had to be absolutely upfront that it was completely without 
prejudice and I had no authority, but that it is the way I played it. (Interview 21, Commonwealth 
line department) 
Each of the modes I have described enacts the separate bureaucratic space described in 
Chapter 5.6 differently.  Policy-driving does so by using it to support systemic goals through 
building policy coalitions outside and around the political and jurisdictional interests that 
galvanise partisan alliances.  In the area of social policy, for example, line department officials 
were collaborating on policy development without a mandate from the political executive: 
Victoria had come up with a view around how we might reform Commonwealth-state relations. 
So they had worked pretty closely with us behind the scenes. I wasn’t telling ministers or 
treasurers about this; this was just sort of happening, cooperating and working together. They 
wanted to send papers to us. We’d comment on them, we’d criticise them, critique them, agree 
with them, whatever. (Retired senior official, Interview 4) 
Policy-driving adopts a number of techniques to push the bigger agenda in preference to 
incremental change.  As in the preceding quote, one approach is to ‘go for the long game’ as 
one official put it, building personal influence and seizing opportunities to advance their 
agendas as they arose.   
One way in which they might do this is through the use of data to advance an issue outside 
traditional boundaries and processes.  Policy-driving values the knowledge that emerges from 
data and information processes and flows; many officials commented on the importance of data 
and information in helping them frame or structure problems and issues. For example, a 
Commonwealth official, noting that the Commonwealth did not have a direct role in 
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implementing asbestos removal, ‘and we are not a department so we do not have a policy-
setting role’ nevertheless used data gathering as the basis for an evidence base: 
Then I wrote to all the EPAs and said, ‘I would like to convene a working group so that we can 
bring this to the attention of the jurisdictions.  Because I had a report with very good 
recommendations, they agreed to work through every issue. So now we have a process which is 
going to make what we call socially optimal models of some of these policies that can be 
implemented when those opportunities arise (Interview 39, Commonwealth line agency)130 
Another common approach is to shift particular processes and procedures outside their standard 
formats, to enable a clearer focus on higher policy outcomes.  In developing policy on national 
on-line education tests, one official recalled: 
I’m watching the room going, ‘We’re not going anywhere particularly clearly and quickly.’ So I 
just closed the meeting and went, ‘We need to have a conversation without an audience, because 
ultimately we are the accountable officers. If this goes pear shaped it won’t be a minister that cops 
it; it will be our kids, our communities and our staff and ultimately us. What’s going on here, 
guys, and how do we get through this?’ Because we didn’t have everybody else and we didn’t 
have the other parties in the room we could have that conversation. (Interview 28, Territory line 
department) 
In the following example relating to competition policy, the approach consciously lifts the 
process of policy analysis away from its settings in a negotiation process; an approach that 
clearly differs from the way data is dealt with in the partisan and agreement-making modes: 
We went into that project very prepared to see, come what may, where the evidence takes us.  We 
treated it as not connected to a set piece of the negotiations. So we didn’t say, ‘This is to prepare 
us for the negotiation on the IGA.’ We said, ‘Look, this is completely separate. This is an 
unrelated piece of policy work that we think is really important.’ (Interview 22, Territory central 
department) 
6.5 Practice modes and intergovernmental management 
6.5.1 The distribution of practice modes in intergovernmental management 
A simple frequency count of the number of times the interview transcripts were coded against 
a particular ‘practice mode’ is provided in Table 3.  Processing is the most frequently 
encountered practice mode, perhaps unsurprisingly for a group of bureaucrats.  Partisanship 
and networking came an equal second, followed by policy-driving and finally agreement-
making, again unsurprisingly as the latter tends to be a role that is concentrated in central 
departments.  Overall, however, little can be read into this distribution of practice modes within 
jurisdictions, as the coding frequencies could simply be a random product of the small number 
                                                 
130 The immediate marker that differentiates this text from the processing mode is this official’s indication that 
there was no direct Commonwealth interest or power in this area, but he goes ahead anyway.   
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of interviews and their distribution.   
Table 3: Coding frequency by jurisdiction and practice mode 
 
Partisanship Agreement-
making 
Processing Networking Policy-
driving 
Commonwealth 31 22 39 26 26 
NSW 17 5 25 9 36 
Vic 28 14 41 23 16 
SA 19 4 13 27 7 
Territory 10 11 20 18 7 
Total times coded 105 56 138 103 92 
 
These findings do, however, suggest the interesting possibility that certain practice modes may 
predominate in particular policy sectors or particular jurisdictions.  In the latter case, for 
example, particularly strong leaders have introduced and signalled a shift in the jurisdictional 
culture that has then been reflected in the views of his or her subordinates and sanctioned 
changes to their practice. 
As an example of the relationship between practice mode and policy sector, it may be that 
particular practice modes appear to be more prevalent in some types of policy area than others 
because of the nature of the tasks involved.  Thus, there was a preponderance of references to 
networking and processing amongst officials working on environmental policy and regulation; 
very few interviewees in this policy field displayed a partisan practice mode, and there was 
close to a complete absence of references to agreement-making.   
Again, I attribute this to the likelihood that agreement-making tends to be a central agency 
activity, whereas regulation tends to be a line department/agency responsibility.  However, this 
does point to the potential for further analysis of practice modes by policy sectors.131 
                                                 
131 This point echoes Inwood et al.’s analysis of intergovernmental relations in Canada; their research explores 
‘one of the interesting dynamics discussed in contemporary policy and public administration literature’, viz ‘the 
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The preponderance of agreement-making by central agency officials is clear in Table 4, which 
allocates the frequency of coding for practice mode by the type of organisation interviewees 
work for. In comparison, far fewer central department officials discussed networking, which 
together with policy-driving ranked a clear second behind the other practice modes for those 
working in central departments.  Processing – again, not surprisingly – and networking were 
the modal frequency for those in line departments. 
 
Table 4: Coding frequency by organisation type and practice mode 
 
Partisanship Agreement-
making 
Processing Networking Policy-driving 
Central 43 45 43 20 29 
Line 62 11 95 83 63 
 
6.5.2 Practice modes and personal agency 
Turning to a general overview of how the ideas and practice modes outlined in the preceding 
sections contribute to the research question, each practice mode has a characteristic approach 
to change, in terms of its objectives, how it is legitimised and effected and how it is related to 
the formal structures and processes officials work with.132   
As Table 5 indicates, the number of times personal agency and impact were mentioned in 
connection with a particular practice mode varies considerably.  Officials who tend to describe 
their work in terms of networking and policy-driving are notable for their belief in, and 
activation of, opportunities in the system for the exercise of their personal agency, while those 
who describe their work from a partisan and agreement-making perspective mention their 
personal roles in change the least.  
                                                 
dynamic between ideas and institutions and actors, where policy "arenas" provide a forum for the shaping of all 
three’ (2011, p. 13). Thus, for example, they discuss the influence of free market monetarism on ‘the ideational 
frame of the work of finance officials - perhaps the single most influential cohort of officials in the contemporary 
public service’ (p. 133); the priority of economic reforms arising from New Public Management over 
environmental protection (p. 180); ideas of globalization, continentalism, and free trade on officials working on 
trade policy (p.  304) and so on. 
132 In effect, this exemplifies the critical realist argument against conflating structures and individual agency by 
showing how actors use existing structures to change institutions (Leca & Naccache 2006). 
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Table 5: Coding frequency of personal agency and impact by practice mode 
  
Examples 
given of 
active 
personal 
agency 
Examples 
given of 
personal 
impact  
Partisanship 4 6 
Agreement-making 7 8 
Processing 14 24 
Networking 29 27 
Policy-driving 18 24 
 
The reasons for this variance may partially relate to the way practice modes interact with formal 
structures, processes and contexts.  Thus, for example, the partisan and agreement-making 
modes are also the ones most strongly associated with the formal structures and operations of 
federalism such as agreements and ministerial councils.  Conversely, the networking and 
policy-driving modes take place in contexts where the adoption of such approaches is less risky 
and is a legitimate, acceptable role to aspire to.   
The partisan mode works on change in the context of the ministerial councils and their 
processes.  Frequently, change is understood or designed as a response to an exogenous change 
rather than something officials introduce themselves. A particular example that a number of 
officials commented on was the introduction by the Rudd government of seven working groups 
in major policy areas that were chaired by the relevant Commonwealth ministers, with state 
government ministers as their deputies, and supported by a mix of Commonwealth and state 
officials.  These new arrangements did not follow standard operating procedures, and 
consequently were regarded as ‘really strange beasts’ one official recalled: 
The officials were really freaked out. It actually worked quite well for a couple of them, and a 
couple of them didn’t work so well. A lot of work was done between the formal working group 
meetings by officials. But they sort of worked surprisingly well in a couple of instances. 
(Interview 21, Commonwealth line department) 
Despite its apparent source in the fault-lines of the federation, the partisan practice mode 
actually tends to bolster the federation’s institutional stability.  By focusing on the development 
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of, or shoring up, intra-jurisdictional alliances between central and line departments, and inter-
jurisdictional alliances across the states, partisanship generates and reinforces patterns of 
expected behaviour that simplify and increase the predictability of outcomes from any given 
strategy.  Similarly, by reducing uncertainty about how processes work or what they will 
deliver, partisanship increases the efficiency of those processes, albeit at the expense of their 
potential outcomes. 
Processing is notable for the way this practice often changes the way working groups function 
in order to secure better outputs from them.  Officials frequently described how they had 
applied this mode in terms of the way they chaired such groups, particularly through 
establishing, clarifying and changing standard operating procedures.  For example, an official 
chairing an education policy working group described ‘walking into a meeting where I actually 
don’t know the directors-general and secretaries’, and, on finding it bogged down 
said to a whole lot of the jurisdictions, including the bigger ones, ‘No, you’re not having a cast of 
a thousand. Sorry, you can have two and you, because this has to be a genuine conversation. We 
have to problem to solve. (Interview 28, Territory line department) 
Whereas policy driving may be prepared to risk good process in the service of major policy 
changes and outcomes, the processing mode is about managing the risks of such change in the 
service of ensuring the integrity of the system is maintained and public sector values, such as 
accountability and due process are adhered to.  Accordingly, the processing mode tends to 
impact on federal dynamics by contributing to systemic stability and resilience, along with 
partisanship and agreement-making.  The following is a typical expression of where processing 
lands on the balance between systemic change and preservation: 
A senior Commonwealth official said to me, ‘We’ve just promised this to the states,’ and I looked 
at her and I just put my head on the desk. I was not trying to make a dramatic gesture; it was a 
physical reaction. I thought, ‘Oh, my God, what have you done? Do you know what you’re doing? 
You’re spending bloody billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money without prudent assessment of 
the risk’. It caused me tremendous anxiety and stress—tremendous. (Interview 42, 
Commonwealth central department) 
Unlike the partisan mode, the exercise of agency and the aim of innovation in agreement-
making is about finding ways to maintain systemic stability and to overcome the problems of 
vertical fiscal imbalance and centralisation.  Consequently, as a practice mode with the most 
developed normative perspective, agreement-making has a major effect on federal dynamics 
by its contribution to systemic coherence and resilience. 
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The agreement-making mode is most often embodied in the work officials undertake to change 
the overall process for making agreements; for example, officials may see opportunities for 
greater efficiency in the process, or they may see instances of agreement-making that depart 
from their strongly-held normative view of how agreement making should work, particularly 
as it is embodied by the IGA FFR.   
The partisan, agreement-making and processing modes tend to introduce change as a way of 
stabilising and improving existing processes and structures, in line with Jabko and Sheingate’s 
view of agency in defence of the status quo:  
we wish to draw attention to the creative, order-sustaining action by defenders of the status quo. 
Furthermore, we suggest these order-preserving innovations are themselves an important source 
of institutional dynamism that standard approaches often miss. (Jabko & Sheingate 2018, p. 313) 
In contrast, change carried out through the networking and policy-driving modes tends to work 
in opposition to established structures, and the latter mode in particular is characterised by 
attempts to circumvent hierarchies and processes.   
The ambiguous relationship between networking practice and federal structures noted earlier 
produces two systemic impacts. Networking makes a major contribution to systemic stability 
and resilience, by ensuring that personal relationships endure and function outside and despite 
the politicised environment and the pursuit of interests that entails.  However, the ‘safe spaces’ 
networks provide can also be incubators of innovation and experimentation, and consequently 
this practice mode makes an important contribution to processes of change in the federation.   
Finally, in common with networking, policy driving tends to affect federal dynamics in terms 
of its contribution to change and innovation, rather than stability. 
6.5.3 Practice modes and coordinative discourse 
In forming their ideas and developing their practice, managers reach ‘up’ for a guiding set of 
values from the higher level narratives around the nature of the federal system, and apply them 
‘down’ to a particular policy canvas in the particular ways in which they tend to work.  In 
observing this effect, I am linking Schmidt’s three levels of coordinative discourse, and how 
ideas, norms and values ‘travel’ up and down this hierarchy, with Benz and Broschek’s 
ideational and structural layers and how they interact. 
Officials use the values and ideas contained in broader paradigms about the federal system to 
position themselves and their work, in terms of how they describe their personal goals and 
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strategies in the practice of intergovernmental management; the issues which they identify as 
being most important to them in that work; how they understand the salient problems in 
intergovernmental management they are dealing with; how they select and operationalise the 
solutions available to them; and, finally, how they operate as change agents. 
This does not contradict Hollander and Patapan’s depiction of Australian federalism as 
‘pragmatic’ (cf Chapter 2.2.2 above).  As they argue, ‘this does not mean it is a federalism 
without ideas. Rather, it is a federalism largely uninformed by imposing aspirations and grand 
political or legal theory, or shaped by party ideology and platform’ (2007, p. 285).  
Consequently, as officials draw on the higher level value sets and narratives to guide and 
legitimate their practice, they do so in ways that are contextually relevant and vary according 
to the circumstances, rather than adopting a priori stances to which they adhere regardless. 
In order to understand the connection between the higher ideational or discursive levels of 
federalism and the specific policy issues to which they are applied, it seems useful to 
characterise the bureaucratic space in which that happens as discursively ‘ordered’ or 
‘structured’.  A discourse is said to be structured ‘if the credibility of individual actors in a 
given domain requires them to draw on the ideas, concepts and categories of a given discourse’ 
(Hajer, 1995, pp. 60–61) and consequently their resulting practice ‘makes sense’ to their 
colleagues and stakeholders.  Thus, for example, agreement-making is based on working with 
colleagues on getting them to understand the aims and purposes that lie behind particular 
agreement processes, even where this may run counter to the approach their own jurisdiction 
has adopted (an example of the distinction between ‘trusteeship’ and ‘serial loyalty’): 
they need to understand the federal financial relations framework.  They need to understand what 
the difference between an outcome and an output is - a lot of people don't understand that and 
mix them up. So somebody will draft an agreement and it will have a lot of these problems, they 
include input controls - which we can't have.  (Interview 1, Commonwealth central department) 
Policy driving and networking, on the other hand, derive legitimacy and sanction from ‘big 
picture’ outcomes in policy terms, or from collaboration as a goal in itself, building 
relationships to use when necessary: 
I’ve seen the public servants play out the politics at the Canberra level. I’m not interested in that. 
I’m interested in resolving some of the big issues. We’ve now set up this group of environment 
regulators across Australia and New Zealand to work on these big problems. If we can get the 
federal department to play with us in the same way, we actually have a chance of giving our 
ministers a very real action to actually change things. In my view, the barriers to stop that are 
about behaviours. We as public servants have the luxury of taking a longer-term agenda. 
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(Interview 12, State line agency) 
The ideas that generate and inform practice modes also affect federal dynamics through the 
role of multiple discourses as a structuring framework.  This point effectively returns to March 
and Olsen’s fundamental recognition that ‘the fact that most behavior is driven by routines does 
not, by itself, make most behavior routine. The number and variety of alternative rules assure 
that one of the primary factors affecting behavior is the process by which some of those rules, 
rather than others, are evoked in a particular situation’ (1989b, p. 24).  The task, therefore, is 
to uncover how and why they do so in the federal context, and the implications for bureaucratic 
practice.133      
Discourses multiply over time as well as by policy sector or jurisdiction. Most, if not all 
officials who had any longevity in their role noted how differing signals from the 
Commonwealth had a critical effect on systemic priorities, particularly as, at the time of the 
interviews, the Turnbull government had abolished the Abbott federalism review but not 
replaced it with any strong directions for COAG.  As a result, one official suggested,  
first ministers’ departments around the country are inherently a bit less interested in that space 
and are focusing on other priorities (Interview 24, State line department) 
Other officials described a mix of sectoral and temporal dimensions to the content of their ideas 
about the federal system.  In relation to human capital, for example, officials compared a recent 
COAG meeting which was ‘all about who pays’. 
If you went back 10 years it was a conversation about the fiscal gap but it was where we put our 
investment. In that fiscal environment you could talk about new investments. This year it’s been 
about talking about savings and who bears the burden of the fiscal gap. (Interview 17, State line 
department) 
Similarly, officials described the shift from collaborative to adversarial relations in working on 
schools and disability policies: 
it has gone back much more to a genuine battle of Commonwealth versus state than it probably 
was five or six years ago, because of how Canberra is using the COAG space and the 
intergovernmental discussions. I think probably post-Gonski and NDIS a lot of goodwill has been 
worn away: it’s a Commonwealth takeover and a very Commonwealth-driven approach to a 
welfare entitlement as opposed to an insurance model. (Interview 19, State central department) 
                                                 
133 The following discussion supports the critique by Selsky et al. who argue discursive approaches have failed to 
explain how different discourses interact within a domain; accordingly, they argue for a more complex and 
dynamic framework in which actors ‘use multiple discourses in making sense of, negotiating and ordering the 
domain’ (2003, p. 1731). 
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The notion of multiple discourses within the bureaucratic domain also illustrates how officials 
respond to the conflicts that arise between values and ideas contained in these contending 
discourses.  For example, officials base their practice on ideas that are derived from all three 
of the domains I explored in Chapter 2: that is, from the federal system, from their role as public 
servants more generally with the associated ideas about public administration, and, finally, 
from the ideas that characterise particular policy areas and their histories.  Ideas and values 
prevalent in one may conflict with those that dominate in another of these domains; for 
example, many officials described a tension between delivering the best outcomes for their 
current political executives, derived from their role as public servants generally, and their view 
that the national interest would be served by achieving collaboration (again, highlighting the 
trusteeship and serial loyalty described previously).  
Different discourses played out between the states in their response to the development of the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme.   
Throughout that debate we [Victorians] were very much about the outcomes for patients whereas 
New South Wales was about getting a deal because they knew how important it was to the 
Commonwealth about getting a deal. (Interview 19, State central department) 
The clash of discourses often lies behind the different interests and strategies adopted by central 
and line departments.  As one official put it, the former 
are interested in the big principles and the big settings - how much funding, policy autonomy, 
how much reporting, what does this say about state sovereignty, does this contribute to national 
reform agenda, how are federal-state relations going in general and what’s this saying about where 
we going? Line agencies actually have to get a whole bunch of business done. Part of that is 
ensuring you’ve got funding. They’re talking in the realm of principles, we actually deliver 
services and actual stuff happening on the ground. (Interview 15, State line department) 
Managing conflicting discourses is an important element of effective intergovernmental 
management; indeed, as Sheingate notes, such institutional complexity provides opportunities 
and resources for actors’ creativity (2003, p. 186).  Managing this ideational complexity may 
be done by allocating structures and processes that allow each discourse a bureaucratic space 
in which the associated practice mode operates, as occurred, for example, in the development 
of the National Disability Insurance Scheme: 
We spent a fair bit of time trying to build a culture where we had a trusted relationship with the 
states on the design. We were pretty clear, too, that the other side, the intergovernmental 
agreement, was much more conflictual and done by economics people and the treasury types. We 
ran them quite separately, so it was really clear that there were different conversations happening 
and that the rules were different. (Interview 26, Commonwealth line department) 
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However, it was also clear that change strategies fail where there is insufficient leadership and 
oversight to ensure that the alternative cultures are legitimised and supported.  The new 
working group arrangements introduced under the Rudd government did not last, and one 
reason for this, according to a senior state official, was the lack of cultural change throughout 
the home organisations for those officials involved. 
This new approach had to be implemented both culturally as well as practically. One reason why 
it all went to hell in a hand basket was because when it went out to the line ministers, be they 
Commonwealth or state, or the line agencies, they just reverted to type. It reverted to very tactical 
skirmishes. Rudd did not himself take enough responsibility, and COAG with him did not take 
enough responsibility that a leadership group like that should (Interview 8, State central 
department) 
Finally, my interviews suggest officials often become change agents by adopting and applying 
a different discourse to the one that is dominant in the particular organisation, network, policy 
field and so on in which they are working. As an example of how change occurs through the 
adoption of a counter-mode, when the partisan mode is prevailing, one senior state official 
noted the change when a Commonwealth official introduced the policy-driving perspective: 
Look, it’s not as though I don’t have positions, I don’t even have any attitudes on many of these 
things.’ In fact, that was sort of disarming but quite helpful because it meant that we could have 
a collective conversation which wasn’t just rehearsing old positions, fights and battles. It was, 
‘Let’s go on a collective journey together of understanding what could be mutually beneficial. 
Let’s help ourselves out.’ (Interview 10, State central department) 
6.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has described how the separate bureaucratic domain of intergovernmental 
management identified in the preceding chapter is shaped by the ideational characteristics of 
Australian federalism.  I noted that there are no unitary cultures, at the federal, jurisdictional or 
even organizational levels, and particularly no simple, binary ‘us and them’ oppositions 
between the Commonwealth and states or central and line departments.  Rather, the tensions 
between these coordinative discourses open up opportunities for officials to exercise agency in 
delivering change, whether in the form of institutional innovation or with the aim of providing 
resilience and stability.  They may do so in a calculated, strategised way, by building networks 
and alliances, or by using existing processes to nudge work in a particular direction; or they 
may do so by seizing an opportunity that has opened up in an unexpected way, most frequently 
in response to an opening offered by a colleague or colleagues in another jurisdiction. 
Officials navigate the multiple discourses of Australian federalism to develop and apply their 
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strategies, or simply to take advantage of such opportunities as they perceive, through the 
adoption of ‘practice modes.’  I have described five practice modes that emerged from the 
interviews.  These are not stable, consistent roles that characterise an official’s behavior over 
long periods and across different situations and problems; rather, distinctive practice modes are 
highly contextualised, drawing on the federation’s formal and informal structures and 
processes to produce ideas and values that legitimate and frame their approach.  Similarly, each 
practice mode delivers outcomes in terms of systemic resilience and stability, or in terms of 
incremental (occasionally significant) change and innovation. 
As a pointer to the overall conclusions in the next chapter, there is a clear correspondence 
between an official’s organisational seniority and/or experience in the intergovernmental field, 
and their capacity and resources for autonomous strategy formulation and action.  But what 
this chapter has made clear is that officials can base effective strategies on their ideas even 
where they may lack the positional power of those above them. 
This chapter has confirmed the findings discussed in the preceding chapters that discern two 
rule sets that officials must adopt and adapt: one, derived (at least in the Australian system) 
from Westminster-type serial loyalty to the political executive, which tends to support systemic 
stability and process; the other, derived from notions of ‘stewardship’ and therefore closely 
related to the concept of intergovernmental management as a separate domain, which supports 
change and innovation.  These two rule sets, which help officials navigate the formal and 
informal structures of the federation outlined in the two preceding chapters, are brought 
together in the practice modes discussed here. 
As a theoretical aside, some of the stability historical institutionalism attributes to path 
dependence and the lack of exogenous change may, in fact, be due to the work of such order-
sustaining change agents.  Conversely, what looks like stability or institutional equilibrium 
may in fact mask incremental innovation (Sheingate 2003). 
Finally, in terms of the conceptual underpinnings for my research in the area of federal 
dynamics, I have confirmed Benz and Broschek’s argument, outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter, that tensions between the ideational and the social and institutional layers within 
federal systems are an important source of federal dynamics, but to this I would add that a 
second source of federal dynamics lies in the way federal structures and ideas combine and 
interact. 
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Thus, the data in this chapter introduces the notion of differential rates of change that can apply 
to the formal and informal institutional layers, and the ideational layer.  Change in values and 
ideas, embedded in the Westminster model of public administration and in ideas of the federal 
culture, appears to take place slowly, in conformity with Schmidt’s view that ‘philosophical 
ideas generally sit in the background as underlying assumptions that are rarely contested except 
in times of crisis’ (Schmidt 2008, p. 306).  As she goes on to argue, changes in policy and 
programmatic ideas are debated more regularly, and here can be associated with informal 
routines and formal structures. 
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Table 6: Intergovernmental practice modes: characteristics, sources and effects 
 Structural 
focus 
Craft focus Coordinative discourse focus Source of 
individual 
agency 
Impact on federal dynamics 
   Frames/philosophies Policy  
paradigms 
Policy solutions  Continuity 
and stability 
Change and 
innovation 
Practice mode         
Partisanship COAG and 
ministerial 
councils 
Bargaining and 
negotiating 
Federalism as an area 
for contending and 
adversarial interests 
Winners and 
losers; a zero-
sum game 
Pursuit of 
jurisdictional or 
organisational 
interests 
Political 
mandate or 
sanction from 
senior 
officials 
Intra-
jurisdictional 
mobilization 
Depends on 
exogenous 
changes to the 
council system 
Networking Intra and 
inter-
jurisdictional 
networks 
Establishment 
and 
maintenance of 
networks and 
relationships 
Federalism 
characterised by 
multiple, overlapping 
networks and 
relationships  
Sectoral 
networks 
Mobilisation of 
network 
resources 
Networks and 
relationships 
Maintenance 
of cross-
jurisdictional 
trust, use of 
personal 
relationships 
to get things 
done 
Establishment 
of new 
networks, 
policy learning 
across 
jurisdictions 
Agreement 
making 
Fiscal 
federalism 
and intergovt 
agreements 
Fashioning 
agreements 
Federalism as a 
process for reaching 
and formalising 
intergovernmental 
agreement 
Frameworks set 
by the IGA FFR 
and general 
settings for 
agreements 
Congruence with 
overarching 
agreement 
frameworks 
Agreement 
frameworks 
(especially 
the IGA FFR) 
Guardianship 
of agreement 
standards and 
processes; 
cross-
jurisdictional 
liaison to 
effect sound 
agreement-
making; 
maintenance 
of fiscal 
federal 
processes 
Occurs 
through 
actions to 
improve fiscal 
processes and 
restore the 
primacy of 
normative 
agreement 
standards and 
individual 
agreement 
objectives 
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 Structural 
focus 
Craft focus Coordinative discourse focus Source of 
individual 
agency 
Impact on federal dynamics 
Processing Senior 
officials’ 
meetings, 
working 
groups 
Briefing, 
communiques, 
efficiency of 
outputs 
Federalism as a 
process for the 
provision of support 
to the political 
executive 
Public sector 
bargain: 
competence and 
loyalty  
Good practice in 
bureaucratic 
techniques – ‘no 
surprises’ for 
Ministers or 
senior officials; 
‘cognitive’ 
narratives 
Formalised 
policy 
routines 
Effectiveness 
of the federal 
system 
maintained 
‘behind the 
scenes’ despite 
differences 
between 
political 
executives; 
maintenance of 
support 
mechanisms 
for ministerial 
meetings 
Incremental 
changes to 
policy and 
governance 
processes, 
policy transfer 
across 
jurisdictions 
Policy-driving Public sector 
organisations 
Getting to a 
policy 
outcome; 
mobilisation of 
organisational 
and network 
resources 
Federalism as an 
opportunity to define 
and achieve the 
national interest, 
and/or end outcomes 
in a policy sector 
End goals and 
objectives for a 
program or 
policy 
‘Crash through’ 
changes to 
established 
hierarchies and 
processes 
Personal 
agency, 
organisational 
leadership 
Achievement 
of policy 
outcomes 
Formation of 
advocacy and 
instrument 
coalitions 
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Chapter 7 
‘Fitting New Wheels’: Conclusions and implications 
7.1 Introduction 
My purpose in focusing on the bureaucracy’s role as a distinct aspect of the federal system is 
based on the proposition that it makes an important and distinctive contribution to the policy 
response to Australia’s immediate and long-term challenges. Despite this, we know little about 
how decisions are made in this context, including how the bureaucracy manages and leverages 
the balance between the continuity necessary for systemic stability while building a capacity 
for change.  The effectiveness of federal structures and processes depends on the volition and 
agency of officials working in and on them.  Their capacity to find ways past the constraints 
and to deliver outcomes (and even occasionally to slow a centrally-driven policy momentum), 
despite the prevailing direction set by political and jurisdictional interests, has important 
implications for the short and long term future of the federation. 
Accordingly, the thesis addressed the following research question: how does the practice of 
intergovernmental management affect continuity and change in the Australian federal system?  
In order to answer this question, my research has covered a range of subsidiary questions that 
contribute to the sporadic history of research on this issue: what do officials do as 
intergovernmental managers?  Why and how do they do it?  Under what conditions?  With 
what results?  What changes?  And how, of course, how do longer term cycles of stability and 
change in the federal system affect the practice of intergovernmental management? 
7.2 ‘Structures only get you so far’: a summary of the findings 
Chapter 4 presented findings on how and when officials exercise agency in the context of the 
federation’s formal settings: its councils, intergovernmental agreements, and public sector 
departments and agencies.  The chapter described the way individual officials negotiate 
directions, priorities and strategies amongst and between their individual departmental 
positions, their jurisdictional positions the national federal policy context and, of course, the 
political settings for all three. 
The chapter contributed a new perspective to the study of intergovernmental management by 
focusing on what happened when a number of COAG ministerial councils were abolished in 
2013.  I argued that we can learn a great deal about the role of individual agency in 
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intergovernmental management by looking at how officials responded to that change and why 
they did so.  In particular, I noted that the networks that developed or continued made a major 
contribution to systemic change and resilience.  The thinking and motivation that goes into 
such network building suggests that a new set of ideational factors is needed to understand the 
bureaucracy’s role.   
Consequently, the chapter demonstrated that officials consciously balance their representation 
of their ministers’ and jurisdictions’ specific positions and interests with a depoliticised 
commitment to making the system work despite the politics, as well as in the direction set by 
their political executives.  This perspective, common to all intergovernmental managers, 
whether in the Commonwealth or states, and whether in central or in line departments, allows 
them to play an in important role in overcoming problems inherent in the federation’s formal 
structures and processes and preventing such problems from arising in the first place.  
Accordingly, the chapter showed that stability does not mean stasis, nor is agency always 
subversive; order-preserving innovations are themselves an important source of institutional 
dynamism and resilience.   
Turning to the normative context of intergovernmental agreements and their negotiation, I 
noted two normative frameworks that govern negotiations: one based on adversarial conflict 
and distrust, and one that contends that individual state interests as being best served by a 
collective outcome.  Again, I described how officials predicate their work on a balance between 
these frameworks: for example, as policy brokers who may, in certain conditions, apply 
problem-solving and mediation strategies in pursuit of national outcomes as distinct from 
narrower organisational or jurisdictional interests.  
Chapter 5 built on the findings in Chapter 4 by pointing to the way officials understand and 
operationalise intergovernmental management as a distinct form of public administration, in 
which they prosecute their political executives’ policies, or their jurisdictional and even 
organisational interests while, at the same time, articulating and practising a commitment to 
the effective and efficient operations of the federal system overall.  The chapter found these 
‘dual hats’ at work in a number of settings and processes, including committees and working 
groups, the processes of agenda setting, drafting communiques, negotiating, briefing and so on.   
Chapter 5 adumbrated the conditions that allow officials to depart from the political priorities 
of the day, and to focus on longer term, systemic policy issues.  The concept of 
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intergovernmental management as a distinct institution with its own rules and organised 
practices is an important source of legitimisation for moving outside the boundaries of 
sanctioned policy development.  The chapter contributed to a more nuanced understanding of 
the role officials play in the federation by showing how, subject to structural accountabilities, 
they exercise agency in constructing or using their bureaucratic space to pursue public value 
outcomes they perceive as distinct from those of their political executives. 
As the chapter showed, the exercise of agency depends to a significant degree on mutual trust 
and information exchange, keeping channels of communication with one another open, keeping 
networks and agreement-making processes separate from ongoing policy debates, and by 
gathering, analysing and reporting on data outside formal channels. 
The chapter reinforced my earlier findings about the complex relationship between federal 
structures and constraints, and the individual agency of the officials who work in and with 
them.  Agency may be inherently conservative, directed at preserving systemic stability, 
retaining policy momentum, or institutional memory.  In such cases, innovation may be 
directed at preserving a normative status quo.  At other times, agency is exercised by working 
against the prevailing directions set by one’s government, jurisdiction or organisation, or to 
rebuild some part of the system that is not functioning well. 
Chapters 4 and 5 identified a close bi-directional interaction between the federation’s formal 
structures and processes, and the values and ideas that guide officials in their work.  Chapter 6 
showed how that interaction works in the daily practices adopted by officials.  In effect, these 
are the institutional and ideational layers of federal dynamics at work, and consequently the 
adoption of different practice modes has varied implications for the exercise of agency in 
pursuit of systemic, or particular policy change.  For example, while the partisan, agreement-
making and processing practice modes generally aim for stabilising and improving existing 
processes and structures, the networking and policy-driving modes tend to work towards 
innovation and experimentation. 
Finally, the chapter explored the implications of multiple discourses for federal dynamics as a 
structuring framework. The chapter showed that bureaucratic practice in intergovernmental 
management is far from routine, with the ability to manage conflicting discourses integral to 
effective intergovernmental management and the role of a change agent. 
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7.3 Conclusions about the research problem 
This research has found that intergovernmental managers make an important contribution both 
to the stability and resilience of Australia’s federal system, and to its capacity for innovation 
and change.  They do so by basing their practice on values, priorities and strategies derived 
from discursive paradigms about the nature of the federal system, their role as public servants 
in that system, and ideas about particular policy areas and their histories.  They then apply these 
values and ideas to particular policy issues, and to their work more generally in 
intergovernmental settings, using and sometimes pushing back against the political and 
structural constraints they face. 
As a distinct contribution to federal dynamics theory generally, and to the study of Australian 
intergovernmental management in particular, my findings suggest that the links between the 
institutional and ideational layers of the federation produce two distinct rule sets.  These rule 
sets govern the perceptions and behaviours of bureaucrats in both the formal and informal 
settings of the federal system, such as ministerial councils and their supporting frameworks 
and processes on the one hand, and the informal networks and relationships that criss-cross the 
federal system on the other. 
The first rule set reflects the ‘serial loyalty’ public servants provide to the political executive 
in the Westminster tradition, along with a commitment to specific jurisdictional and 
organisational interests.  The second rule set recognises and sanctions a role for officials in 
exercising stewardship over the federal system as a whole, alongside their services to the 
political executive.  This rule set is embodied in a strong sense officials have that 
intergovernmental management is a separate and distinct policy domain with its own interests 
and objectives.  Along with the continuity/change continuum referred to above, these rule sets 
form a second axis of normative orientation along which officials position their work.   
As summarised by Figure 4, officials navigate between and balance these rules sets in 
responding to the tasks and problems of intergovernmental management.  The rules are 
implemented through the adoption of practice modes that guide officials’ understanding of the 
federal system and their place in it, and, consequently, the priorities, strategies and roles they 
should adopt.  In terms of the research question, these practice modes capture the ways in which 
officials contribute to systemic continuity and change, and how they do so by harnessing the 
federal system’s structural and informal resources and settings.  But as Figure 4 shows, 
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practice modes are not fixed or static; officials may shift, for example, from pursuing the 
finalisation of agreements in pursuit of a government’s agenda, to a more normative stance that 
reflects the aspirations of the IGA FFR.  They may network in order to support a particular 
policy change, but they may also develop networks as a way of making the system workable.  
Policy driving may depart from established routines to bring about a specific policy goal, but 
may also aim at systemic change beyond the interests — and, indeed, the lifetime — of any 
government.  Even partisanship may depart from its characteristic tendency to reinforce 
traditional roles and postures to pursue significant changes, albeit in the pursuit of the political 
executive’s wishes rather than moving into stewardship as the other practice modes do. 
Figure 4:  Practice modes, loyalty/stewardship and continuity/change 
 
My findings challenge conventional thinking about intergovernmental management on a 
number of fronts.  First, I have departed from the tendency in research to infer the interests and 
motives of the bureaucracy from the constitutional, legal and political structures and processes 
that constrain it. I have shown that officials play an active role as ‘rule takers’ but also as rule 
makers, breakers, shapers and keepers.   
Such complexity also challenges earlier conclusions about Australian federalism that argue 
executive federalism and vertical fiscal imbalance close down the options and opportunities for 
change available to federal reformers. 
In relation to public sector organisations and their impact on federal dynamics, I conclude that 
the traditional perspective on central versus line department roles is still valid.  However, I also 
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show that the demands of complex policy challenges, and the resultant need to apply technical 
expertise to processes of national harmonisation and coordination, have generated a diversity 
of views, interests and strategies at play that cautions against simplistic ‘central versus line,’ 
or ‘states versus Commonwealth’ bifurcations.   
My findings suggest that an adversarial view of the federal system simplifies a more complex 
and varied set of perceptions among officials.  As a result, the adversarial view is only one 
approach officials take to cooperation with other jurisdictions.  Similarly, the interview data 
showed that jurisdictions, including the smaller states and territories, have a wider repertoire 
of strategies than simply responding to exogenous events, passively accepting whatever the 
Commonwealth and one of the larger states have cooked up. 
7.4 Implications for theory 
The findings in this research contribute to a number of directions for the development of federal 
dynamics theory, particularly as proposed by Benz and Broschek (2013, p. 367). 
The normative dimensions of federal dynamics theory, which underpin my research, begin 
from the proposition that the sustainability of federal systems depends on a capacity to shift 
with flexibility between continuity and change (Benz & Broschek 2013, p. 382; Clarke 2007, 
p. 58). While these researchers look to constitutional frameworks to provide this balance, my 
research has shown that the role played by the bureaucracy also contributes important ‘ballast’ 
to federalism, with the exercise of agency in bureaucratic practice a key contributing 
organisational characteristic that supports systemic resilience in the balance between continuity 
and change.  Moreover, to the extent that the bureaucracy contributes to such effectiveness and 
resilience, it makes an important contribution to the public’s confidence in the system’s 
legitimacy and capability. 
Federal dynamics theory draws on rational choice and historical institutionalist explanations to 
explain stasis as the outcome of national/sub-national interest equilibria and path dependency 
respectively.  However, while accepting the limitations of my qualitative data, I have shown 
that continuity and change in federal systems may also be the products of individual agency, 
confirming an explanatory role for volitional, actor-centred approaches.  Consequently, this 
research demonstrates that an understanding of federal dynamics is deepened by combining 
historical institutionalist with other approaches.  Indeed, Benz and Broschek note that the 
further development of federal dynamics theory should ‘take into account mechanisms like 
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discourses’ (2013, p. 386).134 
A second theoretical point relates to the interaction between federalism’s institutional and 
ideational layers.  The application of a discursive epistemology and methodology to federal 
dynamics shows how broader societal cultures and ideas affect both intergovernmental 
relations and their management.135  Benz & Broschek see these broader societal ideas about 
federal systems, or ‘philosophies’ or ‘paradigms’ in discursive institutionalist terms, as 
generally stable patterns that shape intergovernmental and executive-legislative relations 
(2013, p. 385).  However, the data reported here on the strongly-held idea of the separateness 
of the bureaucratic domain, and its embodiment in practices of stewardship, suggest that the 
bureaucratic domain of intergovernmental management exhibits its own differentiated 
response to these broader cultural and social settings.  The involvement of epistemic 
communities in intergovernmental management, particularly where they include non-
government players,136 raises another interesting possibility for ideas sourced in broader social 
and political settings to affect the federal system.  
Federal dynamics theory is also concerned with the role of ‘asynchronous’ developments in 
different institutional layers or arenas (Benz & Broschek 2013, p. 369).  This may occur, for 
example, because relations between governments are generally slower to change than relations 
between officials, as I have shown when a policy trajectory has rapidly shifted due to a senior 
official’s intervention.  Over time, intergovernmental relations depend on the effectiveness of 
bureaucratic networks and behind the scenes interaction between officials, so developments in 
the latter may ultimately deliver broader systemic change.  Conversely, as I showed in the 
analysis of the abolition of ministerial councils and the introduction of minister-led workgroups 
under Rudd, sudden changes in federal structures and processes can act as critical junctures 
allowing for new forms of intergovernmental management to develop. Consequently, the 
interrelationship between intergovernmental relations and management may be an important 
element in future federal dynamics theorising. 
A final theoretical element suggested by this research involves the relationship between 
                                                 
134 This view was also expressed in personal correspondence with me by Schmidt, who noted the potential to 
apply historical institutionalism to change in the institutional layer, while using a discursive approach to look at 
the ideational and political actor layers where ‘discursive interactions challenge the path-dependency 
assumptions’ and allow for new policies to incrementally ‘layer’ over the old (correspondence dated 23/2/17) 
135 For example, Sayers and Banfield note the ‘bi-directional’ interaction between political institutions and 
ideational forces in Australia (2013, p. 195). 
136 See the example of CRC Care at Chapter 5.5.2 above 
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governance and institutional reform.  Federal dynamics theory posits a complex relationship 
between degrees of centralisation and incentives to cooperate, with Australia’s extreme vertical 
fiscal integration and domination by the Commonwealth of the policy agenda likely to both 
raise the transactional costs of cooperation and the motivation to do so (Benz & Broschek 2013, 
p. 383).  These findings touch on both sides of this equation; leaving aside the obvious impact 
of political interests, they suggest that the propensity to cooperate is highly differentiated by 
policy sector and history, the strength of the relevant networks, the views of senior officials 
and the prevalent ideas in that policy space that may sanction more or less cooperative 
behaviours.  Similarly, practices such as the ‘processing’ mode I describe specifically aim to 
reduce the transaction costs of delivering a cooperative outcome. 
7.5 Implications for policy  
As noted in Chapter 2, ‘intergovernmental policy-making capacity’ was the key concept linking 
Canadian federalism, policy-making and public administration for the study conducted by 
Inwood et al.   
Although this dissertation is predicated on a different, if related question, it has nevertheless 
shown that a focus on how actors, institutions and ideas interact has great relevance for 
intergovernmental management and its policy functions.   
First, differential rates of change in the coordinative discourse between officials may translate 
to differential rates of change in the federal system’s policy outputs.  As discussed in Chapter 
4, ideas about the federal system overall change slowly, but a much more free-flowing debate 
about particular policies and programs takes place in intergovernmental forums, energised by 
boundary-spanning individuals, that informs the work program supporting formal and informal 
ministerial committees.   
Second, the application of a discursive methodology to public policy allows us to consider how 
changing the discourse — in other words, how a policy problem is described and 
communicated — may change the way it is prioritised, options developed and designed, how 
it is negotiated, implemented and evaluated.  Changing the discourse, in turn, may depend on 
harnessing and encouraging changes to the processes and structures in and by which 
intergovernmental managers operate.  As Schmidt argues, ‘only by understanding discourse 
not only as substantive ideas but also as interactive processes can we fully demonstrate its 
transformational role in policy change’ (2011, p. 107).   
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For example, my findings suggest that a rule set around the concept of ‘stewardship’ exerts a 
powerful influence on the practice of intergovernmental management.  Consciously harnessing 
that rule set may allow for a different set of dynamics to inform intergovernmental performance 
management.  Instead of producing adversarial and game playing behaviours, alternative 
approaches to goal setting might reduce the transaction costs of reporting and encourage policy-
driving practice.137 
The importance of, and level of engagement with data gathering, analysis, reporting and 
dissemination discussed at Chapter 5.3.4 has interesting implications for future policy 
development and the federal system’s capacity to adapt and respond to new challenges.  One 
such possibility relates to the concept of ‘niches’ as network-based spaces for innovation that 
are less constrained than formal organisations in their capacity for innovation and 
experimentation. The policy-driving, networking and even the processing practices I have 
described would all work well with such structures, albeit requiring varying degrees of 
legitimation.  Bringing practice modes to bear on fostering, building or maintaining such niches 
might contribute to a system-wide capacity for innovation, experimentation and learning.138  
More generally, a systemic approach to such micro-innovation suggests the possibility, if not 
yet the practice, of an ‘information age’ federalism in which localised initiatives, testing and 
pilots contribute to a national intergovernmental response to complex policy problems (one of 
federalism’s potential benefits to which the Twomey and Withers report quoted in Chapter 1 
draws attention). The states’ role in service delivery and program administration, through 
which most of the data for such policy is generated, gives them control over a resource the 
Commonwealth requires as an input to its own policy capacity, and hence may, at least to some 
                                                 
137 See Metzenbaum (2008) for a discussion of goal-setting as an alternative source of intergovernmental 
incentives in the US.  My point here echoes Simeon’s much earlier argument that, despite the costs and constraints 
of the Canadian federal system, ‘major policy innovation’ was made possible by deep and ongoing networks of 
communication between officials, based on their long association with one another, and despite the political state 
of play (2006, p.327). 
138 Possibilities for federal systems include experimentalist governance (Sabel & Zeitlin 2012), policy learning 
(Saam & Kerber 2013) and of course the older tradition of laboratory federalism (eg Oates 1999; the concept is 
critiqued in Tarr 2001, including the likelihood that ‘over the longer term, the tendency would be toward policy 
uniformity’ as states gravitate towards the most successful model (p. 42).  It is interesting to note that the 
‘laboratory’ benefits of federalism were discussed by the watershed Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration over 40 years ago: ‘while conflict may be endemic in federal systems, they also offer scope for 
imaginative administrative arrangements which would not be available in a more centralised, monolithic system 
and which utilise the resources of the different levels of government in a way which is advantageous to both (cited 
in Wettenhall 1983, p.166). 
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extent, balance their fiscal dependence on the Commonwealth.139  The governance of such data, 
including the need to ensure the exposure to risks is managed at both the aggregate national 
level and de-aggregated state and local levels will present new challenges for 
intergovernmental management practices (for example, see Leuprecht 2012).  Other 
characteristics of an ‘information age’ federalism that these findings suggest include a role for 
smaller jurisdictions in generating and facilitating policy transfer, and a role for networks, 
particularly those that encompass non-government, private and expert collaborators.   
7.6 Implications for practice 
The pragmatism described in Chapter 2 as a dominant characteristic of Australian federalism, 
let alone the day to day exigencies of public administration, would appear to leave little room 
or motivation for broader theoretical reflection by practitioners.140  Although interviewees 
welcomed the opportunity the interviews gave them to think about federalism generally, they 
clearly felt more comfortable discussing specific and detailed policy diagnoses and solutions.  
Consequently, it would appear that Australian public servants share the tendency Inwood and 
his co-authors noted in Canada for officials to use, but not reflect on, dominant ideas in political 
discourse that played a major contextual role for their work (Inwood et al. 2011, p. 418141). 
However, even if such pragmatism is, itself, a dominant discourse with an accompanying set 
of strategic and behavioural implications, it misses what Burgess refers to as the ‘federal spirit’ 
in action, ‘as a shorthand expression of a set of values and principles that guide action and 
behaviour among political elites’ (preface to Burgess, 2012).  In this formulation, with 
federalism characterised as a ‘mindset’ (note the link to what Schmidt would call the highest 
‘philosophical’ level of discourse, and to the ‘ideas’ that animate discursive institutions), the 
federal bureaucracy becomes not just a utility for the implementation of decisions but part of 
the animating spirit of the federation itself, with its own differentiated set of discourses, not 
least amongst them the sense of ‘stewardship’ I found so dominant. 
Accordingly, one of the key findings in this research has been the extent to which officials 
                                                 
139 It is only fair to acknowledge that many of my interviewees were sceptical about the possibility of this effect 
in the absence of any change to the vertical fiscal imbalance in Australia. 
140 When I apologised to a department head for taking up so much of his time with the interview, he responded by 
showing me detailed notes he had made against each of the questions I had sent him, and graciously thanked me 
for prompting those reflections on his practice. 
141 Indeed, I note their recommendation that the study of intergovernmental policy capacity respond to ‘the push 
for more reflection’ on the part of its practitioners and analysts (2011, p. 466). 
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draw on these higher paradigms to inform and legitimise their practice.  Bringing their ‘practice 
modes’ forward for systematic critique and self-examination would help officials think through 
policy problems and solutions from different perspectives (jurisdictional, policy options, 
implementation options and interactions between all of these)142 as well as enhance their 
capacity to adopt different strategies and approaches to their work as intergovernmental 
managers.  
In guiding and supporting this process, academics and theorists of federalism, public policy 
and public administration respectively have an opportunity to bring practitioners up to date 
with more contemporary models, while informing those models with developments from the 
‘front line’ as it were (Cairney 2015).   
While Inwood and his colleagues found that officials were not focused on reforming existing 
structures and relations (2011, p. 260), 78 percent of respondents to a survey of Australian 
officials felt it was very to extremely important to reform the institutions and processes of 
intergovernmental relations (Bruerton & Kildea 2017, p. 219).  My interviewees provided 
many instances of systemic or micro-reforms they had personally introduced, or at least 
attempted, including changes to the way lapsing intergovernmental agreements are reviewed, 
changing the way meetings and working groups operate, changing the structure and role of 
networks, changing the way negotiations proceed, and so on.  Again, bringing practice modes 
forward for examination in a systematic manner would assist in identifying when and how such 
change may be introduced, by what means, and what examples of better practice in other 
jurisdictions are available. 
The Australian and other federal systems have seen information, trust and negotiation become 
salient aspects of the decision-making process in intergovernmental management, in addition 
to the formal allocation of constitutional and structural responsibilities (see Clarke 2007).  The 
process of bringing practice modes forward for self-conscious reflection, in concert and 
engagement with other intergovernmental managers, would develop their capacity to manage 
in that policy environment and give them the opportunity to understand more deeply the 
perspectives, interests and even the administrative cultures of other jurisdictions. 
Finally, my findings had much to say about the relations between central departments, line 
                                                 
142 For example, Bosomworth argues that finding new approaches to climate change policy requires reflection on, 
and changes to the dominant interpretations of climate change as a policy problem (2015, p. 1452). 
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departments and statutory agencies, in delivering programs through the federal system.  While 
Australia only has a small cohort of intergovernmental specialists, it shares with other 
federations the problem that the importance of the bureaucracy in the federation is not 
supported by specific training (Poirier & Saunders 2015, p. 463).  Accordingly, opportunities 
for reform in this area suggested by my research begin with the need to foster a better 
understanding of the respective roles played by departments and agencies within and between 
jurisdictions, where each ‘side’ is coming from in their interrelationships and 
intergovernmental processes, and how those processes may be constrained or enhanced by the 
adoption of particular practice modes. 
7.7 Further research 
The propositions arising from my findings reflect the broad, exploratory methodology that I 
adopted in response to the limited research history in this area.  However, I noted in Chapter 2 
the importance for the analysis of federal dynamics of differentiating between policy types and 
sectors to understand how policy processes are specifically affected by their federal settings 
and the significance of variations between them.  For example, Australia’s historical focus on 
driving economic and regulatory policy changes through the federal system may have a 
particular impact on federal dynamics that could be compared and tested against possibly 
different impacts in other policy fields.  (Inwood et al. found a similar variation between 
jurisdictions and sectors, noting that the implications of this were poorly understood by 
academics and practitioners alike [2011, p. 464]). 
Prompted by an extant and extensive application of discursive methodologies to environmental 
policy, my interviews took a vertical slice of environmental regulation, from Commonwealth 
central and policy departments to state-level regulatory authorities.  However, I found it 
difficult to identify other policy sectors characterised by the same degree of vertical policy 
integration, which brought Commonwealth central and line department officials together with 
front line state authority regulators in the same forums and networks.   
Consequently, there is still a great deal of information to be gleaned from comparative case 
studies, within the Australian federation itself, and with other federations, particularly where 
they display different inter and intra-federal settings.143 
                                                 
143 I note, in passing, that only two of some four hundred case studies in the Australia and New Zealand School 
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Other issues for a consideration of their impacts on federal dynamics might include comparing 
policy areas where smaller or larger jurisdictions have led the work, and a comparison of policy 
processes carried out by formal or informal structures and processes.144 A related research 
question might consider the effect of engagement with other sectors on intergovernmental 
practice, particularly as cross-sector partnerships and networks become the norm under what 
is broadly termed ‘the new public governance’ (Osborne 2010).  For example, Brown has 
drawn attention to the divergent trends of increasing centralisation on the one hand, and 
increasing reliance on decentralised policy and service delivery capabilities on the other (2007, 
p. 12).  How Commonwealth and state government officials navigate between the two trends, 
and bring local government and other sectors into the intergovernmental management system, 
will be an increasingly important issue for the system’s effectiveness, and understanding 
current practices and their implications for the future would be a useful direction for further 
research to take. 
My emphasis on the role of coordinative discourse in Australian federalism prompts questions 
about whether discourse about the nature of Australian federalism is differentiated across the 
policy landscape, with varying implications for strategy and practice depending on policy 
sectors.  A considerable amount of research has already been done on the way climate change 
policies are affected by the three levels of discursive interaction (eg Gillard 2016) and similar 
analysis might be applied to other policy sectors.  Questions might be asked about whether, 
and to what extent, discursive diversity applies between jurisdictions or within them; between 
and within different organisations; or whether, in fact, there is a stable normative and cognitive 
core of discursive resources that informs intergovernmental management wherever it is 
practised. 
The active role officials play in maintaining processes and relationships, despite the politics, 
confirms broader studies in institutionalism that see institutional resilience as a function of 
innovation and creative adaptation (Aligica & Tarko 2014).  Again, their agency prompts 
questions about how the labile policy orientations I have described might be harnessed to allow 
officials to respond with greater flexibility and diversity to policy issues and challenges. A 
                                                 
of Government’s John A Alford Case Study Library (https://www.anzsog.edu.au/resource-library/case-
library/the-case-program) deal directly with intergovernmental relations (confirmed in personal correspondence 
with the Director of the Case Study Program, 3/10/2017) 
144 The group of senior officials who meet as the Australian Education Senior Officials Committee is an example 
of smaller jurisdictions leading change with the support of a highly formalised structure.   
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particular focus for future research might be on how the settings, operations and rules of 
intergovernmental management might be developed in ways that make officials at federal and 
state levels ascribe value to new ways of working together. 
My interviewees described the current state of data sharing between jurisdictions, particularly 
between the Commonwealth and states, as ‘embryonic’, ‘ad hoc’ and even ‘archaic’.  
Accordingly, an important part of the program I have suggested would include a consideration 
of the role data plays in generating and facilitating policy development and implementation 
across the federation and its governance.   
Finally, the outcomes from research into the issues and implications I have canvassed in this 
chapter may support a more systematic approach to training officials in intergovernmental 
management, rather than leaving it up to individual organisations to provide on-the-job 
experience and socialization into the role.  At the very least, joint engagement by officials from 
different jurisdictions in formal intergovernmental training exercises would give them an 
opportunity to see their own and their colleagues’ practice modes in an objective, theoretically-
informed context. 
7.8 A final note 
In the course of researching and writing this dissertation, I have seen the abolition of one major 
review of the federation, the completion of reviews of the productivity impacts of 
Commonwealth-state relations (Productivity Commission 2017) and horizontal fiscal 
equalisation (Productivity Commission 2018), and, more recently, the announcement of ‘a 
review of federal financial relations from a NSW perspective’ (Perrottet 2019; his review was 
dismissed, within hours, by both the Prime Minister and the leader of the federal Opposition).   
Such reviews may, from time to time, contribute useful analysis; or they may be discarded by 
the side of the road down which the Australian federation travels, to join the remnants of other 
such reviews.  My aim, as I set it out in Chapter 1, was to understand what goes on beside and 
beneath this public face of intergovernmental relations, to consider the practice of 
intergovernmental management and the contribution improving such practices might make to 
the operations of the federal system overall.   
I have confirmed the utility of understanding the complexity and diversity of this practice and 
its impacts, through the conceptual lens of federal dynamics, particularly in the way the 
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federation’s institutional and ideational dimensions interact. I have similarly argued that the 
interaction of the formal and informal aspects of intergovernmental relations and management 
most affects the capacity of those working in the system and is consequently where 
improvements to the capacity for intergovernmental management are most likely to be found.     
In applying these conceptual frameworks I have found that, despite the constraints of a highly 
centralised federation, the practice of intergovernmental management offers opportunities for 
incremental structural change.  Intergovernmental managers are not just problem-solving.  
They are guided by values and purposes that give significance to their activities beyond their 
immediate utilitarian scope.  By building on and deploying existing and strongly held values, 
norms, cultures and ideas, officials find new ways to balance change and innovation with 
stability and resilience; in effect, adding new wheels to Deakin’s chariot. 
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Appendix 1 Studies of Australian intergovernmental management 
Name of study Summary 
 
Leach (1976)  Leach tests ‘the hypothesis that central to the optimal 
workability of a federal system is agreement among those who 
work in it as to what that system entails’.  Accordingly, he 
surveys federal, state and local public servants to understand 
what they think about federalism in theory, and its impact on 
administrative practice, particularly comparing how attitudes 
differ by level of government.  The results indicate a high level 
of dissatisfaction amongst Commonwealth and state public 
servants on relative roles and responsibilities, while 75 per cent 
of the Australian respondents feel that arrangements for 
handling intergovernmental relations are unsatisfactory.  He 
notes that ‘respondents seemed to find it easier to describe the 
difficulties they felt federalism posed for them on the job than 
to articulate its advantages’. He reports that Australians tend to 
favour informal intergovernmental adaptations such as better 
communication to facilitate intergovernmental planning. 
Warhurst (1983) 
 
Warhurst’s first study traces the emergence of 
intergovernmental specialists in central agencies at the 
Commonwealth and state levels.  He contrasts these ‘gossamer 
threads’ with the ‘rods of iron’ that had bound officials in 
‘functional’ or line departments up to the 1970s.  He concludes 
that segmented policy making via the 'iron-rods' of cooperative 
federalism cannot cope with the increasing number of issues 
which cut across artificial boundaries. 
Warhurst (1987) 
 
Warhurst’s subsequent study continues to review the role of 
central agencies and the emergence of officials who specialize 
in the conduct of intergovernmental relations, concerned with 
‘the way intergovernmental relations business is conducted, 
with what is being done across the whole range of government 
activity, and with how their government ought to do business 
with other governments’. 
Weller (1996) Weller was commissioned by the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet ‘with a view to ‘enhanc[ing] the 
effectiveness of the analysis, development, implementation 
and evaluation stages of social and economic policy reforms’ 
involving Commonwealth and state governments. The review 
is based on seven case studies of reform and makes 
recommendations on the role of officials on such matters as  
 formulating COAG’s agenda 
 negotiation techniques 
 progress monitoring 
 championing initiatives. 
 
Questions 
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Name of study Summary 
 
Painter (2001) Based on his study of emergent forms of joint decision making 
under the Special Premiers’ Conferences, and then COAG, in 
the 1990s, Painter concludes ‘there is a long-term trend 
towards the diffusion and institutionalisation of more 
collaborative forms of coordination in the Australian 
federation’.  His study focuses on the role of officials in 
supporting such developments, including a ‘new breed of 
policy entrepreneurs who are mobile between jurisdictions, 
appointed personally and trusted by their ministers, and 
coordinated in their strategies by increasingly active informal 
networks and a growing range of protocols and official 
channels for joint discussion and negotiation’. 
Menzies (2012b) Analyses intergovernmental capacity in the Australian public 
sector for a 20 year period from Hawke to Rudd, based on 
interviews conducted with senior Commonwealth and state 
officials.  The article focuses on the Department of the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and the skills its officials require in the 
role, including generalist skills in policy advice and 
negotiation, and more specific tactical skills in ‘bargaining and 
compromise, political acuity and an understanding of political 
and policy parameters for decision- making.’  The article warns 
that ‘[w]ithout any long term capacity PM&C focuses on 
existing procedures and processes rather than on a strategic 
agenda. Without the capacity to develop a strategic national 
agenda, this role is ceded to the states and territories’.  
Harwood and Phillimore 
(2012) 
This report examines the effect on Commonwealth and state 
central agencies of the post-2007 COAG Reform Agenda.  
Adopting a formal institutional analysis, the report focuses on 
such matters as the role of central agencies in supporting 
greater Cabinet scrutiny of federal matters, their role in policy 
coordination, relations with line departments, legislative 
harmonization, the impact of personal relationships at the 
political level on the bureaucracy.  The report also notes that it 
is senior officials who ‘often generate much of the forward, 
blue-sky thinking’ at COAG.  
Davis and Silver (2015) Addresses the lack of discussion of the role played by central 
agency heads and those supporting them who ‘play a 
significant, if undocumented, role in federal reform and 
intergovernmental relations in Australia’. The review 
concludes that the National Competition Policy was a success 
due to ‘shared agendas, technical expertise, hardworking 
officials drawing on substantial evidence and given ministerial 
authority, public and industry support, sufficient timing, and 
good political management’. However, the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations fails due to ‘lack 
[of] a detailed evidence base, sufficiently robust mechanisms 
to measure outcomes, or an agreed implementation plan with 
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Name of study Summary 
 
clear governance arrangements.’  The review concludes that 
‘[t]o succeed, COAG requires a continuous interaction across 
jurisdictions, an endless conversation to define projects, bring 
together expertise, and find agreement among first ministers 
about a reform agenda’.  
  
Smullen (2015; 2017) The first article challenges one-dimensional assumptions of 
Commonwealth centralist dominance, through a study of less 
formal, decentralized processes in mental health policy 
formation and implementation.  The study highlights the role 
of intergovernmental committees and forums. 
The second article presents a framework for evaluating and 
improving the quality of interaction between policy actors for 
the purpose of ongoing mutual learning, using mental health 
policy and services as a case study. Smullen finds ‘evidence 
that a high degree of informal mutuality, consensus and 
bottom-up shared expertise’ informs the development of 
mental health objectives, as well as ‘robust discussion between 
jurisdictional representatives about performance and barriers 
to improving policy and service delivery.’   
Deem, Hollander and 
Brown (2015): Australian 
Constitutional Values 
Survey 
This research looks at the way officials think about 
subsidiarity.  It describes how the different ways each level of 
government approaches subsidiarity, and values around 
finance, efficiency and uniformity, are likely to colour public 
servants’ attitudes, leading to difficulties in translating the 
principle into reform. 
Arklay, Bruerton and 
Hollander (2017): Future 
of Australia’s Federation 
Survey: Australian 
Policymakers and 
Practitioners 
A review of ‘what officials themselves say about collaboration, 
when and where it works and why it is more or less successful’.  
Their survey ascertains how extensive the network of 
interactions between bureaucrats in different jurisdictions is 
and how positive and productive they find those relationships, 
although ‘person-to-person relationships are critical to the 
success or failure of a program’.  While overall opinions are 
positive, federal respondents are more positive about 
interaction with their state colleagues than state respondents 
are about interacting with federal officials. The study 
concludes that the foundations for positive collaboration are 
mutual understanding and respect, not allowing a partisan 
environment to derail action, a clear division of 
responsibilities, particularly in relation to implementation and 
funding, external motivation such as a disaster or threat and 
Commonwealth inclusivity. 
Bruerton and Kildea 
(2017): Future of 
Australia’s Federation 
Survey: Australian 
Policymakers and 
Analyses what survey respondents thought were the highest 
priorities for reforming the federal system and what they saw 
as the major barriers to 
those reforms succeeding.  Respondents place more 
importance on improving the operation of the existing federal 
Questions 
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Name of study Summary 
 
Practitioners system than on reshaping the federation through constitutional 
amendment: reforming financial roles and relationships, the 
allocation of roles and responsibilities and the institutions and 
process that support intergovernmental cooperation.  Across 
all jurisdictions, attitudinal barriers stand out, particularly 
singling out politicians putting their interests above the public 
interest.  The states (particularly state politicians) are identified 
more often than the Commonwealth as a ‘problem’ group. In 
summary, ‘officials view the reform process as captive to 
sectional interests, whether they are those of Commonwealth 
and state governments, politicians or outside stakeholders, and 
subject to the will of an apathetic and ill-informed public’. 
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Appendix 2 Semi structured interview questionnaire 
All interviewees were provided with an indicative questionnaire a week or so before the 
interview, to encourage more detailed consideration of the issues and to give them time to think 
of examples of successful or unsuccessful strategies and engagements in their personal 
experience. 
Some general questions about what you do in IGM 
What work do you do in IGM – what’s your role?   
Is it a sub-set of your usual work, or something distinct?  
How long have you been in IGM?/in this policy field? 
How much time do you spend on IGM? How much time do you spend in direct, face-to-
face meetings, as opposed to e-mail communications?  
 Probe for routine management vs core intergovt work. 
How do you perform your role, eg how are authority, strategy, implementation, evaluation 
tasks performed? 
 Difference between negotiation and bargaining?? 
 How do they report to each other? 
How did you get into this role?  Do you have a background in IGM in other depts., 
jurisdictions?  Evidence of mobility?  
Would you consider yourself a specialist in IGM?  Or an expert? 
What skills are required for your work, and IGM generally?  How do you/your 
colleagues/counterparts get these skills? 
Has your IGM role changed in any way and if so, in what way and why? Seen changes?  
More difficult?  What’s changed and why? 
What triggers the work —  Meetings?  Workplans? What throws it off-track? 
What are the priorities in your particular IGM policy field?  Where are ‘things’ up to? 
 
Interview questionnaire  
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Some questions about your perception of intergovernmental management practices 
What does IGM mean to you?  What do you understand by intergovernment relationships?   
(Not how well it’s working – we’ll come to that) 
Do you think IGM is different in your field cf others? 
What are the rules of IGM for you?   
 How are they established? Are they always clear, or are there areas of ambiguity or 
discretion?  Eg if I was a new starter, what would you tell me were the 2-3 things I 
needed to know to guide me in my work? 
 Do these rules vary according to seniority, role, agency?  (eg test for perception that 
players in other parts of the system have more or less ambiguity or discretion to 
play with) 
 What is the interviewee’s response to such ambiguity?  How do they find a way 
through such ambiguity and make their own rules, or decide when and how to 
exercise discretion? 
Where do these rules come from?  How do you ‘learn’ them? 
Imagine I’ve been newly appointed to work in your agency on IGM – brief me on what I 
need to know 
Whose interests are paramount?  For example, are there clear State interests cf other States 
and the CW?   
Probe for policies and directions at CW and state levels, and how officials learn of and 
respond to them, eg are there different sets of such rules within a jurisdiction, between them 
in an IGM forum and across the whole system?  
How important are formal regulations and guidelines and do they have any effect on your 
IGM work?   
How important are formal structures and processes like MinCos? 
What about resources?  What kind of resources matter here and how do they make a 
difference? 
Networks and coalitions: 
 Who do you typically work with and/or report to in IGM?  Who forms your 
authorising environment?  Who provides you with support, data?  Who do they take 
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Some questions about your perception of intergovernmental management practices 
advice from? 
 Is there a lead agency or individual in this area?  How did they get this status, and 
how is it exercised?   
How important is the role of personalities who can foster trust and transcend boundaries 
What are the factors inhibiting or enhancing your role in IGM? 
 separate political from administrative factors 
Test Inwood et al. finding that informal relationships are the most important factor for IPC, 
followed by pol and admin institutions and actors, and resources in budgets, personnel and 
time (Inwood et al. 2011, p.417) 
Importance of resources, eg time to do policy work (Inwood p98) 
Overcoming barriers and vetoes: 
 Are there veto actors in your domain?   
 Who are they? 
 How does their veto operate – in relation to rules, the implementation of the rules, 
or both? On what basis, ie what is the basis of their veto right?  Is the veto final, or 
are there areas of sanction less than veto? 
 What is the interviewee’s response to such actors, how do they negotiate change? 
Perceptions of other players within jurisdiction or across 
 Line vs central depts. 
CW vs States 
Senior vs junior 
How relevant is what’s going on in other jurisdictions?  Do you look at what they’re doing 
and learn from them? 
Thinking about the extent you’re able to exercise your own initiative or scope in IGM work, 
can you think of an initiative or program you have worked on where you were able to 
exercise considerable individual scope? 
What about more generally – can you think of examples you’ve seen of individuals 
successfully exercising their initiative in IGM? 
Interview questionnaire  
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Some questions about your perception of intergovernmental management practices 
Are there examples of intergovernmental policy work or outcomes that they can ascribe to 
the agency of officials, rather than simply being commissioned by political leaders? 
And now thinking of the opposite, can you think of an initiative or program where you 
would have liked to have had more scope but were constrained? 
What factors do you see as significant in either case?  What factors lead to a successful 
process of IGM?  What factors undermine it? 
What are your perspectives on the current state of intergovernmental relations?  
What are your perspectives on the future challenges and directions in inter- governmental 
management? 
What needs to be done to improve IGM? If you could change one thing… 
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Appendix 3 List of interviewees 
Interviewee 
ID 
Jurisdiction Role 
(Head/Deputy; 
other) 
Department/agency type 
(Central; line 
department; agency) 
Primary policy 
field* 
1.  Commonwealth Other Central  
2.  Commonwealth Other Central  
3.  Victoria Other Agency Environmental 
regulation 
4.  Commonwealth Other Line Social policy 
5.  NSW Other Line Social policy 
6.  NSW Other Central  
7.  NSW Head/Dep Line Environmental 
policy 
8.  NSW Head/Dep Central  
9.  NSW Other Central  
10.  NSW Head/Dep Central  
11.  NSW Head/Dep Line Social policy 
12.  Victoria Head/Dep Agency Environmental 
regulation 
13.  Victoria Other Agency Environmental 
regulation 
14.  Victoria Head/Dep Agency Environmental 
regulation 
15.  Victoria Other Line Social policy 
16.  Victoria Other Line Social policy 
17.  Victoria Other Central  
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Interviewee 
ID 
Jurisdiction Role 
(Head/Deputy; 
other) 
Department/agency type 
(Central; line 
department; agency) 
Primary policy 
field* 
18.  Victoria Head/Dep Central  
19.  Victoria Head/Dep Central  
20.  Victoria Head/Dep Line Environmental 
policy 
21.  Commonwealth Head/Dep Line Social policy 
22.  Northern 
Territory 
Head/Dep Central  
23.  NSW Other Agency Environmental 
policy 
24.  Victoria Other  Line Social policy 
25.  ACT Other Central  
26.  Commonwealth Other Line Social policy 
27.  Commonwealth Other Line Environmental 
policy 
28.  Northern 
Territory 
Head/Dep Line Social policy 
29.  Northern 
Territory 
Head/Dep Line Social policy 
30.  Commonwealth Head/Dep Line Environmental 
policy 
31.  South Australia Head/Dep Agency Social services 
32.  South Australia Other Agency Environmental 
regulation 
33.  South Australia Head/Dep Agency Environmental 
regulation 
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Interviewee 
ID 
Jurisdiction Role 
(Head/Deputy; 
other) 
Department/agency type 
(Central; line 
department; agency) 
Primary policy 
field* 
34.  South Australia Other Line Social policy 
35.  South Australia Other Central  
36.  South Australia Other Line Environmental 
policy 
37.  South Australia Other Line Social policy 
38.  South Australia Head/Dep Central  
39.  Commonwealth Other Agency Environmental 
regulation 
40.  Commonwealth Other Line Social policy 
41.  Commonwealth Head/Dep Line Social policy 
42.  Commonwealth Other Central  
Retired senior officials, interviews 1-4 
 
* Although some central agency officials specialised in particular policy areas, these have not been 
separately identified because some individuals could be identified as a result. 
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Appendix 4 List of coding themes 
 
Main coding 
group 
Key sub-themes Specific sub-topics 
 
Structures   
 Formal Structures and 
Procedures 
Department-Agency dynamics 
Jurisdictional issues 
Ministerial Councils 
Agreements 
 Informal Structures and 
Procedures 
Epistemic communities  
Networks 
Other bodies 
 Line-Central dynamics  
Craft Relations with Ministers  
 Interpersonal behaviours  
 Swimming between the 
flags 
Internal processes and procedures 
 Policy sanction or 
constraint on agency 
 
 IGM Activity Resourcing IGM work 
Direction-setting, steering 
Bargaining and negotiation 
Communication & discussion 
Network Mgt & Orgn 
Data, Information and Reporting 
Briefing  
Harmonisation  
Agreements Mgt  
Committee work 
Regulation 
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Main coding 
group 
Key sub-themes Specific sub-topics 
 
Policy development  
Policy coordination 
Governance 
 Stance Example of applied personal agency 
Example of passive response to 
structures  
Examples of how subject feels they made 
a difference 
 IGM Problems Differences with Ministers  
Differences between CW and States 
Differences between States  
Differences within CW  
Structure - Ministerial councils  
Problems with process 
Problems with agreements  
Turnover  
Resourcing 
 IGM Solutions Communication between jurisdictions  
Intra jurisdiction assistance 
Negotiation 
Committee work  
Political mandate 
 IGM  - learning the craft  
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Main coding 
group 
Key sub-themes Specific sub-topics 
 
Values, 
Cultures & 
Histories 
  
 The Federal System as a 
whole 
Rudd reforms 
Abbott White Paper 
 Commonwealth-State 
relations 
CW role 
 
 State cultures and roles  
 Traditions, conventions, 
rules 
 
 Interests  
 Trust  
 Career  
Discursive 
Content 
  
 Narratives, Stories Cognitive 
Normative 
 Policy Discourse Levels Frames, Philosophies, ideologies 
Problem definitions, program paradigms 
and frameworks 
Policy solutions, ideas and concepts 
 Clashing discourses  
 Discourse focus Partisan 
Agreement-making 
Networking 
Processing 
Policy driving 
 Knowledge, data and 
information 
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Main coding 
group 
Key sub-themes Specific sub-topics 
 
 Discursive Practices Learning & Transmitting 
Routinisation 
Producing a discourse 
Disruption, subversion 
Argumentative interaction 
Outcomes   
 New directions competition and productivity reforms 
 Policy transfer and 
diffusion 
 
 Modes of change 
(historical 
institutionalism) 
Conversion 
Layering 
Displacement 
Drift 
Stasis 
Case Study Environmental regulation  
 
 
 
 
